 So the construction of states post conflict is a complicated and layered topic as we have seen discussion on in the previous two events. In this panel we will discuss important aspects of developing post conflict states relating to security institutions and economic development. We will have staggered presentations for the panelists first we will have a discussion on the role of security institutions. Our first speaker joining us today is political science professor Ila and that knock at the University of California Berkeley, her research examines a variety of international and domestic influences on the stability of fragile states, especially elections in these contexts, bringing together insights from international relations and comparative politics, as well as policing and community attitudes during crisis. She seeks to better understand how different actors can foster peace and improve governance outcomes. She's the author of electing peace from civil conflict to political participation. She will present first and we will have a brief q amp a, followed by professor skeptic us's presentation, which will be followed by open q amp a for attendees. Wonderful. Thank you so much, Mika. Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure to be here with you. I am going to share some slides. Wonderful. Okay, so what I want to present today is some work that is related to a new book project that I'm working on which is called inviting intervention state building by delegating security. And in it I'm going to talk about sort of different ways in which we think about state building with regard to security institutions and broadly to post conflict context in particular. And then I want to push for this idea about thinking about places where states themselves actually invite intervention by international actors in forums that are shared sovereignty. So what we're looking at thinking about today is state building broadly state building can be thought of as both domestic process or an international process. So states with ineffective security institutions produce instability not only for their own citizens so you know disrupting people's daily lives but also have these sort of problems of spreading transnational threats to other states. So the main question in policy world has been can state building help and in particular what international policymakers usually mean about this is Ken intervening by an outside actor by an international actor into this state help. The fragile states often struggle to strengthen and reform their own institutions. And I call these fragile states that term is sometimes politicized but I really mean this in terms of having institutions that are not stable and sort of long lasting insecure, and especially today will be focused on the security institutions. Additional state building efforts have really mixed records about whether or not they help with these interventions or not. You know, when you think of state building you probably these days think about Afghanistan or Iraq, which have been you know notably problematic cases. And so thinking about going forward there sort of these geo strategic politics and resource constraints that make that type of state building and a minimum, pretty rare. The question is, are there other options. And what I want to highlight today is thinking about cooperative arrangements between host states and outside actors, which I think are an underexplored, underappreciated and yet pretty common mechanism of state building as I'll show you from some of my recent work. Okay, so what I want to do in the talk is talk about sort of four different things, thinking about the concept is what we're going to do mainly in these, you know, 20 minutes or so. And so we'll think about the concept of invited intervention, especially along sort of a shared sovereignty dimension. Why is the shared sovereignty how is the shared sovereignty when we get these particular types of arrangements. So the concept of state building versus state backing, which I think fundamentally is about reform. I'll talk more about that. And I'll show you just a little bit of preliminary data this is not the final cleaned version of the data, but showing that these invited interventions are actually pretty common in practice, and suggesting some ways forward that this concept should point us in terms of thinking about where we might go with state building going forward. The concept of invited interventions, particularly in terms of shared sovereignty. There is a little bit of work on shared sovereignty. Weak states often designated as weak states, maybe willing to relinquish some of their international sovereignty for domestic sovereignty so here we're especially thinking about what's often referred to as Westphalian sovereignty which is the basically the ability to host states to keep other actors out of their domestic processes. They're often willing to relinquish that in order to get better stability within their states. And so this work, you know, builds on especially Krasner Steve Krasner's work thinking about this in his shared sovereignty book, but also many others. And this is that David Lake's work and others. So what we want to think about though is how state share sovereignty so shared sovereignty is often sort of pretty general term that's used. And it's actually used to capture pretty diverse set of cases. What I think of as shared sovereignty or type of shared sovereignty that I'd like to highlight in this project is that there are these invited interventions in which host states consent to other sovereign entities these have to be foreign states or intergovernmental organizations, other actors that also have sovereignty, taking temporary authority to implement policies or laws within the host states own territory and over its citizens. It's not just deciding whether or not to give aid, but actually being part of the process of actually doing implementation of a policy within the state and that affects its citizens. So crucially, these missions have, you know, this foreign sovereign entity working in the host state territory with jurisdiction over its host state citizens right that sort of the fundamental executive function that these outside the host states in these cases consent to a contract. So what they're doing here is they're actually using their international legal sovereignty to sign some sort of deal these are often formal treaties that don't have to be there often formal treaties that allow this outside actor in for a set period. The whole process occurs in this system of sovereign statehood. And so by signing this contract they're actually in some ways reinforcing their own sovereignty, even as they're delegating some of their sovereignty and so this is why I think of these as very much shared instances. These don't have to be symmetrical bargaining processes right it may be that the outside actor has more capabilities like military capabilities for example than the host state does. So they can be asymmetric bargaining processes but they're still bargaining processes that are leading to a contract which in theory should improve sort of the status quo option for both sides. I think that these processes where you're getting a contract gives us sort of the best chance of sustaining the contract, given that it is with these two sovereign entities within what is an anarchical system but one that hinges on the sovereign statehood right so by through signing these contracts between these two different sovereigns. And they're actually sort of reinforcing the process by which they both are given their own power. And so this is what makes these arrangements to me very much shared sovereignty at its core and really interesting. My studies of the project that I have at specifically focuses on these invited intervention in state security institutions are thinking about policing investigating prosecuting and judging here. These can also operate in like banking or you know other sectors but these are the ones that I focus on in this study. So just to show you a little bit and give you sort of a better sense of the different types of sovereignty arrangements that we can be thinking of here. So what I'm thinking of on the on the y axis here is is sovereignty taken over by the international actor on the left hand side of your screen and sovereignty retained entirely by the host state on the right hand side of your screen. And what I really want to get into is sort of this middle area where you have shared sovereignty but let me just briefly say what I think is going on in the two side columns because I think that this is where a lot of the state building work actually lives currently. On the left hand side, we can think about foreign imposed regime changes or other invasions these are cases in which the states fight their way in and then take over the state, or simply depose the existing regime, and then leave it to chance as to who's set up afterwards. So these cases can spill over into neo trustee ships when you trustee ships can be a little bit separate from this so this is where you end in particular recent years sort of taken over a state, and administered it until it becomes independent. These are especially in new states so Kosovo and tomorrow less as they're emerging from, you know, being part of another state that they may be administered by an international system. There are some pro regime stability or status quo defending operations that can exist here, especially if perhaps like the leader has just faced a coup and has just been deposed and you might sort of see an international actor entering without formal permission from the from the state itself but basically assisting the regime that's in power. Almost all of these in the in the left hand side of your screen are what we refer to as international state building in most of the existing literature. They can have some sort of transitional administration whereby they hand power back over to the enter to the domestic state, and newly created domestic state in many of these cases, and that can be sort of the trickiest part of these operations, but all of them also of course are critiqued for imperialism and neocolonialism because these are sort of fundamentally operating at the international communities impetus maybe if they're un operations, or simply a foreign state, I'm going in and changing the regime of another state. So those are very much, you know, sovereignty taken over by an outside actor. On the right hand side of your screen, you have cases in which international actors are operating in which they're intervening in some way but sovereignty is retained entirely by the host state so these could be cases where the international actors are trying to change the state fundamentally so they might be giving aid to rebel groups and so they might overthrow the state. They might be giving conditional aid to the government so that it will change its policies and practices in order to get that conditional aid, or they might just be giving regular per regime aid. Or even this could be foreign contractors or personnel who are working just within the state as contractors right so they're just working on on what the state asks them to work on. In those cases the state itself may be trying to strengthen and perhaps change its institutions, but it's really not sharing sovereignty with anyone right it might be taking aid but it's not sort of sharing its authority with with any of these outside actors. Training operations slide a little bit into allowing the outside actor to have some say over how for example military operatives in their state are trained like what the rules are that they operate by. But even those tend to have mostly the sovereignty retained entirely by the host. So I think the interesting set here are these invited interventions which are really clearly shared sovereignty agreements right in that these are host states that are actually asking these outside actors to come into the state for a limited period of time and help with some of these security functions. So that gives us sort of a sovereignty concept of these international actors and what they're doing here. I think we also want to think about the state building versus state backing to mention of the concept that I'm defining in this book project. So, in practice I think these missions come in really different forms state backing missions can provide just capacity alone for these international of sorry for these domestic states. So, you know, if a state is facing rebellion, you know, in part of its country and it simply wants another country to come in and assist us with assisted with fighting that rebellion. It might have a state backing mission, right that would be very different from a state building mission that has a component of reform. So these reforms change, but usually also standardize the security process that contributes in some way to the rule of law. So in many cases, these could just change the institution so it could change from like favoring one group to favoring another group but in practice what they're usually doing is sort of trying to make everyone a little bit more equal in the eyes of the law right in the ways in which the security sector is applied. In practice, the ways in which international actors usually are involved in this it can involve changing personnel or particular policies within bureaus and so they might be operating within like the police department. It can involve changing bureaus themselves so it might demobilize some units, set up new units that maybe are going to be more multi ethnic for example in some contexts, especially post conflict context. And it can even be changing the laws that the bureaus put in place and potentially the ways in which the bureaus are overseen in their work right so it might be putting them under legislatures for example and showing them how to report to those legislatures. So, both of these types of missions I would argue fit in the central column in the shared sovereignty column, but they have these very big differences in terms of whether or not they have a mandate for reform. So the state building missions which I call in my work governance delegation agreements are the ones that have some sort of reform component to them. And they are invited interventions but they are state building invited interventions so mandate for reform is sort of the top part of this chart now on the y axis. And on the bottom part we have these state backing missions where you're just coming in and aiding a foreign actor. So you can see the other types of missions also break by this, you know mandate for reform or not. So foreign imposed regime changes, as well as most neo trustee ships are fundamentally about changing or setting up new institutions in these states, whereas pro regime stability or status quote defending operations would not be right they would just be backing sort of the administration that exists. And then with aid so aid to rebels, right would be fundamentally trying to change the state conditional aid and democracy promotion would also be trying to get some change in the state, where as pro regime aid or private foreign contractors or personnel would very much be just supporting the institution that exists so no mandate for reform there. I'm going to talk briefly about whether state building and in terms of invited intervention is common in practice, before getting to some conclusions and wrapping up here in the next few minutes. So, I wanted to identify possible cases of invited intervention and so I've coded data between 1980 and 2015 with the help of both undergraduate and graduate student research assistant here at Berkeley. What we did was we set up to code a set of all sources that we could think of that would help us identify any in all instances in which foreign troops police investigators prosecutors or other security sector personnel were sent into these host states. And so we looked at like the foreign forces and military balance which is notoriously unreliable so we always tried to cross validate those. And so we looked at these entities and agreements. We liked it via reported missions. We liked a particular categories of aid or training that are reported to see if they were particularly sending foreign personnel. And we did a bunch of other searches which are standardized in our code book. We then verified all of these cases they mentioned so through official mission or state websites through academic sources or policy literature and through news reports. We're still in the process of coding, but what we wanted to code in particular was missions all missions that are operating these countries and then coding whether or not they entered by consent. So confirming that these missions were carrying out executive functions in the policing or judicial sector. There are some difficult cases to define on this so many of you probably saw the tragic incident in the share where you a service person was killed. And I think that that is one of these cases that's a little bit hard to define in our data set because many of these are defined as training missions and they're stating that they're only training personnel, but in fact, especially when these operations go wrong we find out that they're also operating in these countries so we wanted to be able to detect any cases in which they are also operating in these countries and so we have coding rules that seek to do this and to give us the benefit of the doubt if we think they might be operating. We define both implicit and explicit consent so did the host state just cooperate with the mission or did it like formally ask for this through an agreement or a treaty. And then we determine whether or not their state backing which is just sort of this contributing capacity alone or state building which also has reform component. So we try to code some of these other factors like who's leading the mission their budget and number personnel but those are harder to find so we have more missing data on those variables. Overall, this is, I should mention a first cut at the data so please don't say these numbers, we are undergoing a second coding round. And so it's almost certain that these numbers will change and any bias in them is not known because we added a couple of different coding steps which I think we'll find more cases we don't know where they'll find more cases. But, but, so take this as preliminary data, please. But what we find is basically that there are a huge number of missions operating in general in Sub-Saharan Africa. So I should mention this is Sub-Saharan Africa. This is between 1980 and 2015 as I mentioned so of all of the missions that enter these countries, about 73% of them seem to enter with consent. So this is that they have some sort of consent from the host state. If we think about the way in which we define state building and for thinking about Afghanistan and Iraq in our minds. So that's actually at least in our data in the Sub-Saharan Africa data set in these preliminary data, a minority of cases right that's only these 27% of cases where states are kind of forcing their way in. In most of the cases they're actually being invited in by these host states, and then the state building and state backing missions are pretty equal so in about half the cases, little less than half the cases, these states are actually asking for reform, not just for city building. And overall the missions occur in about 77% of all these Sub-Saharan African states. And in about 10% of the country years total. Again, preliminary data so take this as a grain of salt but this is just to give you an idea of what's there in the data set. Okay, so where does this concept point us I've talked a lot about this concept which I think is important and a bit different than how we usually think about state building. So I think intervention seems to be often invited, at least in the data we've examined so far and some other cases that I examined in this book project in Guatemala, Solomon Islands, a very different context we're seeing this type of invited intervention. Intervenors can provide additional capacity and either a loyal force to back the incumbent or a relatively neutral or untouchable force to bind the leaders hands as I argue in the case of reform. This points us to some crucial characteristics of these missions they often add capacity, but they also lock in a more removed force from the state politics right they might not be unbiased in the general sense of the word. But they're at least not involved in sort of whatever system exists in the state, and that has both pros and cons. Finally it raises questions about when they occur and what effect like why would states want to invite in these foreign actors, especially to reform their institutions. I argue in the book project that it's about tying hands for these states that they can make credible commitments to their opponents that they actually will change. And so that's sort of the direction forward that's what I what I write about in the book but I wanted to give you especially an overview of the concept here to get you thinking about sort of how we change security institutions in states that have fragile security institutions. And I think international intervention remains pretty important here, but that we should often be thinking about this invited intervention these invited forms of intervention rather than just imposed invasions. So I look forward to your, your questions and the other presentation and general questions as well. Yes, thank you so much. That was such an interesting talk. I'm genuinely learning so much and as an IR major this, these talks are always so exciting to go to to learn more. And so, there is a Q&A option down the screen below so people want to collect their thoughts and submit questions so but while we wait for people to do that I have some couple questions of the things that you talked about so you said that, you know, host states or host states conduct and invited inviting and shared sovereignty to help build back their states. I'm just curious about some of the major incentives for some states to invite other states because personally I don't like I don't find that I didn't know is a common practice in the first place because it seems as if you invite some other foreign sovereignty or state into your country to cause, you know, like tensions or just more problems that could, you know, digress from the progress of of state building so what are some of the major incentives for states to do that. That's a great question I'm glad you have this question because that is the motivating puzzle for this book project. So I've talked a lot about the concept here but but the book is actually about why states would be willing to have this type of intervention, why they would be willing to invite this type of intervention. And so I think there are a few circumstances under which states with fragile security institutions really want to tie their own hands. One is post conflict context, especially if you have a power sharing regime set up. It's very hard for the government to trust the rebels and the rebels to trust the government as they're both demobilizing right and trying to set up a regime that sometimes having this external actor that's actually pushing and implementing the reforms that they've usually agreed on in the peace process but is actually like overseeing this. That can be one case in which we see these types of shared sovereignty arrangements right and it kind of makes sense there because the government wants it not to constrain themselves but to constrain the rebels and the rebels and not to constrain themselves but to constrain the government right so so those make sense to me at least hopefully to you all. And then I think there are other circumstances that are pretty similar under which leaders would want to tie their opponents hand so I think in many of these cases what we saw at we're seeing at least in the preliminary data will see if it holds as we finalize the data and we run the analyses is that places where leaders basically think they're about to lose to an opposition, they may be more inclined to set these up so either in the face of an election that looks like they're probably going to lose or when they have a really high coup threat that looks like they're about to be deposed, they may actually set up one of these with the outside actor. This gives them like a last ditch effort at showing that they're really committed to reform. So it might help them, you know, not get deposed or not get turned over in an election. But if they do lose then their opponent at least has their hands tied right and so that can actually prove them in those cases as well. So those are some of the circumstances under which I find that are I think that leaders will want to tie their own hands and we're finding that to be consistent instead of the preliminary data and the case studies as I mentioned they're in depth case studies here on Central America, where Guatemala has been a major case that has this type of intervention, and in the Pacific Solomon Islands has been a major case with this type of intervention where Australia took the lead on that. Great, thank you so much. So I'll ask one more question before we move on to Mr. Skipper does this presentation, but you earlier said that the state building changes, or the standardizing the security process contributes to changing or standardizing the rule of law. That involves changing the Bureau's and laws and so how do you think I'm curious on how that like reflects on the people and like this actual citizens of the states and have you seen examples of like backlash or he judge backlash from the people themselves against this shared sovereignty. That's a great question. I mean, I think that there are. I think we should almost expect backlash in these cases, you know there are a lot of sort of state building pieces that look at these and say, Oh, you know we're seeing this backlash sometimes why do we see this, like, maybe it's their cases in which the outside actors incentives are not aligned with the domestic actors incentives. But the way in which I'm setting up the theory here I think anytime that you're using an outside actor to tie the hands of the domestic actors like that is what they're setting it up to do right is inherently to have some conflict between the domestic actors and international actors because you're relying on this outside actor to tie the hands of the domestic actors. And they're inviting it they're setting it up this way right but like once you're the rebels and the government operating this and you're trying to like push your limits a little bit, you're going to criticize international actor inherently so I actually think that these sort of like processes of backlash especially from the leaders should be almost inherent and that's what we see like in the case of Guatemala. So I think that there have been a number of different actors have come like, not many many leaders but there have been a number of different presidents who have come through the sissig administration which is sort of the outside actor. And each one of them when they're campaigning they say oh sissig is really important, you know, lack of corruption really important. And then once again to office they start critiquing on sissig. And so I think it is almost inherently complexual relationship between the domestic and international actor in some ways that's the way in which it's designed. And as citizens in many of these cases they actually tend to be very supportive so there have been a huge protests in favor of sissig the outside actor in Guatemala, especially when these sort of leaders sought to suspend it so once it was in the country and operating, you know, even though leaders would say things like oh this is anti sovereign or this is colonialist, you know, critique it in many different ways, a lot of the actual citizens in the country saw it as being beneficial and it's cleaning up their justice system in ways that were really important to them going forward. So I think you can often get, you should almost get backlash based on the way that they're designed, but that in many cases the average citizens can be relatively supportive and actually be a stabilizing force as this goes forward over time. Thank you so much for thoroughly answering my questions so now we're going to switch over to discuss the role of economic development in post conflict states. So to facilitate this discussion we were joined by economics professor stereo scared us. Professor scared us holds the Clifford as Heinz chair on the economics of peace at the University of California Irvine. In July 2016, he was appointed director of the Center for global peace and conflict studies with the basic trade off between production and appropriation at its core, scared us has developed a theoretical framework that allows the study of a variety of economic and political problems, including those of organized crime, the emergence of states and governance, civil wars and other forms of domestic conflict, as well as the effects of globalization the presence of insecurity. His research has been published in a variety of economics and political science journals, including the American economic review, the American political science review, economic journal, the Journal of conflict resolution, the journal of economic theory and the Journal of international economics. Oh, Professor, I think you are on mute. Can you see the. Yes, yes, we can hear you and see your presentation. Let me try. Sorry, I was. I cannot find the the view. Oh, I believe. All right, let's slide so again. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Well, I'm not exactly going to talk about economic development. I'm primarily actually focus on the role of national identity, something which is unusual for an economics I can talk a bit more about economic development for sure. But my talk is actually very much complimentary emphasizes a few different things but it's necessary what the professor of math and emphasized and discussed. So, what I will discuss first of all what is nation building because this is something that when I was invited about that your conference was about nation building, first of all try to define what nation building is. Talk about the role of national identity as an important component of nation building. If I have time, I might skip the, this part about nation building through war that we have there. And finally discuss whether how, or whether can external intervention build a nation, right, instead of just building a state or helping the state. So, this is what I'm discussing today is partly based on research that in collaboration with the scientists Nicholas some bunnies and bill as well as a former student economist online, which are too late. But of course, I'm my co authors are not responsible for this presentation because I'm emphasizing, and there are things that are not in the papers that we have. Okay, so first of all, what is nation building. I think there are three components that the one could put together or maybe two. One is state building. Building state capacity capacity to tax effective bureaucracy, legal capacity they both and in that we can include policing, as well as the rule of law. The regulatory framework for markets and other economic activities. So this is partly, I mean, mostly what the professor Martin emphasized, as well as something that sort of changing different trying to manage conflict. Develop institutions that distribute power so that you go from fighting in the battlefields to arguing in parliaments courts, the public sphere the public square, developing institutions of checks and balances, including possibly democracy and I think democracy is having is a big check on those in power, having civilian control of the military, and develop in the end the monarchy the whatever calls the legitimate means of violence in order to have a modern viable state. The thing that has not, does not receive as much attention and I'm emphasizing here is the instilling national identity having the citizens identifying with the state, and how this is complimentary sort of they go together with state building and managing conflict. So, what does national identity, what do we mean by that is first of all identifying with a nation, what is benefit Anderson called part of any feeling like a member of the of an imagine community. I mean, when we discussing public matters, what are we going to do in Europe if you are an American and you are thinking and when you do that you implicitly or explicitly identified as a member of a political community of a national identity. Additionally, they especially for European nation states, language, religion or ethnicity have been the building blocks of national identity, but you can have also more inclusive attributes that can form this basis, and you have many countries that from the United States to Mexico and Canada to Australia and India, where the basis of national identity is not what we consider primordial this kind of characteristics of the citizens. And of course, it doesn't even require that the citizens agree what is the basis of national identity. In the US, Americans say we are Americans, and when we have been surveys, they can be from all sorts of different things from the melting pot and diversity to being Christian or having baseball or something like that. So, as long as the citizens identified with the state with the state identify as part of this political community. As an economist I model this party with psychological payoffs. You have material payoffs or economic payoffs, but there are also psychological payoffs like status of the nation, the closeness of the citizens brings there to other citizens and that can play the issue of ethnicity and religion and language player all there. So, why do you have this national identity is almost universal in every nation state something that you usually don't pay much attention, but modern states, contrary to the modern states are universally having a well defined try or at least in trying to instill that national identity. It overcomes freerider problems and facilities collective action. If, if you know in a, in a pre modern society state, you have two villages that are next to each other that might be speaking different dialects might be belonging to different tribes. So sort of in at each other strokes through through history, they have tribal laws and other things that, well, a national identity overcomes these issues, and you have, you can have more easily collective action that reduces internal conflicts to the conflicts within the previously sort of communities that were much fragmented, it increases public good provision it allows us for it allows them to collectively organized and provide public goods at the, at the regional or national enhanced state building. And I think I would argue is essential ingredient of nation building and economic growth, and you can see that countries that do not have this social cohesion comes from national like the common national identity, do not have high levels of economic problems and countries that do, do have those things. The way that forging national identity in his sometimes often has involved a lot of coercion and, or propaganda mass education in the 19th century Europe, as to turn French men into sort of peasants into peasants. We have rituals from national days parades flags national Athens, you have economic cultural and sports and other national competence that enhance national prestige, the media has been enhancement of those through initially from newspapers in the 19th century, but in the 20th century we have radio TV and now we have new social media and other ways. So, internal conflicts often sharp identities, possibly including making national identity more salient but also, you can make some national identities more salient to national ones can enhance national identity, and that's something that many European states did that. And with the incest and welfare that the worker that had early in history but later in the 19th and 20th centuries was, was the first and second World War, of course, being important for that. So, so what is the relationship between nation building and national identity. It appears to be necessary for state building and therefore for nation building. You can think of state building as the hardware and national identity as the software of the nation building. State building itself takes long to achieve decades and it's a never ending process of course, always improve it, at least they decades. The bath party, for example, in Iraq, and afterwards during Saddam Hussein was able to build actually a pretty in terms of the nuts and bolts of state of the bureaucracy and state building was pretty affecting but not in reducing internal conflicts through checks and balances and other ways that would reduce that kept conflicts under wraps. But forging national identity is even more difficult than state in building taking many decades if not centuries to accomplish. France is considered the quintessential as a nation state, but and he had a long history of statehood. But even in the after the revolution, most French friends did not speak French, and they did not become French men according to some arguments until World War One, right in many ways. External actors, it's can hardly instill a national identity to another country except inadvertently except as when they you fight them, and in ways that are predictable often and it's difficult to figure out how. Exante, that is for the external interventions. Now traditionally in Europe for many countries in your national identity war forms in international wars. An example of that is the German unification that was took place after the Franco-Prussian war that Germany was not the state. It was Prussia was the dominant part of it. And so what you had at the time, you had Prussia, which was the dominant European state, German state and here is a picture a map of Germany before your unification the green parts are part of Prussia that were actually most of them in the west that were conquered very recently before 1878 70s. And it was the nobler state and Bismarck was attempting to unify Germany. But the southern especially the southern elites by various and places there were really very hesitant. In some ways, I mean there is a lot of historical and other social scientific arguments that said that Bismarck instigated essentially the Franco-Prussian war as a way of forcing the southern elites to unify Germany and sort of I will not go into details. It did not, Bismarck did not seek to achieve a more authentic national state similar to France, but instead he put to absorb the German nationalities without magnifying them. Okay, now, what about external interventions and what about new states that have come into existence in post-colonial times or earlier than that or a bit later, like in Eastern Europe, often in Africa and other places. They often have low state capacity. High German conflicts and no levels of national identification, they have either fragmented identities or polarized identities. It's acceptable as there is out to external interventions that political geopolitical overt covert or military outright military interventions and the worst cases. The most unlikely ones become proxy wars and battlegrounds of external powers. Here the examples Afghanistan repeatedly in its history has been a battleground of proxy, you know, during the great game between the British Empire and Russia. More recently, both the Soviet Union and now the US, you can say it's been a battleground for the US, although the US went and contested. In some ways Pakistan also was intervening in many ways that was contrary to the interests of the US. In Vietnam, Golan Carrago and other countries during the Cold War. You have the Democratic Republic of the Congo Zaire from 1995 on that you had Rwanda being the first one that intervened, external power that intervened, but then almost everybody from Libya, all the way to Zambia became involved somehow in the tragic war in the DRC where we had estimated more than 5 million deaths. And Ukraine more recently is another kind of example. And the result is often linked to instability, the low state capacity, the conflicts, the low level of national identification and the, of course, the economic effects are obviously not there. And they are subject to interventions. What about better cases are not battlegrounds. What about unilateral external interventions that you have sort of say one country goes in without not goes in but provides one type of external dimension without having a battleground with this. Well, they can improve the state's military capacity. They can improve the state capacity and state building of the country itself. So, for example, South Korea after Korean War is a successful example of the US helping in both these dimensions, but also South Korea had a national identity that was pretty strong already. And that was a thing in my view a critical factor on how a country like South Korea that in the 1950s had per capita income lower than say a country that Ghana, why it was able to develop so much partly because it did help from the US in state building in economic help in terms of opening up its markets and technical help that South Korea had, but it also because it had a very something to build on in terms of national identity pretty quickly. But if we accept that national identity is an important ingredient of nation building is can an outside power instill and solidify national identity out of the blue. I'm doubtful of that. And in many ways, it can actually sabotage national identity and nation building, as for example, the US did in Iraq, because there were the elements of. I mean, it was in the process of developing an Iraqi identity that now is probably more fragmented than before. The US intervention in Iraq, and at the same time, Ambassador Bremer actually abolished essentially the bureaucracy and the smallest state capacity that Iraq. So, you know, other external interventions are unlikely to succeed the nation building, unless you have ingredients like those in South Korea that were sort of aligned in many ways and you had huge amounts of effort on the part of the outside Okay, I guess that's it and can open it to questions. Yes, thank you so much. Yeah, national identity is always something that is such an interesting topic to me because we see it every day, you know, in our country, like America and, you know, we grew up for those, you know, who grew up here we recite the Pledge of Allegiance every morning we sing national anthem before every sports game and so I mean I thought you know nation building, but that's, I think, an example of ensuring national identity. So while we wait for attendees to submit their questions. I have a question for you professor so I know I learned in a class previously that some states use violence, especially war to maintain the control and influence over the state by using national identity and bringing together the people to kind of rally up the country and international identity. So how does that affect states that are like fragile, or in the middle of trying to establish a state. So when you do have a, you have civil wars, and you emphasize, you try to eliminate essentially another ethnicity. Extremely, it can be extremely brutal and violent, and often does not lead to effective results. So, even in countries like what you have in countries like the already pre established states nation states that have a strong sense of national identity, say for example, Spain. In periods of stress, you have things like Catalonia nationalism appearing. And what it does make I mean the, it usually creates interventions that have that are violent, actually enhance the sub ethnic identity. Right. There were Catalonians of Spanish descent, or residents of Catalonia Spanish descent, who really became almost Catalonians. Nationalists, after the intervention the violent interaction during the in a couple of years ago of the Spanish government. And this stays as a wound in there that can faster for years, decades, centuries, even in terms of grievances in other words. So, and you can have so it is not that's why a lot of the conflicts that you have civil wars and others so are so intractable and long lasting. Thank you for answering that question and I have one. Oh, I think we have a couple of questions from the Q&A so we'll move on to those so. So someone asked, how do you see the two professors compared us. How do you see the risk of too much national identity such as when national identity, these xenophobic policies, ethnic violence or similar things and how do you think states can balance national identity without going too far. Yeah, I mean, how you define there is not a unique way of defining national identity. So when you have, when you have in the US, when you survey Americans, they say, well, it's being an American is to be Christian, or sort of be an American football. So you have other Americans who emphasize the melting pot, or emphasizing the multiculturalism and other issues. So what you have then that there is not. It depends on what the state chooses and politicians choose to emphasize. And sometimes politicians can use one definition one way try to veer the definition of national identity through their own perhaps narrow ethnic group or narrowly ethnic source to gain politically, but at the expense of overall overall welfare for the country, or there are other politicians that can emphasize more universal identity. So what you have is for India, for example, it's been since its independence, there was an ethos of unity through diversity. And remarkably, you know, you have India that is a country that is in many ways in the linguistically, and in other ways more diverse than the whole of Europe, being able to have to sustain democracy for all these years. And now we see over the past. How many years is it now seven years since more than was a things we have a gradual move towards he do that being the primary way of defining, or at least not the primary ways that what the government in power tries to emphasize as the national identity of the country. So there is not national identity, there is not a unique way to define national identity. So, and a lot of it is part of the, of the political party depends on the political equilibrium the political process, but it is. But there is no, I mean we are, we are still are, and we will be for some time, sort of nation states, it will be very difficult, we cannot have all government and any time soon. We cannot have even a European government many times soon the European Union, there is no the European Union, it tries to define its supranational identity, but most Europeans, especially the rank of file most citizens do not feel primarily Europeans. So we are living in in nation states, and we will have by definition, a national identity the question is this national what kind of national identity does it stay here. Thank you for answering the question so I would like to ask a question that was posed to Professor Matt knock. So how does the reemergence of private military companies and other semi state actors alter this dynamic. I know specifically specifically that certain governments in the Sahel have turned to Wagner group and other unconventional actors to supplement traditional governments. Yeah, this is a great question. There's some really interesting new data on these questions as well so Debbie event at Denver University, and co authors have some cool new projects on actually measuring private military companies so we can actually look at this as a question, you know as a research question. But I think in terms of shared sovereignty private military companies are interesting because they really are more in this contracting framework right like we actually do have a lot of literature in terms of narrative politics about when it is that states will privatize or contract. What we see is like fundamental governance governance functions so everything from sewage and you know water services to schools to their security right exactly it is that they'll they'll use private military contractors is certainly interesting definitely fits in that literature. But I think in terms of like, building states. This can be a substitute to the state backing functions that allies can sometimes provide so like if you have a rebellion in part of your country and you just need more forces to be able to effectively fight it maybe more forces that you know better equipment, you might be able to hire one of these contracting firms. It gets a little bit murkier on the shared sovereignty friend. Once you're in sort of like an area in which you have a foreign state that's hiring this foreign company right to fight on your behalf so maybe that one of your allies is willing to pay for the foreign military company that then comes in and fights on your behalf and that gets a little bit murkier it's closer to the shared sovereignty dimension that we were talking about before. But in theory like these states have control over these military companies and that they can fire them and hire them right and so they're not sort of in the shared sovereignty that we really get to where we often get these like reform based changes right because that is basically just the state defy deciding on whether or not it's going to reform and implement a reform. If it's contracting out to do that to a private company. I do think it really speaks in very interesting ways though to what professors compared us is talking about in terms of forming a nation state right that you have these private military companies that maybe you know are fighting on behalf of the state but do they fight in the same way you might expect your citizens to fight do they have the same allegiance that you might expect your citizens to have so I think those are really good questions interesting questions to ask others but I think in terms of shared sovereignty. They fall much more into the contracting and privatization literature for me and thinking about why states would do that is certainly an interesting question but in some ways a different one from asking why especially states would ask for these reform based missions from other sovereign entities so foreign states or intergovernmental organizations. Um, so that actually makes me question whether. So would you categorize the, for example like the US intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan as an invited intervention. So no both of those would be invasions in the classification and so thinking about the charts that I was showing earlier those would be in the left hand category where outside sovereign actors taking over. And that's what I mean state building has been co-opted to mean those types of functions but I think these shared sovereignty these invited interventions are actually occurring much more commonly than we think of and in many more cases, but just sort of aren't often called the state building that we, we probably should be calling them. So, then what are some examples of sovereignty retain entirely by the host state without include like the US intervention in Latin America during the Cold War, or. So cases in which, so okay so we can think about the left hand column, those would be Iraq and Afghanistan right sovereignty taken over by an outside actor they also include cases like Kosovo and Tim or last to begin with right it's their new states, they're run entirely by the UN, eventually they're handed over in terms of power transition state building that happens where the host state maintains complete control of its own security forces. This is happening every day, anywhere that foreign aid is given right like so international actors might be involved in anyone's, you know policing systems like there's a decent amount of policing aid coming from the European Union. But in those cases, those foreign actors don't have any say over how these many many states take this aid and distribute it right so this this is happening. Many cases of aid provision just generally. So I would say like basically all places where they're receiving aid which is most developing countries right most countries in which in the sort of low income or middle income classification of the world bank standards are in where they retain control and then are doing some of this and state building functions right they're reforming their own security sectors, they're at least strengthening their own security sectors right it's all the same things that the US does every day or that anyone else does every day in terms of thinking about how to run their institutions, they just might be getting some foreign aid for that so those would be the right hand category it's this middle category that I think is most interesting because I mentioned a couple of cases this is invited intervention where we had like, for example, Guatemala has sysig sysig is these foreign prosecutors and investigators who are hired by the United Nations, and they run their own unit in Guatemala to investigate crimes that are related to corruption of the security sector. And so what they're doing there is actually investigating cases they can choose and investigate cases, and then they can co prosecute with Guatemalan counterparts cases that they're invited to co prosecute and so those are the sort of fundamental shared sovereignty cases where you're actually reforming institutions and changing process and ruling on these inside of the context and those are the cases where we really see the shared sovereignty. So a lot of like post conflict policing operations in places like Sierra Leone, where, you know, there are outside actors who are helping police and reforming the policing services. But they're not sort of like, there isn't, there is an autonomous state that has invited them to do this function after the conflict. So those are the ones that fit in sort of this middle category just to give you some examples across each of these. Thank you for the clarification. I have one question for Professor Scapades. You said that there were many problems that come with external intervention, sabotaging national identity. And this makes me think about how Western nation states intervening in non Western states are inherently just problematic or wrong or just doesn't work because of the religious or cultural differences that make up the national identity. Would you agree with that? Yes. Yes, I mean, going somewhere and thinking that you are going to do democracy and human rights, especially actually that's sort of more egregious than saying well I'm going there for the oil or I'm going there for the diamonds or something like that. Okay, you're going there for the diamonds, we know who you are. But then saying claiming that you are going to build democracy and then sort of destroying even the elements of the base, I mean to have democracy you need to create a state, to have a state. And if you dissolve the existing state instead of using it, right, then it's even more egregious because there is no chance of democracy really, I mean democracy that has any effectiveness. It's not just for the issue of destroying whatever equilibria that are there, it's between the different ethnic groups or other groups that are there, destroying even sort of the beginnings of a state or whether it could be authoritarian or not, it's better than having anarchy, right, and instead of having, it's better to have a state, unfortunately, even though it's an authoritarian, than having guns rule the place and having sort of very without any kind of even semblance of a legal framework or a recourse or policing or anything of that sort, you have your life is at the mercy of the mafioso or the gang leader sort of at any moment. And so, well, it goes beyond them, just simply harming the whatever equilibrium exists among different groups there, the society and state. Interesting, thank you. So another question that I have that you mentioned earlier about you were comparing state building as hardware and the national identity of software. So how do countries that have a specific religion that plays a very large role in their government such as Islamic countries. Consider religion or national identity then like would they, or would you consider religion and there's like in that context to be like hardware or even both. I mean, okay, that it was an analogy and I would think it's closer to software than hardware, yes, because it is religion is in the minds of people. It's not now that although there are structures but Islam does not have as much kind of hierarchy and bureaucracy like Christianity has and formal formal institutions as Christianity has but overall I would consider it more like a software with some hardware involved in it. And now, and the conception of Islam are sort of a varied conceptions of Islam as they are very conceptions of Christianity, and you see, you know if you look at the flags of the world, I would estimate a quarter of them have the cross and a quarter of them semi how do you call it the the crescent, the crescent which is the Islamic one sort of, they were originally built on religion, you know European states were originally built on religion. And a lot of Islamic states with Islam with Muslim minorities, they used Islam as a connecting force as they defining national identity, but you can have varied the types of to the extent of how national identity was defined. And for example until Erdogan, Turkey, although it has the crescent in its flag, it was highly secular state under Ataturk, right. And it is in many ways, even though Erdogan tries to formally show it is a secular state and and you have other states that are more religious, I mean, you have perhaps Saudi Arabia is the most one in many ways, but others are not. Thank you so much. So I know we're running short a little bit run time now. So before I pass off to Jackson, Professor Matt knock I one question about your collecting of data and coding whether that, no, no missions entered with with consent or not. And so by collecting data of how these states are operating. How do you, or like how are you going to use that information. Are we going to see this in your upcoming book and how can people or states use this information in future state building. Yes, yeah so the book, the data collection is both for the book and then we're writing a side project together with a graduate student here at Everglee we're writing a side project about it. I do hope that it will be useful for states. I also hope that going forward. There will be better data collection on this because as I mentioned we've had to go to like 12 different sources to try to figure out where foreign forces are going. And that's why you might not always want to make this overt there's been great work about like covert interventions in general in political science but I think that you know in there are some advantages to sort of thinking about this as invited intervention, especially for international policymakers. We'll be able to clarify the concept and then actually be able to figure out where this works and when this might be an option. And so hopefully going forward it will also be of use to policymakers, and we plan to release the data. Once we finish cleaning it and are publishing with it in this book and article project as well. Thank you so much. Okay, so I think I will thank you so much for talking and using your time and talk to us about nation building and nation identity and using nation national identity for security, and even coding and collecting information about these interventions so with that I'll pass it off to Jackson for final remarks. Thank you very much for the invitation and for exciting panel. Yes, thank you very much great to be here. Yes, I'd like to repeat Mika said thank you so much for coming. Thank you to Mika for monitoring the panel and thank you for all you attendees for coming to hear our wonderful speakers today. I certainly learned a lot I hope everybody else in the who attended also did. Thank you again to all of our other speakers who came today. And that's it for today. Hopefully, if you go to Tufts and you're attending this you can join us with simulation tomorrow. If not, then thank you so much to have one whole day. Thank you again to our speakers.