 Professor Naila Khabir, the employment guarantee schemes, especially in India, are those that do not provide any skilling for the people. It's just an assurance of some kind of work to the people so that they do not suffer from seasonal employment provided in agriculture. So these programs, the long-term objectives of these programs should be that the demand for such work should go to zero. That should be the long-term objectives of the government. So what do you think are your comments on it? Drawing on from the Maharashtra Guarantee Scheme, the Maharashtra is one of the richest states in India, but still you see that there is still demand for the employment guarantee scheme in Maharashtra, which itself points to some failures of the government in other ways. So I would like to have your comments on this. Thank you. I have a question to Santiago Levy. In the – if one thinks about the tax transfer system's responses to the lack of formal employment in the developed countries set up, there's been an extension of these so-called in-work benefits, like the EITC system in your neighboring country in the U.S. How do you see the role, potential role of these sort of systems for fostering formal employment in middle-income countries, like Mexico? Thank you for the three excellent presentation. The first question is to Santiago. You said that you have strictly selection for your beneficiaries. How? Yeah, because the similar minimum living standard guarantee program was experimented, implemented in China, but in the very poor area, it's very difficult for the mean test. Yeah, you understand our problem. So the strictly third selection becomes election by the village. And the second question is to Francis. It's to me not to quite clear why the subsidy for children up to 18 years, and how. It's only cash and to understand the similar program implemented in China that the food directly provided to the children and two years old, and also school feeding program was implemented in the schools, but not definitely cash. And also, so the first question that's related also for the yesterdays, that what is the impact of your social guarantee program to the labor market participation. And the third question to Nela, that since India has also fast growth, I don't know what is the impact of fast growth on the employment, because in the China case that the public works are still going on, but the most of poor families relying on Margaret to cities to get their jobs. Thank you. Thank you. Address to Santiago, but others may want to kick in. These experiences that you have been referring to have also been happening at the same time where sort of the global international level, we've had discussions about millennium development goals, setting debates, trying to synthesize experiences and so on, and now we are approaching a point where we are thinking about a post 2015 development agenda. And I'm just sort of wondering, is there one sort of key message or lesson that you would say from your experience moving forward, what sort of the key insight that you would focus on. And I'll give just a little bit of the background from some of the internal wider discussions that we've had, because we are right now moving from one work program to the next. And we have been sort of struggling with these issues, and we do want to come out in a balanced way thinking about on the one hand social protection programs and so on, but then also on the other hand, on the fundamental issues related to economic transformation, structural transformation and so on. And I was sort of sensing that was a little bit of this in the background of the presentations and then made me put it very pointedly, are we wrong when we insist on saying transformation, inclusion as sustainability, is that the right way to, how can you say, or is this just too much an old fashioned economist who keeps insisting on that. Thank you. Thank you, Vin. I must say I really enjoyed all the three presentations. My question is to Dr. Kabir, it's a pleasure to be interacting with you again. It was a very comprehensive analysis that you give of both Narega and the TUP program in Bangladesh, and if I understand correctly in your presentation you showcased how there have been positive impact or there's been a transformative impact on the lives of women in India, whereas in Bangladesh the results were not so positive on the contrary fairly negative. And so my question is that what would be your advice in terms of taking a program like this forward because we are right now in conversations around having a similar program in Vietnam. So what should be the safeguards or what is really the good practices that we should certainly keep in mind when talking about the design to the delivery piece completely. Thank you. Thank you. I'm Richard Marshall from the UNDP office here in Vietnam. I had questions for Santiago and for Nyla. I think to Santiago I'm asking the kind of question that two people already asked and I was very interested actually in what you came to at the end of your presentation where you alluded to how you saw the separation of social insurance, social protection. In fact the abolition of that term, I'm asking could you elaborate more because it strikes me that this incentive incompatibility you described would apply to any social assistance program delivered alongside a social insurance program and that kind of conclusion runs against I guess what is an emerging orthodoxy in social protection. So if you could elaborate more exactly what you would do with Opportunidades now to resolve the problem you described. And to Nyla I wanted to ask, I have some experience of Bangladesh, I was in Bangladesh before here, on TUP in particular. One thing you didn't mention was the fiscal dimension of TUP because TUP is a BRAC delivered, not a government delivered program and it's essentially, it's still a de facto donor delivered program. DFID for example is giving very large amounts of money to BRAC, essentially a kind of budget support to an NGO and I'm certain some of that is finding its way into delivering TUP even if it's not directly paying transfers. I was interested you mentioned R&P, there was the follow on EU program I think called REOPA which was a part UN delivered program as well which had very strong, echo the kind of results you found but that program was even more expensive than TUP, you know the unit cost in that program over $1000 a client. You talk about sustainability in scale up and transfer, I just wonder is it possible for governments like Bangladesh to afford these kind of programs? For analysis of the unemployment on the formal, informal relationship as it relates to Opportunidades. I think that what we would want to see is see the share of the young generation within the formal sector because when you take a large group like those 16 to 15 years old or even older the bulk of that group is pre-Opportunidades and didn't benefit from that. That said the logic of your argument is so strong that I suspect you would find the same thing but I think that we should do that. The previous question was ask you what would you do about Opportunidades. I'd like to ask you what would you do for Securupopular to avoid that incentive effect that is there anything that you can do to maintain in the sense what Securupopular is trying to do and yet doesn't give that negative incentives to the informal sector. I mean you have to think about different institutional context of the United States to Mexico and Latin America but the broad point I think is right. The way I think about it is there's a structure of incentives that is yielded by income taxes, value added taxes, the whole set of taxation plus if you really think about it labor taxation both positive and negative positive in the sense of labor taxes for contributions and negative because there are subsidies depending on some kind of labor status. So there's an array of incentives coming in from the whole set of things that the government is doing and what we observe is that that incentive structure is actually favoring resources to shift into the informal sector. So you want to shift it and you want to shift it and if whatever mechanism that reduces the value of informality and increases the value of formality to firms and workers is welcome. Whether I would do it through an earning income tax credit kind of thing or something else you have to think about the context of the details of Mexico but the broad idea, yes, that's where you want to move. There was a question about targeting. So the way it works in Mexico, it's a very data intensive process. So we gather information about every single household that can potentially be a beneficiary of the program and the way that targeting is done is we look at indicators of physical assets of the household. Do they have cement floor or not have cement floor? Is there water in the household or there's no water? Do they have a bicycle, sort of physical assets of the household? Human capital of the household, female headed, male headed, both parents only, or only the grandparents, how many children, the ages, the education. And on the basis of that we use some kind of statistical technique to come up with points and then that's the way the targeting is done. Statistical problems because of exclusion and inclusion errors but in generally has worked well. Whether it would work in other environments, I don't know because you need to gather a lot of data and whether this would be enough to separate households with some degree of confidence, I don't know. It might make sense in some cases to do geographical targeting altogether and not do this kind of targeting. I couldn't really opine about the situation of China. So let me take Phil's question and a little bit with Richard's question and then I'll touch on last by Elizabeth. So the message that I take from all this is from the point of view of poverty, you certainly do want to have income transfer programs. You certainly want to increase current consumption. You want to do this in a way that is intertemporally consistent so that eventually you don't have to do it because ideally you would like to end poverty. So you have to think about these programs as transitory. What makes these programs transitory is some underlying change in the conditions that generates the need for the program. That has to do with the income-generating process. So I separate the poverty program, the progresa program which I would continue until those conditions have changed. This program needs to continue. Progress opportunities needs to continue and these income transfers need to continue and you can do it targeted, many details about that, but the income transfer needs to continue. The real problem as I see it, at least in Latin America and at least in Mexico, I don't know if it's true everywhere else, is in the income-generating part, the labor market that is not generating the higher real wages and the better jobs. So focus on that. What you have in the labor market is a divide in the way that social insurance is structured because you've imported a concept from Germany in the 19th century that has very little to do with the reality of Latin America in the 21st century which is fund social insurance through a labor tax. If you think about it as a fiscal issue, you ask yourself a question, why is it that I have to fund social insurance from a labor tax? Why can't I fund social insurance from something else? So my coming down is we need to move to universalistic systems of social insurance in which the provision of protection against risks that are common to all workers should be funded from the same source of revenue. So if all workers face health risks, all workers should be having health protection, health insurance from the same source of revenue. That revenue cannot be a wage tax because not everybody's a wage worker and because you induce a lot of wage behavior. So I come in the direction of leave the poverty programs while they're needed but on the social insurance, move in the direction of universal social provision. Whether you wanna call this social protection or not, I don't know because it's kind of the terminology means different things for different people. That's why I think we should use that word. I say universal social insurance for everybody funded from a sustainable source of revenue that is independent of labor status. Keep the poverty programs while they're needed. That's the answer. Merge seguro popular plus all these other health programs, merge them with the programs that you already have for formal workers. I didn't have a time to discuss about this but in Latin America we have a lot of evidence of workers moving between the informal and the formal sector. There's a lot of transit between workers. So it's a crazy system of insurance to provide you with insurance of this kind when you're formal and of this kind when you're informed when you're the same person. So suppose I sell to you house insurance that covers your house in the summer and the spring but not in the winter and the fall. What kind of a health insurance is that? What kind of health insurance is what? If you get this job, you get it and if you don't get this job, you don't get it. So it's these incentives that you wanna get rid of. So moving in the direction of sort of universalistic and if you think about it then it turns into a fiscal issue. What other source of revenue that is less distortionary of firms and workers' behavior can erase and that aligns incentives? Rabbi has a very nice papers about you have to define formality and informality with regards to a particular regulation. Here it's being used with a regulation coverage of contributory social insurance. If I push the point and I now fund all social insurance from the same source of revenue I've got ridden of the words formal and informal. They're no longer meaningless. They're workers with different degrees of productivity but they all have the same social insurance. And so that's I think the direction where you wanna move. Your point about the younger workers is correct but I've done the numbers, I didn't have time to show it. It's actually troublesome because there's no change in the younger cohorts vis-a-vis the older cohorts. Even the younger cohorts of workers that have more human capital than the older cohorts of workers are going into the informal sector. And then they're rationally responding to some incentives. There are many other things that I didn't discuss. Taxes and sort of small regimes for small, tax regimes for more enterprises that also distort behavior. But social insurance, we're talking about 2% of GDP. And then the associated tax on the contributory side is about 1.5% of GDP. These are large numbers. Numbers in the order of 3%, 4% of GDP will certainly change a lot of behavior. Much more than the behavior that is changed by preso oportunidades. So I close here. Preso oportunidades was a nice innovation. In my view, it's been overblown. I think countries begin to, it's enough. It's not a substitute for fixing social insurance. It's a good mechanism to transfer income to the poor. But if you really want to think about serious development and transformation, you've got to move on from these programs that they should continue but now you need to tackle the problems in the labor market and the problems in the design of social insurance and taxation. And that is where I think the agenda in Latin America, I can't speak about other parts of the world, needs to move to. Sadly, what is going on is that governments got enamored of CCTs and they can always increase the transfer and not deal with this problem, which is what we should not be doing. Thank you. Thank you, Santiago. Francis? Hmm. Do you think, when you, Santiago, that the incentives are kind of to switch from formal to informal are contained within Mexico? I mean, is it, I think you're looking inside Mexico for some of the effects of the social, of the social spending, rather than could some of it be being, they're global forces at work. We know that there are, I mean, we're feeling it in South Africa, for instance, with all marches coming and things like that, where one might want to look beyond these sort of containment to these particular programs. I think it's the same part of me which wanted to say to your slide, I will get on to the question of this. That on your very last slide, almost people, the younger people must, we hope that they will find more productive jobs. I think that you must also say, people will have to learn, and that's about the skills you were talking about, to make more, there's not jobs to be found. And part of the trick is in accepting that for the future of so many young people, especially unskilled, it'll be making their own jobs. May I just answer your question? Why the age extension to 18? I think that there are a number of answers, and Harun and Borat might add to them, but partly it was because the old state maintenance grant had been for children up to the age of 18, so people thought, oh, we've lost such a lot, and we must have what we had then back, not understanding that the purpose of this one, and it was government and the committee's fault and not articulating it better. This was a different purpose of mitigating poverty for a very smaller group of young people. There was trade union politics involved, and there was also a very strong lobby group in the country who were talking about wanting to promote the idea of a basic income grant, very much under the mentorship in the sense of guy standing at the ILO, and I think there was a thought there if you could pull the old age pension age back down and then push the child support grant up. You've already sort of done about a third of the problem. It was the cash child support grant was meant to be part of a battery of programs promised by government, one of which was certainly nutrition, and there is a school feeding scheme that goes on at the moment, but it wasn't hooked into it. If this was a separate unconditional program with the likelihood that the vast bulk of that money would be spent on food as is the case. And on the employment labor market participation, I think your question was for all the grants, not for the child support grant, just, and for the, I mean, there's clear evidence for the pension for elderly people, of when the pension comes into, especially to an older woman, that younger women in that household will go out seeking for work. There's also employment around the pension days as I alluded to. And you can see on the pension days, the amount of money that is getting exchanged before the pensioner goes away with his or her money in terms of buying bricks, getting resources here to go and sell there, getting shoes fixed, whatnot. And I don't think any of that is counted in our, it doesn't, we've got relatively very good labor force surveys, but we don't get, I think labor force surveys find it hard to get at that level of stuff. Thank you for that time. Laila? I think both Santiago and Francie were stated that the transfers they were talking about were not employment generation schemes. But I think what I would say is these employment oriented programs are not substitutes for employment generating growth. They exist because although both Bangladesh and India much more so, have had extremely positive rates, strong rates of growth, we've also seen inequalities rising considerably in both countries. And I was very struck by Haroon's slide yesterday that showed the difference that was made to the income distribution in South Africa because of transfers from the very rich to the very poor. So until we get broad based growth that generates enough work for people to be able to work their way out of poverty, until we don't have these distressed migration because there's no jobs in the places that you are, the state steps in as an employer of last resort. And I can't see any move away from that if these other conditions are not met. The advice to replicating TUP, I think I was very worried when Vietnam, Women's Union replicated the Grameen approach in Vietnam. And the reason I was worried is that the Grameen bank approach was developed in a country where women had no tradition of entrepreneurship, no tradition of handling money and had to be trained into it. In Vietnam, you have a strong tradition of female entrepreneurship, and therefore sort of siphoning women off into microcredit programs rather than mainstreaming them into the seem to me a mistake. Similarly, I think with the TUP, it is developed for extremely poor women in an extremely poor country with a very unresponsive government. So one can take aspects of the TUP, and I think if you have got very destitute women in Vietnam who find it hard to aspire, have the capacity to aspire and plan and so on, one can think of programs that would work with them alongside them. What I was very struck with in West Bengal because a program that was implementing TUP in West Bengal that I studied was it added the self-help group model to TUP. And therefore, you didn't have women isolated within the home doing little bits of enterprise. You had women who were members of groups who were able to save and borrow from each other as they progressed. And both the studies from West Bengal, both Abhijit Banerjee's and ours, were very positive about the West Bengal model. So I think it's very important not to replicate the TUP in every sense of the word, but to work out what aspects of it are relevant to Vietnam. And I think the fiscal question, as far as I know, the government has taken over the RMP. I don't know how well it's doing, but I understood that it was handed over to the government in 2006. However, the issue of the fiscal, it goes back to the issue of growth. At some stage, the Bangladesh government will have to show willing, well, it has shown willing in investing in various kinds of programs, whether it will want to take on something as expensive and resource intensive as TUP, I am not sure. And it may be that it will continue to be a civil society type program because it works at the very grassroots. However, what I think was very good about the rural maintenance program, first of all, of course, it had an exit option built in for women. It only lasted for four years. I would like to know how long people continue to work on the NREGS. You know, they continue year after year after year. And the subsequent evaluations of RMP participants was that there was some degree of sustainability in their livelihoods. So that in the long run, those women will not perhaps need the kind of help that existing poor women need. But yes, in the end, it is a political question whether the government wants to take these programs on or not. Not necessarily a fiscal one. Thank you, Naila. Well, I just want to thank you for coming to the session and I want to thank our speaker for these brilliant discussions on social protection. Thank you very much.