 Jean-Pierre, the floor is yours. Seven minutes. All right, as you look at the time. And there's a clock here. Well, thanks a lot for this very kind introduction. Thank you to Thierry de Montbriere and Ifri for inviting me again to this August conference in which I've learned a lot on other topics like AI and semiconductors, which are very much related to the topic we're going to talk about. We are located actually at the western end of the Indo-Pacific region, a region which is very vast, which includes maybe two-thirds of the world population and maybe more than half of the world GDP. So it's a very, very important region of the world. Even in Europe sometimes, of course, we tend to, I wouldn't say neglect in the Indo-Pacific, but we are so focused on Europe and Ukraine for good reason and also on the Middle East for obvious reasons as well that the Indo-Pacific maybe is not at the top of the agenda of most European leaders and governments. However, I think there are a number of things that we'd like to tell you about very briefly to start with. Since I'm based in Hong Kong, which is part of China, as you may have realized, I would like to say a few things about, first of all, the new environment in the Indo-Pacific and particularly the economic environment in which the region is developing today. It's a much slower economic environment than before. The economic growth of China has slowed down to 3%. The Chinese economy is facing a number of issues in the housing sector, local government in the red. And the post-COVID recovery has been quite disappointing. It worked well in the first term of this year, but then it has slowed down and there are some concerns. There are also some concerns about employment in China. The unemployment rate officially is around 21%. Maybe it's much higher among young people, maybe 40%. And there's a sense of malaise. If you haven't read an article by Ivan Osnos in the New Yorker, which is a very interesting magazine, and the article tells you quite a bit about the mood of quite a number of Chinese today. And I can see that among my many Chinese students in Hong Kong itself. So that's the first thing I would like to say. The second thing is, of course, geopolitics is having an impact on the economy in the region, the Chinese economy. It's not disrupting everything. I don't think we're witnessing a full decoupling of the Chinese economy from the U.S. economy or Western economies. But it's disrupting. It complicates the trade flows in a number of sectors. Semiconductors have been mentioned. But also China has retaliated against sanctions imposed by the U.S. And started to use also some economic tools in order to put pressure on the other side, including restricting the export of gallium, germanium and graphite to the U.S. and to other countries as well. Now, what is interesting in this new context is that you see both trends taking shape. One is some kind of reduction of some countries dependent upon China. And one of these examples is South Korea. We may come back to that. And on the other side, we see countries like India, despite the tensions you've alluded to on the border, they still do a lot of trade with China. And actually the trade deficit between India and China is huge and keeps growing to the point that now India trades more with China than with the U.S. So we're not really witnessing any decoupling. If you look at the trade figures between China and the U.S. or the U.S., the U.S. is still very, very strong. And then the slowdown has had also in China has had other consequences. The fact that the BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative now has less steam, less, I mean, in its engine, less money has been involved in, invested in the BRI today. I think it gives opportunity to other players to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific region and the global south of the whole. I'm alluding here to a number of initiatives taken by the U.S. like the B3W, Bill Barbeca world, or the Global Gateway of the European Union, or the G7 infrastructure project. So there are a number of opportunities here, which is also shouldn't be neglected. But I think there are security challenges. And here I will be brief because we can come back to those challenges. It doesn't mean that every country is aligned to this new bipolarity with which is emerging in the region between the U.S. and China. I think there is still a lot of leeway for a number of countries. And the best example maybe is India, which is the same time a very active member of the BRICS, where being much closer to other partners in Asia through the Quad, if you've never heard of the Quad, the Quadrilateral Security Forum between India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. So we see India playing a very diverse role in the region. But what dominates in the Indo-Pacific region now is really growing bipolarity and growing tension between the U.S. and China. The question of course is for other players including the European Union, how can they play a role in that new context. Now the good news in the sense that there are tensions, but for the time being China is playing in what we call the grey zone, within the limits of the grey zone strategy, which is to put pressure on the other side and other players including the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, even in the East China Sea with Japan around the Senkaku Islands, but doesn't go beyond the threshold of war. So the grey zone strategy is not without risks. I think there are growing risks of incidents, of military crisis, and the military crisis needs to be managed. But I think we have precedence, one of the best known precedents of the EP3 incident in 2001 between the U.S. and China, which was negotiated and managed and negotiated by both sides of the foreign ministry. So even if today one of the issues, and the dog will come back to that, I'm sure, is the lack of military to military relations and contacts between the U.S. and China. I think those meal-meal relations will be, sooner or later, resumed, and if there is a need to communicate because of a crisis, I think they will find a way to communicate. So that's the background now. Of course, quite a number of people have alarmed about the growing tension in the Taiwan Strait, and for good reasons. I don't think that the TSMC and the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is an efficient shield against any attack from China. The so-called silicon shield is not something which I would really invest in or believe in. But what I think is that a number of factors have also led China to think twice about starting a military venture against Taiwan. The war in Ukraine is playing a role, clearly. But I think at the end of the day, which is very important to bear in mind, is the fact that both China and the U.S. are nuclear powers. And it's very likely that in the case of a Taiwan contingency or a crisis in Taiwan, Australia and the U.S. will intervene. So it raises the stakes, clearly. But the fact that we have two nuclear powers and nuclear weapons, in a sense, are factors of peace, rather than factors of war, is therefore comparable side to think twice before starting a war in the Taiwan Strait. So that's what I would insist upon here at this stage, and maybe we can come back to those issues. Thank you very much, Gumpia.