 Excellencies, distinguished guests, friends, on behalf of Lee's Grande, the president of USIP, and its board of directors, I want to offer you a warm welcome to this important conversation on the future of Haiti. My name is Keith Mines. I'm vice president for Latin America at the Institute, and I'm joined by our co-host for the event, the admissions of the United States in Trinidad and Tobago to the OAS. The US Institute of Peace was established in 1984 by members of Congress, veterans of war for the most part, whose vision was of a well-placed institute in the heart of the United States that provided both a symbol and an operational hub for US efforts to build a more peaceful world. We seek to mitigate and end violent conflicts and to build on lasting conflict termination through a mix of convenings, good offices, analysis, and field programs. We have an excellent program today in which we will hear perspectives from four former special representatives of the United Nations Secretary General to Haiti, who served during a wide range of situations and conditions. Enrique Trouhorst from Venezuela, who served from 1996 to 1998, Juan Gabriel Valdez from Chile from 2004 to 2006, Edmund Moulet of Guatemala from 2006 to 2007, and then again from 2010 to 11, and Helen Lalim from the United States from 2018 to 2022. So to open our program today, we'll hear remarks from the chair of the OAS Working Group on Haiti, Ambassador Anthony Phillips Spencer of Trinidad and Tobago, who will be followed by Ambassador Leon Charles of Haiti and Ambassador Lazarus Amayo from Kenya. We'll then move to our panel. Ambassador Phillips Spencer. President, good afternoon, everyone. And let me begin by acknowledging the presence of my distinguished colleague, Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of OAS member states to the OAS. Here, of course, present is the Vice Chair of the Working Group on Haiti. I must also acknowledge the presence of His Excellency Ambassador Lazarus Amayo, the Ambassador of Kenya to the United States here in Washington, DC. And it's a pleasure to meet or distinguished former SRSG's. This afternoon, we have gathered to assess the situation in Haiti, inspired and instructed by the intent and mandates issued in UN Security Council Resolution 2699 of October, as well as OAS General Assembly Resolution 3007 of June 23, 2023. Our discussion also, understandably, must be guided by the mandates included in the recently adopted Permanent Council Resolution 1237, which we adopted just two weeks ago, wrong, one month ago, four weeks ago, on the 17th of November. This timely consultation with key stakeholders and partners has been convened with the clear realization that Haiti is at a critical inflection point in the restoration of its security and governance. In the three resolutions adopted in 2023 at the OAS, Permanent Council Resolution 1214 in February, General Assembly Resolution 3007 in June, and again Permanent Council Resolution 1237 in November. Three key imperatives have been identified and reiterated as central for ensuring that the intention, implementation gaps that the people of Haiti have experienced from past assistance measures and support missions are not repeated. These three critical requirements for delivering on building and sustaining the expectant hope that is now being reported on among Haitians at home and in the diaspora. With the imminent deployment of the Kenyan-led multinational security support mission are first an inclusive approach. This was advanced in Resolution 1214 in January, in February, 2023. It also requires immediate action, and Resolution 3007 adopted by the OAS, General Assembly made that clear. And finally, it calls for integrated assistance, which was mandated in 1237 just a month ago. As international partners of Haiti and the Haitian people, we must now recognize very clearly that this significant movement in the security and governance of that long besieged but beautiful country calls for careful and coherent synchronization and reconciliation of these three requirements of inclusivity, immediacy, and integrity in the support and assistance that we provide for what must still be a Haitian-led solution to their country's multidimensional crisis. The OAS Working Group on Haiti is committed to ensuring that OAS member states, permanent observers, entities, agencies, and general secretariat can consistently advance and promote each of those principles in our cooperation and collaboration with our partners and stakeholders. We are convinced that it is particularly only with the integrity in our provision of support to the people of Haiti that what we say we will do, and which reflects our commitment to integrate our efforts to assist them, that the public trust and confidence, which is necessary for realizing multidimensional security and democratic governance in Haiti, will emerge. It is with this shared commitment to effectively reconciling and synchronizing the governing principles of inclusivity, immediacy, and integrity in the deployment and delivery of our support and assistance to increase security and improve governance in Haiti that we assemble today. I look forward to our purposeful reflection on the lessons learned from our previous assistance and support measures and missions. I also anticipate that our productive recommendations will inform how we can effectively reconcile and synchronize the roles of the MSS and the OAS together with other major international partners such as the Caribbean community, CARICOM. I'm therefore confident that our deliberation today will ensure that this inflection point in the restoration of security and governance in Haiti is optimized in the public interest, with the public trust, and for the good and service of the people of Haiti. Thank you very much. Good evening, everybody. It's a pleasure and an honor to be here to address you as a special group. I can say the specialist on Haiti. And I would like to congratulate the presence of the former special UN representative in Haiti. I was in Haiti, I was in service in Haiti in the 90s when Ambassador Moulet was there. I was the chief of police in Haiti when Ambassador Valdez got the Royal Valdez from there. And Ambassador Lanley, two years ago, we had a tough time in Haiti. I hope this conference will give us Haiti the opportunity to look forward and find a solution finally. I would like to extend a double thank you to the president of the USIP, Mr. Kit Miles. And Ambassador Philip Spencer, president of the working group on Haiti at the US, and Ambassador Permanent Representative at the US. And Ambassador Francisco Mota, permanent representative at the US, from the US. And vice president of the working group on Haiti. Let me continue in French. Haiti is a subject of no interest in its history as a single nation has experienced slavery for its culture and also for its misfortunes. I don't really know what aspect of the life of the country this select assistance would like to hear. But I chose to point out my views on the conjunction and the future. I don't have a secret for anyone that currently the country suffers from a gang of armies that makes a turn in the population. It's a situation that, unfortunately, plunged the country into a crisis of security never equaled in its history. The consequences of such a situation are numerous today. Haiti is a wave of unprecedented internal displacements. An important number of the population seeks refuge abroad. The public force is made up of the police and the armed forces. The police are outnumbered, sub-equipped, and lack of efficiency. The armed forces have recently mobilized their state in Rio de Janeiro. In order to resolve the situation, the Prime Minister, her Excellency Dr. Ariel Henry, requested the support of the international community in October 2022 and re-interested her request in June 2023 in order to help the country get out of the bubble. In October last year, the Security Council voted on Resolution 2699, authorizing an international support mission to the security in Haiti under the leadership of Kenya. I thank the President of the Embassy of Kenya in Haiti in Washington, Paulo. This mission is expected, especially in the country. I greet the work carried out by the L'Oéa Soraiti Group, who, through various thematic groups, considered various aspects of the situation in Haiti, especially the humanitarian crisis, the political issues and, of course, the security. The last resolution on Haiti, adopted by the L'Oéa Council on 17 November last year, was presented by the President of the L'Oéa Soraiti Group. This resolution aims to provide Haiti with an integrated assistance in humanitarian aid, the election of reinforcement of democracy, the protection of the rights of the person and the integrated development, in collaboration with the multi-national mission to support security and the group of eminent personalities of the L'Oéa. Without a doubt, Haiti has greatly needed the international support to allow the authorities to take control of the entirety of the territory, to put the order in the streets and to allow the population to freely vacate their activities. So far, to avoid the issues of the past, Haiti needs to aim to build on the future with the support of the international community of the security forces, which will be able to ensure the security of its population after the start of the multi-national mission. We have experienced the Zonousian missions in Haiti over the last two decades. We have learned enough to know that without strong efforts, Haiti will not be able to take the lead in the exploration of the mission. In this sense, reflections have been made with the participation of the international community around the Haiti security system. I would like to remind you that in 2015, the country produced its first white book on the security of the national defense. This document foretold the implementation of a set of structures in the National Security Council in view of consolidating, the progress made with the presence of the Minister at the time, and guaranteeing the future of the country. Unfortunately, the Minister left and the white books were not implemented. Haiti needs a long-term commitment to help it build and guarantee the security of its population. As for security, it is not superfluous to point out that the Army of Haiti, which founded this nation, plays a leading role in the collective imagination in the health of its security. It is true that the behavior of the Army's history, including its involvement in the coup d'etat and in public security, has served as a basis for its dismantling in 1914. It is in place of the reform that it was supposed to undergo. However, the analyses have shown that the empty opportunity by the dismantling of the Army has been favorable to the emergence of the Army gangs. Because the National Police, 28 years after its creation, has not only put the security of the citizens who have the regal function of the state, without talking about the defense of the territory. Moreover, not only is it empty to feel at the level of the security system, but also at the time of the natural disasters that hit the country. And in this special occasion offered by the Institute for Peace and the presidency of the Group of Labor on Haiti, it will convince us to turn towards the future with a new approach founded on the implementation of solid institutions to ensure the order and peace in the streets. It is also the way to follow to ensure a level of stability capable of favoring the development of the country. Thank you. Mr. Keith Mainz, the vice president of Latin America at UCIP, my colleagues and friends, Ambassador Philip Spencer, Ambassador Mora, and Ambassador Leon Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Let me begin by thanking Mr. Keith Mainz for extending invitation to me to join you in this conversation on the important topic on matters relating to Haiti. For those we had a meeting with during the last time OAS permanent reps were meeting, permit me or forgive me if I repeat some of the things we had said on that occasion. But suffice to say that we are honored to have in our midst those that have served in the region before and we having with us here representatives also from CARICOM and from OAS on this very topic on stabilization of Haiti. As we mentioned during our last meeting, Kenya responded to an invitation or request to the Secretary General of the UN and also the government of Haiti for contribution towards the multinational security support to help Haiti take care of matters of law and order. We did that and subsequently a cause requested that we need to legitimize any mission to Haiti. As a result, the United States and Ecuador sponsored a resolution at the UN Security Council which was adopted and so we talk of UN Security Council Resolution 2699 which authorizes member states to form and deploy an MSS mission with the lead country in close cooperation and coordination with Haiti on an initial period of 12 months following the adoption of the resolution. Just to do a summary to say to provide operational support to the Asian National Police including building its capacity through the planning and conduct joint security support operations as it endeavors to counter gangs and improve security conditions in the country. Equally important is to provide support to NHB for provision of security for critical infrastructure sites, transit locations as airports, schools, hostels, and key intersections. When reading this one I said they should have also included farming because farmers also need facilitation. And last but not least in this regard to support HNP and ensure and hindered and safe access to humanitarian aid for population receiving assistance and in general to help HNP maintain basic law and order public safety including arrest and detention as necessary and in full compliance with international law including humanitarian human rights as applicable. Kenya accepted and we've been going on with preparations for deployment. We had our cabinet approve the deployment to Haiti. We had our national security council do the same and our parliament, the national assembly also approved deployment of 1,000 police officers to Haiti. We are going on with preparations. It's only that the dates for deployment changed because as a democracy especially after the 2010 constitution was promulgated in Kenya citizens are free to go to courts and seek redress if they feel that there are issues of interest to them. An opposition leader went to court to question whether there was full public participation or whether it is constitutional to do so. But I'm happy to inform that here's court processes are court processes. We are hoping for a quick outcome on the 24th of January but much public participation has taken place even after the gentleman went to court including approval by parliament itself. Even parliamentary discussions took place after it went to court. So we hope that the courts will be able to dispose of the case at the earliest convenience. As we also promised during our last meeting that we will recognize sovereignty and territorial integrity of Haiti will be impartial in our operations in Haiti. Our desire is to help Haiti stay on the driving seat and deliver an Haitian solution to Haitian problem supported by friends and partners of Haiti. We have gone into consultations with many friends and we continue the exercise of engagement in preparation for deployment to Haiti. We've had of late the recent ones with the Canada with USA with Jamaica, we are continuing the process so that we can be able to have a robust force that goes to Haiti to make a difference to what has been there before. As usual, of course, we have also opened avenues for engagement with the civil society. We have quite a number of private sector civil society organizations that have come to us as an embassy to engage with us to express their concerns. And we promise to be a listening embassy and a listening Kenyan delegation because at the end of the day, what is important is a stable, peaceful, prosperous Haiti and our role based on the UN Security Council resolution is on matters of peace and security, law and order. But you and I appreciate that the Haitian solution, Haitian problem is more than law and order. Law and order alone will not be sustainable if we don't address the other issues of importance too to the Asians. Why am I saying this? As I said during the meeting with OIS, desire is to win the hearts and minds of the Asians so that we have a lasting peace. But we cannot do that with the guns alone. You need complementary roles to go car so that we don't operate in silos. The political process needs to go on. Political dialogue needs to go on involving the stakeholders leading eventually to a democratic process, free and fair credible elections that will be acceptable to the people of Haiti. Of equal importance is the socioeconomic path. What do you do, for example, when you engage and you have a large number of people that were in the guns, they accept to lay down their guns, what alternative do you offer them? How are they going to make their livelihood? And so these are issues that are important for us to address. What am I talking about? I'm saying that the several packages need to be handled almost simultaneously. We may be forced to engage, though we don't have to go that direction on a chicken and egg business. What should come first? There are those that are looking for elections to legitimize whatever is in. But you need a law and order to be able to register a campaign and do the elections. But equally true, you need law and order for the business to thrive. And of importance, just emphasizing what I was talking about earlier, is when you win over Asians on matters of law and order. There must also be a program on social reintegration into the society, so that whatever you are having is sustainable. We believe that Haiti requires support. The MSS mission requires support, financial yes, material equipment, and the likes, yes. It also needs support that is predictable and sustainable. Why do I emphasize that aspect? It's because MSS mission is authorized or approved by the UN Security Council, but it's not a UN Security Council funded mission. It relies on voluntary contributions from member states and organizations. In this regard, we acknowledge with appreciation countries that have pledged support, financial support to MSS, those that are also willing to go on equipment, those that are also going on on capacity building. But this is where we need a bit more on coordination and a bit more on enhancing the provisions. So far what has been pledged, I hope it is a work in progress, but it is less than what you'd need even for the deployment of police from the troops, I mean the police contributing countries. I know there are major attention in the Middle East, major attention in Europe, but as OAS, Haiti is in your Western Hemisphere, and nobody will resolve it without you staying on the steering wheel. In our case in Africa, we had issues in Somalia and an ab of African countries volunteered to contribute troops. And if I'm talking about Kenya's experience in peacekeeping, we have had peacekeeping operations in many countries, whether it is from Croatia, to Namibia, to Sierra Leone, to Sudan, to Somalia, to Democratic Republic of Congo. We have also had, those are peacekeeping missions, but we have also had missions where there's no peace to keep. So those are political missions, like when we went to Somalia, there was no peace to keep. And so just like when we go into Haiti, all are possible. Initially there were many discussions as to whether countries can really go into Somalia, the terrorist activities that were there, but we managed to go there. We were able to engage with the local population where arms were required, we used, where we used negotiations, engagement, communication with the local communities, they were able to appreciate and join. And this is why roles are complementary. If you go to a region and they don't have water, like we had cases in Somalia, and you sink a borehole and you provide water, that wins them over. Or you have medical facilities and you're able to extend that to those that are in need. And so all I'm saying is our mandate is on peace, security, law and order. But I think CARICOM and OIS needs to help Haiti to communicate and effectively communicate its needs that you will not solve security in isolation. It has to come with the other aspects. So that tomorrow, with capacity built, Haitians can be able to continue. If that is not followed, then you may end up in a situation where because the armed personnel are arriving, they come. And it's like there's an arrangement, you keep peace for a year or two, they leave. And once they have left, the situation goes back to where it was before. I don't think that is what Haiti or the Caribbean or OIS or the global community would be interested in. Kenya is committed to this cause. And as I said, we are our only reason for coming in to play our part is humanitarian needs and the fact that Kenya, like the African Union, considers African diaspora wherever they are to be their responsibility. They have a helping hand to extend. In the African Union, we have five regions. The sixth one is the African diaspora, wherever they are in the world. And so we consider Haiti or even the Caribbean as part of the African diaspora. And so when you in Karikom and OIS extend as neighbors and primary stakeholders, we are able to identify with you and join you but you remain on the steering wheel. The other aspect that I thought perhaps is what talking about is that aspect on funding and contribution of police officers. Kenya accepted to contribute a thousand police officers. And I'm happy that we've had a good number of countries also from the Caribbean pledging to contribute armed personnel. The numbers are still low. Even with the targeted figure of 2,500, we are not yet there. We still need almost another thousand to be able to reach a 2,500. But looking at a population of 11 million people with 10,000 police officers registered to be in service, the ratio even by UN standards is low. But if you're looking at the actual, to be able to create that impact, I believe Karikom, Haiti, OIS needs to appeal for more members to contribute police officers to Haiti and for more members to contribute funding to support the mission to Haiti and the other track is to say, let us not wait for one track alone. As we handle matters of peace and security, let there be corresponding engagements to continue. I'm happy. For example, the eminent persons group, why in Haiti continue with the political process, would be glad when these efforts complement one another. But ultimately, we are looking for what would make Haiti stand on its feet and gain hope because when I had discussions with a number of civil society organizations, it's a question of also hope. What do you tell someone who sold part of their land or even livestock to educate their children? They finish all level education, all university, and there are no jobs for them. What role model will you give the younger ones to tell them, please go to school so that tomorrow, normal circumstances, you say, go to school so that you can be as successful as so and so. These are areas where we're saying that it would be important if we continue the conversation. But I must thank UCIP for convening this important forum for bringing us together and for the key players that are here. And in conclusion, just to say, Kenya is ready to play its part. We'll play our part with the key stakeholders. We acknowledge that the stakeholders involved the government, the private sector, civil society, the diaspora, which is also very critical. But like any other diaspora, it gives you room to be able to reevaluate whatever you're having on course. We look forward to more engagements with the primary stakeholders on matters of Haiti so that this mission should succeed because if it fails, then we'll have failed Haiti for the fifth or sixth time. And I don't think that is what we're looking for. Kenya is prepared to do its part. And all we are asking is your voice to come out because even if you go to the social media, what brand do we hear? If you're silent, people may not be able to get the other side of the story to help them appreciate that it is doable. But doable with Asians being involved as primary stakeholders and with Asians at the driving seat. I thank you for your attention and look forward to meeting with you again soon. I'm sorry I had to leave because I have another engagement at three, but my colleague, the Minister of Council, is here. If you are to extend longer, I'll join you before you finish. Thank you very much. We've had a very good scene setting for the discussion that we now wanted to have with four of our very distinguished guests, former Special Representatives of the United Nations in Haiti. One of the things that I think we've heard and that we all know is that one hears a lot that nothing has worked in Haiti. Everything has been a failure that we're, you know, it's just never been a place with a very productive field for progress. And I think that all of you are going to agree that that is simply not true. You've all been involved in different parts of the Haiti experience that have seen progress and there has been things that have worked well and that have seen, again, periods of progress. So I think what we wanted to do today was to think a little bit about what was the formula for when things worked well, what are the things that need to be added to this mission that is being set up. There's a couple of things in play, of course, the multinational security support mission led by Kenya in this negotiation effort led by CARICOM to strengthen the transitional government. But in essence, this multinational security mission that Kenya is leading is replicating a UN mission outside the UN system so it's a very unique arrangement. And I just wanted to start our conversation very briefly. We'll have maybe two to three minute interventions per guest and for some of these questions I'll probably just look to one or two of you and then allow the others if you really want to come in, but we may just go through these quickly. But what resources and personnel and capacity did you have in the UN system that this mission will not have? And how do you develop that? How do you do that in a mission of this kind? And then to think a little bit about what kinds of things the OAS properly resourced to generate of those things that will be missing. Helen, I wonder if we could start with you. Thank you. Well, when I arrived in Haiti, Minousta had already departed. So we were much smaller. Minoujust had already had a year of work in Haiti. And so I really faced having to work UN missions without all of the stuff that had accompanied the larger missions that were there. And so what was important, what was key? It was working more closely with the Haitians and having a continuous dialogue with them about the reforms that needed to take place in Haiti. And so good work was being done in terms of the economy, in terms of humanitarian assistance, in terms of the political effort as well. Dialogues were launched. They weren't successful to the extent that an agreement, an all-accompany agreement was achieved and that was that. But I think with each effort, progress was made and progress continues. So there's a lot of good work going on in Haiti with the government, through the government, with civil society. It needs to continue. And I think we need to understand that this is a long-term effort. And missions are important. And right now it needs to be about security and establishing the conditions so that Haitians can return to pursuing their livelihoods, as Ambassador Charles said. We've got all the principles, but we need to create the mechanisms on the ground that will allow for the kind of coordination that needs to happen with Haitians in the lead. I think that in the past what we have tried to do, what is, and the Haitians have said it, is that we work, we substitute for them and we haven't done enough in working in partnership. And fewer resources means that we need to focus on the coordination much more, coordination with Haitians, coordination within the donor community, and coordination with those organizations that are going to be in Haiti for the long-term. And set up the work so that when the mission will leave, it doesn't all come crashing down. I'll stop there. Thank you very much. Ambassador Mullen? It's on. Okay. Thank you. Well, good evening, everyone. Thank you very much for this opportunity. Well, I would like to echo Kenyan Ambassador's words, Ambassador Lalim's also words, regarding the coordination mechanism. The MSS will be directly involved in guaranteeing security on the streets and for the people of Haiti. But then you have many, many other aspects in Haiti that have to be addressed and that are not included in the mandate that was given by the Security Council. And this is capacity building and the HNP, for example, and humanitarian assistance and development and job creation and rule of law and many, many other aspects. When MINUSTA was in place, it was an integrated mission and we had the cooperation, participation of all agencies, funds and programs, which is not the case now. So this mechanism to coordinate all that is indispensable in order to advance in that direction. With the UN missions, we had, I would say, enough resources in order to achieve all this, which is now lacking. So an enormous effort has to be done also in looking for these resources. And you have the contributions of many stakeholders that can specialize in different aspects. The capacity building of the HNP was done thanks to the contributions of countries like Chile and Spain and France and Canada and the United States. And they built the facilities and they trained and all that was really, right now it's almost lost. It was really unfortunate and I'd like to take the opportunity to say, again, as I've said many, many times, it was really unfortunate that the Trump administration decided to cut the funding for the missions in Haiti. The long-term commitment is indispensable, is important. We've had five, six peacekeeping missions in Haiti over the years. One after the other, one after the other, one after the other. And without the long-term commitment, we will not achieve anything. This is a unique opportunity right now to learn from lessons, past missions, and that commitment should be there in the very long, long term and to have a division of labor of many stakeholders and many aspects for the development of Haiti. Thank you very much. Ambassador Baldes? Yes. Well, thank you very much for the invitation. First of all, it's a pleasure to see here some persons that I admire very much. For what they have done in Haiti, particularly my friend at Montmillé, and it's a pleasure to be at this institution that works so. We give such importance to the country or love, and at the same time, we feel extraordinarily sorrow for the situation that is going on through right now. I would say that when I came to Haiti, the situation of the government was extremely weak. There was, after the expulsion of Aristide, there was a council of Sages, a conceded Sages that had elected the prime minister. I have to say that one positive thing was that Lavalas was defeated in that moment who had participated in the conceded Sages and therefore the person who was elected at least had a certain relationship with those who had been defeated in the political process. This was important because there was a request from some parts of society to eliminate Lavalas from the political system, which was absurd at the time from my point of view. The communications that both us as Minusta and the American Embassy in Haiti maintained was to keep open the doors to communication with all political sectors in the country. Now, but what I wanted to stress is that the political system was extremely weak. They had no resources. They were in the middle of a situation in which confrontations had happened very seriously during the period of Aristide. Therefore, what I thought was extremely important at the time was to understand exactly what the Haitians wanted. In that sense, the idea of, and I read here one of the questions that they wanted to pose to us, the relation between security and politics. The relation between security and politics was to understand and to respect what Haitians were thinking. Because what is political in this context? Political is that when you have a position of power like Minusta had at that moment, it controlled not just the security of the country. It had thousands of soldiers distributed in different parts of the nation. It had the helicopters to move authorities through the country. It had the security to allow them to move inside Port-au-Prince. It had the possibility of talking to some and not talking to others. Therefore, in that sense, the attitude had to be to understand exactly what were the motivations and the interests of people inside Haiti in the political system and in order to respect what was respectable and at the same time to indicate what was unacceptable. And this, I think, was a very important first part of the mission. We came there without intelligence. The other question is what we missed. There was no intelligence in the mission. And this was a result of a debate inside the United Nations on the Brahimi report because the Brahimi report recommended the need for intelligence in the mission, but the mission had no system of intelligence. We had to create one and in that sense I follow what has been said the point is Spanish policemen, for instance, were extremely important in the creation of a system of security in Minusta. I go right now up to end this intervention, this first intervention. I want to say that the most important thing that UN gave us as a mission was a clear structure of authority of who took the decisions, who was responsible for the decisions. This is very important and I think that in this new exercise of foreign presence in support of the police of Haiti, it has to be extremely clear who makes the decisions, who is responsible for these decisions and who has the ultimate authority on the Kenyan policemen who will be supporting the country and the recuperation of law and order. I think this was given perfectly well by the UN to be very frank, I'm not clear exactly how it will happen now. This is, I think, an important question. Thank you very much. Can I follow up just real quick because that did go into the other question about the chicken and egg question that our ambassador from Kenya mentioned as well. Ambassador Valdez, what is the relationship between a capable Haitian government that is transparent and has popular support and the MSS, the security mission? Can you have one without the other? I don't think you can have one without the other. I think that from my point of view, at the time in which we were in Haiti, and I think in that sense there is a clear distinction between the mission that my friend Momule had and the one I had, there were different moments in the history of the country. Because when we came and we were asked by the elites of the country to repress in a clear middle-class country in a clear military way with force using the authority we had, the groups that were controlling, for instance, Cité Soleil and the groups that were creating violence in Cité Soleil, the hesitation we had was because we thought that these people and a very important part of the Haitian people did not see the government that was at that time as a legitimate government. Because they had been appointed without an election and they were waiting for an election. Therefore, if we proceeded to act with violence, the reaction was, the reaction of most people was you are foreigners acting with violence in a situation, even if you are allowed by the UN, but the point is that the only country that has the only possibility of establishing order in this country is with the legitimate government, the legitimate Haitian authority that will say, yes, you have to surrender your weapons. You have to disarm, you have to leave the activities you are carrying on now. Therefore, elections became to us a very important, an essential thing. And I have to say that we were not supported necessarily by the Haitian elites at that time because they didn't want the elections, necessarily when they realized who would win the elections. Therefore, the relationship between security and political development is essential. Political legitimacy is essential. Now, you have to act at the same time, even if the government is not legitimate. I'm not saying that you shouldn't act in the situation of insecurity that the country is having now, for instance. But it is clear that you will be much more, you will be really successful if you have behind, or you have along with the mission, with the foreign mission, a government that supports you, a government that is respected and is seen as legitimate by the population. I think this was a very, this is a lesson I got, and I think it is an important thing to mention. Thank you very much. Ambassador Trehorzko, we go back to the first question again. And that was to consider the things, you were there at a time when there was a very robust mission. You had a political section, you had civil affairs, you had judicial assistance, all this. So what, as you think about a mission coming in now by national mission that's built out of kind of a coalition of the willing, what are the things that you would suggest that they develop that they just have to have, that they may not be part of the natural mandate, but they would need to have sprints somewhere? Yes. Good afternoon. Not only did we have, at that time, a very robust mission, as you call it. It had a very large military component, it had a large police component, and we had also MeCV, which was a human rights operation managed mainly by the OAS, and which was of critical importance because it was MeCV who was in contact with the people who got information, who was the face that helped and was showed solidarity with those that had been mistreated by the police forces. The new mission, this multinational mission, and I would like to thank the ambassador of Kenya, particularly for this very important step that his country has taken in coming to the help of AT. And obviously the government of Kenya has already reflected also quite deeply about what is necessary and has not adopted the very restrictive definition of security. But I think your statement, Mr. Ambassador, shows very clearly that security is a multifaceted thing. And I think as of the moment that you are deployed, I think you should have an additional support by probably a stronger human rights element, wherever it is located, either with the UN or with the new OAS operation, that will, I think, prove very productive also for the military presence that Kenya will be providing. Second, I think it might be a good thing that you still have 1,500 officers to be really provided by other contributing countries. And I think you could, as government of Kenya, probably inform these contributing countries what type of specialty you would particularly appreciate. There is crowd control, there is criminal investigation, there is protection of infrastructure, there is rapid reaction forces that might be necessary. I don't know how you are setting up your own contribution, but I think you have to look at the whole spectrum of police activity. Some of them verging on almost military intervention, given that the situation you will be facing is much more difficult than the one we faced in 96, 97, when by this massive presence of Minua at that time, the sole presence probably was enough to scare the wits out of anyone who intended to do anything against the law. Security was there and we were profiting from that presence, and I have to say also probably from an overflow of the law and order in inverted commas that sometimes is incompatible with democracy that was flowing over still from the time of the Toulier dictatorship. That has disappeared. This situation that you will be facing is one of armed anarchy, if one can define it in any way. And that requires a presence, it requires authority, it requires teamwork, and it requires the Haitians themselves who agree among each other. I have never seen the capacity that Haitians have to fight each other. That I think is something that has to be addressed and we have to see how one can turn this urgency, this incredible emergency that the country is facing, and to really organize a transition in which additional absorptive capacity is created. If the absorptive capacity of Haiti was low at the time when things were going better, well it's even lower now. What we have been witnessing over the last five decades is the slow but steady dismantling first of the state and now of society. So the task that has been front of us is enormous, much, much more difficult than whatever anyone of us sitting here had to deal with. And I think summing up, a stronger MCV, a rapid reaction force, and for the future how do you turn this present support and this present generosity that has been elicited by Kenya and which is shaming others now into participating as well, how does one turn that into long-term support? And there I think we have to think of a long-term objective that has to be turned into reality as quickly as possible and that is to establish what could be called a national development corporation built upon a mixture of peacekeeping operations and models that we have in most of our countries that follow or are similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority, regional development corporations that continue working come hell or high water. It doesn't matter which of the donors has an election and cannot extend the mandate of whatever. There are no mandates. This is a 25 to 30-year operation in which the priorities have been established by the Haitians where the main projects as well have been agreed to, where one can start with the projects that have been approved by previous governments where no legitimacy issues have arisen, but have been stopped because of the lack of resources or any other reason. I think I spoke yesterday to a friend in Haiti. He told me there must be at least 400 projects that have been stopped for that reason. I mean, an operation of this type, let's call it for short, the Tennessee Valley imitation operation, can start work with two or three large contributing countries following also the model that has been established outside of the United Nations by the Syria Recovery Trust Fund, which was initiated by Germany, the US, and Qatar, I think it was. And then, with time, additional countries joined, and they have their replenishment exercises, and it's an operation that functions very well. I think there would be interest in looking at the structure of this Syria Recovery Trust Fund. And it was brought up, it was established by AID and the KFW of Germany, practically. It takes on board much of the administrative and legal structure of KFW, promoted and financed projects. KFW was the German bank that was established with the resources of the Marshall Plan immediately after the Second World War. It is today the third largest bank in Germany, finances all type of projects, and has a particular expertise in governance as it started by identifying bottlenecks for the effective and efficient management of a state, which was the German state at that time. I'm going to have to move on, but I'm glad you planted that because I wanted to get to that. You've actually jumped ahead, so we've covered two questions and one. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. It's fine. Thank you for that. And I just want to say Enrique has a white paper on that that we're happy to distribute. It's actually a very interesting idea. And it is that there is a big question about the generation of resources, again, in parallel to the political and security issues and the economic development in the private sector. There is just a simple question of generating the resources for what is now a huge rebuilding task. So thank you for planning that. I won't have to get to that later. We're a few minutes over. We're going to go just a few more minutes. And then we're going to have some time in a private session later to develop some of these ideas further. I wanted to hit two other issues. One was the issue of gangs. The most immediate thing that this force will confront is gangs. All of you worked at different times when the gangs were in a different place and some easier, some harder. But Ambassador Mulla, I wanted to just see if you could discuss a little bit about the gang strategy that you employed and that you're also familiar with from Central America and other places that you've been active. And, again, what this mission should consider that they would need to most effectively bring the gangs under control. And I don't say to fight them because I think fighting them is probably not going to be something anyone will be able to do with the small force. But what are the tools that you would look for that would be effective in helping to bring the gangs under control? When I came to Haiti, of course, I was very well informed about the gang activities and the kidnappings and the terror imposed on the population and people paying ransom and extortion and robberies, et cetera, and the violence. But what I was really not aware until I got to Haiti was the level of madness of the gang members regarding sexual assaults and sexual violence and rapes. And that really struck me, really. And I would visit these congregations of Spanish nuns in the heart of Cité Soleil and they have a little school and they have a clinic there. And they would share with me their experiences of treating these young, young girls who were raped in such a violent, vicious, vicious way. And I came to the conclusion that many of these gang members should not be really sent to jails or prisons but really to psychiatric wards because they were really completely demented in many ways. And the suffering and the pain, they really wanted to inflict on their victims, on young girls. I mean, there are no surgeries, no operations. Nothing will correct that. Many, many lives were lost like that. And I'm very happy that the Security Council has a special mention of this issue for the MSS regarding sexual violence and abuses because this is an aspect that probably were not, we were not prepared to really address in many ways. And it's a very complex one. So I hope that we will have the contribution of specialists on this matter with the support of the MSS also and the stakeholders on this. The, as I said before, the deterrent presence on the ground is extremely important. When the United States decided to cut the funding for Minou Staufer, the UN mission in Haiti, I pleaded with the administration, okay, fine, you can get rid of the military if you wish, but do not completely deplete the mission of any uniform personnel. If you want to keep some police contingents there, it's very important. The sole fact that they're patrolling, that they have a presence in the country, that is really an important deterrent, which was lost. So I think that in order to face this violence, the gang instilled terror on the population, I'm afraid that 1,000 troops will not be enough. So I do hope that other countries will come in and provide these additional 1,500 in order to have them deployed in key areas. It's not going to be easy. It's going to be very, very difficult. And at our time, it was mainly par-au-prince and some urban areas, but now it's the entire country. The entire country is in the hands of these groups, and they will resist this presence, and they will react in many ways. And that's why I was mentioning the coordination mechanism that Ambassador Lalim mentioned also. It's extremely important because security issues, providing security and patrolling and combating the gangs is not enough. You need humanitarian assistance. You need help. You need to provide food and water. One other problem I faced was even though it was an integrated mission, United Nations funds, programs, and agencies were very reluctant to be seen working alongside military forces because of the famous humanitarian space. And I needed their support in many ways for them to provide humanitarian assistance. At the same time as we were conducting these security operations, I think that UNESCO finally gave me 50 footballs. And that was it. It was thanks to the government of Norway that provided us with cash and money that we were able to install some soup kitchens and buy food and water and rice and sugar and flour to provide to the population alongside our operations in order for the people to see that there's a difference because they depend from these gangs and the structures of the gangs who provide all this basic support to the population in the areas they control. So I think that it's important that it's not only a security operation. It's a multi-faceted one. It needs the assistance of many stakeholders on all the aspects that we have mentioned before. It's not going to be easy, but there's a unique opportunity right now. This is a new model that's being established and I think we have to make the best of it. Perfect. Thank you very much. Let me do one more question. Ellen, if you don't mind. I wanted to ask about the role of the private sector in generating, again, some of the resources, the jobs that will be needed to pick up some of the slack that will help to stabilize the country and just from your experience. In Haiti, where do you see the possibilities with the private sector and how does one do that? Thank you. I'd like to pick up on a couple of things that were said. Sure. Thank you. Because, first of all, we really have to take a different approach this time around. There are, with regard, for example, to victim assistance that we just spoke about, there is a human rights presence through the UN there on the ground. And what we need to do is to work in a more sustainable way. Take what is already there in Haiti and there is coordination going on within the UN. I mean, after all, you have the Secretary General's reform that has focused on one UN. You have a UN mission that is still working and even more so in an integrated manner with the UN agencies that are present in country. We have to do things differently. And when it comes to bringing a force into the country, we need to remember that SEA, the sexual exploitation and abuse issue, with regard to troops. We need to focus very seriously on prevention and we need to have very strong measures in place so that when there are abuses, victims are assisted at a level that they need and that disciplinary action is taken against the abusers. So it's not as if with the departure of the big peacekeeping operations, all these other efforts dried up completely, they are much weaker but they are there. And yes, a thousand Kenyan troops but we also have 9,000 HNP. It has to be an integrated effort with the Haitian police in order to address this issue of sustainability. And when we bring resources in, maybe it needs to happen more modestly than before because everything is always underfunded in Haiti. But we also need to demand of the Haitian government that they put skin in the game with regard to resources so that when we leave, the effort continues. The private sector has a role, yes. The work in the communities, they can provide jobs to these gang leaders and gang members to people who are looking for a way to earn a living and have a decent life. A private sector that works transparently. A private sector that is serious about meeting its fiscal responsibilities. A private sector that understands that corruption needs to stop. That private sector has a very important role to play in the development of Haiti. So let me stop there. Thank you very much. We're going to close one final very quick round, a lightning round if you will, and I just wanted to ask each of you, starting with Ambassador Valdez, what's the one thing you wish you had known before you went to Haiti the first time? Allow me to say one thing about the gangs because I think it's important. I fear that there is a change in the nature of the gangs that we faced at the time in which we were there. The gangs today, and I have never seen that before, have a political discourse they didn't have before. Even gang leaders who see themselves as the leaders of the first Haitian Revolution and that consider that the elites have prevented the country from developing. Second, there is a reaction of the population in front of the gangs which is extremely important. I think that the Kenyan forces will be helped by the population if they manage to motivate this indignation, fury that the population feels towards the criminal groups. I think this is an asset and it has to be worked very seriously. I feel extremely encouraged by the way that the Kenyan ambassador reflected on their responsibilities and on the way in which they are looking at the mission. The question that I didn't know when I was outside the country and I got to learn there is a very serious problem that I think has been changing recently but was the relationship between the elites and the gangs which is something that we cannot look as if it didn't exist. In fact, the reactions that the US government and the Canadian government have had recently in putting people out of, without visas and punishing them in different ways reflects or is a reaction towards this problem. I think that civil society has many organizations, particularly the women organization, are extremely important in Haiti and I think that the business sector has, as Ambassador Alina has just said, groups of people who understand perfectly well what should be their role in terms of fighting corruption and confronting violence and working in coordination with other groups in society. But there is still a group that resists that and this is a problem in society that we have to face. Thank you very much, Enrique. Same question, what do you wish you'd known? You knew a lot when you got there, but what didn't you know? What do you wish you'd known? The time that I arrived in Haiti was so different from what is now. Just by, I was well briefed in New York. I knew it was a difficult task, but that the resources were there. I would have wished better coordination within the UN system, but in the end I think it turned out to be a collegiate working relationship. Yes, early that's all I have to say quite frankly. Thanks, Ambassador Moulin. What I didn't know when I arrived in Haiti was and I learned that very, very soon is that there are many groups and individuals and segments of Haitian society who do not want to change that are benefiting by the current situation of corruption, of drug trafficking, of the state not working, they don't pay taxes, they are against the rule of law. All this is benefiting many sectors, so in order to really achieve something we have to work with many groups and with the media also and with civil society in order to bring all these groups together. There are many experiences with different groups and with a private sector regarding rule of law for example and they were not interested at all. They were interested at all. A tax reform system we were trying to push in order for the state to have enough resources and not depend on international aid and assistance to pay even basic salaries, people were reluctant to do that. So there's a culture and groups were benefiting from this. Just a few days after I arrived we made a big, big mistake. One of our patrols stopped a car that belonged to a member of Congress, to a deputy and he of course had immunity but we knew some soldiers who stopped that car didn't know that at the opening of the trunk it was full of cocaine full of drugs and this deputy was transporting drugs from one side to another side of the country and an enormous protest from the legislative branch and from Congress because we had violated this congressman's immunity and when the government of Uruguay gave to the mission these speed boats and patrol boats and I must say asked me not to deploy them into southern part of the country around Jaqmel. Please do not do that because certain senators from the south we know who they are we're very much opposed to having that kind of verification or eyes on the area so the issue of corruption, of drug trafficking, of impunity these issues are ingrained in Haiti and somehow we have to work with them and convince them the United States imposed sanctions and withdrew visas to many of them but they wore that as a badge of honor instead of really being something that would convince them to do otherwise so that was something I was not aware of and that was really something I had to deal with I'm afraid to say with no results Thank you very much Final words Yeah, I think one thing I didn't appreciate was the degree and the level of suffering of so much of the Haitian population and I think my colleagues have said the same thing in different words I didn't realize that until I got there and I saw it with my own eyes and also the work of so many who are there working alongside to try to alleviate the situation people in the medical field the commitments that they have to Haiti and to working with the population and to working with communities and building community networks is something I didn't appreciate and truly is magnificent and in many ways it started in Haiti so thank you Thank you Well, that concludes our session we've got a few minutes over I hope that's okay As we were choosing, as we were putting together the advertisement for the event the public advertisement we're looking for a photo and one of the members of our team is Stephanie Ayala very skillfully found a very nice picture of two police officers in their office with a map of Haiti behind them and I said you know we're going to use this one you know the other options are burning tires and people running through the streets and you know Haitians have told me look, those are real pictures they've happened but it's not the daily life of Haiti the daily life of Haiti there's millions of people trying to help pull the country together so anyway I was very pleased with that picture for our event today and I hope we've both reflected honestly on the challenges but also just reminded ourselves well there's a lot to do there's a lot to work with and I hope that we can collectively find the means to give Haiti this new opportunity and this time to make it stick thank you very much for joining us today