 Good afternoon everybody. Because I'm sitting up here with three military officers, I'm going to try to start our session on time in a nod to your, I think, close to 100 years of probably military experience. It's a great honor for me to be up here with General Ron Fogelman, the former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Pete Corelli, the former Vice Chairman of the Army, or sorry, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Cartwright, the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And I think you all have their bios in your programs. It's honors and accolades, and a diversity of experience and expertise that is really remarkable. One of the things I think is interesting about the three of them is their representation of their three different service branches, but all attended command of Staff or War College in some other services institution. And I don't know if that's a reflection of the fact that all of them are known individually for being among the more broad-minded within their respective services or willing to challenge the conventional wisdom, I think, or if it's a result of that. But either way, again, I think it's sort of an interesting note about the three of them. So I think we're going to try to engage in this conversation about what we learned after the last 12 years in Iraq and Afghanistan with what Elliot Cohen called the historical mind as opposed to the strategic mind, trying to figure out how to place this experience in the context of a broader history, what kind of a framework does that experience offer? Not a template, but what does it teach us that's relevant about the future? In the magazine of articles that we put out for today's conference, I offered a couple of thoughts on that about changes that have come about both with the integration of conventional and special operations forces and also operations and intelligence activities and also the use of unmanned platforms, but those are just a few of the many examples of how things changed in the course of the 12 years of war and two different theaters. And I hope these three are much better equipped than MI to reflect on what sort of the more fundamental changes may have been and what they import going forward. So General Pogman is going to kick off our discussion with some thoughts on the use of precision strike and reach back and some other issues along those lines. I think General Corelli is going to address some topics about what the military learned about using some of the more non-kinetic means and may raise some of his thoughts on the importance of what many would consider to be non-traditional military activities. And then I've asked General Corelli to offer some broader strategic thoughts about what the last 12 years may mean in the context of policy discussions between the national security staff and the Congress and the nation at large and what kinds of things have we learned that align with future challenges. So we'll go through each of those things. We'll have a few questions in exchange amongst ourselves and then we'd really like to open it up for all of you to have them address some of your thoughts and questions. So with that, General Pogman, thanks so much. Thank you, Marin. So I thought that I would, when asked if you look back over the last 12 years, what are a few things that stick out in your mind relative to the way the conflict is unfolded? One is precision. Precision not only in strike but in location. For amazingly enough, as many of us would be not willing to admit, on occasion, we never knew where we were when we were flying. We knew where we were close to being or where we should have been but we always didn't always know where we were. I suspect the guys on the ground always knew precisely where they were so that's not a big issue for them. But I was gonna talk. I hope somebody had that on tape. Yeah. So I'll talk a little bit on that. The other, as Marin mentioned, is reach back, just a quick look and definition of what I'd talk about on reach back. And then I'd be remiss if I didn't say something about UAVs and finally to give the enemy some due. I thought another subject that might be worth talking about is IEDs. So with that, when I look at the precision thing and I go back in history, you know, the World War II, whether you were an artilleryman, whether you were a naval ship with naval gunfire or you were part of the air campaign in Europe, what you talked about when you were using weapons was a requirement to put a lot of mass downrange or off the thing. So it was a question of how big does the bomber formation have to be to destroy this particular aim point? And then it evolved over time to the first Gulf War where we began to see the impact of precision but precision during that war was more driven by laser-guided weapons than it was GPS kinds of weapons. And of course we had the tank-plinking campaign. We had a lot of things there that started to show us the potential. And then as we got into Iraq and Afghanistan, the real payoff in terms of precision-guided weapons, the so-called JDAMS, the whole idea that GPS enabled you to now ask the question, how many targets can I strike with a single airplane when I individually target each weapon coming off? And that progressed naturally into the point now where the Army has GPS-guided mortar shells, GPS-guided 155-millimeter shells. And so as you start to think in a broader sense, what does this really pretend? I think it has long-range ramifications in terms of force structure. Do you need as many platforms? Do you need the same kind of ammunition stocks that you had in the past as you have before? And so force structure is one thing, I think, that gets impacted by precision. We don't always think about that, but as programmers you would. The other thing is logistics. It cuts down somewhat on the logistics too. Talk about reach back very briefly. You know, reach back, in my view, is the ability to put in the rear area, and I will call the rear area, the continent of the United States, but it could be somewhere other than on the battlefield, certain capabilities that historically you had to bundle up, send forward. They were part of the deployment package. They were part of the footprint that you had to defend. And two that kind of strike me is intelligence. I think that over the years we've done a pretty good job of being able to maintain an intelligence capability stateside that can do the analysis, even do some targeting, and send that stuff forward. Of course, the big choke point becomes bandwidth, and that's a whole other discussion. And of course, UAVs, the UAV thing has more and more, we stood up more and more command and control centers in the United States so somebody can be sitting out in Nellis Air Force Base, or if you're a guard individual up in North Dakota, you can be up there flying a combat sortie or a sortie in support of combat troops. So again, it has all these very positive things in terms of footprint and this sort of thing, but it has a negative thing too. And this is an interesting phenomena that really started to come up during the last 12 years is if you're the commander, if you're a combatant commander out there, you kind of like to be able to look at the people in the eye that are supporting you. And this whole concept of battle buddies and the whole idea that it's nice that you provide me this service, but quite frankly, I'd like you to be a little bit miserable with me. If there's a dust storm, I'd like you to understand there's a dust storm if there's whatever it's like. So there is a downside, I guess, if the battle buddy lack of that in the bandwidth. And then into UAVs. You know, UAVs, very interesting. The net result that you want to get out of UAVs, at least initially and primarily was intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, ISR. This is not a new concept, you know what I mean? When you go back to the Korean War, it was kind of the first time that we really introduced, there was some liaison airplanes, et cetera, during the Second World War. But in the Korean War, we introduced this idea of mosquito aircraft. You know, they were old T6 trainers and they were facts, forward air controllers. And so you didn't have the national means, you didn't have these on-man system, but you tried to provide the same kind of capability. And then you got into Vietnam. And in Vietnam, we tried to provide 24-7, 365 coverage of the battlefield with facts, flying O1s, O2s, OV10s, things like this. And if you think about it in the simplest sense, these were aerial machines that could stay up for five or six hours. They carried a payload of about 150 to 200 pounds called a pilot. And they had a sensor system, which was generally eyeballs or sometimes night scopes, this kind of thing. And so what we ended up replacing that with when we went into Iraq and Afghanistan were the on-man systems that we've known. And then arming these systems made them more than just intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. And that's, I think, where we're going in the future as we look at this. Interestingly enough, because they've been so effective, we've seen some pushback on these things. And it comes within the policy perspective. The use of these things in places like Yemen and Pakistan, we're starting to see human rights groups, international law. And in fact, it's having an effect, I believe. I just recently saw an article where the number of UAV strikes in Pakistan's down somewhere like 37% and in Yemen. And I think it reflects a policy sensitivity on the part of the administration. And then my last subject is to throw out is IEDs. Again, historically, this is not a new phenomenon. I guess the IED part of it maybe, but anybody around in Vietnam, you remember the old bamboo stakes and all kinds of these things, they were there. Even in Vietnam, I remember as a fighter pilot, the greatest sin in the world was to drop a dud bum because you knew the bad guys were gonna get it, they were gonna do something with it to do bad things to your friends on the ground. As we got into Iraq and Afghanistan, more people on the ground, this was taken to a whole new level, if you will, in terms of greater lethality and the whole idea of suicide bombers, which we really hadn't had to deal with. So I guess these are four things that I would say as I look back on the last 12 years, there's certainly more, but these are some that stick out in my mind. I am sitting on a commission on military compensation and retirement compensation. But if I break into actuarial, hey, please, I don't know where I am. It's a good break to get over here. But let me cover a few of the things that Ron covered because I think it's kind of critical. I mean, one of the things that, I start pulling my hair out of devices when we went ahead and deployed the precision mortar shell around. Because all of a sudden, I was deploying a $1,200 round that used to cost somewhere in the city of $60, putting in the hands of it, a real good E6 because you probably never had a more opportune leader or if you did, he was a brand new lieutenant. And we were doing that at a time of war without having the opportunity to train tactic techniques and procedures on when to shoot it and when not to shoot it. I remember when my ABO, my budget officer, went over to Afghanistan, he was watching the firing of a 155 precision round on some IED inflation. This is the early time of this particular round and it was going for somewhere in the city of $110,000. And as these guys were digging in the round and going from hole to hole, they started shooting these things. You know, for the people who were watching it on the TV camera, it was great sport but for him, all he could see was dollar signs because just as the fire mission went in, the guys crossed the street, go over to the next hole they were gonna dig in and he saw three of these fires at a point when a simple battery of the old $60 rounds probably would have done the job a heck of a lot better as $330,000 went flying down. That's one of the issues when you get into precision strike, we, especially the Army, need to do tactics, techniques and proceed. Reach back was always interesting for me because there was a great push based on force levels to leave as much at home as you possibly could. But it was always this idea that the person back at home wasn't necessarily working 24-7. They had other things that were drawing on their time. My crisis did not always correspond with their kid soccer games, a wife's birthday, a vacation or whatever. And there wasn't that same feeling as Ron indicated that they were there to support you. And finally, UAVs, I'm afraid that these conflicts will be remembered for the proliferation of UAVs and that's true. But I will tell you, when I left Iraq in December of 2006, the core commander in Iraq had won UAV 18 hours a day. Now that changed very, very rapidly in 2007 and 2008. But they always weren't at the level that they were at the end of the war and in later years of the Civil War. I think the biggest thing for me that was atypical that I had not experienced in my first 34 years was what Mary talked about in her article and that was soft conventional integration. This is something that I had never, ever experienced before. In fact, it was kind of the Army's idea of inter-service rivalry, you know, the Navy, you've got sub-mariners and aviators. The soft forces were kind of the other guys. They didn't like to play with us very often. They would come down and indicate they were gonna play in a particular exercise and something always changed. That they weren't able to be there for the NTC rotation or some of the other things we were doing. I did not serve in combat in Desert Storm, but I don't think you had the integration you had early on in the war in 2004, five, six and throughout with conventional and soft. And I think there's always a tendency to look at this is the soft supporting the conventional. But I think you have to understand that there's two ways previous. There was tremendous support being provided by conventional forces to soft support. And hopefully through the 12 years of these wars, these are lessons we truly will have learned. That it is absolutely critical to maintain the skills that we built up and we learned so much from each other. I think one of the things where we learned so much was in off intel integration. I think that soft because of their acquisition system and their ability to go out, they taught us a lot. I think that soft really is the reason why we started stood up the rapid equipping force and allowed us to go out and look for off the shelf solutions to some of the problems that commanders were having. Those requirements had to be built within two years. 80% of them had to be built within one year. That was the rule with the rap. It broke all the congressional rules because you were literally going out and finding things and you didn't really care who's district they were in. You were really going out there to build a requirement. I give Dick Cote a lot of credit for that. He told them basically if they're not failing, if you're not failing, you're not doing things right because you really needed to get out and look at that. And I think when I look at off the shelf integration, what I really see in it is what's in command and control. Learning so much from the saw in some of the things they were able to buy and some of the places that they had gone to in command and control. I really opened my eyes to such systems as CPAP. Command Post of the Future was a DARPA project. I basically begged to take 13 systems over in 2004 and the rest is history. While it was under DARPA, it was extremely agile. That was my first year 2004 and 2005. I would literally have people rewrite the software when I went to bed at night and when I woke up, I'm a four-good guy, so when you're talking dropping a new software, I mean, I start to shave. But it would literally drop it when I was asleep that night and every time they were able to provide me the improvements in command and control and off-intel integration that I had asked for. The problem was, as all good DARPA things have to transition over to the Army acquisition system. And in 2006, what used to take me a night to get fixed, I didn't get to fix it an entire year. I really see some use for these systems in the tremendous advances we have made in not only off-intel integration, but our ability to take large amounts of data and analyze it very, very quickly. The work that Hosted is getting us through or at least starting to get us through the problems we had with PET when we had so many UAVs pulling down so much information. And as I look at my current profession and what I'm doing now, I see that in the medical field. I would like to take many of the command and control systems, but I see a real transition of many of those systems into the medical field to provide things that are solely lackable. The ability to just do things like pull the data from a number of MRIs together and be able to compare and look at those data bases, not unlike what we were doing with full-motion video and those kinds of things. And finally, non-Connected. I talked a lot about the non-Connected effects of this war. I believe that these wars have changed the face of war forever, the requirement of the integration of kinetic and non-Connected effects. I think people often forget that. Those that believe only in the kinetic will say that I don't believe those non-Connected guys. I don't know any non-Connected guys. I know kinetic non-Connected guys. Guys that believe that they have to integrate both those things together on the battlefield. To me, that's absolutely critical. And if you want long-lasting value from that proposition, you've got to ensure that at the same time you have a government force that provides what I think was solely lacking, is solely lacking in Iraq today and less Iraq, and that was the ministerial capacity to be able to eat those sewers going to allow the pot of water to continue to flow, to pick up the garbage on a day-to-day basis. And simple things like even writing contracts who are so different from the ministry in Iraq. And I think many of the problems you can see in Iraq today go back to those aspects. They got to have all the fun. I get the other subjects here, but I think the first one in real estate, it's location, location, location. In this activity, it is if you are going to intervene as a third party in somebody's fight, it's a cost-imposing strategy on the third party. And it's gonna take you a minimum of eight to 10 years if you want to hang around and see any benefit from that investment. But it's a cost-imposing strategy. And it always has been, and it always will remain so. Second thing I think, and I'm just gonna click down through these, that for me was a challenge and something that we weren't really ready for was that on this electronic battlefield, this information age battlefield, we could move between DOD's Title X authorities, the intelligence community's Title 50 authorities, and the State Department's authorities at the speed of light. Where was the oversight? Where is the oversight? How do you want to think about those kinds of capabilities? It certainly wasn't, oh, I got a week or two and I'll go up and brief the hill on this. We were moving capabilities back and forth at what we thought was response and still believe was response to the battlefield. But quite frankly, it was not under the intent that those rules were written and the oversight mechanisms that were put in place. And so the question now is, how do we want to start to think about that? And we can blame a platform for it, but at the end of the day, we need to start to understand what oversight's going to look like and how we're going to manifest it on a battlefield that is really not written according to the 20-year patent laws, but lives on Moore's law at 18-month cycles. And 18 months is a real stretch on the battlefield. The IED fight was a 30-day fight. They invented a fuse, we invented a counter, they invented a fuse, 30 days. And if you've got any longer than that, then people are dying at a number that would not be tolerable. And so how do we start to think about the oversight mechanisms in war between the things that we now have checks and balances in between to make sure that we're doing what we really want to be doing out there? It's just a challenge. It's going to manifest itself again. We can blame the platforms, but at the end of the day, we got to take an inward look at governance. Is this what we want to be doing? Is it responsive? Is there some other way of getting what we want to have as an oversight mechanism? The third one in this litany of good and other is this battlefield is not driven by platform solutions. Platform solutions take you 15 years to even get into actual metal. So 15 years of debating what the requirement is, going through that whole evolution, then you start building metal and it's probably another five to 10 years before you feel. And so 20 years ago, you decided what you wanted to use that platform for and what solution you wanted out of it. When it meets reality, it never matches up. In this fight, we did it once. We had to do it, not because we wanted to do it. And that was the mine resistant vehicles. We had to have a platform solution for the problem. But in these conflicts, you're basically taking a maneuver force, turning it into an occupation force, heaving it up, creating things to protect you against IEDs and bullets that are flying on the battlefield, et cetera, and basically reducing your mobility, reducing your ability to go out and actually put fires on the target in a way that you train to do in the first place. Platform solutions need to be thought of completely different and I'm pressing hard in this current wave of acquisition reform, which I've got 40 years of acquisition reform, chapters to tabs. But the reality here is we've got to find a way to move, to be more responsive to the battlefield. And building a platform solution for a problem won't do it. And building a million dollar truck for which five more pounds of homemade explosive means you add two or 3,000 pounds more of armor is a cost imposing strategy on us. We can't accept that kind of stuff. We've just got to start to think about how we're gonna handle that as we go to the future. On the good side, and I'll just do a couple of these because they've been hit pretty well. Recall the world wars we fought as armies, Vietnam, Korea, we fought as divisions. This fight was brigades. It speaks to the precision, it speaks to command and control. It basically tells you that a smaller unit is today more lethal for a whole host of reasons, covers a much larger area of regard as we go out there and do that. And we're not done doing that yet. We're trying to move to be able, whether it's to reach back or drones or whatever it is, to make that unit out there able to cover a much larger area, sustain itself, et cetera. People talk about precision and what it did for bombs on target, the number of bombs per target. But the real value, one of the greatest values out of precision was the logistics side of the equation. The amount of rolling stock that we got rid of because we didn't have to move rounds to the front, the amount of people that were necessary to support that, it just goes on and on. It was significant. In this fight, it was no different. And that would take me in the reach back area to medicine because he touched on that towards the end. Now, in the Civil War, the military came up with a concept called triage. That has remained at the heart of organizing and managing medical services throughout the world up until this conflict. And in Afghanistan, we got rid of triage. And we went to a system that you now see in most of your EMS systems out there also, but basically pushing the intellectual capital of a hospital to the front without pushing the people to the front. So sitting there doing first aid with a high school graduate corpsman who's got a iPad for lack of a better description of it, showing the doctor exactly what he's dealing with, exactly what's going on, the doctor saying patch that, turn it, plug that, get him on the truck. We went from a likelihood of survival in the 50 to 60% through all of the wars up until this time to better than 99% most of the time on the battlefield. The only reason we couldn't keep you alive and get you back was because you were pinned down by fires and we just couldn't get to you. That's a fundamental shift that's now being pushed over into the medical side. But it's that kind of activity that we're gonna have to push on in many forms, not just in the medical area. Large data, it's a fundamental shift in how we fight. For years, certainly for Pete and I, if you had a rifle squad of four soldiers, four Marines and a couple of Com guys in the medic along, you were sent out in the morning to patrol the road to see who shot at you, to figure out what was out there and what you were gonna have to do about it. Trolling, basically for the enemy. Today, we're really much closer to being predictive about where we go and what we take. We have, through these large data analytics, both forensic and predictive, we have moved to an age in which now with a reasonable 50-50 chance, we can tell you where an ambush is going to occur, what the manifestation of that ambush is gonna look like, and what you ought to have along in order to protect yourself. That's a fundamental shift and we're just at the infancy of a lot of that, as is the police now, as they use these types of techniques to start to understand what it is that's going on out there and what the likelihood is that we're going to be attacked. The four things, four or five things that were absolutely critical in my mind to this past 10 years, 12 years of conflict, one, it was paced by computational power. It was purely paced by computational power. That gave us the ability to look at data, gave us the ability to do fire control in ways, reach back, et cetera, in ways that we had never conceived of in the past. The fight was paced by computational power. I could tell you every time that we got a new chipset, exactly where I was gonna put it in order to give advantage on the battlefield. It was absolutely essential. So that was critical in it. We already talked about the move from platform-based solutions to sensors and open architectures that allowed you to put in what you actually needed for the fight you were in, not what somebody thought you might need 15 or 20 years prior. That was absolutely critical. DARPA, DARPA was incredible in our ability to gain advantage. Paired with DARPA, universities and small business. Small business and universities were the hotbeds of innovation for us and there was just no way around it. The willingness to take risk in small business in compared to larger businesses, the willingness to turn things at the 50% level rather than the 95% level made a huge difference and saved countless lives on the battlefield. And I don't know any other way to put it in. That was absolutely essential to the way we were doing business. And I think the last point I would make is that precision, all of the systems that we put together out there, reach back, all of these things. When historians look at this, if we've got the data reasonably right right now, this is one of the first conflicts, if not the first conflict in which the population of the affected nation grew in the fight. I don't know the implications of that quite frankly. So in other words, you usually look, don't take this as a sexist remark, you look at the males 17 to 35, that population historically in a fight dwindles to the point that the nation start to be willing to come to the table. That population grew through the entire 12 years in both these fights. Is that a result of precision and things like that? Yes, what are the implications for termination of conflict? What are the implications for what termination might look like as we go forward? And whether you're actually terminating or you're just finding some alternate venue by which to fight. I don't know the answer to that yet, but it is out there as an issue that we're gonna have to think about. We were talking earlier about schools, but in some ways these last 12 years we're gonna have to put a joint note to the plan. A mixed bang, a result of that on the one hand, as it really enforced some divisions and distrust that were, that could be papered over in the classroom that aren't as evident on the top ones as they're not quite high. And on the other hand, there were new relationships for the interdependence system. And this is also an area where a consensus that was open company. So let me ask you, when you're opening somebody, one did a mixed result on the joint discharge? Was it all positive? Was it 75, 25, one way or another? What are your sense of the fact? Okay. You know, my sense is that there was much more positive about joint than there was negative, number one. Number two, I probably know and this would be true of anybody out on the battlefield. More people in more countries armies, so to speak. Where they're, how they're doing, whether they're getting promoted, where they're getting stationed. In other words, the integration was much more at the combined level in this conflict than at the joint level. Now, that having been said, reflecting internally on joint, I think there were three areas where we eventually had to make a decision that joint was just not good enough for what we needed to be able to do. That was logistics, intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance, and the IED fight, and command and control with that IED fight. And so those three areas, we basically took out of the service world and moved them in to be horizontal across all of the services, but directed at the joint level. You will buy these things, you will attain these capabilities. The services then made sure that they fit in some logical way and that was not done without some pain, so to speak. At least long hours of meetings and whatnot. But clearly in those areas, we needed to move joint. I believe that we were too slow for all of the goodness that was done in the medical area moving to joint. And it was just a very difficult thing. Each of the services, in fact, do practice medicine in a different way. And so do I run up to somebody on the battlefield and go, oh, Navy, I'm sorry, move on? No. And so we worked hard and I'm relatively comfortable. We did well on the battlefield. We did well in the interim stop in Lawnstool, coming back, but once we got back in the States, it was an Army hospital, a Navy hospital, whatever, and it just, it didn't serve us well, and we needed to do better on that. I would argue the, joint is personified was Mike Mullen, when he came over as CNO and saw that the problem the Army was having with IEDs and the fact that we had did not have that skill and it got rid of the skill that so many of his fighter pilots had in electronic warfare. And basically went back home and within three weeks had found 220, I think if I remember the number right, pilots who never thought in the world that they were going to end up being over at Baghdad when Washington D.C. made the amazing decision to put an active jammer in the Marine Corps sector and a passive jammer with Army forces, saying that, well, the Marines are in the West. The Army's in a different place and it won't cause any problems. And I remember getting those two jammers down there and thank God for the Navy pilots, electronic warfare specialists that we had that allowed us to work through that problem. I think for those who were fighting, jointness was exactly what Goldwater Nichols envisioned. I think it became a little clouded once you got back into the building. I think it's fair to say we were late on AMRAP. We probably, and even months, it should have been probably at least two to six months to maybe a year before we should have looked at AMRAP but no one knew how they were going to pay for it until Congress gave us, I believe, $20 billion. That eased a lot of the concerns and Secretary Gates through amazing leadership kind of spearheaded that through. So I think we had our first vehicles deployed in under a year and a large number at the 18 month mark. The number one problem for me as a force provider in jointness was individual augmentees. Our ability, the Army's ability to provide the necessary number of individual augmentees for all the headquarters and other formations that grew out of adapting to the enemy caused us to go to the other services. And I think if there's any place where there was a little friction, it was the friction of listen, this is your responsibility, why aren't you doing it? Why are you coming to us and asking us for help? Albeit it was never requested, what was not met. But I found jointness probably a little bit harder to fully implement in the building and never hard to implement or lack of when you were down there where the bullets were flying. Not having had the personal battlefield experience that Pete had, but looking at it, as things unfolded, I think that there were occasions in which my own service was probably late to helping solve some problems. On the other hand, once we identified them, I think we jumped on it big time. I can recite a couple of specific incidents. One was when the chief went over and we saw what was happening with the supply runs from Kuwait up to Baghdad. And we had tactical air lift that we could have been making those runs with and taking those people off the roads and we just weren't doing it because we hadn't been asked to do it and nobody put it forth. And I think it was John Jumper who was the chief at the time who said, hey, look, this just doesn't make sense. And at the same time, you still had to have a certain amount of stuff moved by road. We had people, I can remember going around during the 2005, 2006 time frame on air bases where in past wars, if you went up to a kid who was a bus driver in a transportation squadron, the likelihood that that kid had been to combat was pretty rare. But because of the augmentation as drivers and these kinds of things, I used to ask these kids, how many times you've been in theater? And they'd say twice, whatever. I'd go to the club and I'd talk to the fighter guys and say, how many times you've been in theater? Well, we haven't been deployed yet. And so there was that kind of thing that was occurring. There was another element and then the other thing was when we tried to take, as General Cartwright pointed out, we had platforms that were designed and built 25 years before and it was the ability to take those things and do things that we never thought about before. For instance, when we took J-Stars and were able to take those J-Stars tracks and go back and see where these guys were coming out of the woodwork, it was amazing what you could do for the joint fight that you never thought about. And before we get off this, I would raise one other thing. And I think generally, this has been, this last 10 to 12 years, has been the first time in a long time that the total force, the Guard and the Reserve really stepped up in a big way. And every indication that I have is they did it very well. It helped in the battlefield itself, but it also helped with the tie back to the American public. But I give the Guard and Reserve of all the services kudos for the way they stepped up. I don't know, Pete, whether you... I think that's very appraisal. It helped with this whole op-tempo rotation thing. Without it, we would have driven everybody in the ground. One more quick question about, and General Fogelman, you touched on this a little bit in your earlier remarks, all right. And I think, General Carr, you did as well. What do you think that the primary takeaways from our last 12 years are for our friends, both those who fought with us and those who didn't, but might hopefully in the future, if we need them to, and adversaries. And adversaries, potential adversaries. What are their lessons? My sense is that everybody has gone to school on this that's out there as a friend or as an adversary. They see the networked approach that has been taken in a pretty significant way. They've seen the value of precision, they've seen the value of knowing where you are and being able to put effect exactly where we want it, the direction that we're heading in those areas. They will certainly look to thwart those kinds of capabilities or they will look to, okay, how do I afford to be part of that team? Both are going to be questions as we go forward. The good news from my perspective is, one, if we were to just stagnate right now and stay where we are, we might get five or 10 years of advantage, but there's no intent in stagnating. We are pressing ahead as a nation in the corporate sector as well as in the military sector for advantage in the information age. And our belief, at least the belief certainly that I've experienced while I was in the service and out, is that the information age is really to do for man what the industrial age did for the human body. In other words, steam engine, the internal combustion engine, et cetera, allowed us to do things that no matter how many people you masked in one place, you couldn't have done. We're gonna do the same in the cognitive side in the information age, the intellectual power that's going to be out there, whether it be computational on a chip or whether it be what we can apply to it, and the integration of that and putting the human being in the right place for the greatest amount of leverage is certainly the way we are thinking about business and the battlefield. And those types of things and the way we are heading are going to be paced good and bad at Moore's Law, not at Patton Law. It's going to turn over very fast and countries are worried about the ability to keep up. My sense, though, is we're gonna have to get over the fact that we're not the only smart people in the world. We're not producing the engineers that we need. We're going to find more and more challenge in that area and there are other smart capabilities that are going to emerge on the battlefield. That's a reality. That's not probably or maybe. That's going to happen. And the question is, can we, through all of the things that we do as a nation, maintain that cutting edge as we go forward? It'll be interesting to see. I'll take maybe a slightly different approach and talk about sort of a vulnerability of the U.S. because of a cultural thing. And that is, I think that friends and allies and foes and potential foes have probably taken notice of how much value the United States of America puts on a single life. And so it is one of the most precious things that we can do, but at the same time, if you are somebody who wants to rattle our cage or shake us, you don't have to necessarily target large groups of people or whatever, you can go after us one at a time or you can come up with a system to attack us in that way that makes us very vulnerable. Now, I'm not sure what the answer to that is. It's just a fact of life that we have to think our way through in the future as we look at that. And I think it has to do with some of the shaping that's going on in the thought process about, we're hearing, well, it'll be a long time before we put big armies on the ground somewhere again and these kinds of things. Unfortunately, we don't always get to vote on that. And so we can't just go in the basic assumption that that's gonna be fact as we go out there into the future. So that's one of these things that I think that we need to think about in a sense. The other is, as General Cartwright pointed out, I think we're very much into the great equalizer, the great leveler for the kinds of foes we're gonna face in the future most likely is going to be in the cyber in the electronic warfare area. These capabilities are not cheap, but you don't need massive infrastructure to go develop it and put it onto the battlefield. So this is an area that we really need to continue to pay attention to, I think. I think we really got it handed to us in the information area. I can't think of very many information battles that we won. We were constantly outflanked and beat to the punch by the enemy in the 24 months that I spent in Iraq. I used to, I loved hurricanes. Hurricanes were wonderful things because they are made for 24 hours new stations because they change every hour. They go a little further, you know, toward Florida or Louisiana or whatever. And I loved it when one formed, or two or three formed down the Atlantic because all attention went off of what we were doing. It literally went to that hurricane and that's what was covered. But the minute it either hit land or did a hook out into the Atlantic again, back they were back on us. And the enemy knew that. He knew that. He knew exactly how to react to it. He knew exactly how to set up a scene. He knew exactly how fast we would be able to react to it to get out information that we were gonna have to do an investigation if the investigation would take so long and there was no way that that investigation would be done. And we were working within a culture that the first story out no matter how right or wrong it was was a story that was gonna be believed even when you got a witness up in front of the media to explain, no, that's really not what happened. They kidnapped me and they were getting ready to kill me and the Americans came in and saved my life. I mean, it was absolutely amazing. And I think we as a democracy have to figure out how in this new information age we are going to begin to win those battles because there is so much of this fight that was fought out on that particular battlefield as opposed to the tactical or operational battlefield that many of us were focused on. So the enemy's gonna invest in hurricane suppression system? I'm a bad idea. Let me open it up to all of you. If I could just ask, we've got microphones I believe and if people could just identify themselves, say their name and identify themselves. So let's start right here in the middle just to make it hard for the microphone people right here. Here you go, right here. Yeah. Well, we want to record it, I think, so thanks. Gentlemen, thank you for your time. My name's Max Kaler, I'm majoring in the US Army. So my question is there's no doubt we need to return to fundamentals of war fighting, whether it may be individual or collective skills, but how do we take the lessons learned from the interagency process, having a massive mobilization of the interagency in Iraq and Afghanistan? How do we take those lessons learned and apply those to us returning to the war fighting skills that we need to do individually? Because what it seems like it's gonna happen, everybody's gonna go their own separate ways and we're gonna have to relearn all these lessons that we've had or establishes relationships again during the next conflict. Thank you. Now, my sense is one, there's gonna be some stuff that we wish we would have done more with and we'll set it by the wayside as we go through because we're not clairvoyant about what the next war oughta look like and we'll be accused of the last war. But some primary questions that we need to answer for ourselves. The first is, do we wanna go back to a maneuver force or do we wanna stay with the heavy force that we have? And I think for the most part, people are voting to go back to a maneuver force that it's easier to adapt and to move a maneuver force to a garrison or occupation force than the other way around. So that's likely. Then the next is, I don't wanna say roles and missions because that evokes some strong emotion but you have three forces basically in the United States. You have the strategic forces which today are defined as nuclear weapons. The question is, do we want them to be, they also have the responsibility for space, cyber and missile defense. So you have that group of force, you have general purpose forces which are the services for the most part raised and provided for. And then you have the special. What do we want the three of them to do? What does the balance look like and what does the range of their operations look like? So you understand what it is you're trying to do. My sense today would be that we're drawing down on the strategic forces but they're not going to zero. And strategic is gonna be more about distance or lack of distance and depth than it is about whether or not it's a nuclear weapon. In other words, they're gonna be conventional non-kinetic capabilities, missile defenses, et cetera that are going to be in the equation as we go forward. To buy the time to make up for the fact that there aren't hardly any countries left in the world that want American patches permanently stationed in their country. That's just a reality we're gonna have to deal with. What are we going to do about that in the ability to close with the adversary? The general purpose forces are going to have to be agile, have more maneuverability and more staying power over greater distances. That's just the way it's going to end up if we're going to have a capability to remain a global power and with global interests which in my sense is we are going to do that. And then the special forces, this is Cartwright's opinion only, are about the intersection between terrorism and state sponsored or state, these state wars. In other words, terrorism now has an intersection that allows it to have a lethality here to for only allowed in nation states that Westphalian mindset and construct. What are we gonna do about that intersection? It's likely that you're going to use special forces to basically say to the world, I can find you no matter where you are and I will find you. So how big do we need to be? Do they have a role in things like non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, I think they do? How do we want to equip them? And how do we go forward? I mean these are basic force, posture, force capability questions. What are the balances? Because right now if you just repopulate and go out and rebuy the strategic forces all over again, you can't afford anything else than the other two. If you keep the special forces just the way they are, then the general purpose forces are going to have to shrink substantially. So it needs to be a debate and we need to understand to do what and then understand the balance in the investment and the grand strategy side of how we're going to think about that as we go forward. General Crowley, do you wanna talk about the interagency piece? Talk about what? Interagency piece, sorry. I wasn't going to. Oh, good. But I'm sure you... Well, yeah. Do you want to? I'm about to give it up on it because I just don't think there's any stomach to go after it. But to me, there's a couple of issues here. The first one is that as you get old, you understand there are very few lessons learned. There's many lessons observed and a couple lessons learned. And it really resides with the generation that's gone through this. I had two tours in Iraq, but the small compared to many of the younger kids who had four, five, and six. But I did it as my last child was moving out of the house. I did not do it in an all-volunteer force with kids who were playing soccer and moving from kindergarten to third grade. If you would have told me on 911, okay, when I was in the building, when the plane crashed into the building, that we would be able to maintain this thing for 12 years and not have the recruiting and retention problems that we did not have, that Army aviators that you knew where they were gonna be on day 365, but on 366, they were gonna be back down range for six years straight. They were on a 12-month home, 12-month deployed rotation schedule. If you had told me we could do that and maintain this all-volunteer force, what's different now, and quit the comparisons to World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, what's different now is you have an all-volunteer force. And the real lessons, if you gotta focus, how are you gonna maintain that force? Because I think we're all pretty happy with less than 1% of the population fighting our wars for us. It seems that way anyways. I don't hear anybody calling, let's go back. Well, a couple of people are. That's okay. I really think we have to put some strong thought into, okay, how do we maintain young men like you who have gone through this and maintain you in the service as we go through this piece and what are the lessons that you're gonna remember so as you move up the chain for all the old folks who don't get them corrected, you make damn sure they are correct and they move from lessons observed to lessons learned quickly before people die. I would just pick up on one comment there, which is I think the all-volunteer force has served us very, very well. The problem we have going forward is it has become unaffordable at its present size and composition. So we really need to work this. I'm so pleased that my friend the general has decided to get on the compensation and policy committee. But seriously, I heard something the other day in a session with some senior people where they said that the budget right now, total personnel costs are about 40% of the budget and very soon they hit 60 and that's just squeezing everything else out. And so we gotta find a way to do this and not lose the quality of the people that we got. And I'm a guy, I don't begrudge any of the things that we gave to that force in terms of compensation and benefits, whatever, but it is just unsustainable for this country and so we have got to think about this very seriously. Go right here and then right there and over there and then we'll go back there. Colin Clark, Breaking Defense. General Cartwright, you're the guy who sparked the question so you can play with it first. You talked about how I'll interpret for you, essentially Goldwater Nichols is in many ways become irrelevant because of the speed of technology and the ways in which information are shared. There's been talk for what a decade at least about redoing it. Old laws that are irrelevant are ignored. Do we need to shift it? Can we tinker? Yeah, my sense is that the thought process, the intent behind Goldwater Nichols is certainly been the driving force that has given us a lot of advantage and capability. Now the question is, is there a counterpart? People have talked about a counterpart, Goldwater Nichols for the interagency is an example. My sense is that's tinkering with the Constitution and we've got to take a look at, and what I was trying to get at is do we really need to go that far? Can we get the leverage that we want and protect what is called in the Constitution the checks and balances, et cetera? And my belief is that we can, but we have to be careful about the oversight that we're going to skip or step aside from number one. And number two, unintended consequences in doing that. And so this is going to be something that is evolving it will not be, let's go down to Key West and change everything. And so the questions here probably are going to come more from the social aspects that we're going through right now in the information age. I mean, the ability to garner information in large quantities, process through it, find the needles in the A-stacks, et cetera, is going to come from the battlefield into the commercial sector, et cetera, and to government. What are the implications? What do we want there? What do we not want? We have a substantial amount of cultural adjustment as you always do when you change age, sometime ages, as we always do down through the generations. There's going to be a renaissance of some sort where we're going to have to think our way through how we do this stuff in the information age. It's not mature enough right now it's my belief to actually have that conversation today. But you can see it being forced on if you read the people like Toffler and whatnot. This transition goes on for a substantial, I think in terms of tens of years, and it generally sparks a lot of conflict. And there's nobody out there that's forecasting that we have stepped away and there's no longer any conflict. There are a lot of people out there who say, I don't want to be part of it anymore. Well, as somebody said already, you don't necessarily get the only vote on that. And so I think that we have a lot of cultural norms as we start to get into the computational power that opens up genomics, bio warfare, and it goes on and on. What are the implications of all of this and how does it fit together? And is this in line with the spirit of the founding fathers, but not necessarily written exactly right, so to speak, or ready for prime time? Let me, because we're running out of time here, I'm gonna get the three that I, if you could all ask your questions very briefly and then one more in the back and then we're gonna have to shut it down. I apologize. I can never remember it's real quick. I'll write them down. Okay. Okay, Steve. Go ahead. Steve Winters, security researcher. One thing that strikes me when I think back on Vietnam was that the enemy had a very clear face. For example, General Gheop recently passed. But when I think of Iraq and Afghanistan, I mean, from your standpoint, is there somebody you identify looking at it who's a figure of that stature? You always just hear about these nebulous people and even Zakawi, if you say he was, he was a disaster from the political standpoint. So you can't really even say, but from your standpoint, was there a personal face to the enemy or just little guys making IEDs out in the ways? I mean, who gets the credit for their success? Get the questions. Yeah. Okay, let me just get the questions first because I think my fear we won't get through them. Neil Cosby, consultant to DARPA. It strikes me that the political leadership of the country, the Hill, the White House and those in Pentagon, learn a different lesson. There seems to be, for the future, no boots on the ground. That seems to work okay for the Air Force, Navy, Army Air. But how about the Marine, Ground Forces, Marine and Army, yeah. Do they have an admission now in the future? And is that, are they working on robotic squads, robotic platoons, robotic companies? What's the future there? And then, right back there, that one right there. Thank you. Christine Vargas-Avison and Syce graduate, very simply put, as a communications professional, I'd be very interested to hear General Fogelman elaborate on the top three capabilities held, the top three capabilities you would like to see our information warriors develop because we certainly will need them for irregular warfare going forward. And then, in the back. Doug Morrison from Dupont Retired Army I'll put it simply, cyber. If we're gonna have reach back capabilities but yet extend the network down to the tactical edge, that opens the force up to a significant vulnerability. Okay, so let's start with the face of the enemy. Anybody? Yeah, that's been the challenge and always will remain the challenge of counterinsurgency number one. It rarely has a single face. And then the intersection of terrorism and state warfare in this empowered individual world that we're in is going to be a challenge. What's interesting here and supports your thesis to some extent is when you look at the Arab Spring, when you look at that, one, there isn't a Leflauenza or a Nelson Mandela to emerge and probably for very good reasons, very bad reasons really. They were eliminated so they couldn't emerge. Is that what we're gonna have to deal with as we go forward? We have to start to understand that mindset and the ability of crowds to act as causes for lack of crowd sourcing similar types. So I think that's gonna be your big challenge there. There were all kinds of faces that I looked at every day that were number one IED guys that we wanted to take out. I don't know if I can remember any of them right now, but there were plenty of them and there was definitely a face for the enemy at the time. I think the problem is we tend to think like that and I think for the American people, the face of the enemy was Osama bin Laden and once he left, everything was gonna be okay, which is the real issue here, it's not okay, okay? And there are still boards that are covered with faces like I used to look at of people that will soon be forgotten but are the enemy today and they continue to multiply over time. I guess I would look at the faces of the enemy a little bit from the look forward kind of thing because you get into this concept of the military is always accused of fighting the last war, being very poor at identifying the future enemy and the flip side of that is that you glob on to an obvious enemy before they are your enemy and you turn them into your enemy and so you do all your, you start postulating about all the capabilities you need is to do this, whether it's aerial denial or whatever it is and so you gotta watch that you're not too quick to identify the face of the enemy of the future. I think Pete said it right, I mean he had lots of faces, there are places of special ops that still have those boards, there are places around the world. So that would be my only caution on the face of the enemy and particularly as we start, whether we pivot, we rebalance whatever we do, we need to make sure that we don't over-commit. On the future of ground forces, I think this is cyclical, I really do. I mean as I sat there and prepared for testimony, I went back and looked at what happened after World War II, after Korea, after Vietnam, I remember after Desert Storm when we decided to take, go from 700 down to five or 450 or 480, Gordon Sullivan did a 30 minute tape in which the 32nd Chief Staff of the Army told us all 36 times in 32 minutes, I'll never forget it, no more Task Force Smiths, referring back to what had happened in Korea with Task Force Smith. I don't fear that there won't be another opportunity for ground forces, I hope there isn't, I hope my brethren in the Navy and the Air Force can handle this all by themselves, but I don't think that's realistic. I think there's gonna be a need, the key is, as pressure goes to take out the ground forces, how do you maintain a force that is relevant and most importantly, not a Task Force Smith, a force that when you call upon it, it is trained and ready to go. But again, we really need to think our way through. You cannot build up an all-volunteer force as quickly as you could a draft Army. You just can't do it. I mean, it took us a year and a half, okay, to grow 20,000 when we needed an strength increase because we were forced to come off stop loss. 20,000 privates to bring in, that's no leadership, it took us a year and a half to bring that force on and get it in position. It is a slow, slow process so we really need to think our way through that. And I bet it in your question, I think, was also this issue of presence on the battlefield. And I oftentimes, when I have this conversation, go back, there are some wonderful paintings of the Battle of Gettysburg. And you look at the frontage and you look at the muskets and the first thing that any soldier that goes up there and does a battlefield walk learns is I'm right there to you, okay, that's how it was. And there's always a second echelon right behind me and if you look at their weapons, they're pointed right at your back and that's what we had to do in a non-volunteer force, et cetera. We believed, certainly I did, well, probably not, but we believe the bomber guys coming from Guam were not really part of the war. They were way too far and they went back home and it was nice and it was wonderful. And we didn't send them to school and we didn't promote them the same way and we didn't give them medals until we finally had to understand that the fundamental shift that had occurred and it's continuing to occur. I mean, the battlefield itself now spans the earth. But I'll be the first to tell you everyone can jump in here. The people that we have in places in the United States that fly these remotely piloted aircraft have a higher suicide rate, a higher divorce rate, have PTSD from these fights and they have to take it home with their kids and their family every night. It is a different battlefield and I kind of push back and rebel a lot of times when people say, oh, they weren't really part of it. The question I think that's valid is outside of an area of conflict, are we going to stay with the congressionally past authorized use of military force, which means I can go into any country where I believe there is somebody who could come after us or who has shown a polypathy. Are we gonna stay with that concept and that law or are we going to shift back to something more normative which really is the law of armed conflict and areas of hostility declared, Congress saying this is a war, et cetera. I mean, that tension is out there right now. The question is where we're gonna go on it. But to the extent that we continue in this limbo area that we're in today with AUMF, then the question becomes, do I wanna put boots on the ground in a country I'm not at war with and be patrolling around there and what's my justification for doing that? It is not that I can't find a 19-year-old that's willing to take the risk. That's not the issue. The information warriors, what do we wanna have our future information warriors? There are probably many people better qualified to answer that question other than I would say that in general, we want people who understand what effective defense in the cyber business is and effective defense is not a rampart. It's not a wall that you're trying to put up to keep somebody from coming in. Effective defense really encompasses a tremendous amount of intelligence on battlefield intelligence in a sense. How's this person gonna try to attack me? What are the things that I can do to help defend my system? I think that's a very key part, if you will, is defensive tools, if you will. By the same token, I want to have offensive capabilities if I can that will go against what I understand to be their key nodes. And that, again, is intelligence preparation of the battlefield, what's important, what are just stalking horses, these kinds of things. So these are the kinds of tools, I think, that you want. And then, the third thing is not so much the responsibility of the information warriors or the cyber people, but it is a good understanding of what are the workarounds. In other words, what happens when the defense fails or the overhead constellations are brought down or whatever. We really need to pay some attention to what are the old-fashioned ways. It may not be motorcycles and messengers, but we may, on occasion, find ourselves there on the other hand, so. You know, and I would jump in. One of the more difficult things, at least for me, during this conflict was all of the, well, gosh, have you thought about what happens if, you know, what if GPS fails? What if, you know, on and on and on? And people wanting to go back to sections and start shooting and land nav and all of those things. Quite frankly, that likelihood is certainly possible. Certainly should have a strategy just like, you know, Hertz will have a fleet of X kind of cars, but then they'll have a smaller subset that's a different kind of car to protect against it. We do the same thing in weapons. We use, we have weapons that need GPS and we have weapons that don't need GPS. We have capabilities that require networks and we have capabilities that don't. So that isn't what paces warfare quite frankly. It is the breakout capability that gives you leverage and gives you advantage and surprises you in the face of your adversary to the point that your adversary can't quite figure out how you got where you got. Okay, and so you can't not do this stuff, but what you do want to do, which I think is what you're facing is think about it, think about the alternatives. My bias is that if you don't understand the offense, you cannot build a good defense, okay? You know, at the end of the day. And a defense only has never succeeded in any conflict. We were good at kicking this off in good military time and it failed somewhat because I'm civilian and ending it on time. Thank you all very much for staying with us. Thank you all so much for a great discussion.