 Okay, thank you. Aloha. Welcome back. As Mike said, we have all the answers in this panel, so stay tuned, get your notebooks out. The organizers did try to put some logic behind the first panel and the second panel, but we didn't really spend a lot of time discussing scenarios in the first panel, and we've told both of our speakers that essentially they can talk about whatever they want to talk about as long as it somehow ties to the alliances and challenges. I think there are a couple of far-reaching questions. One question that we heard in the first panel was, while the U.S. may be the only country really still capable of leading, are we willing to lead? Are we prepared to lead? I think we can all reach our own conclusions on that, but the companion question is, is Japan prepared and willing to take a more active leadership role? And is the region prepared for Japan to do so? And I hope we will look at that question during this session. I think a companion question to that is whether the perception, at least of many that Japan has been looking backwards, will impede its ability to move forward or to be accepted as a leader? So I think these are questions that are useful to ask at the macro level. At the micro level, I think there was a very specific question about what can we be doing, what should be we be doing in the South China Sea. There was a comment by, I think, an over-exuberant U.S. Admiral talking about Japanese P3s patrolling in the South China Sea. I'm not sure that's really what we were looking for, but it'll be interesting to hear both speakers' views on that. And there were a few things that were not mentioned. I think the role of India in all of this really didn't come up, but there has been, I think, a lot of efforts between the U.S. and Japan to involve Australia and India in greater involvement in trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation. There's also one of my favorite topics, which is what's going on or what could be going on in Central Asia. At some point, Mr. Putin is going to be blocked from moving any further to the West and then maybe start looking toward the South. Here he's going to run into Chinese influences. Does the U.S. and Japan have a role there? Do we just sit back and watch a new great game evolve between Russia and China and wish them both well? Finally, I want to, first of all, commend Japan for the outstanding efforts that we've already seen by the Japanese government to try to provide support and stability in the Middle East in response to the ISIS threat. Also, very much commiserate with Japan for the horrific treatment of two Japanese citizens. I would ask the question, at least to Nogami-san, whether or not this ISIS incident will cause Japanese people to be less willing to get involved overseas or whether it will provide a stimulant for them to become more involved due to the outrage over those actions. I think there are a lot of topics and questions, others that I'm sure you have on your mind. We didn't hear at all about economic dimensions in any great degree, but I'm delighted that Nogami-san has said that he will address during his remarks a TPP, since I think this has security as well as economic implications and is one of the challenges we face. At this point, let me turn it over to Nogami-san for your comments. Thank you. Thank you, Ralph. I'm actually very much disadvantaged because I'm faced with those detailed questions for the first time right now, so I'm not really sure what I can respond to those questions. But let me start by talking about more sort of positive backdrops for the recent Japanese efforts to increase our contribution. If I may use Prime Minister Abe's word, proactive contribution to peace on the basis of international cooperation. I think the needless to say, any of the politics is domestic and what is really crucial is domestic backdrop. I think there is a very positive, I would say, three positive domestic backdrops for this, you know, positive direction of Japanese foreign security policy. That is the internal domestic stability of Japan. I think compared to many of the advanced countries, I think at the moment Japanese domestic political situation, I would say, is more stable than any other. Now this is very crucial. Perhaps I do not have to overemphasize the importance of domestic political stability, I think, in Washington DC. We do not see any political dysfunction at the moment. And this situation will continue perhaps for next four to five years. And this is a very important backdrop. For instance, a new security legislation, I think Minister Komura was very, very cautious and very modest. But I think the new legislation will pass the both houses, perhaps, by this summer. First, the approach is very cautious and also approaches incremental. And we are good at the incremental approach. Although we have been very often criticized by our incremental approach, but I think on many issues, incremental approaches work. The second is economic upturn. I think for next year or two, our economic situation will look fairly positive. We will not grow as fast as perhaps the United States. But nonetheless, the three positive factors are in play. The first, income growth through this wage hikes. On the average, I think this year, the workers for the large corporation will receive perhaps nearly 3% real income growth to stimulate the economy. And the oil price, of course, low oil price is a boon to the economy. And the exchange rate adjustment as a result of the first arrow of economics, those will work very positively. So therefore, the Japanese outlook, economic outlook for this year is perhaps very, very positive. So with these three backdrops, I think there is a ground, there is a very strong solid basis for pursuing this proactive contribution, this policy of proactive contribution to peace. Now, of course, we are going to face a lot of the difficult situation. For instance, the situation in the Middle East, for instance, ISIS. But I'm not really sure what the first, I'm talking about this, addressing your question, the other Japanese would become less engaging in this, you know, the situation in the Middle East. I don't think so. I doubt it. I think this, if you take a look at the press coverage, you know, there's no, I haven't seen any press coverage over this hostage issue for the next, for the last month or so. It's gone now, it disappeared. On top of that, the Prime Minister increased humanitarian assistance to Jordan only a few weeks ago after this crisis situation. And there was no criticism at all. At one stage, some, you know, the parliamentary members raised this point in the parliamentary debate, but I think that was completely discarded. So no problem. The one, another question you raised, you know, is Japan ready for leadership? I think the, yes, a modest leadership, but as Comrade Sam mentioned, the, in his statement, Japan is a, is going to be a reliable partner for U.S. leave balancing to Asia. I think this is a very nice way of putting in our role. We are not going to be a sort of a subservient partner, but we are relying, going to be a reliable partner in the implementation of U.S. policies. I think the U.S. needs one. And Japan can be that one. And I think that is, although in a very, very sort of modest way, I think as, as I recall Comrade Sam's statement, very clearly, this sentiment is shared not only by him, but also by Prime Minister Abe. So this is a very important political message. And whether the, the countries in the region will accept the Japanese leadership role, I, I'm not in a position to speak for them. And, but nonetheless, apart from a country or two, I think countries in the region are ready for seeing more increased Japanese role in the maintenance of security in the region. Now, the, you mentioned India. The Japan-India dialogue, Japan-India cooperation, Japan-India, you know, the relationship is at its best. The, and of course, you know, the, there is a very close relationship between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi. But nonetheless, historically, the Japan and India has been in the, in, in a very, very close good relationship. The, and this good relationship is now very much strengthened by the surrounding circumstances and, and also the close relationship between the two leaders. I think the rich entities can testify how closely Japan, India, and United States work on number of issues. So the, I, I don't know whether I should include TPP as a sort of boost or difficulty. The, as far as Japan is concerned, I think the once U.S. is ready for concluding the negotiation, I think Japan will be ready. The Prime Minister Abe sees TPP, if I, this is my suspicion, that I, I, I, I think Abe-san sees the TPP very much from a security window. The, I think he is ready to make a compromise on some of the difficult issues purely on sort of difficult issues in the agriculture sector, for instance. The, and we do not have any difficulties in other areas of negotiation such as rules. The only difficulty remains in agriculture sector, but I think the, I think the Prime Minister is ready to come up with, you know, the deal on this, on these aspects. So it's, if I may say, I think the successful conclusion of TPP very much depends upon what is going to happen here in Washington, DC. And then the, if Japan-U.S. bilateral deal is reached, the, I think the general negotiation on TPP would fall through. With one or two players may drop out, I don't know. But the, the key members of the, the TPP negotiations will be able to go through this very difficult process. So it is going to be a difficult project, but the, at the end of the day, this would be a very strong backdrop for the increased role of Japan-U.S. corporation. The, so that is the reason why I said it's a difficult task, you know, difficult challenge for, not only for Japan, but also the, it is, it is opportunity. The, and also this is a necessary backdrop for successful the U.S. rebalancing to Asia. And that is what, you know, Japan is looking forward to, because what is really needed is to strengthen rule-based, you know, international trade in, in Asia Pacific region. The, the, and also that works for strengthening the much further U.S. Japan security cooperation. So the, the, I don't know how you call the, Antonin for double whammy, you know, the, this works for two ways and, you know, and the, positively, you know, the, so these are the sort of points I, I just wanted to make the outset. And I do not go into the specific, so the security arrangements and the, you know, U.S. Japan guidelines, because Komura-san has already this, they amplified this, and the Japan-China, I think Takara-sensei talked about, you know, but nonetheless, all in all, I think the, yes, I think Japan is in general ready for more strength in the U.S. Japan cooperation. And also, the Japan is ready for making good the, what Arasan describes as a proactive contribution to peace. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Before I speak specifically about the topic, I have to say a few things I think about my country, our country here. It's not a state secret that our model right now is a little tarnished. The eagle is not flying as high as it should be, in my view. The model is seen in some quarters to lack efficiency, to lack energy. This is understandable when you see government shutdowns and gridlock here in Washington. It's insane, totally insane. It's equally the case that when our government temporarily engages as a national policy and torture, we tarnish our brand. We tarnish it seriously. So it seems to me it's about time that, or when we make statements about red lines in the Middle East, referred to in the earlier panel, and the red line becomes a pink line, becomes a white line, this hurts our brand. This hurts our brand a lot. The wisdom of doing something is a different matter. But having said something, I think the United States has to do it. This will not always be the case, in my view. We're getting our confidence back to some extent. Someday we may even get some bipartisanship on Capitol Hill. But it is the case, and I hope President Obama will understand that we are a nation who has interest in every part of the globe, and nothing really meaningful can take place in any part of the globe without our active participation, whether we're talking about Asia or the Middle East, et cetera. Now, the direct question that I was asked had to do with are we better able together as an alliance to deal with some of the scenarios that Dr. Atakihara and Ms. Hicks spoke about earlier. The answer is mixed. To some extent, we're a little better off, but we're near where we should be. That's about to write itself. Now, a lot of credit, in my view, by me, has been given to Mr. Abe for the decisions he's made in the first 700 days or so of his administration, and I mean every word of them. But part of the changed attitude in Japan about defense issues precedes Mr. Abe. I think they started practically in 2010 when that fishing boat chined around the Coast Guard cutter of Japan. This woke people up, and then when the Toku disaster hit and the people of Japan saw what the J-A-Tai could do, saw what the U.S. military together with the J-A-Tai could do, this further, I think, increased some affection in the minds of many in Japan for this alliance. And third, China. China has awakened, I think, the people of Japan to the fact that they need to do more in their own defense. And hence, Mr. Abe, I think, has taken a very good advantage of that. He's advanced his decisions on, the cabinet decisions on collective self-defense, and I think we're a lot better off. But let me go back to the Toku disaster, first of all, because we both haven't done what we needed to do. On the one hand, we work together quite well, but one of the lessons learned with our U.S. Forces Japan headquarters was not ready for a big issue. We had to surge people to man that headquarters. We're still not ready. It's not operational, and it should be made more operational. One of the things, we were able to communicate together. We spoke the same language when it came to emergency, but we couldn't do it in a secure fashion. We still can't do it today. We can communicate, but not in secure fashion. One of the things we did beautifully together was the reopening of the Sendai Airport. This was a fantastic military and humanitarian affairs disaster relief operation, which was seamlessly and flawlessly done. That's a very good thing. So there's a good basis, I think, in the tragedy that befell Japan to see where we can and have moved out a little bit, but we still have shortfalls. I'll give you another. As far as I'm concerned, Mr. Kato will probably know exactly. There have been this year in Japan about 980 intercepts, the highest number of intercepts ever. Japan was 1985, and I think there were 985. This fiscal year in Japan, I believe you're going to beat that record. It'll be a new record for intercepting foreign aircraft in your airspace. United States is undergoing an F-15 upgrade for air defense capabilities. Japan is not. Are we going to wait until the F-35s come? Good luck. We need to be making these decisions. Now, Ralph very correctly mentioned the terrible tragedy, the murder of the two Japanese citizens in the hands of ISIS. But what has been done to develop a special operations capability that would give Japan's leadership an ability to rescue Japanese citizens if it became necessary? If 220 or 200 Japanese were taken by ISIS, what are you going to do about it? I can do anything about it under present circumstances. Now, I referred to the Cabinet decision on collective self-defense. This obviously allows for UN-PKO support and support for other militaries working in PKOs. It allows for Persian Gulf minesweeping, assuming the legislation goes through the various pieces of legislation that are necessary to put this into effect. It will allow us to finish the guidelines on defense cooperation for more joint contingency planning, for intelligence sharing, and for a more robust division of actual roles and missions between the United States and Japan. It also would provide for surveillance, maritime patrols, and a more integrated air defense. All these things would be possible, but there are still real shortfalls in logistics, in training, in interoperability between services in Japan and between the United States and Japan. Our U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force are pretty damn good at interoperability. Our air forces are not, and our ground forces are not. This is a shortfall we can't allow to have exist much longer. The Cabinet decision on collective self-defense will also allow for more realistic decision making. For instance, before we had the Cabinet decision, how could you differentiate the threat that was coming to Tokyo and one that was just directed against U.S. forces? You can't read a missile to that fine degree. This clears up that ambiguity. This allows us, the biggest single thing that the Cabinet decision will allow the United States to have very frank and open discussions with Japan, and Japan likewise to have those same open and frank discussions without us getting wrapped up in our legal underwear over each and every issue, wondering whether it would be allowed. Is it politically supportable? This is what's inhibited us for years. Now, in addition to providing for real collaboration and interaction through the Cabinet decision, Mr. Abe has for three years in a row decided to put more money into the defense budget. That's terrific. Let's take a deep breath and see where we really are. Japan is the seventh largest defense budget in the globe. That's a good thing. But if you look at defense as a percentage of GDP, Japan is a hundred and second in the world, following Belgium and right before New Zealand. So there's plenty of room for more robust decision making. And both of our procurement systems are really in trouble. Mac Thornberry, one of our distinguished members of Congress, is really trying to reform our procurement, defense procurement system, and so too, I think, does Japan need the same to avoid the waste, to make sure that the money that Mr. Abe and his colleagues put to defense goes to defense, and it's not wasted. Now, a couple of a few challenges to talk a little bit about some of the larger issue. The Middle East, as far as I'm concerned, what we're seeing in the Middle East is the aftershocks of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, a hundred years after that dissolution. And it'll probably be, if we're lucky, ten years before you see a new Middle East. Note I didn't say a better Middle East. I just said a new Middle East. Having said all that, ISIS for the United States and for Japan is troublesome, vicious, but they're not existential. It's not an existential threat to us. And the difficulty the United States is having to deal with ISIS, coming to grips with ISIS, is that it's a movement. It's not a military. So you can't fight it in a traditional military way. You can't apply the same metrics to it that you apply to a force-on-force battle. It's a movement, and it's a tough thing for us to fight. Now, but we do have an existential threat, and it's not necessarily China. China is a question. China has good capability, which we both know about. It's increasing that capability, but our intentions are unknown. And it takes the combination of the two capability and intention to make a real threat. So I'm not prepared to say that China is yet a threat to the United States. Her behavior, particularly in the Senkakus, has been threatening to Japan and worrisome to all of us. But Russia could present itself with an existential threat because, unlike the previous panel's description of China, as either my green's description of a rising China, this is a declining Russia. I think that means it's dangerous. They don't have, in the words of Dr. Joe Nye, as much skin in the game as a rising power has. So hence, they may be more dangerous to our interest. I think that's quite possible. Two, sort of disconnected or unconnected issues. One, the energy security. We've, and Dr. Hicks, I think made it clear that we're not, no one is really energy independent. But we've been blessed with shale oil recently. We are moving to being much more self-reliant. And this does give us if our government can make the decision, the ability to not just do our traditional defensive sea lanes, which then provides safety for the petroleum moving or the natural gas moving to our various friends and allies, but if we export our product from the lower 48. And there is a discussion of this this year, next year. This can provide real security to Taiwan, to Japan, to Korea, frankly, to China at a somewhat cheaper gas price. Certainly probably four dollars a ton. And finally, a comment someone mentioned earlier, the internet. In 10 years ago, I'm sure I would have been, if I were sitting here, I wouldn't pretend to really understand the internet, but I would have said things that many have said, such as, oh, this is going to be great. It's going to really bring us together as a world. And it's really going to make communications, and everybody will understand each other, and it'll be really kumbaya. The fact of the matter is, the internet has been the single most divisive thing for societies around the world, where you can spew hate and discontent anonymously and spread rumors, falsehoods, etc. anonymously, immediately, to very wide audiences. So this is another threat, frankly. I don't think that Japan and the United States have thought about it together. So the mark I give to U.S. and Japan's ability to meet different scenarios is probably a C to a C+. Now, there's one, however, thing that few of you will know about, but it's unclassified, and it can show you where we're going and how we're trying to overcome these shortfalls. We've just finished a bilateral exercise with Japan on the West Coast. It's actually two exercises. One was called Iron Fist, and the other was called Dawn Blitz. Iron Fist had about 270 ground self-defense force members, and about 570 U.S. Marines going ashore. Camp Pendleton, San Clemente, some people working out of 29 Palms in California, and it was a live firing exercise. And what was the purpose of this exercise? It involved snipers, anti-tank helicopters that Japan brought, brought with them to the West Coast. It had maritime self-defense force ships off of our coast. The stated purpose of this exercise, CPX live firing, sniping, heavy mortars, joint targeting, and island recapturing, island recapturing. So I think we're getting serious about defense. Thank you, Ralph. Rich, thank you very much. The first and simplest task of moderator is to introduce the speakers, which I of course fail to do at the onset, in part because I think everyone knows our speakers. I should at least mention that Ambassador Nogami, former Japanese ambassador to the UK, has run JIA since 2009 in both good times and not so good times, but I think we're back in the good times area and has also for the past six or seven years been the co-host of this dialogue. Rich Armitage is Rich Armitage. Enough said. If you don't know Rich, then you're not only in the wrong room and wrong building. Baltimore is somewhere in that direction. You're clearly in the wrong city. So we're delighted to have you both. I do want to get to our audience's questions, but I want to just throw one question that I had mentioned in the beginning out, and that's the one that was raised at the earlier session about what should we be doing, what can we be doing to make a stronger show of resolve in the South China Sea. Rich, if you'd like to start. I think when we look at the activities of China and the South China Sea, we generally come to a conclusion which I think is wrong, and that is that their actions have been counterproductive, that they're actually driving nations in Southeast Asia towards the United States. That's somewhat true. And they're certainly bringing about what we would consider something that's not a good deal, and that is a sort of an arms race, and certainly, as some people described it, they brought forward the concept of defense bling, submarines, which is the new defense bling, whether Australia gets their six or Indonesia gets new and etc. From our point of view, as we look at China, I think that's kind of productive. I don't think they think so. The answer, I think Dr. Hara was asked, do they calculate this? I think you said you don't know, I don't know either, but I think so. I think they do. So my my own view is that we ought to continue the most important thing we can. The very most important is just to something I think that Ambassador Nagami was talking about, it's TPP. Let's put us quarelly, on record, as being completely involved in the life of Asia, with everyone playing with the same rules, and by doing so, show China as an outlier. Sure, as a model that is losing steam, not our model losing steam. So I think that's probably the single most effective thing. There are one-offs in each nation and we're doing it with Vietnam, with the sales of certain maritime equipment, doing it in Singapore, perhaps Malaysia. But none of those individual issues are, I think, as large or loom as large as TPP. Well, this response is, you know, sounds a bit conventional, but looking at and talking to the literal countries, their capacity in terms of maritime domain awareness is extremely low. So I think the provision of patrol boats, training, and those things, you know, the minimum, you know, what Japan, US, or Australia can do. At the moment, the countries like Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, the capacity is extremely low. And the first thing first, the capacity has to be slightly upgraded. Thank you. One last comment from me and then I want to open it up for questions. And this is a shameless commercial. You heard a young fellow earlier identify himself as an SPF fellow at the Pacific Forum. We have a number of different fellowships, including the SPF fellowship that brings young people to Hawaii from both Japan and from the US to study about the US Alliance and to work on various aspects of it. So if you're interested in that, Hawaii is not a bad place to be studying Japan from. And check out our our website www.packforum.org or see me or Jim, wave your hand once more and Jim will be happy to tell you more about it as well. So let's open up the the floor for questions, comments. I would ask you to try not to make your question longer than their presentations and we'll sort of go from there. I saw one hand in the back. Yes please. So good afternoon. So my name is I'm a Matthew Kosteris. I'm a sophomore at the George Washington Naval Reserve Officer. I'm a training corps. I'm sorry I just I'm very nervous. This was a great panel. Thank you. But my question is to Mr. Armitage. Thank you for your awesome speech. You really hit on a lot of great points but I want to talk about the nuclear grid for the Japanese given the recent surge in public discontent towards nuclear power as I might as I want to enter like the nuclear navy after I am up get my ensign commissioning. But how do you see the future of of nuclear power in a Japan that is requiring that is using more and more fossil fuels? Excuse me. I certainly know thank you how neurologic the whole question after Fukushima of nuclear power is in Japan. But I don't see in the short term any way for Japan to be successful economically and to have the power they need as a nation without restarting a number some number of those nuclear facilities. And I think the and we can talk all we want about alternative sources of energy and wind and solar and water and all of this but the fact is it's all very expensive. So in the short to medium term I think there's no alternative but the starting of some of these reactors. I'm not competent enough to tell you how many I don't think all 53 or so need to but there's somebody who is company is going to have to make that decision. Mr. Abe has spent a good bit of his time explaining his absolute desire to have these nuclear plants inspected inspected and inspected again and be held to the highest standard so he can stand up in front of his people and say this is safe while we figure out what to do as an alternative energy source. Well actually the number of the nuclear reactors will be decommissioned and now the schedule of decommissioning is made clear by the UTD companies. And then the restarting, recommissioning, not decommissioning, recommissioning over one or two will follow. But I think recommissioning is based on a very very stringent application of this safety regulations and it's taking time. So eventually I think government is thinking about about 20 percent of energy requirement you know that the 20 percent of electricity in the requirement will be from nuclear as a sort of base source. But nonetheless I think it will be years before we come to this level because I think more power plants will be decommissioned than the number of power plants which will be recommissioned. So overall the size is going to decrease. Thank you. My name is Jamie Assef. I'm a non-resident fellow with the Honda Fellowship at Pacific Forum and I'm a science policy fellow at DoD and I have a question about using the Alliance as a tool to manage non-traditional emerging threats in the region. So as Dr. Hicks pointed out with globalization increasing economic development in Asia we have new technological concerns that we need to think about. So for example the spread of biotechnology in Asia and Southeast Asia is a huge driver for technological for economic growth but also spreads dual use technologies. Likewise growing interest in nuclear power in Southeast Asia that's also going to create dual use technologies. We have growth of transshipment hubs in the region not only in Singapore but other countries that are economically developing and if you look at that together that is a recipe that's ripe for proliferating dual use materials that could pose WMD threats. And so my question is how can we can't do you think that we can use the Alliance as a vehicle to marshal the resources that the US government and Japanese government have and the private sector have to sort of manage those threats that we that the current tools we have aren't really well equipped to do and by extension can we use the Alliance to bring in the rest of the region to build capacity and get everyone working together to counter it. Thank you. Yes. I think one of our participants from Japan who is a specialist on the non-proliferation is here and part of our team so I think I will ask Kiyama-san to respond to the Yeah. No, but why don't you Kiyama-san? Sorry to intervene. My name is Noba Kiyama from Hitotsuwa University and with regard to the export controls I think gradually it becomes even more difficult because of the sort of spread of use of the US items as you know and then I think the as the economic growth I mean Asian country enjoying economic growth naturally it's hard to control the flow of the technologies and also the use of nuclear energy the sort of greed for the nuclear energy is increasing in Asia and then I think that makes even more difficult for the technology holders like Japan, United States to control and then they also for me the concern is to what extent the will and the capacity of the administrators of these countries you know good enough to sort of you know introduce the stringent export controls and you know their non-proliferation mechanisms at home so like in Japan, Australia and the United States these are the countries which must cooperate to introduce sort of culture of non-proliferation culture of nuclear security so that the countries in Asia spontaneously you know introduce stringent export controls Do you think it's okay? No thank you Nova I would also take this opportunity to brag a little bit that at the governmental level of course the the ARF the ASEAN Regional Forum has a non-proliferation and disarmament study group that has been looking at but at the track two level I think leading the way JIA and Pacific Forum as the US CISCAP and Japan CISCAP have worked moving this forward we've also been doing a lot in the area of export control and we are now conducting training courses on both export control and non-proliferation in general in Myanmar we're also doing activities like this in Taipei and bringing Taiwan into the picture with the other countries in East Asia so I think there's a lot that is going on at the track two level and we see behind the scenes I think a lot of very good close cooperation between Japan and the United States both within the ARF and within CISCAP to make that happen Chris next question Thanks Chris Nelson exceeding my quote of three questions in one conference I apologize first I wanted you to know second I volunteered to come out to Hawaii any time you want us we'll be there oh shoot yeah that's right that's right I would like to re-ask the question I asked Dr. Hicks to Nogami-san to Rich-san because I thought for all of the general brilliance of her overall approach her answer on North Korea really missed the point of the question sure there's always a mix of sanctions and everything else but the point is we're not doing it and it's been clear as Mike Green I think would attest for the last 20 years there is no system of sanctions that the Chinese are prepared to support that would really pressure behavior change North Korea so we're stuck with the situation where they keep on producing we're not negotiating a cap and yet now they're doing this economic program which is successful will make them even more successful de facto nuclear power it's my analysis to Faisal is there a better way to think about this is there some way the U.S. and Japan can do a better job of getting our Chinese friends to see what we see which is that North Korean nukes and missiles are a greater stability risk to Asia than the pressure of regime collapse through sanctions that aren't going to be enforced anyway is there another way to be thinking about this essentially do we have some fresh thoughts on how to deal with North Korea yeah Rich why don't you start and then well I take the position first of all that we're not the only horse in this race Chris and as far as I'm concerned the Republic of Korea has the lead and she has the most largest equities immediately at risk and I think if over time the Republic of Korea felt that things have changed to warrant a different approach we'd certainly do it at least I would be willing to do it second on the on us in Japan I think there is while we generally share the same view on China I think on Korea we view a threat from North Korea more seriously than some in Japan do because it's it's always been there it's been there so long it's a known factor when I just parenthetically my comments about the collective self-defense one of the things that we are going to be able to do again without getting wrapped up in our legal underwear is talk frankly with our Japanese friends about what sort of facilities rear area access etc we'd need if there were contingency Korean contingency we have never really spelled that out and it would be something that has to be done on the fly which is not a good thing to do in an emergency situation I think that's a long way of saying that a couple of things can happen they North Koreans as you indicated in your previous question are making some changes whether they're beneficial to a sufficient number of of the citizens or not I don't know whether it's sufficient enough to give North Korea the confidence to step forward I doubt it frankly because I see in Kim Jong-un in addition to a rather outlandish haircut I see a fellow who has no confidence none I was standing if I may have confidence to open up a little bit in the in the agricultural sector or something like that but he's a fellow who has to put in relatives or in-laws in every key position because he doesn't trust anybody so I don't think this is a guy that I personally would be wanting to look for a brand new road today by myself I would be talking to our Japanese friends but particularly to our Korean friends on the question of how much influence China has I don't doubt at all that attitudes in China have changed a lot toward North Korea that I get it whenever we talk with Chinese friends they're fed up they're tired of it it's an annoyance et cetera but whether that translates into policy change certainly not yet the as you know the Japan is engaged in this bilateral talks with North Korea over the over some some information about hostages and the the Japanese women who went back to North Korea years ago and also those who have the deceased in North Korea and we are seeking information on all the details of information on those issues but nonetheless so far we have not received any credible response and as a result the Japanese we have we have imposed sanctions on top of the you know the UN and other sanctions you know we have a unilateral bilateral sanction I mean own sanction but nonetheless there isn't very much a move on the part of North Korea so I'm not really whether you know this sanction route is really a sort of effective way but one thing I'm worried about is the at the time of a collapse of the regime who will go into North Korea at the moment nobody wants to I think this is a very dangerous situation the China may not are okay definitely not and Japan no no way and who is going to go to the North Korea to have a some sort of semblance of stability that scenario has to be carefully and also seriously considered because regime may melt down the leader is not very very popular at all amongst North Koreans of course and the Takarasa mentioned that the economic situation is slightly improving but only those who are connected the you know the sort of very small version of the crony capitalism but the overall situation I think many in the North Korean government do not want to be seen by the leader so that they are not exposed to any sort of impossible task or danger so it's collapse you know it's it's it's in a very precarious situation so the nuclear yes but but at the same time we have to we have to think about the sort of meltdown scenario thank you thank you if I could add just a quick point or two on on the question I first of all what I found in our dialogues with the Chinese a great more willingness to discuss how the two of us can cooperate to deter North Korea from conducting additional missile and nuclear tests based I think on the realization among the Chinese that our response to North Korean nuclear test our being the U.S. Japan South Korea actually do not serve China's interests so it's not because they've suddenly become eager to cooperate with us but understand that we need to take joint action to deter a future test so in that area I think there is opportunity for greater cooperation the North Koreans say they want both nukes and economic development the Chinese join us and the Japanese and Koreans and saying you can't have both so all of us are saying the right words but many still believe that Chinese actions are allowing them to have both and the question is how do you get to get Chinese actions to match Chinese words on the one one point about the nature of the nuclear threat we conducted a trilateral tabletop exercise a U.S. Japan Korea exercise in Maui last fall and the last summer the results are again on our on our website and what I found very interesting was that by and large Japanese participants were much more concerned about the probability of North Korea using nuclear weapons against Japan then South Koreans were worried about them using it against the ROK and where that plays out is I think a reminder from our Japanese colleagues while there may be some UNC bases that are earmarked for supporting Japan in the event of a conflict on the peninsula Japan has some very high equities at stake and needs to be involved as an active player in making the decision on how to how to move forward Ben I had you next and then other questions yeah and then thank you very much this is another wonderful panel thank you so much for your insights as Komura sensei pointed out this morning Japan has gotten much more serious about defense and the alliance and as Armitage sensei pointed out just now there is real meat there in terms of the exercises that they're getting more serious the alliance itself is getting much more serious about deterrence we assume that the guidelines review will lead to an alliance that is really much more serious about maintaining the deterrence that's so critical to Asia so we can all applaud that the same time I'm reminded by Jim Foster's excellent question at the end of the last session that we also need a long-term solution for the East Asian region that's more than just balance of power deterrence we need some form of security community building and this leads me to something I think I read from Takahara sensei as he described the challenge of security building with China building a security community that includes China will likely involve or require some fundamental political change on the part of the Chinese before we can achieve that do you agree that that is necessary before we can achieve the security community including China that's my brief question essentially there is fundamental change required in China before we can realize the goal of an Asia security community can you create that community with China as it is today I suspect that eventually there will be change in China but for a fundamental no we have existed quite well alongside systems that were quite anti-democratic that's what you're talking about a democratic opening I think now do I think there will be some moves to that direction yeah over time and right now in my view you have a China which also lacks a certain amount of confidence else they wouldn't be putting so much money into the people's armed police or their citizens might be more content to stay at home rather than trying to immigrate to Australia the US Canada etc so it's not absolutely necessary we can coexist and have but I think over time that people of China are going to demand some degree of over as they already are well I don't I don't think that China seriously believes in the threat from Japan the uh they they I think they talk about it they educate kids on these things and all these but I don't I think the only security concern they have is the United States and so if United States as which can live with it well that's fine I think I know the the China talking about Japanese materialistic you know approach or you know the the returning to the you know right meaning you know government and all that all that that is well that is first a propaganda and second that is for domestic purpose and three perhaps trying to use that as a card for some sort of you know the deal with with Japan but nonetheless I don't think they're seriously threatened we're running toward the end of time I have at least two hands up I want to take both questions and then if there's a third short question out there I'll take it and then we'll come back to the panelists so come as it all right Matate Kamiya from Japan's National Defense Academy and I have a question to Mr. Amitage that is how do you perceive the limited nature of Japan's proposed exercise of collective self-defense I think it is remarkable and I'm very glad that Japan finally has decided to start exercising right of collective self-defense but as Mr. Komura said the proposed way of exercising that right by Japan will be quite strictly limited and do you think the way Japan will or is scheduled to exercise that right is sufficient for the US Japan security corporation which you believe necessary for the future peace and security in the Asia Pacific region and globally thank you again Jim Plady M&SPF fellow as Ralph said I'd be glad to talk about the fellowship with anyone just quick question to Nogami-san about Japan-Russia relations in 2013 Abe seemed to have a good visit to Russia but obviously with the crisis in Ukraine since then the relations seem to have stalled just I'd like to hear your thoughts on where you see Japan-Russia relations going now thank you So we'll start with Nogami-san if you just talk a little bit about Japan-Russia and any final comments you want to make and then Rich is limited collective self-defense enough and any other points you want to make please Well of course Japan has this pending issue of you know the making a peace treaty upon solution of this territorial issues on the I think that was one of the political objectives you know placed by Prime Minister Abe and so he tried very hard to nurture the relationship with you know Russia and also with the relationship but with the Putin but look what he did and the Abe-san had to say that he will not be able to condone any change of status quote by force you know that is a very clear statement and of course what he had in mind maybe not only Russia but also the China so but on the basis of that statement it would be extremely difficult as he to pretend the behave as if nothing happened so inevitably the I think aren't the Japanese relationship with Russia is is very much stifled by what the Russia has done and what the leadership by Russia has been talking about you know use of nuclear weapon and you know the all these things the I don't think you know the Japan-Russia relationship will become sort of normalized or the stabilized you know not not so soon the the contingent upon what the Russia is going to do vis-a-vis Crimea or Ukraine Eastern part of Ukraine or what he's they are going to talk about the world order you know it's it's it's not going to be easy one now is this the first step or the only start no I as I said the government is taking as I said in my opening remarks government is taking a cautious and incremental approach and that is wise the or the and also Manju the as Komarassan said it there still is some anxiety amongst the population and over time this may be overcome but there still is I think come May media campaign against it is going to be very very noisy but one thing the yes they came up with this conditions you know with the situation where Japanese are fundamental you know blah blah blah in lieu of geographical distance at the cost of you know the at the cost of introducing those qualitative restrictions the geographical districtions restrictions removed I don't know which is it's more effective or not but after all what is introduced as a new sort of constraint is very qualitative the but the the geographical constraint we had upon on the base of this old law is very very sort of geographical restriction is there it's very clear but nonetheless it's now a qualitative and how you interpret this qualitative restriction will depend upon the future situation so I think that approach taken by the government I think is rather clever Joe Nye and I have written years ago that the Article 9 prohibition on collective self-defense was an impediment to alliance cooperation assuming the proper legislation is agreed upon as we move forward that impediment to alliance cooperation is gone that is the alliance cooperation on defense of Japan et cetera and perhaps patrolling sea lanes and things of that nature is it what I would have wanted no I would have wanted more but this is the system of government Japanese citizens have agreed to and we have the same general system of democracy and that means compromise so the compromise with Kome party to get where they are was necessary and frankly it's allowing I think from my observation I was last in Japan about a month ago it's allowing Japanese people to get a better understanding of just what this means and what are the limits that Mr. Abe himself is talking about he hasn't got a great free hand but hand in hand with that better understanding of the people of Japan about what is involved in collective self defense and what is involved with being your own master of your own fate as a nation I think has been the awareness in Japan that no longer can Japanese citizens hide behind good works as sufficient to make them safe in the world I noticed the government of Japan for 70 years been involved in tremendously good work it hasn't made Japan necessarily safer witness the murder of the two journalists not so long ago by eyes so is it sufficient yes for now is it a first step that's for the Japanese people to decide they'll make these decisions moving forward let me ask Mike Green to come and replace me while I ask you to join me in thanking our two presenters don't go away you're the wrap up speaker you can stay Rich and I will be self-conformer let's drink I just want to thank our partners at JIA Nogami-san thank Ralph and Jim for starting this very important annual conference on the alliance and joining us today and the staff at CSIS who helped us and we have a reception in the back the days proceedings will be available online at the CSIS website eventually not right away and Nogami-san and I and I think Yuzuka-san from URI are doing a small podcast interview right now which you can also view on your personal mobile device on your way home if you like and with that thank you and please join us in the back for a reception oh and now I I just simply echo what the mic had that's it