 Mae'r Prif Weinidog a'r CEO yw New America. Mae'r ddechrau yn ni fwyaf i'r meantime a cyfnodig cyfnodig wedi'u gyflwyntio i'r Rhunu America yn y Llyfrgell. Mae'r Prif Weinidog yw Ysgolwyr Fyredu Iosgwyr gyda'r Prindstyn ysgolwyr, ond rydyn ni'n ymgyrch yn ei ddweud. Ond rydym yn ymddangos i'r cyfrifedig, ar 2009-11, mae'r prif Weinidog yw'r drefysgol ar gyfer y statwyr, yng Nghymru'r ysgolwyr, Felly, mae'n ddiwedd ystafell, dr Slautr wedi'u gweithio'r wych yn ysgwyddiadau iawn, ac mae'r ddau'r cyflwydoedd yma y tufyrdd, ac mae'r gwaith o'r gyfer yma, ysgwyddiadau yma i ymddiannol, ymddiannol yn y rei'r gweithio. Mae'n ddechrau'r gweithio yma, a ddechrau'r gweithio yma, a'r ddau'r ymddiannol yn ysgwyddiadau iawn. A dda i gynllun o'r gweithiau, dr Slautr, was Dean of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs from 2002 to 2009, and also Professor of International Foreign and Comparative Law at Harvard Law School from 1994 to 2002. You'll begin to wonder how she has fitted all of this in, as well as writing or editing seven books, including New World Order and the idea that is America keeping faith with our values in a dangerous world. And, of course, one that certainly received very worldwide attention, women, men, work and family. And I think the article arising from that was one of the most read articles, I think in the history of the internet. Dr Slaughter is a contributing editor also to a number of publications, including to the Financial Times and today's Financial Times, an article in assessing the aftermath of the election in the US. She's obviously provides a lot of commentary and is no stranger to all the slings and arrows of discussion on foreign policy in American, and that brings in discussions on American foreign policy. And very interestingly, and I think it's probably a prelude to the discussion today, she curates foreign policy news for over 80,000 followers on Twitter. She comes at the end of a tumultuous week for us, for America, for the world, and it's been a tumultuous and unsettling year, certainly for us here. We're overwhelmed, I suppose, by the results of the US election and its implication for foreign and economic policy. But I think probably we have to study ourselves and see that the world still turns, and we have to find ways to deal with the issues that are on hand. The bitter war in Syria, Ukraine, refugee flows, far eastern tensions, Middle Eastern rivalries. But what would be particularly interesting for us today is, we'll be to hear what Dr Slaughter can outline by way of her understanding of the politics of the modern world, where foreign policy issues can no longer be dealt with in isolation, but in conjunction with other forces that influence our ways of thinking, such as terrorism, crime, trade, economics, food security, et cetera. So we look forward to hearing how all of these influences might be bought to bear and the challenges that we face. Dr Slaughter, floor is yours. Thank you very much. More about Europe and really about how to think about Europe and the world. You extended this invitation after an FT column that I wrote after Brexit that said the United States of Europe view of Europe, which was the federalist view of the European Union. It came back in 1957 and thereafter is certainly battered if not broken, but that that was perhaps the wrong way to think about the European Union and the Brexit accompanied the issuance of the European Strategic Report that Federico Mogherini undertook and that had talked about Europe, the European Union as a cooperative regional order and that as a proto-federal state the EU is going backwards, but as a cooperative regional order it is still by far the most successful example in the world. And I argued further that the United States or the federal state was the answer to how to achieve democracy at scale in the 18th century. That's the federalist papers, that's of course many of the enlightenment writers. And that was a method that worked very well for the United States, for other federal states around the world. But today the question is how to weld sovereign nations together with their different cultures and their different languages and a reserve of powers they will not surrender. How do you unite them in such a way that you get the benefits of pooled sovereignty but still allow democracy to operate across that realm? And the answer to that question, that is the question that I think the EU is trying to answer. So that's the starting point. But I want to explain how I get to that thinking and I want to give you a way of looking at the world that I think helps you analyze the European Union or indeed many other things quite differently than we traditionally do. And I will just say I'm going to talk about the chess board and the web. This is a concept I introduced in an article I've just published in Foreign Affairs a month ago looking at a grand strategy, which I have to say might have been adopted in a Clinton administration very unlikely to be adopted now, but we write for the longer term. And it is a book that I have coming out in March on how to think about the world not only as the chess board and the web. So let me start with two examples and give you the chess board view and the web view. I'm going to look first at Ukraine and then at Syria just as two very current and continuing hotspots in global affairs. So if we think about Ukraine, the classic way that I think many of us and by us I mean those of us who are foreign policy professionals, experts, maybe even enthusiastic amateurs, but nevertheless we have been taught to think about the world in chess board terms. This is just classic Westphalian analysis. Essentially you think about a world of great powers and you think about well if I do this they'll do that. Sometimes it's chess, sometimes it's poker. It is always a game among a certain number of powers and indeed we teach it now in terms of game theory and certainly in the 20th century that was the great way that the United States always thought about its relations with the Soviet Union but even if you think about US-China relations or EU-China relations or relations with Iran you're thinking about a chess board or a poker set. So if you think about Ukraine from that point of view it looks like yet another great East-West tug-of-war. The origins are either depending on which view you believe, the decision of the Ukrainians to opt for the EU over the Russian economic space or the expansion of NATO and what that triggered in Russia. But in either case you're seeing that on the geopolitical chess board. Ukraine in the middle but having triggered these larger forces. And you think then of the response as very much Putin's aggression and what is the West, NATO, the EU, the United States going to do about it. And that is not an irrelevant set of calculations. Everything I say today is both and, not either or. You'd be crazy if you were thinking about this not to think about what Putin wanted, not to think about what it means for NATO, what it means for the West versus Russia. But the way I would also look at it would be quite different. So that's the chess board view. Here's the web view. I would start with Ukrainian people and I would argue they were less focused on the EU versus Russia than they were on getting rid of corruption and having a decent state. This is after all the second time they've tried to do this and the first time in the Orange Revolution was not about the EU. It was about getting rid of a corrupt government. And this second time, yes, they wanted to continue negotiating with the EU but on the premise that the EU was their best shot of getting a decent government. And could you have given them a decent government without joining either side? They'd have taken that. It wasn't necessarily on offer, but it's really important to remember that what they wanted was looking west and looking east to governments that function, the ones that function more on the western side. That's what they wanted. That's the first point. The second, so that's just the desires of people and people looking around the world at other people and seeing a better standard of living and opting for it. The second, of course, is trade flows. Now, here I will take an ethnocentric perspective. The United States, of course, initially started with John Kerry thinking, well, I'm going to resolve this with Sergey Lavrov. This is an east-west matter. This is NATO. This is me. This is me and the Russians. Well, the United States has 30 billion of trade with Russia every year. And the EU has 300 billion. If you wanted to look at who was going to have any power in that setting, it was not going to be the United States. It was going to be the EU, and ultimately, with the Mins negotiations, I think we got there. I mean, actually, the United States backed off, or the Europeans insisted whichever way you want to play it. But if you were thinking about flows among people in the web perspective, you'd have to be thinking about trade flows from the beginning, and you'd have to understand where the balance of power lay. The final thing that you'd want to be thinking about are digital flows. It's harder to remember now, but in 2011, you will recall there were very strong demonstrations against Putin in Moscow. He was very frightened by those demonstrations and has done a great deal since to crush them. When the Ukrainians first, when they demonstrated on the Maidan, they had tremendous close ties with their Russian fellow dissidents. If you track their digital relationships, there's a, you know, a dissident ties across, through digital flows, essentially that is how they communicate. I mean, then that's also how they communicate with their followers through blogs, through Facebook, through social media generally. Putin was terrified that if those dissidents won, they were showing Russian dissidents what could be done, which again is not an East West issue, it's a matter of Russian politics. So from the chessboard perspective, you get a geopolitical set of calculations. From the web perspective, the world of networks, of networks of people, economic networks, digital flows, you got a different set of calculations that gave rise to a different set of policy prescriptions in terms of who should lead, how hard you push on trade, and how you then really the most important thing you could do is to build up the Ukrainian government. So that's one example. Let's turn to Syria. And I think the one thing I'm fairly certain of at this point with Trump's election is that this will be the end of US support for anything other than cutting a deal with Bashar al-Assad's government and Russia. I'm not sure that deal will hold, but I'm sure we will now try for it and essentially say whatever happens in Syria is not important. What matters is ISIS will cut the deal, will fight ISIS, and will leave the Syrians to their fate. Again, I'm not certain that deal will hold, but we can talk about that in the question period. But again, if you look at Syria, when the Syrian Civil War started, it was not unreasonable for Barack Obama to do exactly what James Baker did in the Balkan Wars in 1992 or 1991 and say, we don't have a dog in that fight. If you looked at it, Israel was okay. Turkey was supporting the opposition, so was Saudi Arabia, but it wasn't anything that was going to directly affect the United States. Of course, above all, from the President's point of view, he wanted troops out of the Middle East, not to get involved in the Middle East. He could look at it and say, this can be contained. We are not going to stick our necks out, just exactly as we initially thought in the Balkans. Then you could further look and say his priority was Iran, which is not an unreasonable priority in terms of, again, thinking about geopolitics, thinking about a nuclear Iran. It's greatly debated as to what extent actually our greater action in Syria would have derailed those talks, but it was a reasonable calculation to make. Thinking about it geopolitically, you looked at the great power configuration. You wanted to continue relations with Iran, and otherwise, as long as our allies in the region were okay, you didn't want to act. Now look at it from the web perspective. The first thing actually you'd look at, which very few people do, is the impact of climate change on the Syrian Revolution, the understanding that because of a five-year drought, you'd had massive movements into the cities. You have a country of 22 million people. The land cannot support those people in general, but certainly not after the weather they'd had. Of course, that drought played a role throughout the Arab Spring, raising food prices, and that was part of the unrest. But particularly acute in Syria. So just to start with, if you're thinking about flows and you're thinking about connections, you'd have looked at the impact of climate flows on that region and seen it's not just political, or it's political but it has deeper roots. But you'd have also looked at refugees' resentment and recruitment. Refugees were not hard to predict, and many of us were predicting that it was clear from the beginning that Assad would do anything to stay in power. This is a crisis that began with torturing children in Daraa, and after six months of nonviolent protests where he was shooting into the crowds, then of course being willing to use chemical weapons, and earlier than the United States actually recognized, it was clear he would rather destroy his country than give up power, and then it was equally clear that you would have massive refugee flows at least in the region. I'm not sure any of us predicted what would then happen in Europe, but you certainly could see it was going to destabilize the region. You could also see, you're just breeding another generation of ISIS recruits or al-Qaeda recruits or whatever the manifestation of extremist Islam is in the next generation. You've got a whole other generation of young people who see the United States as standing for those values but not being willing to do a thing when it actually came to helping them. So you're incubating, as we have done already in refugee camps, another generation of terrorist sympathizers, if not actual terrorists. Finally, of course, recruitment. Again, looking at flows, the people who are looking at social media knew that you had a far easier way to recruit across the Middle East given what ISIL learned from al-Qaeda in the digital world and, again, thinking about the patterns of digital flows. So if you'd looked at that, and many of us did, you could see that although geopolitically we might not have had a dog in that fight, certainly from the web perspective, when you think about non-state threats, when you think about refugees, when you think about destabilization, and again, if you map the digital world, you could see growing forces that should have caused us to go into Syria. So those are two examples. Let me just give you the broader way of the chessboard and the web, and then I want to come back to how that means we might think about Europe. My point here is the title of this talk is Hot Spots and Blind Spots. The chessboard shows you the hotspots. That's what we still focus on all the time. When you apply the lens of the web, you actually see different things that we don't tend to read about, but they give you a different set of policy choices. But you can also see crises coming, and I'll just throw out one, Venezuela, right now. From a geopolitical point of view, that's not such a worry. Chavez himself has fallen, Cuba looks different. It doesn't look like that great a threat. From a web perspective, it's a disaster. The Caribbean is like the Mediterranean of old. It is one cultural and linguistic entity, and we're going to have massive refugees, and you've got climate problems, you've got drug problems. So just to give you an example of how to think about it. The chessboard we know how to think about. The web, as I said, it's think about the worldwide web. It is the networked world. It is world of criminal networks that we're used to thinking about. We're used to thinking about terrorist networks and arms traffickers and drugs traffickers and money laundriers, that world. Of course, the world of global business, networked supply chains, which again, from an economic point of view, we're more used to thinking about. It's the world of civic networks. Everything from NGOs to organizations like this one to think tanks, obviously, but also universities, churches, all the civic players who again have been globalized and have tremendous power. If you think about the Paris Agreement, regardless of what the United States does as a government, the 7,000 cities that were part of that agreement and the many businesses that were part of that agreement, they will still make their commitments. That's not to say that it is not a grave setback, but it's not the same setback that it would have been if it were just a treaty on the freedom of the seas. It is a treaty that engages global networks. Thinking about the web, we have to think about how to build networks strategically and how to activate them. In the actual book, I take network theory and I have categories of different networks and how you would actually build them and deploy them and lead them because our tools are still chessboard tools. We don't have web tools in the way that we need them. The other thing to say about the chessboard view, McKinsey has a connectedness index, which actually maps how connected different countries are in terms of trade in goods and services, finance, data and people and digital. That's the last one. This is an outlook that people are adopting and starting to measure power in terms of connectedness. That brings me back to the EU. From the point of view of a networked entity, the EU is preeminent in the world. The EU's power after the fall of the wall was not just the attraction of being part of the West, it was the actual integration of all those countries' officials into the EU networks, the agriculture ministers, the finance ministers, the environment ministers, the justice ministers and lots of networks in business and civil society and education as well. If you think of the EU not as an entity that is trying to be a unitary state great power in the world, other than economically, not as an entity that is going to have one army, I think that's a long way away. No one's ever been willing to cede military power to the UN. I don't see ceding it to Brussels, although I see coordinated action in many ways. But if you think of it as a set of networks in which different EU states can decide I'm going to be part of this network and not part of that one, although I would say there has to be a minimum number to decide what they're parts of. You can't just be part of one or two, but you can choose. Then not only is the EU extraordinarily well placed to be connected to Asia, Africa, Latin America for the Iberians and of course the United States, but equally importantly to use those networks in ways that allow you to actually mobilize power. So again, if you think of corporate networks, civic networks, you think of even government networks, sub-state networks, the EU offers a vision of a region that is by far the most successful of any other region. So I'm going to leave it there and urge you to think about the EU this way, but to suggest that thinking about the EU this way is simply one example of a way that we're all going to have to think to live in a century that is both the world of the chess board and the web. Thank you.