 First of all, it's a great privilege to be here with so many friends. I mean, to see a lot of familiar faces here and to be sitting next to Jake Tapper, who did write a brilliant book called The Outpost, which is the experience of multiple units over time in a particular geographic area in Afghanistan. It's a book that I think brings out elements of the enduring nature of combat. So I thought what I might just offer up front are some thoughts about how the Army is thinking about future war. But first, I just want to thank Peter, I want to thank General Freakley, really ASU and this tremendous organization for bringing together a great group of experts to talk about, I think, a really important problem, which is the problem of future armed conflict. And I think it's important, particularly in timely conference, because of the threats that we can see so clearly to international security and national security. And I think those threats, I think we can identify them as coming both from really nation states, adversarial states, as well as non-state actors and the emergence of what so many have called really this hybrid threat of really the confluence between networked insurgent and terrorist type organizations now bridging over into transnational organized crime networks, but tied to nation states and really having access to capabilities that they didn't have access to in the past. And so we're fighting these so-called hybrid enemies and networked organizations that have capabilities previously associated only with the fielded forces of nation states. And those capabilities, as we know, involve communications, the ability to mobilize resources, and access to very destructive technologies. And so it's a very important time because we are at risk, I think. We are at risk by the various groups that we see in the greater Middle East and ISIL in particular these days who are advancing a medieval, anti-Western, anti-human, I would say, ideology, and are, in fact, the enemies of all civilized people. And we also see other developments today such as Russia's actions in Ukraine where they're using unconventional forces under the cover of conventional forces to change the geopolitical landscape in Europe and to change really the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass. So these are just a couple of examples. So super important conference, so glad to be able to participate in it. And I think what I would just say up front is I think how we think about future war is vitally important. And if we think about really how to think about future war, I think really about two main observations. The first is that we have to balance both continuity in the nature of war with change in the character of warfare and maybe not confuse the two. I think when we get in trouble is when we neglect continuities in the nature of war. War is an extension of politics. War is human dimension. War is inherent or imminent uncertainty based on the continuous interaction with the enemy and these very complex environments based on politics and the human dimension. And then war is a contest of wills. And so we have to think about continuity and do it with the historian Carl Becker said. He said the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future should walk hand in hand in a happy way. And so as we think about changes in the character of warfare, I think we ought to do it in the way that Sir Michael Howard suggested. Think about war and warfare in width, depth and in context. In width over time so you can see changes over time and understand both possibilities and limitations for example of technology. Look at conflict in depth like Jake's book on the outpost where you look at a very specific area and a campaign in depth and then sort of the tidy outlines of war from an academic perspective kind of dissolve and you see war as it is, right, chaotic, profoundly human. And then to consider war in context, context of what we have to achieve politically in armed conflict. Context of the military's role in society. Context of really a society's will and how we generate and sustain the will to confront increasingly determined, brutal and capable enemies and adversaries. So I think the two things I would just stress is continuity and change and thinking about war and warfare in width, depth and context as Sir Michael Howard recommended. Thank you. It's an honor to be here and thank you so much for having me and it's especially an honor to be talking to Lieutenant General McMaster. I want to read something to you and get your reaction to it. In Iraq and Afghanistan, gaps between prior visions of future warfare and the nature of the eventual wars themselves, complicated efforts to adapt strategy over time. Minimalist linear plans in place at the outset of both wars were disconnected from the ambition of broader policy objectives and the complexity of the operating environment. Indeed, recent war plans have at times been essentially narcissistic, failing to account for interactions with determined enemies and other complicating variables. In extreme cases, plans were based on the assumption that a war would end with the disengagement of one party to the conflict. The author is you. What do you mean by narcissistic? What I mean is we tend to define the problem of war and warfare in relation to us and what we would like to do and also in relation to how we would like war to be. And so what typically you hear when we neglect continuities in the nature of war is really, really the next war will be fundamentally different from all wars that have gone before it. And it's typically due to an over promise of technology, technological advantages, whether it is in the 1990s, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs and the orthodoxy associated with what became the Defense Transformation Movement. Remember, future wars were going to be fast, cheap, efficient. We were going to conduct something called rapid decisive operations, which is sort of like the George Costanza approach to war. You just leave on a high note. You just go and do some military things and then leave. And then the language was hubristic in large measure because we didn't give agency to the enemy. So this is one of those continuities in the nature of war. There was uncertainty because of its political and human dimensions, but war is uncertain fundamentally because of the continuous action with determined enemies who really are adapting continuously, who are evolving conflicts in ways that you don't understand at the outset. And so recognizing that interaction with the enemy then I think leads to a more humble sort of understanding of what you can achieve through technological prowess. And I think for the U.S. military in particular, what we have to take from that example really, I think that setup of that ideology and defense theory of the 90s for the difficulties we encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have to recognize that we have to learn lessons from that. And so I would say that we can learn quite a bit. As I mentioned up front, this is an important time for this conference because of the threats we see emerging to international and national security. It's also an important time because we have a tremendous opportunity to consolidate lessons of 13 years of war. And there's an old saying, hey the military, they're always ready to fight the last war. Well really if you look historically at military experience, those who were least prepared for the war that they embark upon were those who studied the last war only superficially. And so I think what we have to really do is study our most recent experiences and I think one of the things we relearned was that we have to pay adequate attention to continuities in the nature of war. And it's important for planning in wars, so that you're undertaking military operations, conducting military operations to get to sustainable outcomes consistent with your vital interests that you're acknowledging that your enemies are going to fight against you in ways you may not expect. Conrad Crane said there are two ways to fight the US military, asymmetrically and stupid. Now you may want to hope that people pick stupid, but they likely will not. And so the key is how do you seize, retain, exploit the initiative over the enemy. How do you continuously adapt? And so that's important for conducting campaigns, conducting operations in war, but it's also important in between wars. And I'd say we're not really in between wars right now, but if one day we are in between wars, then we have to recognize that in between wars, we interact with potential adversaries as well. And so if we take this narcissistic approach, and we define an objective, hey, here's where we're going to be in the future. Remember in the 1990s some of the language was that we're just going to be so darn good, so capable that we will lock the enemy out of the market of future conflict. They won't even mess with us, we'll be so bad, you know. And so of course if you bank on a narrow suite of capabilities and technological advantage as the principal element of your differential advantage over future enemies, your enemies are going to figure it out. They're going to figure out how to bypass that strength. So what's American military power? First of all is joint power. It's using land, air, maritime, now cyber forces space together. It's how we combine things in this game of rock, paper, scissors, you know, which is war. And American, I think Americans' differential advantage over the enemy has to do with skilled soldiers and teams, skilled sailors, airmen, Marines, and teams with multiple technologies that give us that differential advantage. There are three conflicts going on right now that almost could have been taken from a war textbook, perhaps written by you five years ago, ISIS, Ukraine, North Korea. And I'm wondering how you think we could have, if you could go back in that time machine and better prepare, how could we be better fighting ISIS? I'll do each one of them one by one. But it doesn't feel as though the United States and the coalition are even close to really posing a significant challenge to the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and indeed throughout from Algeria to Afghanistan. Right, okay, so you gave three, I think, great examples of the complexity of war, right? And I think one of the main lessons from the experience in the greater Middle East broadly and the catastrophe that's happening there, and this applies to our experience in Iraq, is that in Iraq, the competition with our enemies was very complicated because of the political and the human drivers of that conflict. And so what it was important for us, I think in a period of time during which we adapted to the way that campaign had evolved, was to understand what was driving that conflict politically and develop a political strategy as the foundation for all other activities to be able to address those drivers of the conflict. And so in Iraq, I think it's a great study to look at the evolution of a conflict over time from what was initially a decentralized, localized hybrid insurgency that coalesced over time. An insurgency for which we weren't prepared because we didn't plan for anything really beyond unseating the regime. We didn't plan adequately, I think, is fair to say. And so as a result that some of the actions that we took initially against the former members of the regime and BATS has actually tended to help justify really this growing insurgency and inflame the situation. That insurgency changed its tactics over time. Remember, hey, just kill some Americans and they'll leave. Well, that didn't work. It was the whole Black Hawk down idea that Saddam had. Then later it was destroy infrastructure, right? The whole Lenin thing, the worst, the better. Grow pools of popular discontent from which the insurgency could draw strength. And then Zarkawi, as this insurgency morphs now with this alliance of convenience between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the former regime elements, they systematically went after Iraqi security forces because they saw them as a real danger to their strategy. But then ultimately the strategy became what Zarkawi called the Afghan model. We called it in December of 03, jump-start a civil war, pit-arrest communities against each other. And then we can portray ourselves as patrons and protectors of one of those parties to the conflict, mainly the Sunni-Arab and Turkmen populations. And then mass murder against the Shia population, drive them further away from any kind of a political accommodation, invite retribution attacks that can be used as justification, right? For you as a patron and protector. This is essentially the same sort of technique that is being used across the region. In Syria I think you see the same dynamics in Yemen, you see the same dynamics in Nigeria, you see the same dynamics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, where our enemies, I mean those who, these transnational terrorist organizations pick communities against each other and then they use a local conflict, a local competition for power, resources and survival to gain a foothold as a patron and protector. They establish control through a whole bunch of control mechanisms, intimidation, coercion and so forth. And then solidify their control over people and territory. And so I think we can learn from the evolution of the conflict and our response to that. Now what is left in Iraq in terms of potential for the kind of fragile political accommodation that set conditions for reversal of the deterioration of that situation in 2007, 2008 remains to be seen. And that's really the big political challenge. In Ukraine, I think Ukraine is an example of the importance of forward deterrence against a power that is going to wage limited war for limited objectives. And I think Yaakov Griegel's work on this is probably extraordinary in terms of really clear thinking about the problem of Putin, Russia and the use of his armed forces there. So limited war for limited objectives, go into Ukraine, take some territory at very low cost with very low risk and then portray the international community's reaction as escalatory. So how do you cope with that? I would say, you know, I'm in the Army, you know, I say one of the ways you do that is forward deterrence, right? You have to ratchet the price up of taking action like that at the frontier or else it's very difficult to defend against that. And of course standoff capabilities, joint capabilities have application, but I think we undervalue you know, deterrent military capabilities at our own peril. We can make much more dangerous contingencies apparent. North Korea would say it's an example. We'll get to North Korea. So I just want to go back to, okay, I'll do Ukraine and then I'll go back to ISIS. So do you think that the United States or the coalition, or not the coalition, the United States or NATO should have armed the Ukrainian military months ago? No, I can't. I mean, obviously it's a policy decision and there are all sorts of complicating factors politically. Again, war is an extension of politics. I'm just using it as an example, you know, of really, of any power waging limited war for limited objectives in terms of security, stability, preventing conflict, forward deterrence, you know, is an important element of that kind of a solution. So how it applies to Ukraine, they're much better experts than me and obviously this is a policy decision. Okay, I understand you can't get into policy decisions, but in terms of ISIS, in terms of fighting ISIS, it does seem that a campaign that is limited to coalition airstrikes and whatever military might can be assembled from the Pereshmerga, the Free Syrian Army, if there's anyone there who's actually doing anything, and then obviously the Iraqi army, those who are still willing to go to the front, is insufficient. Right, well I think one of the key things to then look at is, you know, how are the continuities in nature we're playing out there? So for example, if war is an extension of politics and we're trying to do a sustainable political outcome, what are the broad range of actions necessary to be able to get to that political outcome, either done by ourselves or through proxy forces and partner forces? One of the key questions has to do with, you know, with the human dimensions of that conflict. What is the degree to which the Sunni Arab population under such duress, having been, you know, under such terrible conditions for now so long, how can that be pieced back together so you can have Sunni Arab participation in the future security, in their future security, and then a slow reform of Iraqi politics and of course, you know, Iraqi security institutions such that they have the capability they need, but also the legitimacy, and this bleeds over into war as a contest of wills, right? Is the will there among forces that we're supporting to be able to confront this brutal and determined enemy? And I think that we've got obviously a great team working on that, a great multinational team working on that with new Iraqi leadership and Haider al-Badi who I've got a lot of respect for as a person, worked with him over the years there. Of course, he has a tall order. It's complicated further by infiltration and subversion into the Iraqi government and security forces by Shi'i Islamist militias and those in particular that are beholden to the Islamic Revolution and Guards Corps of Iran, which I think has in large measure, you know, created the conditions that led to a return of large-scale communal conflict in the country. So, I mean, I don't know how to sum all this up. It's complicated as hell. It has a lot to do with, I think, our thinking has to be aligned with sort of the continuities in the nature of war, what we want to achieve politically, what is driving the conflict from a human perspective and, you know, people fight for the same fundamental reasons today, right? As Thucydides identified 2,500 years ago, fear, sense of honor and interest, right? What are the drivers of those local conflicts across different portions of Iraq recognizing war is uncertainty? There's going to be a continuous interaction with this enemy and recognize especially war is a contest of wills. And I think all of this helps you understand what can be achieved through partner forces and proxy forces and maybe what can't, you know, based on what, you know, a political scientist called principal agent problems, you know, that tend to be pretty significant in these situations. In terms of North Korea, it's obviously not news to anybody in this room that a cyber attack was pending. I guess Admiral Rogers here yesterday told my colleague, Yanchudo, that the only thing they didn't know is that it would be attack on a movie studio that actually had such an effect, but these cyber attacks have been going on for quite some time. How could we be better prepared for the future? Do we need to integrate private and public more efficiently? Where's the weakness there? Right. Well, I deferred it to Admiral Rogers, you know, who's, I think, exactly the right leader at the right time for this very complicated problem set. And within the Army, Ed Cardone is our lead. For the Army, what we're looking at is really hard, and what are the tactical implications of the cyber space and what do we need to achieve in context of what we, in the Army, are calling joint combined arms operations, really, how we're going to operate in the future in this game of rock, paper, scissors, and what kind of cyber tools do we need? And so essentially, we have to try to be able to do three things in cyber space to support, I think, what we're doing militarily. The first of these is we've got to obviously defend our own networks and our capabilities. And this, again, gets to this continuous interaction with the enemy, right? Our enemies will do four essential things to us, I think, in the future. The first of these is they will evade our capabilities, right? So if you think you're going to have a quick answer to the problem of future war, I mean, enemies will evade that. And especially on land, I mean, land warfare is different, right? Because, I mean, there are a couple of complicated things. Geography complicates things. On land, it's not really a targeting exercise. I mean, I think on land you have typically tens of thousands of so-called targets, which they're not their people, all of whom are trying to avoid being classified as such, right? So you have them taking sort of countermeasures to evade your capabilities of dispersion, concealment, intermingling with civilian population deception. The second thing I think we'll see is enemies disrupting our capabilities. And this is where cyber attacks, I think, are a threat, but also other capabilities. You know, UAV-type capabilities, maybe swarm capabilities with autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, long-range precision munitions, tied to commercially available satellite imagery, weapons of mass destruction. I mean, these are all things EMP-type capabilities. These are things that can really disrupt what they see as our asymmetrical advantages. So evade, disrupt. The third thing is they're going to emulate our capabilities. And I think that there's a school of thought out there that we can maintain our differential advantage as a military force, as a joint force, by investing in high-end technologies. And that will deliver our capabilities in the future. But I think you could make the argument that technology is the most transferable element of our differential advantage to our enemies. So I think we're going to see more and more emulation in cyber and in other areas. And then the fourth area is our enemies will go into other battlegrounds. They will expand into other battlegrounds. And those battlegrounds are cyberspace, certainly. I think space and the maritime domains are going to be a lot more challenged than they have in the past. We've been able to achieve and maintain supremacy there. And we're also going to see that expansion into battlegrounds of political infiltration, subversion, and so forth. So cyber, we have to protect our ability to operate. We have to use cyber to better understand our enemies, how they're operating, what are their sources of strength, what are their vulnerabilities. And this is big data-type tool sets, but it's also really understanding social media and the dynamics there. I mean, if you look at what this team at the Institute for the Study of War does to advance our understanding of a very complex situation in Syria and Iraq, it's astounding. And they're getting it all off social media. So understanding is the third, and the third is to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to limit the enemy's ability to use it. So I think cyberspace is analogous to those other domains where you want to ensure your own freedom of movement and action in those domains, whether it's the maritime, air, space domain, land, and want to restrict the enemy's freedom of movement and action. So what are the tools at the tactical level that we need to do that? We're developing those. I think if you look at military innovation, I think people will look back at this period years from now and look at Army Cyber Command as an example of well-executed innovation. And I think General Cardone, as I mentioned, he's doing a tremendous job and a very forward-looking effort to develop that capability within our Army. I have a lot more questions, but I also know that we only have 17 minutes and 17 seconds, so I will open up the floor and I'll call on you if you could stand up, state your name, if you're with a publication or a media organization, state that, and then you can go ahead. I'll start with you in the front row. Is there a microphone? Here we go. Thank you very much. Patrick Tucker from Defense One. So General, the other day at the Defense Writers Group, you were talking about what happened in Iraq and the failure of the Iraqi government to consolidate gains and how this was something that eventually led to a power vacuum that was eventually filled in part by ISIS. You don't write policy, you've made it very clear. The most recent authorization for the use of force in Iraq. There's nothing in it that speaks to consolidating gains. There's a small carve out for some special operations. To your mind, we've since then said that we are going to train like a group of 20,000 Iraqi security forces, Kurds, to move into Mosul. So that seems like a potential place for some gain consolidation. But to your mind, knowing that you don't write policy, does the most current version of the authorization proposal that's coming around make room to attack this problem the way you would attack it? Well, I mean, I think the key thing is that there obviously is a requirement to consolidate gains. And this is one of the things that we highlight in the Army Operating Concept. If you just Google Army Operating Concept, it's a real page turner if you want to read about. The Army's view of the problem of future armed conflict. I have it right here. And I'd really welcome any feedback you have on it. But we talk about the need for consolidation of gains. And I think this is one of those clear, important lessons from the last 13 years of war. Now, who consolidates gains? I mean, it shouldn't matter as long as you're getting to that sustainable political outcome consistent with your interests. And what's necessary to consolidate gains? There always has been military support to indigenous security forces who take on increasing responsibility, the development of security forces that are capable, but also legitimate and trusted by the population. It's military support to governance and rule of law consistent with the traditions of that society and the history of that society so that you can deny the enemy really the ability to operate freely amongst those populations. Now, if you could say, well, that sounds like a reinvention of Iraq and Afghanistan. Well, I mean, I think that the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan, what we learn is going to be super important. And I personally believe the lesson is that we did not do it the way we could have done it. I mean, we could have done it more effectively, but because we didn't plan for it effectively, because we didn't recognize that this was an enduring requirement in a post-conflict situation, we were unable to consolidate gains effectively, and that created opportunities for our enemies to gain strength, and we could go into more detail about both if you'd like later. But the lesson for today is somebody has to consolidate gains, and we've always had to do it. If you look across our history, American military forces, except in conflicts where the political objective was very narrowly circumscribed, we've had to consolidate gains. The commander-in-chief likes to go, boy, girl, boy, girl. I'll follow his lead if there's a woman who wants to ask a question. You are definitely not a woman. Yes, ma'am, back there. So you should have come and dragged is what you should have done. I want to hear your question asked. Good morning. Erin Simpson from Keras Associates. HR, you've talked a lot about the enduring nature of warfare this morning. I wonder if you could highlight some of those things you think are definitely changing, and both where the Army and where the Joint Force more broadly needs to adapt to account for those changes. Well, those are great questions. Okay, so what is changing? I think the way we're thinking about future war is in four key areas, right? A lot of fours we use in training a doctrine of command. The first of those is threats, enemies, and adversaries in future operating environments. What is changing about that? I mentioned some of this already, that we see the outlines of that today. I think we've seen harbingers of future conflict in connection with the so-called hybrid enemies, but networked enemy organizations have the capabilities previously associated only with nation states and can do those four things, right? They can avoid our capabilities, disrupt our capabilities. They can emulate our capabilities and expand on to other battlegrounds. You know, the so-called hybrid warfare of Russia, or the very sophisticated, you know, sort of political subversion and infiltration that you see maybe the IRGC and its related organizations conducting the Greater Middle East. So I think that's what we have to be prepared for in terms of threats, enemies, and adversaries. And I'll talk about technology that was separately. Missions, what kind of missions are we going to have to conduct in the future? There's been a lot really discussed about anti-access area denial type capabilities, and that is significant. So part of our missions, I think, are going to be to ensure our freedom of maneuver and action in increasingly contested environments and across all domains. So for the Army, the implication is that we'll have to conduct operations on land for what you'll always need in Army for, right, which is to feed enemy organizations, to establish control of territory, to do what well to deny its use to the enemy oftentimes, but also to consolidate gains to get the sustainable political outcomes. But increasingly, Army forces, I think we're going to have to operate in a way where we can then project power outward from land into the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains to ensure our freedom of movement and action in those domains and then restrict the enemy's activities there. I think the other key mission is we're going to see a lot of bad things that can be delivered at long range emanating from enemy territory and increasingly urban areas. And, you know, Dave Kilcoyle and I saw here today, you know, we wrote a great book about, you know, increasing urbanization and threats that emanate from urban. So why do we care about urban areas? Well, I mean, we care because what could draw us there, terrorist safe havens and support bases, long-range ballistic missile capabilities tied to weapons and mass destruction, cities as launching pads, essentially. So for the Army, I think that we're going to have to conduct what we call expeditionary maneuver and that's rapidly deploying forces into unexpected locations to maybe bypass anti-access. But that can't be a force that just gets there. It's got to be a force that has mobility, protection, and lethality to get the job done that can transition quickly. And then the third area that we're thinking about is technology. Some technologies that we're developing will give us those kind of expeditionary maneuver capabilities. I mean, this is demand reduction, power and energy technologies. You know, we are working hard on our ballistic missile defense type capabilities and our air defense type capabilities. We're integrating autonomous and semi-autonomous systems so that the forces that we want to deploy in the future for the Army, we want those forces to really be able to operate widely dispersed with decentralized capabilities, but to do that while maintaining what we call mutual support, right? So you're not trying to create multiple little bighorns simultaneously, right? You want to be able to fight together and to support each other. Essentially what we're thinking about is air-ground joint teams is elevating the tactics of infiltration to the operational level. To operate dispersed, but be able to concentrate against enemies. To be able to defeat those enemies and then be able to establish control of territories, all in the context of joint operations. Technology is going to help us do that, but we have to recognize what enemy technologies are and we have to recognize countermeasures to our technologies. Again, rock-paper-scissors, right? Submarine sonar, bomber radar, machine gun tank, tank anti-tank missile, right? There's no silver bullet in this game, okay? It's combinations of capabilities. And then the final thing that we look at is history and lessons learned because we think that the way to think about the future, Aaron, is to walk backward into it, like the ancient Greeks, right? To pay attention to what's going on these days. So I think that, you know, I ask you to participate in our Army's thinking about future war. Sir Michael Howard said, hey, you're going to be wrong. No matter how well you think about future war, you're just going to be wrong. The key is to not be so far off the mark that you can't adjust to the real demands of conflict once they're revealed to you. So how do you do that? I think you do that by, you know, by asking the right questions, thank you. And so what we've tried to do in our Army is establish a framework of 20 questions. These are first-order questions, the answers to which will improve current and future force combat effectiveness. These are portrayed as first-order capabilities in Annex B of the highly readable Army operating concept. And these are enduring problems for the Army. And this is really, for this group, we would love to work with all of you on how well we think we can do that and how each of those challenges, meet those challenges, and how we might be able to do it better in the future. Jen, we have eight minutes left. Just a quick follow-up if you could give. It's exactly if possible, so we can get to some more questions. Give me a hypothetical of what you're talking about when you talk about bad things emanating from an urban environment. What exactly is a realistic idea of what you're talking about? I think there are some historical analogies that we ought to keep in mind. The V-1 and V-2 threat to London and World War II. The Skud missile threat out of the western desert of Iraq in 1991, the threat to Israel. The threat of rockets from Gaza and from southern Lebanon to Israel is analogous as well. I think we're going to see more and more of that, because we have long-range weapons systems that threaten us and our allies. And so this A2AD capability is very important. But we've defined it in a way that really it's just to keep us out, right? Because remember, we're so bad, right? But it's also an offensive threat. It's a coercive threat. And so just as you couldn't solve any of those other historical long-range weapons capability, those threats in the past, by standoff capabilities alone, I think that you're not going to be able to do it in the future either. In our Army's future force development, that's why we're emphasizing two really elements of the concept. Expeditionary maneuver and joint combined arms operations. Okay, the gentleman in the green sweater has been very patient. The green turtleneck in the red sweater has been very patient. I'm Harlan Alman, HR. That was a brilliant summary of warfare. Thank you. I'm going to ask you a career-ending question, so be prepared. You talked about... I'm overdue, Harlan. No, you're not. You've got a long way to go, HR. If you were to update dereliction of duty, which for those of you who haven't read it, was a stunning critique of Vietnam in terms of continuity and change today in 14 years of war, what might you have to say if you're prepared to say anything? Well, I mean, the book I wrote was about... which is also a real page-turner too, by the way. It was about how and why Vietnam became an American war and how decisions were made that led to an American war in Vietnam. And from the research, I was able to identify really problems that undermined our ability to think clearly about the problems in Vietnam and develop a strategy. And it resulted really in a situation in which we went to war without a clear strategy, without an ability to connect what we were doing militarily to sustainable political outcomes there. And it led also to a failure to consider long-term costs and consequences as a result of a number of factors. One was a difficult civil-military relationship. There's blame on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well, who actually compromise principle for expediency in some cases or for corporateness. Some of these problems then led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There's a much different civil-military dynamic, a different way that civilian leaders can gain access to military advice. But I think the bottom line is, hey, what's the role of the military in these sort of situations? I mean, your role is to give your best military advice, right? And not cross the line between advice and advocacy of policy. Nobody elects generals, right? I mean, to make policy. I mean, we would escape, you know, sort of a responsibility to the American public. It's our civilian officials who have that responsibility. So that's what we owe, and that's why for military officers, we have to be able to think clearly about future war. We have to study it with depth and context. We will benefit tremendously from forums like this and from the tremendous knowledge and experience that's brought together here. And so I think for me, you know, what I want to emphasize inside of our Army, and this is consistent with General Ordeano, who you're going to have a real treat of hearing from him tomorrow, is, you know, his number one priority is leader development. And that's leader development so that we can do what we need to do tactically in the Coral and Gall Valley, right? And the great story that Jake told, we have to be able to conduct fire and maneuver, combined arms operations. We have to be able to defeat our enemies in close combat. And we have to develop those core competencies in our junior officers. But from the very early time, our officers and NCOs have got to be thinking about how do you connect what you're doing to that political outcome? That might sound crazy, but I think what we owe our soldiers and a test of good strategy is, can you answer this question? Can you explain to your soldiers how the risks that they're taking and the sacrifices they're making are contributing to an outcome worthy of those risks and worthy of those sacrifices? And so I think we could become better at strategy. We have to be better at communicating it. We have to be better at communicating the nature of the conflicts we're in. I mean, how many Americans could name the three Taliban groups that we're fighting in Afghanistan, even? So it's tough to generate the kind of understanding across our nation, but then also even within our military oftentimes, on who we're fighting, what are the stakes, right? Why is this worth it? And then how is what we're doing going to get to that sustainable and worthy outcome? I mean, I believe that we are engaged in sort of righteous causes right now, okay? And I think it's okay for us to want to win against these misogynistic, murderous bastards that we're fighting in the greater Middle East. And so I think that we ought to be unabashed about it and we ought to really define what winning is, okay? It's not. And MacArthur's lifting of all restrictions on force, but it is a rational determination to succeed and it's a clear idea of how what we're doing militarily is connected, right? To all the other elements of national power that are directed at achieving that sustainable and worthy outcome. So I think if there's a big lesson that you can take from really across multiple conflicts is that clarity in our strategic thinking and planning is something that we can all work on, you know, across civil military teams, multinational teams. I think I heard in there a very diplomatic answer to what you asked. And I'm looking forward to the next book. Presumably after you retire. We have time for one more question. Is there a woman that has a question in the Boy, Girl, Boy, or your own? She's right here, actually. I'm sorry? She's right behind this silver-haired gentleman. Oh, there you are, okay. My name is Martina Vandenberg. I'm an international human rights lawyer. And this panel is called Continuities in Change in Future Arm Conflict. But I'm wondering as you talk about strategy and as you develop the sort of tactics of the future, what's the role of international law? Is international law keeping up? Are there discussions about this? What about the Geneva Conventions and how we're training our future warfighters to actually fight in a way that's consistent with international law? Right. Well, you bring up a really great point. I think international law is behind based on the nature of the enemies who we've been fighting. But I think that really what's important is moral, ethical, and psychological preparation of soldiers and units for combat in these very complicated environments, environments where the enemies intermingle with civilian populations, and in these environments of persistent danger. So I think legal sort of restrictions on the use of force are super important, obviously, right? Because they are what helps make war less inhumane, right? But also, you know, we have to go beyond that. We have to inculcate into our soldiers our values in our army, our warrior ethos. Because it is that warrior ethos that allows you to, you know, to operate effectively in these complex environments. And the story that's been untold, I think, about the wars both in Iraq and Afghanistan is how many times, every day, do our soldiers take on greater risk, and our Marines take on greater risk so that they can protect civilians, you know? And so I think that what we have done is inculcated into our force, really an understanding of the importance of moral, ethical, and psychological preparation for combat. And that is, you know, from a, you know, the ethical preparation is really building across our army. What do we expect of each other? What do you expect of the soldier, the man or woman next to you, in terms of their conduct in combat? Vis-a-vis civilians, vis-a-vis the enemy, captured enemy, right? And we have to do this from kind of a John Stuart Mill kind of utilitarian perspective, right? That every time you, you know, you take action in a way that's against your values, you might as well be working for the enemy, right? But also from a Kantian sort of manners and ends and a recognition of our values and that we can't violate our values or we may have lost already, right? So I think our army is very focused on this. I know all of our services are very focused on moral, ethical, and psychological preparation. A lot of this is also education. It's learning about the histories and the cultures of the regions. I think a deliberate effort to cultivate empathy is very important as you go into these very complicated environments. And I think that we've made tremendous progress on it, but we have to continuously get better at it. So I think it's a great question. I think our legal frameworks are dated. Our enemies know how to operate around them in so-called law fair and so forth. But I think that what's equally important is maybe even more important is moral and ethical preparation as well as understanding legal constraints and standards in terms of soldier behavior and combat. I'm afraid that's all the time we have. Thank you so much to Lieutenant General McMaster. It was really great hearing from you. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.