 Good afternoon, and let me welcome all of you to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and let me also welcome our viewers online And thank you for joining us today for our discussion Park. She the post-summit assessment This event is part of the CSIS Korea platform series and as always we like to thank Samsung electronics Who's generous support make these events possible? My name is Ryan Sickles, and I'm the deputy director of external relations here at CSIS And I'm privileged to be joined today by two of my colleagues in longtime Asia hands Victor Cha and Chris Johnson They're here to discuss the geopolitical ramifications the regional jockeying and the bilateral Implications of the very important meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Republic of Korea president Park and a that occurred last week in Seoul We couldn't have two more qualified experts to discuss the summit You all have their bios in front of you, but allow me to quickly introduce our two speakers Dr. Victor Cha CSIS senior advisor and Korea chair as well as director of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University previously served as Asian as director of Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council and was deputy head of the US delegation to the six-party talks in Beijing He regularly testifies before Congress on Asian security issues and his writings often appear in major media outlets around the world Chris Johnson is also CSIS senior advisor and holds our Freeman chair in China Studies Prior to joining CSIS Chris spent nearly two decades in the US intelligence and foreign affairs communities Including his most recent post as a top China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency He's briefed top officials throughout government and his analysis is highly sought after by the world's media These gentlemen will each open with their own reflections and analysis of the summit before opening to a discussion with all of you So without further ado, let me turn this over to Chris to get us started. Please join me in welcoming our two speakers Great, thank you so much Ryan and thank everyone for for being here it definitely was a Interesting piece of theater to watch I think This summit that's just occurred and and has a lot of implications I think for how from the Chinese perspective, and I'm sure Victor feels the same from the South Korean perspective It's a great emblematic story I think of the dramatic tectonic shifts that we're seeing in the region in terms of how the region is shifting with China's growing rise and influence and How that puts all the more pressure especially on the United States government But also regional governments to kind of be aware of these changes and to try to stay one step ahead of them Or at least manage them successfully You know my key takeaways from the summit were one that Xi Jinping clearly continues his sort of courting process if you will of President Park Very much desirous of establishing a totally different and much warmer relationship with Seoul After the Lee Moon-Bak Administration where of course things were very strained between the Chinese and South Korea largely because of China's support for North Korea despite silly behavior from the North Koreans and dangerous behavior by the North Koreans Clearly Xi Jinping has made this a priority from early in his administration when he hosted President Park when she came and visited There clearly is a good rapport between the two of them It's interesting to me just watching the the sort of personal dynamics between the two of them President Park is probably one of the few leaders internationally around whom Xi Jinping seems almost deferential and Somewhat nervous. This is pretty unusual for him. And so I think that's a real interesting development It may give It may give President Park some leverage in the relationship But it's it's unique and I think you know part of this is the Chinese understand, you know, she speaks Mandarin I think she was very thoughtful in the in the visit that she made to China about making sure to go not just to Beijing But also out to Xi'an to show her interest in Chinese culture, you know and so on So there's a lot going on. I think at the same time None of us should be too surprised that the kind of underlying goal here for China is to see what progress can be made in terms of Pulling the South Koreans more into China's orbit in terms of how they think about policy developments They see I think South Korea as on the chessboard Something where they can perhaps have a better influence I think the Chinese are very rational in their understanding of the power of the alliance with the United States and the trilateral alliance with Japan But that doesn't mean they're not going to seek opportunities through the pull of their economic relationship with South Korea And let's face it some pretty serious present tensions with Japan to see what they can do I think what's interesting though about Xi Jinping's approach in several of these instances and These days as many of you who attend my China events will know when we talk about the Chinese government we increasingly talk about Xi Jinping because this is the way he sort of accreted all this power to himself personally and is exercising foreign policy often based on his own views on things and What's been interesting to see is despite this desire to try to ingratiate himself with South Korea and to Bring the South Koreans more closely into the orbit of China There are always in each one of these visits or interactions that little bit of punch that comes with the That comes with the softer side that if I'm South Korea it leaves me kind of wondering You know what indeed is is going on here And I think it's very reflective of what we're seeing in other places in the region where the Chinese are indeed Trying to have good relations with their neighbors promote good relations with their neighbors But also trying to transmit the idea that increasingly we're going to call the shots in the neighborhood and we want a good relationship with you But it's on our terms and we want you to be willing to accept that And so I think in just a couple of the instances that we saw where Xi Jinping's speech for example Seoul National University talked a lot about the Japan issue and history issue tried to rope the South Koreans probably uncomfortably for them into implicit criticism of Japan And you know, I think we see this time and again with with Xi's approach The other thing I think to emphasize that was noteworthy for me Was the large business delegation of course that that Xi Jinping brought along with him heads of all the major Chinese tech companies and so on and a lot of people are busy Sweating that you know this me and of course he went need toward The Samsung Industrial facility was given a personal tour by the heir apparent of the company, you know and so on so obviously There's a lot of symbolism in there about the business-to-business relationship and I think the the that delegation that the Chinese brought may have bred some concern about cooperation deepening between those two Sides but let's remember that Samsung and LG are competitors with those companies that we're coming over from the Chinese side And so on so I think that's also very important for us to remember That there are it's a competitive relationship as much as it's a cooperative one. Yes, the South Koreans very much understand What's going on? With the economic pole and power of China But I think they also like so many other countries in the region now after some of China's recent behavior They welcome that interaction, but they're also somewhat cautious You know wanting to know what China wants out of that process and and are the strings that might be attached More than they want to subscribe to I think also on the North Korea issue. Obviously, there was a lot of a lot of discussion I think in the past, you know in the first summit there was this impression that the Chinese were perhaps having some success in Painting themselves as an alternative answer if you will to South Korea's North Korea problem I think that narrative is much harder to establish now given China's Seriously strained relations with the North so their ability to kind of get the North to behave or to influence That is declined, but I it strikes me that now the tack from both China and South Korea I think if they're playing this smartly is to just emphasize the strength of the bilateral relationship I mean, you know, yes a lot of commentary was put out there about how this is the first time a Chinese leader went to South Korea before he went to North Korea and That's obviously true as a statement of fact I don't want to oversell it but I do think it says a lot about how they're thinking about the relationship and there always has been this balancing act and It really was one of the few times that I'm aware of that they didn't even have a senior North Korean official kind of drop in and have that exchange before he went To the South so clearly in terms of an advantage for the South Korean government, but also China's messaging to North Korea There was a lot of in implicit messaging there. I think what's encouraging is to see is that you know coming out of the See ICA or Kika or however you pronounce it summit in Shanghai Where there was this effort to talk a lot about new security concept and so on and the South Koreans clearly Bawked at that the first time around I would imagine Xi Jinping press this very heavily again In this instance and I think from what we can see from the joint statement and so on It it didn't gain any traction again So folks who are worried that somehow the South Koreans are going to abandon the alliance or something like this I don't think there's too much to be concerned with there Likewise, I think the the history issue with Japan obviously the Chinese can get a lot of mileage out of this and want to Want to press that as hard as they can But I do think the the sole government is very mindful right now of how they message that and and that it's a double-edged sword for them Just like it is in some ways for the Chinese with regard to public reaction and and expectations and so on So that's my quick overview. I'm happy to elaborate some more, but great. Okay, jump in all right So I agree with everything Chris said so maybe we should just go to questions Don't do that Well, thank Chris first of all, thanks for you know, we decided to put this thing together pretty quickly and Thanks for joining us because I know that you are really busy and on planes most of the time And I look around the room and I think I thought most of you were on vacation. So thank you for joining us as well The so let me just sort of make three quick points and I think you'll find a lot of them resonate with Stuff that Chris has already said The first thing is sort of when you think about summits like this As a former staff right can tell you there's sort of three things you think about The first is sort of just the the the logistics Everything that goes into a summit which is the logistics the form the negotiation of commas and semicolons and everything in the formal statements There's that aspect of it, right? So the logistics and the language The second it are the optics very important, you know, how this thing looks I mean the two leaders are meeting That's what sort of impression that's giving a and the third is sort of the substantive policy messaging Right, that's that's the third piece of it. So let me take you through each piece at least give you my opinion on this So first in terms of optics very clear, you know optics were fantastic, right as As Chris said these two leaders Do have a relationship with sorts of in their fifth. I think fifth meeting between the two of them With you know, no meetings between the Chinese leader in the North Korean but the fifth meeting between the two the second summit I think Chris is right I mean President Xi seems a little bit uncomfortable around Pacanay almost like he's got a crush on her He's just very He said that not very uncharacteristic And And so and I think At least from the South Korean perspective I think the bottom line is South Koreans have wanted for a long time to have a leader that they can have a relationship with in China All right, I think it has been the aspiration of previous South Korean leaders on successfully And so I think they really feel like This is the one that they have a they have a good relationship with In terms of the language right this the second I mean the logistics were fine In terms of the language the formal statements. I think really highlighted two things One is sort of the deepening strategic relationship between South Korea and China whether it's in the form of a creation in recent years of a whole set of bilateral consultations at all sorts of different levels across all ministries It's really you know broad and deep in the relationship and then the second message I think was as evidenced by the large business delegation and The proclamations the economic relationship been in particular setting a very high bar for economic cooperation particularly with this Announcement of the ambition to conclude the bilateral FTA by the end of the calendar year. So not only talking about how How strong the economic relationship already is but really setting an even higher bar of trying to take it even further and faster And then the third is on sort of the substantive policy messaging and I think so I think this is just my personal opinion I think it's sort of three things that I saw here the first is that the The substantive policy messaging on the alliance with the United States and I think very clearly the Koreans wanted to be able to show that They can have this sort of deep and strong relationship with China In the context of a very deep and very strong foundation of a relationship with the United States And you know, I think if it were the South Korean choice, they would always like to have A China summit following a US South Korea summit just because it helps to reinforce that message I think many senior policy makers in South Korea see The the two the relationship between the two is as as positive sum in the sense that A strong us ROK relationship actually gives the South Koreans a better Foundation upon which to build a relationship with China And that if their relations with the United States are not good Then actually that hurts their ability to have a good relationship with China Or at least a relationship from their perspective where they feel like they're on more of an equal footing So so I think that was sort of one of the messages that they wanted to send the other And this is a bit more complex was I think they also wanted to try to send a message that that the you are that the bilateral relationship between China and the ROK is About China and the ROK and that's not about Japan Right, I mean there's you know a natural perception given the difficulties in the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo for many to see this as a sort of reaction to the relationship with Japan Undeniably that the Chinese want to leverage this for that purpose And there are a number of things that we can talk about in the summit that clearly were We're aimed at doing that But I think from the South Korean perspective what they tried the way they tried to Show this was first, you know in the formal language of the statement There was no mention of Japan, right? And and there was no acceptance of this idea of a joint 70 year celebration this sort of stuff I mean the It's pretty clear that what the South Koreans are trying to do is Without denying that they have some deep and substantive issues with Japan to try to very clearly delink that From their relationship with China and talk about their history problem with Japan as a as a sovereign issue something that they deal with on their own terms with with with Japan and that while they will listen to and May even quietly empathize with some of the things that the Chinese say they're not willing to draw that formal link and then the the third message and I and and it's sort of related to second is that China-ROK relationship is not about Japan, but it is about North Korea and very clearly the You know the Chinese. I mean the the South Koreans I Think sense not incorrectly that there's distance between Beijing and Pyongyang That has not been there before in part. It has to do with the leadership change in both countries North Korean actions a variety of things, but I think the bottom line is that whether correctly or incorrectly We just don't know they sense space there and so that I think is what is motivating a lot of this Effort to deepen the strategic tie with China It's really to try to move the needle on North Korea with China Now we all know that there's a clear core dilemma here Which is that the the South Koreans need the Chinese when they think about unification? But the same time they know the Chinese don't want North Korea to collapse In spite of that dilemma they still work the problem and I think that's exactly what they're they're they're trying to do now and You know and so what is it that they're trying to do? I mean, I think probably the most important conversations that may have taken place between the two leaders. We'll never know about And and But I think what the South Koreans hope for us to try to get a deeper Understanding on China's part that essentially China's future on the Korean Peninsula is with the South It's not with it's not with the North and you can point to the business delegations You can point to the FTA you can point to a variety of things That is evidence of that Terms of the road ahead Three quick things first The this the bilateral FTA commitment to try to finish this by the end of the year in my view very lofty goal There's a lot of work at least from my understanding that needs to be done in terms of market access and other just lots of stuff That needs to be done What this suggests to me is that if they do reach an agreement, it's not going to be a high quality FTA I think it was maybe it was Chris or somebody else said that you know these FTAs in many ways are political agreements more than anything else and and So I think that appears to be the track that if if the idea is to finish by the end of the year that appears to be the track That the China ROK FTA is on I think from Korea's perspective They don't have a problem with that and they don't see that as being inconsistent with What is now a much more clearly enunciated interest in TPP and being one of the first You know if if whenever agreement happens one of the first countries post major economies post-agreement to a seed to TPP The second is The whole issue of transparency and I think while this was a great summit You know, I think the Koreans walk away from it still with these very lingering concerns about In that you know, there was still some basic transparency issues when it comes to dealing with China And one of the clearest examples of this was his speech that he gave the president he gave at Seoul National University Where my understanding is you so we all know what this was in the speech, right? It was a very forward-leaning view on history and Japan and countries in Asia that have been You know that are tied together and been whipped by Japan together and all this But you know from I think and I don't know if any Korean official will say this But I think from the Korean perspective that was quite awkward and uncomfortable But also that they didn't know right they didn't know what was coming in the speech Largely because it wasn't shared in advance and so you know, that's got to leave some lingering, you know questions about the the transparency And then the the last thing I'll say and this is Sort of where Chris close all close at the same place there's sort of a dual game going on here because The Chinese walk away from this summit and their feeling is like we got the South Koreans right where we want Right, we're starting to peel them off slowly from you We got them right where they were one and the Koreans walk away from the summit and they're like we got the Chinese right They're starting to edge away from North Korea, so it's it's you know, like there's kind of this is sort of this dual game going on And in the end it's probably a wash Well, actually if I can just build on that because I think it is a very important point that that leads to a couple of others I actually think My sense would be that both President Park and President Xi know exactly that that's what's going on and they like it Yeah, they're there that kind of personality the two of them You know, it's sort of who's gonna use the other one more, you know This is clearly Xi Jinping's relationship with Putin, right? You know, you see a lot of this going on and And and they both acknowledge that that's the game and it's the blood sport of politics I mean, I don't know if it's the Prince Ling phenomenon there How that works, but there seems to be a kind of enjoyment of the bloodlust of competition, you know, which is which is interesting And I think that speaks more broadly to a couple of factors with Xi Jinping just because your points about the alliance I think we're very important and and one of the one of his goals I think in this process is to again Signal not that they think they're gonna somehow have a big win, you know with regard to pulling the South Koreans off Militarily, but again to just kind of signal the US side We have options. We have options. We can do this stuff bilaterally if we need to the free trade agreement is a bit of a smack at TPP process. I think to some degree. I agree with you. It'll be very political. I guess, you know, I'd welcome your views I have some questions as to you know I mean certainly Southeast Asians and their free-treated agreement with the Chinese You know where they did sign a very political agreement have subsequently sort of said whoa We would have renegotiated certain parts of that if we'd known this is how it was gonna go I wonder if this presumably the South is aware of that phenomenon and kind of I wonder in other words How far are they willing to go? You know just to have the agreement and then I think the other piece is again this this Stuff we've been talking about in the paper you and I collaborated on This kind of great power diplomacy piece right and and how the Chinese are trying to just say straight out now We're gonna be much more active Diplomatically and that includes getting away from the constraints of the whole North Korea lips and teeth thing We're gonna do what is in our sort of great power Morgan Thou realist Interest and and also Through this subtle, you know You know smile but kick Element, you know not giving the text of the speech and so on this this kind of we're the big gun You know and and the rest of you were are here to understand that you know that kind of element I think is very powerful and and so while it suggests It's again certainly not to compare the two, but it is interesting There's some parallels with the Russia relationship We all know that there are hard limits with regard to how much progress China might be able to make in that relationship But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't focus very carefully on what's going on there Right and and be very aware of it. It doesn't mean we have to go crazy Responding it just means we have to also elevate our game a little bit to stay informed and and so on. Oh, yeah, absolutely I mean I Right, I mean that the fact that there is I mean that I I do I think and I think many analysts in town believe that there are Limits to how far the South Korea-China relationship can go that is not a mandate for apathy ambivalence on the US side. I mean it clearly means We have to keep our game up at the same time on the FTA I think yeah, it's interesting because I think from my understanding of The whole process, you know, they are really in the hard part of an FTA negotiation now and yeah, it is it is ugly ugly difficult and Yeah, how much the you know given that the Koreans have negotiated the pro that the prototypical high quality FTA and chorus Which was the framework for TPP, which was a framework for India and you you know How much are they willing to compromise? Exactly. I think It sends a bad political signal to compromise too much at the same time. I think there's some Deep dark desire on the part of the Koreans also to try to be the bridge eventually For you know for eventually China being integrated into this broader. Yeah trade architecture. That's interesting Now that's I mean I shouldn't say a deep dark seat. That's more of a like a dream But and and so that will also figure into how much they should or shouldn't compromise in terms of What this FTA looks like? I mean it is puzzling to me? Why they set out such a clear timeline. Yeah, because it does put a lot of pressure on both systems on both systems and the other bureaucratic issue on the Korean side is all the Korea botchers in the room know, you know There was a Reorganization of who does trade negotiations on the Korean side now that trade ministry used to be a part of the foreign ministry used to use That's why we had had this terrible acronym Mo fat right ministry of foreign affairs and trade and now the trade ministry is Is not within the foreign ministry, which means it's no offense to anybody in the room But it's a trade bureaucrat who's doing a negotiate not someone who was also thinking about the grand strategy So someone who might be more focused on widgets or yeah, right, right? And and and not thinking about the broader political implications. It just strikes me that you know The that whole ICT space especially is so important to the Korean economy And yet that's the area where it's going to be toughest right trying to come to to closure and so on So interesting for sure. Yeah, I'm gonna keep an eye on. Yeah Think we'll open up to questions If you could identify yourself wait for a microphone Keep your question in the form of a question It's just like Jeopardy couple down here. Let's start here Thanks very much Rob Warren I'd like to ask you about South Korea's trust Politique towards North Korea what we have I think is a real spanner in the works They really haven't addressed North Korea adequately There's an opportunity that the two could try to deepen a Dialogue with North Korea would trust be the basis for further progress Thanks, Rob. You know, I think So my understanding of trust-politique the concept of it is essentially There they're so the concept of it is you can't you you know any sort Relationship has to be built on trust right and how do you get trust it first starts with? Small promises right small promises turned into into practices and practices eventually turned into institutions I think that's sort of you know in a nutshell that's sort of the conceptual thing behind it. I think as a Strategically or tactically however you look at it. It also gives Parked moral high ground right and being able to say look I'm interested in principle in a relationship But it has to be trick based on trust You know, how could anybody disagree with that right? I mean it's like the it's like saying do you disagree with? You know Apple pie is being American. You just can't disagree with that So I think you have to you can call that tactics or strategically. I think that was one of the ideas behind it But as we can see not very successful right, I mean one family reunion Closing and then reopening a K-Song really nothing nothing beyond that and and I get the sense that Trust politics is still a part of the policy But that in this beginning in the second year of the Pakenna administration Especially with the Dresden speech it the discussion has moved much more in the direction of unification now and Also in terms of inter-Korean relations a focus on the people of North Korea and trying to help connect with the people of North Korea That's again something that I think most people can't disagree with but the latter probably is seen as quite threatening to to the regime so So right now the prospects don't look very good We've passed June 15th, right, which is the anniversary What the 14 year anniversary of the summit the first summit and nothing really came there people thought maybe something was going to happen there The closer we get to August the more people think we're going to cycle back to something worse because Exercises start again military exercises start again in the region So, you know, is it there's this window here that you know, maybe there's an opportunity for something to happen But it doesn't doesn't look like it right now Having said that It's north-south, right, so it's very unpredictable Anything can happen But right now that the it doesn't look very good Of course Nelson also reports are as a couple minutes late I had to push send, you know a journalist friend that you guys know Call me today and said did I have a sense that? President Park is more interested in Being tougher with the North Koreans on nuclear issues got more involved in it and I said boy Well, yeah, maybe but you better call Victor. So maybe she did. I hope she did What's your what would have been your answer if she did call? Without letting cats out of the bag. Is there a sense that President Park is perhaps more into dealing with These the larger strategic issue of nukes and missiles and not just the north-south issues and Because that also feeds into the Relationship with China and the clear mutual self-interest that both China and South Korea have in the people development Economic development program. I just one small anecdote I was up in New York with one of these track twos recently I don't came over if you were there Victor, but the senior Chinese that we both know said that what they're working towards is trying to force the North Koreans to To choose more butter and less guns My phrase for it, but that's really what it was talking about and his senior American participants said well, they've already chosen I wish you know, but they're choosing the guns. So I think that's vaguely related And is a question What do you think happened if anything between Park and she on dealing with with North Korea is nukes are nukes more on the agenda Is there any possibility of more cooperation on the on the? Economic development social development aspect in North Korea. Thanks Well for something now, you know Chris, maybe you want to talk about sort of like China and have China, so I but so so You know, I you know, I think basically I Mean many people in this room have been following this issue for a long time, right? And I think we're You know, essentially they're Sure, there could be another negotiation and sure I'm sure the Chinese and the South Koreans talked about how do we get back? To a six-party talks, how do we get a freeze back in place? How do we get inspectors back in place? How do we do all these sorts of things? So I think that Conversation is a part of any discussion, you know, when you get to that part of the talking points on on the crew on on North Korea But I think it is it's all happening increasingly more So that sort of discussion is increasingly happening in either a spoken or unspoken context of That we all understand that's just a tactical Way station and that there's a larger game here And that the answer Ultimately to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons in the region has has much more to do with the overall Future of the Korean Peninsula than it does some tactical negotiation And so who knows whether that was a spoken or an unspoken context But I think that is increasingly the context in which these Discussions take place. Yeah, I think that's right. I mean I and I guess I would put in a vote for unspoken Yeah And that the formal dance of it is is as you say that kind of list One thing that did strike me I think the best queuing to look at from the Chinese side on on this issue was how much attention it got in their central media And there were distinctive people's daily and sheen while releases related slowly to the denuclearization issue So I think that does suggest that at least messaging wise They wanted to indicate that you know this was on the table front and center and so on and again I think this is another one of these issues where there's a subtle jab at the US here, too Right because the Chinese of course have been trying to suggest I think to the US side that we're more willing now to discuss You know Some of these issues that perhaps maybe in the past we might not have been and so why not take advantage of a summit with South Korea to be able to say they they're open to the idea of talking to us in this more robust fashion You know about these issues We'd like to see that from you the United States I think that maybe there was some subtle messaging in there along those lines And then I also think it's just the broader issue of you know this whole conundrum of how to understand China's policy toward the north and is it indeed changing and and all of this and You know, I think you I mean my position is that there's a lot of ink and other and air and everything else wasted on whether or not The policy has changed Because that's an angel's dancing on the head of a pin issue, you know, that the core Approach of China has not changed fundamentally. I mean, they're still giving them, you know The the the life support that they need where I do think it has changed in that is in this area of redefining the relationship with the north You know right to both a give them more perhaps strategic flexibility with the south but also again this idea of You know normalizing the relationship with the north to the degree Xi Jinping has made any effort to change I think that's what it is and it's not it's not to open that relationship It's rather to sort of say again, we're the patron You're the client you need to behave like the client the lips and teeth thing where we will put up with your Petulant child behavior is is gone, you know, and and we want you to get in line And of course North Korea from my perspective, you'd know better is pushing back very hard against that that message Right and trying to say no, no, we're our own our own show So that is straining things, you know incredibly badly and then I think also just you know from my recent trips I do pick up a Heavier sense of I won't go so far as to say fear but but certainly Insecurity in the Chinese leadership about what the heck is going on inside North Korea I mean, you know, I think this is one of those areas where oftentimes we need to just You know when the Chinese tell us something we need to just believe it at take it at face value And when they say they don't know what's going on or their their capability is diminished We should listen to them, you know on on that one. I think so so they're therefore a desire also just to get another Altituding, you know amplitude Take from another very deeply concerned party. I think that would have been part of Xi's agenda Hi, I'm dr. Donowales. I'm a geopolitical analyst. Can you talk about the India China Korea strategic triangle under Modi? India, I'm sorry India China Korea strategic triangle Right, right. Okay now with Modi. Yeah, I can take a whack. Oh, yeah Don't everybody jump each other Well, I I won't I don't know much about the South Korea piece So I I don't want to speak out of ignorance there. I what has been interesting to me Since Prime Minister Modi's election has been the speed with which the Chinese have tried to embrace him, you know Which I think is very interesting knowing full well his past views on China and the relationship with with China Some of this I think is being driven by their concerns as you point out about the relationship with Abe and how that's developing and how They might slow that process Some of it I think is developing out of a concern that you know We're pretty darn busy on our front door right now, you know with the maritime stuff So we need to secure the back door and at least keep things calm, you know That's a big piece of this as well I think they also want to use thing vehicles like the bricks bank, you know And and these sort of ideas to signal to the Indians were about trade and economics and growth in our relationship with you We'll put the security stuff aside I mean, you know, I think it was quite interesting that that Wang Yi the foreign minister when he visited India You know Made noises that they're willing to move towards solving the border dispute and you know And this is one of those where I'll believe it when I see it but you know the same calculus that went on for the Chinese with regard to solving the land border issue with Russia may be sort Of at play with the Indians and all part of this desire to kind of keep you know because Unfortunately, I think that the Chinese may be more more willing more likely to believe in the kind of pincer movement Concept even though I would argue especially from the Indian perspective There's no interest at all in New Delhi and in playing that role, you know They're all about the the economic relationship and so on So I think this is another one of these areas where there are these kind of tectonic shifts going on and there's a lot of space and everybody's trying to jump into the space, right? And we'll just have to see how it develops. I don't know how the South Koreans play in this But maybe you know, I don't I actually don't either The I mean, yes, the leadership change is quite significant how much that has impacted Korea's initiatives on India. I don't think that much. I mean, there's always been a constant interest for trade reasons for a variety of other reasons You know the the large play in that part of the world for India has always been Japan and But not not so much Korea. I mean I could be wrong. There might be some initiative out there They don't know about but But I think it's really the it's really that three-way relationship that is most impacted by the change in India. I think so too Let's go over here on the aisle Steve Winters Washington based researcher. I'd like to get back to your comments about she's speech at the National University Somehow the impression you're giving is that he's sort of one on off on a tangent of his own without informing them But from what I've seen for example from CCTV They do the Chinese and the South Koreans do seem to be making common cause on this issue of History for example the Commission they've set up to collect records regarding the comfort women that still exist in a mainland and Sort sort through those and particularly I there was a recent meeting of of Korean elite Speakers over at the Wilson Center and they express a lot of concern about Obes reinterpretation of the Constitution and so forth and so on so if you see that sort of put those two things together I mean it seems that she's speech is really sort of a response to the reinterpretation of the Constitution and that really they are making common cause in saying no we're not gonna as their slogans go we're not gonna let the Defeat of fascism be reversed or what happened be denied and so forth and so on So I don't quite see why you're trying to separate the two Just before you go deep. I'll just have a one sentence answer Which is I think you in some ways you answered your own question because you watched you saw it on CCTV So, you know that should that should kind of tell you that there might be some shaping going on but So So so my understanding of the whole soul national University thing was that you know The Koreans invited him to give a public speech. He was happy to do it. They say great Can we see the speech and they said no maybe later got closer to the event. Can we see the speech now? No, right? and so basically they and They weren't gonna pull the plug because that would have created more problems than not pulling the plug and But once once the speech started it was very clear What the purpose of the speech was and what the message was now with with something like this Can you find elements where you can point to and say? Yeah, the Koreans and Chinese look like they have common cause on this absolutely, right? I mean Just, you know any place you can find that at the level up at the official level You know as an analyst I look for certain things and one of the things I look for is there anything in the formal statement? Right because that would be a serious indication of common cause Is there you know, is there are there any sort of formal agreements at the official level? Right and this commission, you know Maybe I think basically the way that the Koreans try to handle this was that they you know They knew that it was the elephant in the room if you didn't talk about it being a part of the discussion at all and so the way they tried to split the difference was essentially to Insist that it not be a part of any formal part of the communication But then there'd be a back brief afterwards that the Blue House gave in which they said yeah Of course they talked about this this sort of issue and and that's I think the way you know again If part of summits are messaging that's sort of the way they get the message out But at the same time not give the impression that they are allying with the Chinese You know against I mean I'd welcome your thoughts But a question I would have based on what you described with regard to the speeches, you know Then what happened afterward? Did they do a Dimarsh? Did they you know yeah, it's an interesting question I don't know you know express their they're probably probably embassy officials in the room from both countries So maybe we can ask them What was the what was the aftermath of that of the so national speech? Come down to here Hi, thank you Chen Weihua. Yeah, I'm not surprised you say I mean present She looked like they have a crush on present Park because President Park I think is a massively popular among the Chinese. I don't I actually do I only heard nice words about her That's unusual. I mean for any world leader. I mean coming among the Chinese millions of netizens probably I mean the question I have is You know this tricky relationship about China and South Korea have with Japan I mean, there's no bilateral summit with Japan So to what extent you do what kind of compromise maybe Japan or anyone would make For this kind of a summit to happen will China maybe South Korea coordinate on such things I mean who would do first and second question. I think I hope it's not destruction I think it's you mentioned China's South Korea relation is also subject to I mean the nature of China US relationship So Chris, I mean based on your interpretation on the first day of SED I mean Beijing. Do you think this relationship China US is warming up? I mean leading up of course to November's visited by President Obama. Thank you. Sure. I Love to hear your views on SCD. Okay But I think it's important though to to also address the first half of the question because you know I do think there's an an element there that's that's worthwhile and I you know to me it's this issue of To what degree is the relationship between she and Madam Park going to be about more than just the show Right, you know and the positive energy. I mean, I agree with you I hear nothing but positive Impressions of her from Chinese I speak to as well. So I do think she has kind of a unique You know rock-star-ish status in China, which is interesting on the SED, you know I think I'm waiting for the for the communique. I mean, you know, it's been very interesting to me The run-up has been quite silent. I mean, you know, even even the journalism calls have been They're quiet and I think it's because nobody expects anything You know, my view is that I would recommend Jane Perles's article this morning in the Times and Simon Deniers of yesterday Don't read the parts where I was quoted but the rest of it is pretty good And and and and so, you know, just this idea that the relationship is indeed in a tricky spot Totally resolvable totally fixable. I think both sides are keen on on doing that SNED is a fantastic platform for doing that You have these high-level leaders from both sides coming together and kind of especially with the president going for APEC in China You know this fall. It's a great opportunity to set the table For that so we'll see. I mean, I'm not expecting a lot in terms of deliverables simply because my impression is that the There wasn't even a viable agenda until days ago, you know I mean, it just wasn't I didn't feel the energy from prep this time that there may have been for previous rounds of the SNED I also do think there's some perception Fairly or unfairly on the Chinese side that that the two US interlocutors aren't quite as engaged as their predecessors were Just in terms of general interests not that they don't see the form is very important and and so on so on I'm not sure that's a fair assessment, but I think it exists and therefore it has implications And so, you know, what I'm looking for coming out of it is What how does the SNED reflect the preparations, you know for the summit between the two presidents this fall? And will they announce things like a national security advice? National security visor rice trip, you know to Beijing to prepare to prepare for that or or those kind of issues We'll have to we'll have to see what happens That's really I mean, that's interesting because Right, you can't think of an ideal Circumstance to really try to move the ball right to have the SNED which in itself is a The Sort of action-forcing event that should lead to some sort of progress on whatever the issues But then to have the president going in the fall right to Beijing to have that one-two punch It would you would that's really the right playing field for very high expectations Absolutely, yeah, and and so yeah, it would be kind of disappointing if nothing came out No, that's the worry. I think in other words. So is the relationship Stalled enough that we're missing the first the the SNED as you point out should be a springboard toward that You know you mentioned in your opening remarks about how summits are forcing function for the respective bureaucracies So we should be seeing that kind of motion, but we're not and I mean I think that tells us that the relationship is in a tricky spot You know that needs some attention at the very senior levels from both sides Yeah, let me let me just say on the on the what you on what? The countries can do to sort of effectuate eventually a summit between the leadership, you know, I think the interesting thing One of the interesting things that the Pakenet Xi Jinping summit has done it is that it has created more attention to Displaying to others that While Korea and Japan are having these history issues They're still in managing to move forward the working aspect of the relationship. That's a great point So that I and I think it's in a way that we haven't heard them talk about before so there's a lot more focus on On things like Trilateral coordination on six-party talks, there's The trilateral sort of military dialogues and defense dialogues You know the soul has been trying to make point these things are continuing to move forward in spite of the difficult history relationship Which I mean from an American policy perspective is music to your ears, right? Because that's what that that's always been the way the United States has been forced to manage this relationship Which is you can't expect that there's a golden key for the history problem But you hope that the governments can continue to work pragmatically With this baseline of historical problems. I mean we all have Historical problems with different members of our family, but we managed to move we have that as a baseline But we managed to sort of move forward pragmatically on other things and you know and it is that's the kind of relationship It is I think just related to that But there's I think there's some similar vibrations going on in the China-Japan relationship I mean, I just can't bring myself to say I'm optimistic about it But but but you know the Meti minister did go and have a good visit I think he saw a vice premier and Politburo member not the right one He should be seeing Wang Yang and he saw Leo Yandong But but at least the atmosphere was generally good. There wasn't too much emphasis on on the history issue and having just come from Tokyo it's clear to me that they're feeling a little more Optimistic, you know, China has a pattern of being the most shrill before they're ready to make a breakthrough So we'll we'll have to see if there's anything further there It's good right here on the aisle Hi, Xiaoyang Shao of Donggui de Lei, Shanghai China There were reports saying that one of the main topics Of this past visit with regard to China's South Korean economic cooperation China is asking the South Korea to join the proposed the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank While there were also reports saying that US has been laying some pressure on South Korea to not join it So my question is how does US views? view this investment bank and will this initiative consists sort of a challenge to the US influence in the region and What if South Korea made this make a decision to join it? Will this sour the bilateral relations between US and South Korea? Thank you very much I'll take a stab sure You know my sense is that on the on the first-order question of of you know How does the US side see the the bank? I think it's something we're watching very carefully I think it's fair to say that You know China deserves some credit frankly for for seeing that need, right? That's there in terms of interest infrastructure development in Southeast Asia and jumping on it What's interesting to me is that and I I'm guessing that South Korea probably has the same approach Which is why we didn't see any strong statement from them saying yes, we're in is that while The Southeast Asian countries for example are very desirous of having the the aid the the infrastructure development aid Post the 9-dash line and recent other developments and so on there is some underlying skepticism, right? About does this come with strings attached or what else is in this? And so I think there's a strong desire for China to try to bring in others right Into that process so that it doesn't look like it's just them You know doing the doing the financing and I would think so then's reaction might be you know We're not close to the idea But let's see how you and the other players choose to capitalize this particular Enterprise and based on that we'll think about how we might want to participate or not so I think they're probably waiting would would be my guess as to You know whether the US sees it as you know a danger or you know something I don't think so I mean you know my feeling is this requires a little bit of nuance to understand what the Chinese are doing and I'm guessing I admit I don't know but but you know my my view is things like the Bricks Bank things like AII be are not designed to Undermine the world post-war war to Bretton Woods, you know system and so on But rather to establish some parallel structures where China sees it in its interest to be able to operate to achieve Other other goals and you know, I mean there's been a lot of talk about the Asia for Asians Comment and things like this my own views has been slightly misinterpreted I don't quite I don't quite see it is as menacing as it has been you know portrayed in it in a few contexts But we will have to watch that space very closely To see again do these are they indeed just simply parallel financing? institutions to drive Chinese economic growth or are there broader strategic implications and goals associated with them and time will tell on that Gil Rosamond the Asan forum We haven't heard anything about Putin's initiatives in North Korea and Appeals to South Korea to join in and China's response and whether the Sino-Russian Co-op new level of cooperation Extends to the Korean Peninsula or that's turning again. That's working against their cooperation Could someone comment on that Chris sure? Why don't you start on the North Korea piece? Okay, all right hop in so Well and Gil you know this as well as anybody else. I mean I think so you know There certainly are tactical reasons why we see this Outreach to North Korea on the part of the Russians, but a lot of it has to do with Putin himself I mean Putin is the only Russian leader in recent history that has any has had any interest in North Korea You know whether this is the last time he was in office or this time in office There's a demonstrated record there of being interested you know in North Korea and In trying to Try to befriend the leadership try to do things in an unorthodox way that makes leadership feel comfortable this famous Offered to visit his apartment Kim you know for Kim Jong-il to visit his apartment and have lunch off the summit schedule You know I guess not many leaders do that for the North Korean leaders So you know these sorts of things are really appreciated, you know in the broader scheme of things Yes, you know there's this idea of this energy infrastructure that you could build It's not so much the North Koreans would benefit from this In energy which you wouldn't need much of for them to benefit But it's really the rents that they would get if this structure moved through all of Asia and connected, you know connected Russia's energy infrastructure to the economies of Asia. So I think that's always been the grand plan The Russians were always also interested during six-party talks and providing light water reactors than North Koreans much started to smay And so there's always been that element of it, but And they've forgiven the debt right or a large part of the debt But I think the the the Historical problem, and I think it still is the current problem is that you know There are a couple of steps that they take but it never really Rolls out into an implementable strategy And I think that's the same challenge that they face they face this time. Yeah, I largely agree with that I guess one thing that's interesting to me about it. I see some parallels Between that side of the house and what's happening between Russia and China and Central Asia, right? And and I think that You know what was interesting about the Xi Putin summit was you know If it depends on your frame of analysis if you want to emphasize The the sort of the hard limits in what can be achieved in the relationship Then Central Asia sort of seems to me like an issue where they both decided well We'll just lay that aside, you know Sooner or later there'll be a great game element to this but you know, let's just stay focused on the cooperative pieces And I think perhaps there's some of that going on in the North Korea relationship The other way to look at it is that the two of them have reached a much deeper Strategic sort of common viewpoint in which should there be Issues in either Central Asia or North Korea elsewhere They've agreed to have a way to manage it bilaterally to work cooperatively and I think the jury's out on what the answer is My my suspicions run toward the ladder, but but I think that's something we should all watch very closely So thanks for answering asking that question. I think it's an important one Why don't we take a group just a couple we'll do one here and then These two on the aisle Hi Bill Tucker I'd like for you to comment on on China reaching out to to South Korea and Japan Well at the same time being more assertive in the South China Sea and Protecting what they think is their interest in these in these islands there Okay, oh Great, we're gonna take a group. Yeah, I'll take it. I'll just two more and then He's on the aisle Lee from KBS I'm very curious about the next step or next to move by China on North Korea side The do you think it is possible for? President president Xi Jinping will meet the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in the near future or President Xi will make a high-ranking official to visit the North Korea okay Okay, and then last one a young Chen Kim from Fletcher school Can you elaborate more about your statement that the South Korea and China relations? It is about North Korea this time because if you look at the official statement not only in Japan But also North Korea was not mentioned in the official statement They only talk about nuclear denuclearization in Korean Peninsula. They didn't specify North Korea So what do you think about this? I I'm not sure that the the moves the Chinese are making with Japan and Korea are necessarily related to what's going on in the South China Sea I mean, I think this is another one of the myths or narratives that has been true for so long But name that Xi Jinping may now be shattering which is this idea that they don't want to have multiple fires burning at once And so they got to stabilize in Northeast Asia to be busy in Southeast Asia You know my own sense is that he sees all of this as part of a net not individual issues And and so to me it's coincidence that at vast I and especially in in a Xi Park summit there really is no East China Sea or South China Sea angle there I don't think the South Koreans want to touch that with a hundred-foot pole So, you know, I just don't see it and answer that question I think there was one about will Xi Jinping go or what's going on? I have seen no indication that there's any interest on the Chinese side in either hosting Kim Jong-un right now or In the Chinese sending either Xi himself or some sort of senior leader I mean, this has been very interesting. I mean, it's it's a major again I mean, I just mentioned breaks with past practice is another major break with with past practice Xi Jinping is very comfortable with unsettling others, you know and risk and and so on and and so I think he's trying to send a very deliberate message there And I think you know if you're Beijing too, there's an awful lot of concern as Victor mentioned earlier We may be going back into the traditional, you know bad bad guy cycle And so why would the Chinese want to host Kim Jong-un and then have him go back and do something that you know causes them to lose space So I I don't see it. Maybe you do for the North Korean side No, no, no, I think I'm so you know one of the things we do is we we collect all this data and we've looked at sort of the correlation between China South Korea meeting high-level China South Korea meetings and high-level China North Korea meetings And I can't remember maybe this are my step I can't remember the exact But they're fairly closely correlated like within a period of weeks Generally you see over time if they do one they do the other and it's part of their whole equidistant policy And what's striking now is this, you know really nothing, right? So in answer to the question, you know, I think there's a better chance of abe Then there is then there is a chance of Xi Jinping and then and then and then on the On the right, there's a better chance of abe going to North Korea than there is of abe going to South Korea And then and then on the the you know the the non mention of North Korea in the statement I mean So this is part you're your student, right? So this so this is part of international relations and diplomacy It's like the more they don't talk about it formally the more they actually talked about it, right? So So and I think in this case, you know what you know It's again, it's about messaging and the main message they wanted to send is that they're both in favor of denuclearization of the peninsula, right? Obviously, that's what they're concerned about and you know for the for the Chinese there are Certain equities they have with North Korea that would be badly damaged if they were very clearly out there and said Yeah, we went we diss North Korea and we want to put that in our joint statement So, you know, that's that's if you think about it There's no positive gain from that because everybody knows that's what they did and there's only loss because if anything It could just push the North Koreans off in bad directions So I think that's why you don't see it But I think everybody believes of course that this you know, this was the elephant in the room, right? And that how could you not talk about it? I Think with that we've we've reached our time again. Thank you all for coming to CSIS this event Recording and audio will be available on the CSIS website. Thanks again. Please thank our speakers