 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for braving the after lunch panel, which is always a challenge. There's a lot to talk about, unfortunately, someone who was on our panel, who was acting director of policy planning has had to be called away. You can't hear? No. We can't hear. Put on the headsets then. Oh, the other ones? I mean, yeah, put these on because then you can hear me and each other through the headset. Anyway, I regret Mr. All-Naidi couldn't be here, but we have a lot to talk about. We're in the Middle East after all, so it's only appropriate we have at least one real panel on the region. There's so much to talk about, the impact of Russia's return to the region, China's golden road, the notion of U.S. retrenchment, whether it's real or not, intensified regional competition, what does it mean for these countries to have a green, carbon-free world, let alone wars in Libya, Syria, Yemen, big regional powers playing in the region, the repositioning of Israel to put it mildly in the Abraham Accords and what public response has been, heightened tensions with Iran, the moribund state of the JCPOA, though no one dares to actually take its pulse and call it dead because that would mean they'd have to decide what to do next, which they don't want to do. We have problems with Turkey, which is very much engaged now, making geopolitical forays. Then there's the quite interesting question of the return of Bibi Netanyahu at the head of a very different Israeli government. What does this new coalition mean for Israel, for the Palestinians, for Israel's reputation, frankly? Then there's the question of the health of Abu Mazen, what happens to the Palestinian Authority. There's always the sad tragedy of Lebanon, the influence of Hezbollah, the worry about another Lebanon-Israeli war, but with rockets, big, big rockets. Then we also have divisions in Europe toward the region. We're going to try, since we started late, to end this on time at 1545. Without one panelist, maybe we can get there. I'll try to have some time for questions at the end. But the idea was, because the topic is so broad and our panel is so diverse, wonderfully diverse, to ask people to speak for a few minutes about the topics I've mentioned that interest them. I may then ask them a question or two, and then we'll go down. I mispronounced terribly, who, as you might tell, is a Turk, and he's the founding board member of Global Relations Forum and a founding partner of Canunum, and also chairman of Koran Consulting. So, Nakhmud, over to you. Thank you. Actually, I'm a Turk, probably with an Egyptian name, Mamdouk is very Egyptian, as I understand. It's good to be here. It's great to be in Abu Dhabi, great to be, again, a guest of the World Policy Conference, so I thank the organizers, Thierry, and of course Abu Dhabi for hosting us. Whenever I'm invited to speak on a Middle East panel, I feel both anxiety and intrigue. Anxiety, because my usual life during the year, I focus on issues like digital currencies, the global energy situation, so more the geoeconomics part of the world, or geotechnology. So, Middle East, I don't have prepared remarks. I have prepared remarks for so many things, but not for this one. So, that's the anxiety. Maybe that's better. Maybe that is better. That is the intrigue. The intrigue is that I know so much happens in this part of the world that when I sort of take a distance and look at the region for a full year, very unusual patterns emerge, and then I'm intrigued. It's just, it induces dopamine, the expectation that I will get something interesting at the end of it. I think I'm the only one from my panel of last year, and we ended last year. I was here again on the Middle East panel, saying that there is something in the air. There is something good in the air. That there is, the tensions are receding, and there is a sense of de-escalation. That proved to be, I think, reasonably accurate. This year, I mean, we did get the main tensions, quite a few of the main tensions sort of calmed down, Turkey being at the center of quite a few of them, the Turkey UAE, the Turkey Saudi, Turkey Egypt, then within GCC, the Qatari Saudi. I mean, many of these tensions that burdened us seem to have softened at least, and that was the expectation. So I think we got that right. And there is a truce in Yemen, however, tenuous. The Libya situation is, you know, again tenuous, but at least we're not in an active war situation. The Syria situation is complicated, but still it is what I may call still sort of a frozen state of affairs, not a sort of war, a real, real war. So this year, my concerns are really, looking forward, are related to the Iranian situation and to the situation in Iraq and Lebanon. But let me go back to the synopsis of this there was there is something in the air. I think it was accurate, but it was incomplete, because what I didn't realize at the time is that the something good in the air was predicated on pragmatism, on the side of many of these actors. It wasn't wise long termism, but it was simple pragmatism. And what turns out to be the case after looking at this past year, I think actually it was hyper pragmatism. That is what we are facing. It is unanchored pragmatism, and that worries me, because I think that kind of pragmatism is ineffective to deal with long term issues, it corrodes institutions, and it makes us unable to deal with these long term challenges. Before I explain myself, let me just give you the punchline, because this year, more than before, I felt Thierry wants us to be precise, concise, open, get to the point, so let me get to the point. I'll tell you what the point is. I think now we are at a stage where Middle Eastern players, including my country, including Saudi, including GCC, these countries feel empowered for different reasons, and these countries are in a hyper pragmatic state. Short termism, swift maneuvers, deals, bargains, they are the currency of the moment. It is normal for the West, but especially for Europe to feel it is being left out of this game. But I think fast paced bargaining is not the European forte, or the comparative advantage. So I think this is a phase and we will need the European institutions and long term structures to survive the phase that we are going through. I think Europe should not compromise what it is good at, we will need those norms, and it should use those structures in this phase to bring in the Middle East players to the table for long term problems. Now, that is the punchline. That is my main theme. Shall I stop there? A couple of more minutes. Briefly where I stand, yes, we are in a phase of transitions. This is when we need foreseeability to coordinate actions, when everything is changing, but instead we get anxiety across the actors. Everybody is trying, it is a climate of mistrust, knee-jerk pragmatism is everywhere, and norms, balances, alliances that give some structure to this world are eroding before our eyes. So it is a world of 90 and uncertainty that we see. And I think we can see it, and I can't go into it, but I won't, the global energy market is a very good example of that, because I think the main axes of that structure have been broken and everybody is after self-sufficiency, which makes that whole structure very inefficient. Reaction, what can you do when all this happens? You can go for Cartesian rationality, I think that's what Thierry was hinting at, I don't think it's possible. You can push someone to absorb all the risk that's America not happening. You can have by insurance, you can say I'll give you security guarantees, you give me energy stability, that is not working. You can have portfolio of countries you work with, Russia, China, US, that is happening. And finally, you can just go for incrementalism, fast maneuvering, and that I think is the name of the game. Let me ask you a much more specific question. Please. You have Erdogan who is going to have an election soon, who seems very shaken by this prospect. He's balancing many, many powers. He's annoying a lot of people. NATO, America, Russia too. He's playing footsie with Russia, he's not doing sanctions. Can he keep going like this with a tanking economy? Or is he going to start another war in northern Syria or with Greece? What do you think? No. Very simply, no. I do not think Erdogan or Turkey will start a war. I think these problems in Syria and in Greece, they are actually manageable with under this hyper-pragmatism that I'm talking about. They are not, they can be contained within that framework. Erdogan has enough room for maneuver with all the actors and all the instruments he has and we can get security on our southern border and I don't know what it is with Greece. That's an unnecessary problem. I think these can be managed without a war. Do you think he will allow himself to lose the election? Well, it's a democratic system. It's an election. So if he loses, he loses. You know. We'll see. Old friend, Gilles Cappell, who as I think you all know, a very distinguished scholar of this region, of Islam, of what's going on in the banlieue of France in the very complicated world of French relations with Islam. Gilles is a redistrector of the Middle East Mediterranean chair of the Ecole Normale Supérielle professor at Paris Saint-Saint-Létre and has worked sometimes as an envoy for various presidents including Jupiter. Monsieur Macron, Gilles. Well, thank you. Thank you very much for having me. I know that had the results of the soccer game been different last night, I would not be here and had Kyle prevail on Kylian. It would be my English opposite number who would be here on my step. I try to do my best. The one thing which strikes me in our conference is that it took us panel number 19 or 20 to discuss with the Middle East issue. As if the prevailing, the present war between Russia and Ukraine was just a enactment of some sort of east-west war of old. It is to an extent but it is not and as you as you, sorry I pronounced it the Egyptian way, as you rightly mentioned the Black Sea, this war takes place on the Black Sea and the Black Sea is part of the Mediterranean system but you know this is not the first time a war that was taking place in Europe also had a very significant extension in the east whether it be Salonique during World War I where my great-grandfather was the gendarme militaire or Valentine's Day 1945 which where FDR and Ibn Saud had their amour toujours conversation about my oil against your protection, my protection against your oil. So to a large extent we have to take the region into much more serious consideration but I think we did until recently. And it is not only because of oil, because of oil prices have skyrocketed because the reason many of us came here, we have to say that frankly to Thierry is that the climate is much better because we are freezing in Paris at zero degrees tonight and this morning many of us went to the beach and it's definitely, this is a very important issue which goes back then to the same Valentine's Day agreements but there is also a very significant issue that we have not taken into consideration to a large extent that as we mentioned Thierry K fortunately which I believe is an extremely important actor with what you call hyper-pragmatism which is a concept I will use and of course quote you in the future where that means Erdogan changing sides every other day so that he will, things he will be re-elected but this means also that he bought S-400s from Russia, sold by Akhtar drones to Ukraine, that the Iranians are helping the Russians with their own drones and that nice guy Mr. Medvedev warned the Israelis if ever you give the Ukrainians the means to down the Iranian drones beware about the Syrian skies and so on and so forth so I think that this is not something we have really thought of that the Middle East, the global Middle East is also taken into something which now as you had hyper-pragmatism which was your concept, let me try mine which is disaffiliation, does that mean anything in English? That means that you know nothing has to be taken for certain, it would be hyper-pragmatism at the global scale so and like you know you mentioned the mission I did as Special Envoy to President Macron and some of the southern and eastern countries of the Mediterranean and what I was being told by my interlocutors was that we do not think we're bound significantly by any former alliance if Israel brings the best missiles, China the best whatever Russia this and that we're going to choose cherry picking which is okay if you think that the world is based on daily transactional things but this may lead to not hyper-pragmatism but hyper-tribalism if I may say so and then in a region where you have to have strong security this is a major challenge that we are facing now particularly in a country like the UAE which is extremely dependent on security issues which is part and parcel of the not the Valentine's Day agreement but the Abraham Accord or the Donald Accord as you wanted it to be called and particularly with what is happening in Iran. One other thing which we have to take into consideration is that you know authoritarian regimes are also being shaken in the process. What is happening in Iran irrelevant regardless of what happens with GCPAA, no GCPOA, post GCPOA and so on and so forth is now being significantly different from whatever happened in the past. The green revolution or whatever it was called where the police arrested a number of people, sentenced them, put them in jail and then it was put down. This is not happening yesterday the sentence to death and executed the first demonstrator as an enemy of God, waging war against God but this is definitely not bringing any quite. This is something much deeper that has to do with issues of identity, of self, of women cutting their hair in public, something which has to do with the what is intimate in Shia culture and their clearing at pains finding a way to changing. And we have to foresee the fact that the Iranian leadership in spite of the fact that they have this sort of hyper activity militarily on their borders are in a state which is now significantly weakened and we have to think of that for the future. Very briefly another issue is that what is happening in Russia also the fact that they are unable to lead a military strategy which is winning except bombing civilians will also change a number of things in the region a number of countries were willing to buy Russian weaponry. What is happening now is not a great showcasing for Russian weaponry. So all that is changing. I think that there is a real need to interject much more of what happens on the south eastern front in this war for fear not to really understand the stakes which we deal with. Which is why I sort of started a bit by mentioning Russia's movement into the region which isn't brand new but is real and isn't going away and I'm curious others may want to respond to this too but what this does to Russia's intentions in Syria other places but I also am very interested seeing the demonstrations in Iran. I mean I covered the Iran revolution I'd still try to follow it. The demonstrations in China which are really interesting we don't see a lot of demonstrations in Russia I have to say because perhaps many of the people who have demonstrated have already left but I do wonder what this shakiness in Iran and persistent rumors that Ayatollah Khamenei is quite ill how that will impact the rest of the region and also what Iran sponsors which is the thing we haven't really talked about. What do you think? Well on Khamenei's health bulletin I have no answer but what is interesting in Russia also is that you know the mass of people who are coming to France to the front are increasingly people from the Muslim Republic or non-Russians from the federation not to mention the famous Ramzan Khadirov who repatriated recently to Chechnya the body of Abdullah Ansarov who beheaded Samuel Pati in France of Chechnya but the there is a price that is going to have to be paid for that by Putin relying on those populations so that because they are citizens of a different nature and this is going to probably lead to a problem within the state of the union but others here are much more competent than I am on this issue. Now on Syria I heard Mamdur say that he thought nothing would happen from the Turkish side whereas you know we had the drum beats all over the year and was it your minister of defence or interior whatever say it's going to start tomorrow where we're going to wipe the Turkish terrorists out of everything we're going to have our three kilometer debuffer state but nothing has happened and even in your hyper pragmatism concept which I like don't you think that at the end of the day if you as we say in French you cry to the wolf and the wolf does not come finally you don't fear the big bad wolf anymore. Exactly it's that famous Qawafi poem the barbarians are coming they never arrive so what must we do now? They were a kind of answer. We have to say that it is Qawafis the poet and not Khazafi as many people are saying. Can I take that? Let's keep going sorry just thinking of time I apologize Mona, long friend of this conference, senator from Egypt advisor to the UN high representative for the alliance of civilizations which let's hope works and so I think a lot about Egypt although we haven't had many demonstrations in Egypt despite LCC also and one wonders say what you like but is Egypt losing its important place in the Arab world is this a big issue at home? You are making it a big issue. Okay, no answer. Before I talk I want to thank Jerry for gathering us once more as a very special club here club of WPC and I want to thank his team I want to thank Kwan for everything they have done and of course the host country. Now let me go to the New Middle East as I had told you this is what I would like to talk about the first time this term New Middle East was used by Shimon Peres if you remember in 1993 after the Oslo Accords this was a view that he has put out and an initiative and I'm afraid it didn't work as we thought it would. At the time many analysts concluded that complete and final conflict resolution must be achieved and here we are talking of course about the Palestinian question which was not mentioned and is not mentioned either today but at reconciliation. Now I think that Shimon Peres was a man of vision and that his ideas did not take hold is not his fault but today the move is to replace all these misconceptions in the Arab world and there is a tendency to do so this is what they want to do although I have seen some commentators lament that the Arab that the Abraham Accord represent the obliteration of the Palestinian course and the imperialist economic aims of Israel. I believe this is nonsense that is why I think it is time today to turn to the Arab and Middle Eastern civil society what we call or what Joseph Nye called the soft power and this is where you really feel the pulse of the Arab world in the hand of the Middle East the MENA region so I believe that after and what the West thinks of the changes that are happening in the Middle East so after reducing the region the region was reduced to global war on terror for two decades we had nothing but that this is what is their claim to fame but today the Middle East is now moving through the lens of the great power competition narrative increasingly the Middle East is defined as a battle ground between the US and China and to a lesser extent Russia so what is new is the trend towards Middle Eastern strategic autonomy which mainly translates in that the diversification of foreign policies by US Gulf partners and allies such as Egypt and even Israel since 2021 most Middle East countries have worked towards de-escalation de-escalation and partly out of the realization that US disengagement which I think this is a turning point in the Middle East and I would think this was also the flash point really the disengagement of the US not positive but negative but taken very seriously but the countries in the region seeing that they can't count anymore on the US partners so the disengagement of the US from the region implied that countries in this region had to take matters in their own hand and this is what they're trying to do now so after the Gulf States and Egypt and then to the Qatar blockades in January 21 a frenzy of diplomatic visits followed and that momentum of de-escalation even involved Iran at one point with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi toning down the hawkish rhetoric towards Iran this de-escalation moment coincided with the Abraham Accords and the subsequent wave of normalization between Israel and several Arab states more than anything the Accords reflect the new foreign policy ambitions of Middle Eastern countries in March and this is important Israel hosted a security summit in the Negev attended by Bahrain, Emirati and Egyptian foreign ministers the summit illustrates how much the Middle East landscape has changed in less than two years notably these developments are homegrown they came from inside the region and not from outside their evidence of the growing desire of the Middle East states to shape their own regional order in their own terms and the question is what is the best way for the US to stamp down the Middle East from becoming a focal point of competition with Russia and China I believe the more local actors grow confident about their own autonomy the less tempted they will be to align themselves on the agenda of another external power and this is shown in the Ukraine-Russian war when the feeling is that some of the western countries would like our countries to take sides and they are not taking sides they refuse to take sides today they are not pro-Russian but they are not anti-Russia either so we heard this from Minister Girgash eager to diversify their partnership on the part of the west more realism is required so I would like to present some of the salient points that I would see as prominent in the changed Middle East one is the role of religion in daily life two is the role the advancement of women in the workplace three is prioritizing opportunities for young people to learn technological skills no more are they going as they push to learn political science or international relations and this is the only thing that I know so they are pushed to stick new technology so as to be better equipped to participate in the 21st century what is noticeable also is an enhanced role of the state today China's model is looked upon with admiration in many of the Arab countries today in many of the Arab Middle Eastern countries non-interference in other affairs namely supporting each other's internal measures be they authoritarian or not to save God what is very important today in this region which is stability stability and prosperity so the belief is that jobs economic growth and oil wealth can be used to entice citizens to ignore demands of political pluralism which the west continues to ask for so strained relations of late between the west and traditional allies in the region are bringing a central question into a sharp focus does the west really understand today's changed Middle East what we are seeing today is that the leadership of the Middle East and the majority of its people have remained resolute to make progress on many fronts but are these positive changes being recognized in the west I don't think so most of the public opinion suggests no people in the west still tend to view the Middle East as backward and conflict ridden a region where progress is doubtful and a place more likely to be a source of problems rather than solution that's great two minutes 30 seconds it's been 8 minutes already this example is the declaration of US disengagement from the region this is really a turning point here but it's underpinning change in the new Middle East what do we see bold reform agenda such as Saudi Arabia's modernization program even the fail for women is no more obligatory so in Egypt if we take an example for a majority are seeing the ideology of politicized religious move although Islam is extremism is still very well entrenched in most institutions of the society but the youth are today favoring pragmatic governments that can create more jobs for young people reform religious institutions and enhance public services such as health and education thank you very much let's move on we can always come back to these issues I'm very grateful to you thank you Itamar Rabinovich was Israel's negotiator with Syria among many of his other accomplishments he was ambassador to the United States which was not about accomplishment either he's been a teacher head of Tel Aviv University he's vice chairman of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv among many other things and Itamar you've been here many many times Israel has a new government but a new set of relationships here so over to you please and with the new Israeli government and then talk more broadly about the region two years ago was a very optimistic time in Arab-Israel relations the Abraham Accords were signed it was seen as a milestone secondly in Israel for the first time an Arab party and Muslim Brotherhood a softer version of the Muslim Brotherhood joined the coalition first time that an Arab party in Israel was part of a government coalition and it seems that Arab-Israeli relations were looking up nowadays the perspective is far darker the Abraham Accords are there they did not develop into a larger regional structure the summit of the Negev was mentioned some people thought this would be the core of a Sunni-Israeli coalition against Iran and its Shiite axis it doesn't seem to be the case the Abraham Accords are limited to actually very positive development in bilateral relations with the Emirates and with Morocco Sudan is not so important in this context but it's not the nucleus of any regional structure in Israel itself a good government that represented the gamut of Israeli politics all the way from the left to moderate right and including an Arab party collapsed after a year and a half and the not just the right wing but the extreme right wing won the last elections and it's probably going to form a very nationalistic government with probably negative implications for Israeli politics, Israeli society Arab-Jewish relations inside Israel and Israeli Arab relations, Israeli-Palestinian relations in general it is important to bear in mind that the elections were decided by very few votes and there was a plurality for the center-left block in the popular vote but Netanyahu is a very good politician, election strategist, he put the right wing together in a very cohesive way, they did not lose a single vote center-left lost quite a few votes and the result is that we have this peraging change in Israeli politics will it hold? I doubt it I think that this government is likely to implode the policies that the two extreme right wing parties and the ultra-orthodox parties are trying to impose on the country will lead either to implosion or to massive popular protests, I doubt that this will remain the case for very long but we are in difficulty here in Israeli politics, Israeli Arab relations inside Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian problem in a broader way. Now let's remember one thing, Netanyahu is on trial, he's being tried for serious criminal charges, corruption, a breach of faith and what interests him the most is his own legal situation, he depends on these partners in order to be in power, he remembers that when Prime Minister Olmat left the government he went to jail, he doesn't want to go to jail and he wants to be in control and he wants to reshape the legal system, this is what drives him in the first place. Let me now move more broadly to the region and I would use the word flux, I think the region is in flux on all three levels of politics, domestic regional and international domestic, we have six failed states in the region, other countries on the elections as in Turkey, in thermal Iran and so forth. Originally there is no structure, there used to be a structure, the last time we had a structure was during the Syrian Civil War and the Arab Spring when people spoke about Saudi axis of Sunni states versus the Iranian axis, this is no longer true, there is no axis. What is very significant in regional politics is that the region has been joined by two large powerful states, Iran and Turkey. They were not part of Middle Eastern politics most of the previous century, only after the Iranian revolution of 79 did Iran join Middle Eastern politics and Turkey with the first years of this century when Erdogan realized that Turkey was not going to be accepted into the European Union and it was looking for influence elsewhere, what is known as neo-automanism. So we have two countries of about 100 million people with strong economies, highly developed civil societies, strong militaries that punch at their fate in the region. What is more recently and very interesting is that these two countries are now trying to play a larger global role. Turkey has been active all the way from Azerbaijan to Libya, in East Africa, in Yemen and Iran now of course joined Russia very closely and became part of the war in Ukraine. So this is not something that we were used to, we were used to larger international powers coming to the Middle East to control the Middle East suddenly we see Middle Eastern countries trying to play a larger role. One point you asked Mona about where is Egypt. I think there's been a shift in the Arab world from the traditional centers of Arab nationalism in Egypt in Iraq and Syria. Egypt is sort of unto itself, Iraq and Syria in basically failed states and I think the focus is shifting to this part of the Arab world in the Gulf where you have stable wealthy, highly developed countries that are now playing a much more important role in the larger Arab world. Internationally Russia is, we'll have to see what the implications of the war in Ukraine are for its position in Syria and its ability to be effectively active in the Middle East and the U.S. always raises the familiar question is, is the U.S. pivoting away or is it not? In fact, number of U.S. troops in the region has not declined but the message is not very clear and the U.S. has I think a hard time of finding a solution to what Minister Gargash presented eloquently yesterday that is to say the tendency of Middle Eastern countries to say yes, basically we are pro-Western but we allow ourselves sort of a polygamy that you Washington needs to be able to handle to live with. Thank you. Can I bring you back into the Israeli interior for a second just with one question. The great experiment of the previous government which was Israeli Arabs or Israeli Palestinians whichever you choose to say getting involved with an Israeli government, is that experiment over or do you think it could come back again? No, it's not over the Arab minority in Israel is 20 going to up to 21, 22 percent Israel at the majority and the minority will need to find a long term way of living with one another now inside the Israeli minority there are two contradictory trends. You see a growing middle class, a growing professional class in my own University Tel Aviv University the number of Arab students rose from 4 percent to 16 percent. In the Technion in Haifa which is Israel's majority it is 37 percent Arab students and the student population. So you see a trend of younger people moving up becoming professional, moving to leaving their towns and settling in Tel Aviv and Haifa and seeking integration. This is what Mahmoud Abbas and his participation in the coalition in a way represented. But there is a hard core of people who still oppose the very essence of the state. This will continue. It needs to be addressed by an Israeli government that will come to the air minority and say listen, this is a Jewish state but you are a significant minority of 20 percent we need to find a definition of the relationship. Say cultural minority but obviously this is not the government that will do that in the coming year. And of course it would help if there finally were a settlement and two states because then people could decide where they really belonged. But we don't have to get into that right now. Our last panelist is the distinguished founder of the Gulf Research Center, Saudi Abul Aziz Ulfman Sagar who has also been a great interlocutor about the Arab world, the Saudi world and I'm curious what you have to say to us since you're from the region but I'm also very curious if you could talk a bit about relations with the United States and how they've turned. Thank you sir. Thank you very much. First let me extend my deepest appreciation to my good friend and to the World Policy Conference for all the effort they put and for the host country. I mean this is great to see a lot of good friends and old faces together here. We understand what does it take to bring all this effort together because we are in the same okay. Let me start by saying what are the key concerns you know and the keepers in my opinion that it is important. First the US relation to the region and we see a softness approach, a confusing approach from the US. We don't know what they are up to. We have a different signal, confusing signal. On one hand they said we are reallocating of our forces. On the other hand we are reducing our forces in the region. On the other hand you can hear a statement by saying we remain committed to the security of the region but what is the reality we don't know. So there is a lot of confusing signal and predictable coming out of Washington there that really has an impact on the geopolitics of the region. Traditionally we understood their commitment and traditionally we understood where does the US and the rest of the west country stand when it comes to the regional security now. It's a bit confusing honestly and that confusion forces the region to take different action, different play toward the other. Second because of the confusion of the US policy. When President Obama said in Syria it's a red line, we will not allow. All of a sudden we have the Russian re-existent in the region and the Russian re-existent in the region was due to the American un-clarity of policy. They allow that sort of intervention to happen. Where do we stand on the Ukrainian cases? I will come into that but I think I will pass this one because I want to focus it in the key element. The third of course is the Iranian expansionist. Today we are still suffering from this real serious threat from Iran. We still have the maritime security issue, we still have the energy security issue threatened from Iran, interventionist policy expansionist using sectarianism as a dimension supporting militia. All of those issues remain as a key issue for us in the region. Where does the Iranian threat go from here? That's also have a very critical impact in our geopolitical issue. The Ibrahim Accor, some Arab country including United Arab Emirates and Bahrain based in their own national interest. They felt going and signing into the Ibrahim Accor and normalizing relation will bring a better peace to the region. Some country in the region thought they need peace first before normalization. Some country they are negotiating quite secretly so that is a sovereign state decision but at the same time this is a new element in the geopolitical side of the region. So the other thing we have a conflicting issues and we have a hot spot in the region including war in Yemen, Syria, Libya also the Israeli-Iranian vessels attack and each other and so but at the same time that did not change the geopolitics of the region. When people talked about the Syrian crisis they thought Jordan will be taking over next day but Jordan remains still there, Syria is still there Turkish intervention on the north part of Syria is still there we have the Iranian intervention in Kurdistan is still there but that did not really change the whole geopolitical structure there but that is also an important element in the geopolitics to look at all this conflict, all these issues that is taking place. What is interesting also to see that the region start making their own sovereign decision without really waiting for the instruction coming from the big country, from the superpower and I think that's a very clear signal you can see it in UAE in Saudi Arabia, you can see it in Egypt in Algeria and many countries in the Arab world start saying look at we need to protect our interests, we need to fight based on our interests and we need to look at that one. So this also is an important dimension. Is that going to, since we are witnessing now a new cold war era, is that independent decision and sovereign decision and so going to be challenged by extreme two power? In other words, our economy 67% of our export goes to Asia. China is the largest importer from us. So on China the president visited recently to the region he is making a statement saying we are the second largest economy we would like to legitimize our economic relation by a political visit and by a political umbrella and the U.S. is concerned if you read today the Washington Post there is a concern in the U.S. about the China-Gulf relation I think it's legitimate concern but at the same time still it is an economic relation it have not yet developed to a political strong political ties or a strategic ties China will not replace the U.S. in the region and China cannot provide the security that the region want or looking for that area but also because of the cold war era syndrome or feeling that we have that will put a pressure in the region where do you go east or west whom should you listen to you know each one can exercise different pressure they are a buyer of 3.6 million barrel a day from the region so they are at Saudi Arabia almost 20% of their export goes to China and the U.S. is on Ukraine we were forced by the U.S. and to take a decision I think there was misinterpretation of our balance and I like yesterday when Dr. use the word not neutral but balance and balance today Israeli having a balance in a position on the Ukrainian crisis India they have a balance position we in the Arab world have a balance position compromising the unity of Ukraine and that has been stated by all the foreign minister we are not accepting an intervention by using a military means we are not accepting a territorial intervention or so but at the same time we have a similar case in Yemen where we understand the Russian concern and the Russian concern comes from three things they want a friendly government to deal with they want to have a safe border that would not represent a threat to them and they do want to have a foreign military presence that can represent a threat in Yemen we have a similar case we want to have a friendly government that we deal with and we want we don't want to have a foreign military presence from Iran in our border that threat us and represent the threat to us and also we want to have a safe border you know that you know also we share with them a huge one if I look at yeah I mean just the last comment if I look at the 2023 I think similar issue still of concern to us number one can we still keep our sovereign independence decision from the superpower can we really still state our position based on our interest or that will be challenged that will be a key issue also in the 2023 can we continue in that Iran and what will happen to JCPO aid we have a different scenario today no agreement status code modified agreement with minor changes modified agreement with a major changes all new agreement can be reestablished and that one we don't know so that remains a big challenge and how Iran is going to act in terms of representing a threat are they going to retaliate in the region and how that is going to be but I could ask you many many questions but let me just limit myself right now to do you think the disorder in Iran makes it more dangerous for the region does it work to keep them concentrated at home I personally belong to Hobbs school in IR so I believe in a central government role will be far better than having a fragmented government because we saw that in Lebanon and the outcome but also if I go back to my 2023 I think oil prices will be very important what will happen to the oil prices you see because again the region have a lot of important project and a lot of expansion and development I think we are happy to have a settlement in Yemen but based on two things no intervention is from Iran in that one based on the decision of the Yemeni people and the agreement that can take place I think all of that really still represent you know the sort of challenge you know to us in the region but again I'll go back and start from my point of view I think we are going to have a settlement in Yemen again I'll go back and start from where I start the US relation is a key issue in this one here we're not saying we need to replace it we're not saying we have already alternative for that and we are not saying we don't want it in fact it's a very important very crucial we have enjoyed almost essentially of a good relation here in the region what we want to have a more sensible approach in Washington when looking at the region here and respecting the I mean thank you sir we've had different words for Washington which we need a more educated policy we need a wiser policy we need more attention but clearly the region is sending messages to Washington also as Saudi Arabia is the visit of is a message I mean it's a very clear message to a very sensitive point now in Americans view of the world I promised that I would not even though we got started late it's there's a lot to do by the end of the day so I promised to end this on the accepted time which means I'd really like we've got 11 minutes that's all but I would like to take some questions please address them to to whomever you like because I would like to give the panel at least a couple minutes to respond it's been a very rich conversation but it's hard to draw a theme so Igor please can we perfect and then after that thank you very much Stephen my question goes to Mr. Abbenovich we were made to believe that without Russian army Assad is dead no regime, no power, nothing so what happens now when the Russians are full in another war and what happens on the Turkish Iranian confrontation there and Kurdish question Igor to your right there thank you Stephen thanks to the panelists for these wonderful presentations I would like to have a very short comment on what's happening in the Middle East today as I see it as a very contrasted situation on the one hand you have the Abraham Accords that have triggered such a tremendous change in the area and we're witnessing an unseen cooperation between Israel and the in the countries of the region on the other hand we have still questions that are may I remind you that we have the Palestinian issue the Lebanese issue the Syrian issue the Yemeni issue the Iraqi issue that are just pending if I might say so my question would go to ask the honorable panelist here about one thing that is very much worrisome as Mona has rightly pointed out too we are witnessing the regionalization of Middle East the intervention of the superpower or the so-called superpower is no longer here I mean the fading presence of Russia even of the United States of course the obsolent may be a role of Russia in the years to come so what is very much worrisome is the fact that in this region we have no regional solutions that might or may bring about a kind of settlement of all these conflicts you have the European Union you have the ASEAN you have the NATO but in this region which power from your point of view is the one that might be able to bring about a change or a settlement in this region thank you so much there's another question I think from my Japanese colleague yes thank you thank you very much hero Akita from Tokyo my question is about the Arab states relation with Russia I understand that the Arab state have been taking a balancing behavior between the West and Russia but my question is as Russian military situation get more and more deteriorated in Ukraine will it affect the Arab countries distance with Russia that is my question thank you perfect and last question Jim Bitterman Jim stand up so they can find you it's just a question for the panel in general I mean it seems to me there's an inherent contradiction it's a great panel it's a great discussion but when you start off talking about hyper pragmatism and move on to polygamy and then the desire for stability those of us in the room of a certain age have a sort of a fondness and nostalgia for NATO and for these institutions these brands institutions that come along so how do you square that circle how is it that you can have stability by making hyper pragmatic deals and having multiple lovers thank you it's a very good question so listen I'm afraid we're not going to have tons of time so I'm going to go back to the panel ask each of you to respond as you like for no more than two minutes please you've got the clock also you can see it so let's please keep to the time over to you and apologies for not getting back to you sooner about Syria now the situation in Syria I think when and if the Russians sort of succeed it creates a new constellation and that constellation could work to sort of put the pieces together because there are two things Syria's territorial integrity and not having Iran in Syria those two things can actually align quite a few actors on the field I think the US I think Turkey what remains of Russian presence those can be aligned and when I talked about Turkey not engaging in a war in Syria what I meant is that Turkey will not be it will not be an sort of an outright war but what is very clear and consistent and continues from the beginning is that Turkey insists on the security of its southern border and so we have these sort of sporadic incursions to ensure that and what is pragmatic about Erdogan's president Erdogan's approach is that he waits for the timing when the stars are aligned to find the point of least resistance and I think we are very close to that point of least resistance because of the reasons I mentioned that is one thing I still have 45 seconds and the second one is with the hyper pragmatism I think yes you're absolutely right it is very difficult to hold it together now that we have sort of some room for maneuver because of the oil prices because of Turkey because of the Ukrainian situation creating some room for Turkey for a while this can work but I think in the long run it cannot and this is a phase and we will go back to the first search for stability and that is why I think it is very critical that the Europeans don't feel that they're being left out of a fast bargain game they should just sort of hold on to their guns their time will come they should we should not lose credibility in the European ability for structures thank you thank you member that was good sorry I mean you speak what yeah why don't you borrow that perfect is it better yes fine answering an attempt to answer Joe Mela's question I wonder whether what remains of a local regional institution the only one that remains to some extent is the GCC and I would like of course return to Abdulaziz for more comments after we everybody considered that the GCC was dead and buried because of the Qatar blockade this has ended for a number of reasons that many of you know about and when she came to the region he went he came to Saudi Arabia all the all the regional powers or non-powers gathered to Saudi Arabia and seen from China the place where everybody was summoned quote unquote or whistled to come was the Arabian Peninsula so to a large extent the sort of the financial center of the region is more and more becoming its political center and because particularly in a time when resources are scarce where the price of commodities is growing where hyperinflation is coming the position of power of this part of the region is significantly increasing so that would be my gut feeling but I'd like to have not from the horse's mouth I don't say you're a horse of course Abdulaziz but you know Mona please I also would like to answer Joe Mila's question we do have institutions one of them which is the main one which is the Arab League is unfortunately impotent and the only one we can look at is again the GCC which we thought that it was the most resembling let's say to the European Union so we do hope that they will continue to do so but what I want to say that the main thing that exists and nobody spoke about it so much is the need from people of the region to have religious institutions be changed be more pragmatic be more to have a dialogue that President Sisi had asked for four years ago a reform of the religious dialogue and this is not happening unfortunately and another thing is that the extremism Islamist extremism is very well entrenched in many of the societal institutions in Egypt in particular thank you to Igor's question I think Turkey will first of all Turkey is practically annexed about 8% of Syria it will continue to hold this territory let's bear in mind that Turkey is the one preventing Russia and Syria from attacking the Idlib the province of Idlib in which you still have 50,000 jihadis Turkey doesn't want an attack on Idlib because it will send another million refugees into Turkish territory so it will remain involved in a big way as for the impact of a potential reduction of Russia's presence in Syria there is a very close Iranian-Russian relationship in Syria and in Ukraine and the greater the decline of Russian presence and influence in Syria the greater that of Iran the difference is that Russia wants influence in Syria Iran wants to penetrate Syria to turn the country in a very deep and a very profound way briefly to Jim Biderman's question I'm afraid I see more instability because there's another factor at work which is population explosion 320 million people in the Arab world today, numbers are growing mostly in the non-rich Arab countries and this would create further instability in years to come and they're very young maybe I don't need to, okay is it okay like this let me answer by two things I think in January 2021 when we had the GCC summit in Al-Ula, I think it was clearly stated that we resolve a lot of the dispute differences that have occurred between the Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar and I'm so happy as a Gulf citizen to see the relation is back to normal even better the last week we've witnessed the visit of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed to Qatar we have seen you know Prince Mohammed bin Salman Prince being in Qatar for the World Cup for the you know opening ceremony so that's also make us feel what brings us together more than the different now in terms of regional security there are several initiatives which include the US Mesa which include the Russian, Mesa was rejected by the Iranian because they felt it was against them the Russian was rejected by the American the Iranian initiative was rejected by the American the Iranian was rejected by the region because the Iranian initiative although it's based in non-intervention and aggression but they want to they don't want to ignore the past and just deal from today and on they don't want to deal with Hezbollah or the interventionist in Syria and by the way in Syria because of the Israeli military attack on the Iranian presence in Syria that have reduced the Iranian to almost 20% today they don't talk about it the Israeli neither the Iranian they talk about it but it is reality on the ground and the Russian are providing clear rules of engagement in terms of military action from the Israeli against the Iranian presence in Syria now we understand from a national security point of view the Turkish interest in North Syria because in no way we will support a separatist group like the Turkey because we have also a serious situation here in the region if we do so but we hope that will end soon and the Turk will just try to finish it as fast as possible. On the other initiative also we have the Chinese now coming up with initiative but still that Chinese initiative we're not so sure that it works so we have the American, the Russian, the Iranian, the Chinese and the European but the European focus on maritime security what we need in any initiative in the region three preconditions inclusiveness so we need to include Israel, Iran, Turkey we cannot exclude anyone of these three. Second we need to have the guarantor first we need to we need to resolve the current problem in the region we can't go into a security architecture in the region and we have the militia supported by Russia in Libya and we have the militia in Iraq supported by the Iran and so we need to resolve current problem in the region and then we need to have the guarantor and the guarantor cannot be only the UN so we need the Security Council plus the UN and find the right formula of the sort of guarantor that can be providing to have a better security architecture but by the way look at the different we called the JIDDA summit which was attended by President Biden Development and Security here we did not call it security but with the Chinese we called it Development and Sustainability thank you. Well thank you and if I may just for one second let me thank Thiele, Songim the organizers, the hosts and especially the translators who have been working their butts off and done such a wonderful job so as you applaud the panel please applaud the translators also.