 Our next speaker is Jaroslav Lisavolik, who now works for as a chief economist for Eurasian Development Bank. And twice already during this discussion, we cited, I cited Zbigniew Żyzynski, you cited someone else, saying that who controls Eurasia probably is the key master of the geopolitics of the world. And so we are very much interested. Are we going to be the leader of Eurasia or we are going to slide a little bit and one way, one belt, we just give it as a present to our Chinese friends? Well, I think this is probably one of the big questions for the next several decades, what the strategy of Russia will be in terms of structuring its alliances internationally. And actually, this was one of the points I wanted to raise during my intervention. But I do think that as Mr. Fushe noted, China is a big part of Russia's foreign economic policy strategy in the coming decades. It's just there, it's already the largest trading partner if you take by country, obviously. And yes, this is going to be one of the key issues for Eurasia. I think we're already seeing signs of competition, hopefully creative competition, constructive competition between Russia and China and Eurasia in some parts of Eurasia in Central Asia. Clearly the influence of China, economic presence of China has increased tremendously. But let me start, before I come back to some of these issues, let me start with a broader general observation that if there is one thing that we can be certain about with regard to Russia in the next several decades, it is that Russia will attempt to stage a catch-up effort. And that effort will definitely necessitate a certain strategy. And the strategy that dominated before seemed to be very simplistic, seemed to be, well, clearly not very successful in the sense that it was largely dependent on the hope that the West would deliver the good, so to say. And the disillusionment with regard to that vision was palpable with striking in some ways in the past several years. Some of the examples that I would bring in Mr. Johnson touched upon some of these issues, and I would say the WTO accession is, if there's one thing that could have been done better, I think in the preceding decades, it's that instead of Russia waiting at the door and seeing a lot of the CIS countries get into the WTO ahead of it, waiting for 20 years, nearly 20 years to get into the organization, it would have been far better, of course, if Russia was allowed to compete equally on equal terms at the outset in the beginning of the 1990s. And obviously, this is one of the several issues that Russians have with regard to the preceding several decades. So accordingly, I think there will be a strategy that to some degree will be based, will represent a contrast effect of sorts with regard to the experience of Russia in the past decades. And I think one part of the strategy that we're already starting to see to some degree is more emphasis on self-sufficiency, clearly the realization that Gershyn Kron, Alexander Gershyn Kron, the economist who came up with the principle that there are advantages and backwardness in countries that are lagging, will adopt technology and catch up quickly. That doesn't seem to work for a lot of reasons. And there needs to be a more concerted effort to forge ahead with modernization. So self-sufficiency import substitution to some degree may be a far bigger part of the economic strategy going forward. I think what is very interesting that you're hearing in the domestic policy debates as all of these economic plans are being devised by Kudrin, by Arezhkin, by the government, et cetera, is the word nonlinear catch up, meaning that if previously the vision was that, well, we adopt this or that technology step by step, we go through all of the necessary stages to all of the requirements, so to say, to reach a certain level. Now Russia is looking for shortcuts. And some of these shortcuts may be precisely represented by the new infatuation of President Putin, namely the digital economy, the new economy. That seems to be from what I understand the topic of greatest interest for the Russian president. And in terms of the model that Russia is going to emulate, again, I would side here with Mr. Foushey. I think if the preceding several decades we had overarching Eurocentric kind of strategy in terms of economic alliances, in terms of the vision of how things are to develop, I think China is certainly seen as far more successful in terms of its transition path. And to some degree I think it's only inevitable that this model will attract the attention of Russian policymakers as will some of the other successful models in East Asia. One of the examples that President Putin likes to, I think, cite and cited on many occasions is South Korea. And that obviously is a model that was not devoid of certain autocratic elements itself, especially in the, obviously in the early stages of its development. But clearly, more of a tilt towards Asia, I think, is to be expected. In terms of the components of catch up, if you take the macro model of any country, capital, labor, productivity, in terms of capital, the key issue that is still unresolved in the preceding decades and that has to be resolved is infrastructure. The issue of industrialization has not been delivered upon so far. And infrastructure is something that allows Russia to deal with the number one curse that has already been mentioned by Mr. Juergens, which is distance. And the issue of distance is tremendously important and under and appreciated by a lot of the economists, because if you look at the balance sheets of a lot of the Russian companies that are strenuously competing with their peers from the West, transportation costs tend to be far higher in terms of shipping costs from hinterland regions, from the inter-religion regions of Russia to external markets. And then we go to the second component, which is labor. And with regard to labor, demographics is likely to continue to, it was a tremendous shock, obviously, probably one of the largest shocks that Russia experienced in the transition period. And we're now still experiencing this. The lower growth rates that are exhibited by the Russian economy are partly because we're losing hundreds of thousands of people from the labor force each year. And this is the aftershock of the 1990s. In these circumstances, migration will have to remain part of the economic policy package. And the key issue for Russia will be quality rather than quantity. And obviously, in terms of quantity, Russia is currently one of the largest recipients of labor migrants in the world. One issue that I would highlight with regard to labor, and it was again mentioned by Mr. Johnston, I think, very rightly so, the issue of human capital, I think. And all of the discussions on the economic strategies of Russia, human capital is being ascribed significant attention. One, I think, interesting angle is generational. Any time frame of 20 years that you look at is about generations. You look at the transformations in other countries, including Ukraine to some degree probably, and the role of generations is clearly to be seen. I think we're starting to see some very interesting signs of this generational shift, including in the upper echelons of power of Russia, whereby you have, for example, the new economy minister, Mr. Areyshkin, a very capable policymaker who's risen to heights in a matter of several years. And he's recruiting, believe it or not, some of his deputies from Facebook and social media. So in terms of how the Russian government is starting to operate is going to be, I think, very different. And this generation of the likes of Areyshkin is, I think, a very interesting one that is likely to be quite influential. And the emphasis, actually, in terms of getting new people on board, whether it's the governors or also the economy ministry headed by Areyshkin, is precisely to recruit the young. And finally, with regard to productivity, this is probably one of the biggest frustrations and one of the biggest question marks for the future. If you take the past 10 years, first of all, productivity was almost every year consistently below real wage growth. And secondly, if you take the past 10 years, no catch up at all vis-a-vis the West. So where we started from 10 years ago in terms of around 30 percent level, a third of the U.S. level of productivity, this is roughly the same where we are now. Arguably, there are good things to be said about low base effects that could be exploited by Russia that could provide some upsides. And some of the low base effects that have not been fully exploited so far, I would first and foremost single out economic alliances. So if you look at the number of FTAs secured by Russia for an average WTO economy, this is, I think, 14, 15. For Russia, this is one or two. One of the recent ones was Vietnam. Obviously, Russia is doing it together with the Eurasian Economic Union, but there are dozens of countries that are waiting in line to forge a free trade area with Russia and its Eurasian partners, diverse partners, potential partners such as Singapore, such as South Korea, which is very keen from what I understand to secure an FTA. Other players like Israel, for example, and some of these cases are actually near-term goals for the government. So this whole issue of what is called by Russian policymakers new openness, openness that is now based on forging economic alliances across the world. Finally, after joining the WTO, Russia is doing it in a way that we can pursue a proper trade policy. This is, I think, very important. The second issue in terms of low base effects is investment. Russia's growth, if it was staged in the preceding decades, was largely consumption driven. Investment, I believe, is likely to be the main driver of economic growth in the coming decades. And that would, to some degree, allow Russia, if it deals also with terms like corruption, to address the infrastructure barrier. Now, in terms of I'm getting pretty much to the end of what I wanted to say. In terms of other resources that could be employed and that could present upside potential to some of the scenarios that we saw from Mr. Dinkin, I think the experience of 2006, 2007 shows that, for example, Russia's resources abroad that are not always readily observed can be a factor. What I'm talking about is the capital abroad of Russia and there could be, you know, judging by the size of the capital outflow in the preceding decades, trillions of dollars abroad that could come back if conditions were to improve. And we saw precisely that for brief periods of time, in 2006, 2007, when Russia experienced relatively significant net capital inflows. Another possible upside potential is the Russian diaspora. Russia has one of the largest diasporas in the world. According to the foreign ministry, it's either third or fourth in the world. And it's probably one of the most high tech diasporas. So if Russia is capable of, you know, exploiting some of this potential that is out there abroad, then this would be, obviously, more of a factor in attaining high growth rates. Finally, I want to end my intervention with a reference to Dostoevsky, who was also mentioned here today already. And believe it or not, his last piece that he wrote in his diary in 1881 was an economic piece on Russia's economy where he made predictions. And we all know that Mr. Dostoevsky is great in terms of predictions. And his main message to Russia was the lack of long-term horizons, short-termism, as probably the ultimate most important barrier with regard to economic development that needs to be overcome. And the second issue was trust, the lack of trust undermining really the effectiveness of economic policy. Whatever was said by Dostoevsky significantly more than a hundred years ago still remains the case. And hopefully some of these issues will be finally addressed in the coming several decades. I think there is cause for hope. Thank you. Thank you very much. So if we carry on with our narrative on bipolarity, no matter in which poor we want to be, democracy or autocracy, we have to do according to Mr. Lisovolic with whom I 100% agree, we have to do human capital, investment capital, and technological breakthrough for which we need a little bit of a more relaxed political climate because those people in the West, about 8 million of high-techers will not come back easily.