 Book 5. Sections 8-9 of Politics, by Aristotle. 8. We have next to consider what means there are of preserving constitutions in general and in particular cases. In the first place it is evident that if we know the causes which destroy constitutions we also know the causes which preserve them, for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation. In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to the law, more especially in small matters, for transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats up a fortune. The expense does not take place at once and therefore is not observed, the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that if each part is little then the whole is little. This is true in one way but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles. In the first place then, men should guard against the beginning of change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the political devices of which I have already spoken, invented only to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are in good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them. They should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honor or the common people in a matter of money, and they should treat one another and their fellow citizen in a spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals. Hence if the governing class are numerous many democratic institutions are useful, for example the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that all those who were of equal rank may share in them. Indeed equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have already remarked. The short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families. It is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny and oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices and have a long tenure of them. Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the constitution. Wherefore the ruler who has a care of the constitution should invent terrors and bring distant dangers near in order that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night watch, never relax their attention. He should endeavor too, by help of the laws, to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from catching the spirit of contention. No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman. As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises not out of any variation in the qualification, but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually, and in larger cities every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times greater or many times less, then when the ratings recognized by the constitution were fixed, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. Where this is not done, a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrow to a rule of families. Or in the opposite case, constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy. It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of government, not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honor for a long time rather than great honor for a short time. For men are easily spoiled, not every one can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honors which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws provide against anyone having too much power, whether derived from friends or money. If he has, he should be sent clean out of the country. And since innovations creep in through the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason, an increase in prosperity in any part of the state should be carefully watched. The proper remedy for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements. Such opposites are the virtuous and the many or the rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body or to increase the middle class. Thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality. But, above all, every state should be so administered and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. In oligarchies special precautions should be used against this evil. For the people do not take any great offense at being kept out of the government. Indeed they are rather pleased and otherwise at having leisure for their private business. But what irritates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money. Then they are doubly annoyed, for they lose both honor and profit. If office brought no profit, then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be combined. For both notables and people might have their wishes gratified. All would be able to hold office, which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, which is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be accomplished when there is no possibility of making money out of the offices. For the poor will not want to have them when there was nothing to be gained from them. They would rather be attending to their own concerns. And the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them. And so the poor will keep to their work and grow rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. In order to avoid speculation of the public money, the transfer of the revenues should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And honors should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incorruptible. In democracies the rich should be spared, not only should their property not be divided, but their incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be protected. It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing, from undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choruses, torch races, and the like. In an oligarchy, on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go to them. If any of the wealthy classes insult them, the offender should be punished more severely than if he had wronged one of his own class. Provisions should be made that the estates pass by inheritance and not by gift, and no person should have more than one inheritance, for in this way properties will be equalized, and more of the poor rise to competency. It is also expedient, both in a democracy and in an oligarchy, to assign to those who have less share in the government, i.e., to the rich in a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy, in equality or preference, and all but the principal offices of states. The latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class. 9. There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the highest offices. 1. First of all, loyalty to the established constitution. 2. The greatest administrative capacity. 3. Virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government. 4. If what is just is not the same in all governments, the quality of justice must also differ. There may be a doubt, however, when all these qualities do not meet in the same person, how this election is to be made. Suppose, for example, a good general is a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal and just. Which should we choose? In making the election ought we not to consider two points, what qualities are common and what are rare. Thus in the choice of a general we should regard his skill rather than his virtue, for few have military skill, but many have virtue. In any office of trust or stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be observed, for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which all men possess. It may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public? Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments are held to be for the interest of various constitutions, all these preserve them, and the great preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned, to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stronger than the disloyal. Neither should we forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in perverted forms of government, for many practices which appear to be democratically are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push matters to extremes. They do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. A nose which varies from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub may still be of good shape and agreeable to the eye, but if the excess be very great all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other. And this is true of every other part of the human body. The same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if anyone attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government, and end by having none at all. Wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. If equality of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take another form, for when by laws carried to excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined. There is an error common both to oligarchies and to democracies. In the latter the demagogues, when the multitude or above the law, are always cutting the city in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause. Just as in oligarchies, the oligarch should profess to maintaining the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For there are cities in which they swear, I will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm against them which I can, but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very opposite feeling. In the form of their oath there should be an express declaration, I will do no wrong to the people. But of all the things which I have mentioned, that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. Now to have been educated in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class and an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution. And in democracies of the more extreme type there is arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority, and freedom. Men think that what is just is equal, and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will, and that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies everyone lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, according to his fancy. But this is all wrong. Men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution, for it is their salvation. I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continuance. End of book 5, sections 8 through 9. Book 5, section 10 of Politics, by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics, by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 5, section 10. I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its destruction and preservation. What I have said already, respecting forms of constitutional government, applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy and their most extreme forms. It is therefore most injurious to its subjects being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. The appointment of a king is the resource of the better classes against the people, and he is elected by them out of their own number, because either he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions. Whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who gain the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables. At any rate, this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. Others, which were older, originated in the ambition of kings, wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others, again, grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates, for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty if he desired in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of state. Thus Fiden and Argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants. Falaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas Penetrius at Leontinai, Sipselis at Corinth, Posistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues. And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this honor have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations. Some, like Codris, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war. Others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Milatian kings. The idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and oppression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, except as conducive to his private end. His aim is pleasure, the aim of a king, honor. Wherefore also in their desires they differ. The tyrant is desirous of riches, the king of what brings honor, and the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries. That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny the end is wealth, for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury. Both mistrust the people and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. From democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power, and also because plots against them are contrived by men of this dash who either want to rule or to escape subjection. Hans Perriander advised Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional government. Subjects attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of property. The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. Monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire to all a mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office, where the sense of insult is the motive against their lives. Any sort of insult, and there are many, may stir up anger, and when men are angry they commonly act out of revenge and not from ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the posistratity arose out of the public dishonor offered to the sister of Harmonius and the insult to himself. He attacked the tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristigeten joined in the attack for the sake of Harmonius. A conspiracy was also formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambrosia, because when drinking with a favored youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by Adolis and his friends, and Amentis the little by Dirtis because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Avagaris of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult, for his wife had been carried off by Avagaris's son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was the attack of Cretius upon Archelaus. He had always hated the connection with him, and so when Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of Elimea, when he was hard-pressed in a war against Cirrus and Arbius, and the younger to his own son Amentis, under the idea that Amentis would then be less likely to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra, Cretius made this slight a pretext for attacking Archelaus, though even a less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his connection with the king. And from a like motive, Hellenocrates of Larissa conspired with him, for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfill his promise of restoring him to his country, he thought that the connection between them had originated not in affection, but in the wantonness of power. Pytho II and Heraclides of Enes slew Caudus in order to avenge their father, and Adamus revolted from Caudus in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a child. Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus at Mitolini, Megaclides and his friends attacked and slew the pentility, as they were going about in striking people with clubs. At a later date Smurtus, who had been beaten and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Dachandicus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack. He was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged, for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by Dachandicus on the foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from similar causes. Fear is another motive which, as we have said, has caused conspiracies as well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government. Thus Artipanis conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders. He, having been under the impression that Xerxes would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal and that the offense would be forgiven. Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sardinopelus, whom someone saw carting wool with his women, if the storytellers stay truly, and the tale may be true if not of him, of someone else. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius because he despised him and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt, for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt. The assailants are ready to strike and think nothing of the danger because they seem to have the power in their hands. Thus generals of armies attack monarchs, as, for example, Cyrus attacked the styages, despising the effeminacy of his life and believing that his power was worn out. Thus again Seuthes, the Thracian, conspired against Imaticus, whose general he was. And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzenes, partly out of contempt and partly from the love of gain. Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns on a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success, for courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory. Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way, as well as in those already mentioned. There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honors, however great, but who, nevertheless, regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honorable in the world. They wish to acquire not a kingdom but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men. He who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed. Such a death would be welcome to him. This is a temper to which few can attain. Once more tyrannies like all other governments are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. That such a government will have the will to attack them is clear, for the two were opposed in principle, and all men, if they can, do what they will. Democracy is antagonistic to tyranny, on the principle of Hesiod, Hatter hates Potter, because they are nearly akin. For the extreme form of democracy is tyranny, and royalty and aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. And therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well governed. Again tyrannies are destroyed from within when the reigning family are divided among themselves, as that of Gilo was, and more recently that of Dionysius. In the case of Gilo, because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hyero, flattered the son of Gilo and let him into excesses in order that he might rule in his name, whereupon the family got together a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny. But those of the people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people. He afterwards perished himself. There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies, hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired have retained their power, but those who have inherited have lost it almost at once, for living in luxurious ease they become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger too must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready to strike. The angry are more impatuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle. And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the puzzlestratity, and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless. In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned, as destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny. Indeed, the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore lasting. It is generally destroyed from within. There are two ways in which destruction may come about. One, when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and two, when the kings attempt to administer the state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law. Royalties do not now come into existence where such forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters. But in our own day men are more upon inequality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and anyone who obtains power by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies, a further cause of destruction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and although possessing not tyrannical powers but only royal dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readily affected, for there is an end to the king when his subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts whether they like him or not. The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes. End of Book 5, Section 10. Book 5, Sections 11-12 of Politics, by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics, by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 5, Sections 11-12. 11. And they are preserved to speak generally by the opposite causes, or if we consider them separately, one, royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired. For then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their ways, and they are less envied by their subjects. This is the reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Miloshians, and for a similar reason it is continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by Theopampus, in various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the efferalty. He diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less but greater. There is a story that, when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he had inherited from his father, no indeed he replied, for the power which I leave to them will be more lasting. As to two tyrannies they are preserved in two most opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants administer their government. Of such arts periander of Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the Persians in the administration of their government. There are firstly the prescriptions mentioned some distance back, for the preservation of a tyranny insofar as this is possible, vis that the tyrant should lop off those who are too high. He must put to death men of spirit. He must not allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like. He must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among its subjects. He must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another, for acquaintance begets mutual confidence. Further he must compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at his gates, then he will know what they are doing. If they are always kept under they will learn to be humble. In short, he should practice these and the like Persian and barbaric arts, which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavor to know what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the female detectives at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hyro was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting. For the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sew quarrels among the citizens. Friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects. He thus provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizen, and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. The pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy. Also the offerings of the family of Sipselis, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Puzestratidae, and the great Polycrotene monuments at Samos. All these works were like intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power. Again the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such is the power given to women and their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters. For slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants, and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the people too would feign be a monarch, and therefore by them as well as by the tyrant the flatterer is held in honor. In democracies he is the demagogue, and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of flattery. Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a free man in him will lower himself by flattery. Good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. Moreover the bad are useful for bad purposes. Nail knocks out nail as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike everyone who has dignity or independence. He wants to be alone in his glory, but anyone who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table, for the one are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him. Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power. There is no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, one, the humiliation of his subjects. He knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody. Two, the creation of mistrust among them, for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another, and this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good. They are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they would not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men. Three, the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow tyranny if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred. One, he sows distrust among his subjects. Two, he takes away their power. Three, he humbles them. This, then, is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved, and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful. He must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend to care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presence of a sword at which the common people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from them, and lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists. He should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends, a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants, for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant. Nor need he fear that, while he is lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. Such a policy is, at all events, much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home than to leave behind him a horde. For then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power, and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second place he should be seen to collect taxes and to require public services only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, and generally he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belong not to him but to the public. He should appear not harsh but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least defense against modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe alike self-control towards other women. The insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they may admire their happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should, if possible, be moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world, for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised in attack, not so he who is temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly everything which has been said before about tyrants. He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the gods. For if men think that a ruler is religious, and has a reverence for the gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very gods fighting on his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought foolish, and he should honor men of merit, and make them think that they would not be held in more honor by the citizens if they had a free government. The honor he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to make one person great, but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. If, after all, someone has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit, for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. And if anyone is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, not taken from him all at once. The tyrant should abstain from all outrage, in particular from personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the young. He should be especially careful of his behavior to men who are lovers of honor, for as the lovers of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the lovers of honor and the virtuous when their honor is affected. Therefore a tyrant ought either not to commit such acts at all, or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction and not to trample upon others, and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed to arise from affection and not from the insolence of power, and, in general, he should compensate the appearance of dishonor by the increase of honor. Of those who attempt assassination they are the most dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who do not care to survive if they affect their purpose. Therefore special precaution should be taken about any who think that either they or those for whom they care have been insulted, for when men are led away by passion to assault others, they are regardless of themselves. As Heraclitus says, it is difficult to fight against anger, for a man will buy revenge with his soul. And whereas states consist of two classes of poor men and of rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his rule, and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach to his government, for, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens. Either party added to the force which he already has will make him stronger than his assailants. But enough of these details. What should be the general policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to his subjects in the light not of a tyrant, but of a steward and a king. He should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian. He should be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life. He should win the notables by companionship, and the multitude by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His power too will be more lasting. His disposition will be virtuous, or at least half virtuous, and he will not be wicked, but half wicked only. 12. Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted the longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sisyon. This continued for a hundred years. The reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and, to a great extent, observed the laws, and in various ways gained the favor of the people by the care which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular, was respected for his military ability. If report may be believed he crowned the judge who decided against him in the games, and, as some say, the sitting statue in the Agora of Sisyon is the likeness of this person. A similar story is told of Pisistratus, who was said on one occasion to have allowed himself to be summoned and tried before the Areopagus. Next, in duration, to the tyranny of Orthagoras, was that of the Cipcility at Corinth, which lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cipcilis reigned thirty years, Periander forty-and-a-half, and Semiticus the son of Gorgus three. Their continuance was due to similar causes. Cipcilis was a popular man, who, during the whole time of his rule, never had a bodyguard, and Periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great soldier. Third, in duration, was the rule of the Pisistratidae and Athens, but it was interrupted, for Pisistratus was twice driven out, so that during three and thirty years he reigned only seventeen, and his sons reigned eighteen altogether thirty-five years. Of other tyrannies, that of Hyero and Gelo at Syracuse was the most lasting. Even this, however, was short, not more than eighteen years and all, for Gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in the eighth. Hyero reigned for ten years, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. In fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration. I have now gone through almost all the causes by which constitutional governments and monarchies are either destroyed or preserved. In the Republic of Plato, Socrates treats of revolutions, but not well, for he mentions no cause of change which peculiarly affects the first, or perfect state. He only says that the cause is that nothing is abiding, but all things change in a certain cycle, and that the origin of the change consists in those numbers of which four and three married with five furnished two harmonies. He means when the number of this figure becomes solid. He can seize that nature, at certain times, produces bad men who will not submit to education, in which latter particular he may very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some men who cannot be educated and made virtuous. But why is such a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather common to all states, nay, to everything which comes into being at all? And is it by the agency of time which, as he declares, makes all things change, that things which did not begin together change together? For example, if something has come into being the day before the completion of the cycle, will it change with things that came into being before? Further, why should the perfect state change into the Spartan? For governments more often take an opposite form than one akin to them. The same remark is applicable to the other changes. He says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again into a tyranny. And yet the contrary happens quite as often, for a democracy is even more likely to change into an oligarchy than into a monarchy. Further, he never says whether tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into what form it changes. And the reason is that he could not very well have told, for there is no rule. According to him it should revert to the first and best, and then there would be a complete cycle. But in point of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that itsitian changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Pleisthenes, into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antillian did at Calces, into democracy, and that of Gilo's family did at Syracuse, into aristocracy, as at Carthage, and the tyranny of Carleus at Lacedaemon. Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny, like most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily, for example the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Penetius, that at Gila into the tyranny of Cleander, that at Regium into the tyranny of Anaxilaus, the same thing has happened in many other states. And it is absurd to suppose that the state changes into an oligarchy merely because the ruling class are lovers and makers of money, and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should have an equal share in the government with themselves. Moreover in many oligarchies there are laws against making money and trade, but at Carthage, which is a democracy, there is no such prohibition, and yet to this day the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It is absurd too for him to say that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich and the other of the poor. Is not this just as much the case in the Spartan Constitution, or in any other, in which either all do not possess equal property, or all are not equally good men? Nobody need be poorer than he was before, and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a democracy, if the poor form the majority. And a democracy may change into an oligarchy if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic, the other indifferent. Once more, although the causes of the change are very numerous, he mentions only one, which is that the citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though he thought that all or the majority of them were originally rich. This is not true, though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their property they are right for revolution. But when anybody else it is no great matter, and an oligarchy does not even then more often pass into a democracy than into any other form of government. Again, if men are deprived of the honors of state and are wronged and insulted, they make revolutions, and change forms of government, even although they have not wasted their substance because they might do what they liked, of which extravagance he declares excessive freedom to be the cause. Finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one form of either of them. End of Book 5, Sections 11 through 12. Book 6, Sections 1 through 4 of Politics by Aristotle This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 6, Sections 1 We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of government. We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of constitutions, how and from what causes they arise. Of democracy and all other forms of government, there are many kinds, and it will be well to assign to them separately the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about them. Moreover, we ought to consider the various combinations of these modes themselves, for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments inclined to democracies. When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these. When the deliberative part of the government, and the election of officers, is constituted oligarchically, and the law courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to office aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state. I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to consider how these and other forms of government are to be established. First of all, let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry, we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One has already been mentioned, differences of population. For the popular element may consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of laborers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause remains to be mentioned. The various properties and characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less, and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy or only to remodel an existing one. Founders of state try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions, but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states. The basis of a democratic state is liberty, which, according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state. This they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical, not proportionate equality. Whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just? Every citizen it is said must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all Democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes. This, they say, is the privilege of a free man, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns, and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality. Such being our foundation, and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of officers by all out of all, and that all should rule over each and each in his turn over all, that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill, should be made by lot, that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one, that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of a few except military offices, that the tenure of all offices, or of as many as possible should be brief, that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important, such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts, that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and a magistrates over none, or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid, even this is robbed of its power, for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous discussion. The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services. Assembly, law courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay when it is to be had, or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law courts, and to the stated assemblies, to the council, and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, mean employment. Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution, it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to all democracies, but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, that all should count equally, for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers, and in this way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state. Section 3 Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich men? And shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? Or if this is not to be the mode, ought we still retaining the same ratio to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts? Which, according to the democratic notion, is the juster form of the constitution, this or one based on numbers only. Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs that to which the wealthier class, in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole power, but this would be tyranny. Or if justice is the will of the majority, as I was before saying, they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality which they both agree, we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice. Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted, but not without some reserve, since there are two classes out of which a state is composed, the poor and the rich, that is to be deemed law on which both or the greater part of both agree. And if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those that have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that they are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich. In such a case, the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourses had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear, who can if they like encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger care for none of these things. Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the previous discussion, the best is that which comes first in order, it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants, for the best material of democracy is an agricultural population. There is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and, not having the necessaries of life, they are always at work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of government or office, where no great gains can be made out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than of honour. A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property, for some of them grow quickly rich, and the others are well enough off. Moreover they have the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account. Their ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied, and in some democracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except the representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at Mantania, yet if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantania. Hence it is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election, and from persons having a qualification, the greater requiring a greater qualification, or if there be no offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government, the citizens are sure to be governed well, for the offices will always be held by the best persons, the people are willing enough to elect them, and are not jealous of the good. The good in the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account. Every man should be responsible to others, nor should anyone be allowed to do justice he pleases, for, where absolute freedom is allowed, there is nothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in every man. But the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states. The right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the best kind of democracy, and why? Because the people are drawn from a certain class. Some of the ancient laws of most states were all of them useful with a view to making the people husband men. They provided either that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land, or that if he did the land should not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. Formerly in many states there was a law forbidding anyone to sell his original allotment of land. There is a similar law attributed to oxylis, which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man's land on which he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to the evil of which I am speaking would be the law of the Aphiteans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are all of them husband men. For their properties are reckoned in the census, not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have more than the amount required. Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks. They are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior. There is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics, or traders, or laborers. Besides, people of this class can readily come to the assembly because they are continually moving about in the city and in the Agora, whereas husband men are scattered over the country and do not meet, or equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy or constitutional government, for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population, the assembly ought not to meet in democracies when the country people cannot come. We have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted. It is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order, and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind. The last form of democracy, that in which all share a like, is one which cannot be born by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have been pretty fully considered. In order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent or citizen, whether father or mother, for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonality exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class, beyond this not to go. When in excess of this point the constitution becomes disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at Sirene, for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. Measures like those which Kleisthenes passed when he wanted to increase the power of the democracy at Athens, or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at Sirene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established, the private rights of families should be restricted, and converted into public ones. In short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another, and get rid of old connections. Again the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic, such for instance as the license permitted to slaves, which may be to a certain extent advantageous, and also that of women and children, and the afflowing everybody to live as he likes. Such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner. End of Book 6, Sections 1 through 4. Book 6, Sections 5 through 8 of Politics, by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. Politics, by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 6. Section 5. The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state. For any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days. A far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states. He should guard against the destructive elements and should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly democratic or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. The demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law courts in order to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make along that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury, but be sacred. Thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations. For it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies. Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them where there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables, for the money must be obtained by a property tax, and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies. Where I say there are no revenues the government should hold few assemblies, and the law court should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages. First, the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid. And secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law courts. Where there are revenues the demagogue should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus. The poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy. Measures therefore should be taken, which will give them lasting prosperity. And as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or at any rate make a beginning in trade or husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions. And in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies, and should in return be excused from useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people. Their policy is, from time to time, to send some of them into their dependent towns where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their goodwill. Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot, the latter that the people may participate in them, and the former that the state may be better administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot. Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted. Section 6 From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy. The first and best tempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards of qualification, the one high, the other low, the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices, and the higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should always be taken out of the better class of the people. The principle narrowed a little gives another form of oligarchy, until at length we reach the most clickish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. For, as healthy bodies and ships well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-man ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care. The populousness of democracies generally preserves them, for the state need not be much increased, since there is no necessity that number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion. Whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz good order. Section 7 As there are four chief divisions of the common people, husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, laborers, so also there are four kinds of military forces. The cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the navy. When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established. For the security of the inhabitants depends upon the force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep horses. The second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry, for this service is better suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light armed and the naval element are wholly democratic, and nowadays, where they are numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. A remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals, who combine a proper contingent of light armed troops with cavalry and heavy armed. And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests. Being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary, and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the agile movements of light armed troops. And these, when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become light armed warriors in reality. The oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to the people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property qualification, or as in the case of Thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from mean employments, or as at Missalia, to men of merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not. The magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them, and will take no offense at the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. It is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices, or erect some public edifice, and then the people who participate in the entertainments, and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire an alteration in the government, and the notables will have memorials of their munificence. This, however, is anything but the fashion of our modern oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor. Oligarchies like theirs may well be described as petty democracies. Enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized. Section 8 Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken. No state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In small states, as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them, but in larger there must be a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated. First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market. A magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. For in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's wants. This is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state. A second office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is commonly called the office of City Warden, and has various departments which in more populous towns are shared among different persons. One, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbors. There is another equally necessary office and of a similar kind having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country. The magistrates who hold this office are called wardens of the country, or inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments. These are called receivers or treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This office again is sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called recorders, or sacred recorders, presidents, and the like. Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, vis that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers, and also the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it. No one will undertake it unless great profits are made, and anyone who does is loath to execute the law. Still the office is necessary, for judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect, and if society cannot exist without them, neither can it exist without the execution of them. It is an office which, being so unpopular, should not be interested to one person, but divided among several taken from different courts. In like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on register of public debtors. Some sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular penalties due to the outgoing, magistrates should be exacted by the incoming ones, and as regards those due to magistrates already in office, when one court has given judgment, another should exact the penalty. For example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agorah, and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them, but a double odium is incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, and if they are always the executioners they will be the enemies of all. In many places while one magistracy executes the sentence another has the custody of the prisoners, as for example the eleven at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailership also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners, but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it, for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. They're ought not, therefore, to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty, but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge of it. These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first. Next in order follow others, equally necessary but of higher rank, in requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which are committed the guard of the city, and other military functions. Not only in time of war, but of peace, their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. In some states there are many such offices, in others there are a few only, while small states are content with one. These officers are called generals or commanders. Again, if a state has cavalry or light-arm troops or archers or naval force, it will sometimes happen that each of these departments has separate officers, who are called admirals or generals of cavalry or of light-arm troops. And there are subordinate officers called naval captains, and captains of light-arm troops and of force, having others under them. All these are included in the Department of War. Thus much of military command. But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office, which examines and audits them, and has no other functions. Such officers are called by various names, scrutineers, auditors, accountants, controllers. Besides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and to this it is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides in a democracy over the assembly. For there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the state. In some places they are called probuli, because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly councilors. These are the chief political offices. Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion. Priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the gods, and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood. For example, superintendents of public worship, guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests. Such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public heart of the city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and sometimes pritonies. These then are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows. Offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbors, with the country, also with the courts of law, with the records of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutiny and accounts of magistrates. Lastly there are those which preside over the public deliberations of the state. There are likewise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order, such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the law, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics, also superintendents of gymnastics and Dionysia contests, and of other similar spectacles. Some of these are clearly not democratic offices, for example the guardianships of women and children. The poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as servants. Once more, there are three offices according to whose directions the highest magistrates are chosen in certain states, guardians of the law, pro-buli, counselors. Of these the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the pro-buli and oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. Enough of the different kinds of offices. End of Book 6, Sections 5-8 He who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life. While this remains uncertain, the best form of the state must also be uncertain. For in the natural order of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought therefore to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not the best for the state and for individuals. Assuming that enough has already been said in discussions outside the school concerning the best life, we will now only repeat what is contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz external goods, goods of the body and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and who will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice to his dearest friend for the sake of half a farthing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or madman. These propositions are almost universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good. Something that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal to facts which easily prove that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue or both, is more often happy with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind, and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useful extent but are deficient in higher qualities. And this is not only a matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are of such a nature, that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate, to be of no use to their possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the natures of which we say that these very states are states, so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. Let us acknowledge, then, that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference between good fortune and happiness. For external goods come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chance. In like manner and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that which is best and which acts rightly, and rightly it cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, or temperate. Thus much may suffice by way of preface, for I could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them. These are the business of another science. Let us assume, then, that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions. If there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over and consider their objections hereafter. 2. There remains to be discussed the question whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state or different. Here again there can be no doubt, no one denies that they are the same. For those who hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number. While they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. 2. Here present themselves for consideration. First, which is the more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an alien who has no political ties, and again, too, which is the best form of constitution, or the best condition of a state, either on the supposition that political privileges are desirable for all, or for majority only. Since the good of the state, and not of the individual, is the proper subject of political thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our inquiry. Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is, or is not, more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods. I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. For these two lives, the life of a philosopher and the life of the statesman, appear to have been preferred by those who have been the most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment, for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who think that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man's individual well-being. Others take an opposite view. They maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits of being practiced, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness. Indeed, in some states the entire aim both of the laws and of the constitution is to give men despotic power over their neighbors. And therefore, although in most cities the law may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power. Thus in Lackadamen and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view to war. And in all nations which are able to gratify their ambition military power is held in esteem, for example, among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honor of wearing as many armlets as they have served in campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup, which was handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb, and there are numerous practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesmen should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or will not. How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesmen or the legislature? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no parallel. A physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet most men appear to think that the art of despotic government is statesmanship, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practicing towards others. They demand just rule for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behavior is irrational, unless the one party is, and the other is not, born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not, indeed, all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects, just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which may be hunted for food or sacrifice. This is to say such wild animals as are edible. And surely there may be a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well governed, for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well administered and have good laws, but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies. All that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honorable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them. His enactments will not always be the same, and where there are neighbors he will have to see what sort of studies should be practiced in relation to their several characters, or how the measures appropriate in relation to each are to be adopted. The end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly made a matter of future consideration. Three. Now let us address those who, while they agree that the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner of practicing it. For some renounce political power, and think that the life of the free man is different from the life of the statesman and the best of all, but others think the life of the statesman best. The argument of the latter is that he does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To both we say, you are partly right and partly wrong. First class are right in affirming that the life of the free man is better than the life of the despot, for there is nothing grand or noble in having the use of a slave, insofar as he is a slave, or in issuing commands about necessary things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule over free man and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have set enough at the commencement of this treatise. And it is equally a mistake to place inactivity above action, for happiness is activity and the actions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble. But perhaps someone, on accepting these premises, may still maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number of noble actions. If so, the man who is able to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neighbor, ought rather to take away his power, and the father should make no account of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend, they should not bestow a thought on one another in comparison with this higher object. For the best is the most eligible, and doing eligible and doing well is the best. There might be some truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be. Their hypothesis is false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honorable unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he is already lost in departing from virtue. For equals the honorable and the just consist in sharing alike, as just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. If, therefore, there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey. But he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue. If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the act of life will be the best, both for every city collectively and for individuals. Not that a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are these ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results. But much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves, since virtuous activity, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions, the directing mind is most truly said to act. Neither, again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from others and choose to live alone should be inactive, for activity as well as other things may take place by sections. There are many ways in which the sections of a state act upon one another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were otherwise, God in the universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection. Hence it is evident that the same life is best for each individual and for states and for mankind collectively.