 The title of my report is Quantum Glution Attacks on Reduced Simpler V2. First, I introduce some knowledge of quantum computation, such as Grover algorithm, quantum random access memories, and some discuss with QRAM. Then we introduce some of the techniques. The first one is super xbox, and the second one is rebound attack. According to those techniques, we can present the collision attacks on simpler 2 and simpler 4. Then according to the quantum algorithm, we can pretend the quantum occlusion attack on simpler 2 and simpler 4. Now we describe the problem which can be solved by the Grover algorithm, given a search space of 2 to the n elements and a Boolean function f, where f is given as a black belt box, found as the only x such that f of x is equal to 1. In classical setting, we require about 2 to the n to find x, but in the quantum setting, Grover algorithm can be solved this problem which needs about the square root of 2 to the n Grover iterations. Next we introduce the definition of quantum random access memories. It is the quantum analog of a classical random access memory, given a list of classical data L with x sub i. The qram4L is modded as a unitary transformation as follows. Therefore, we can access any quantum superposition of the data cells by using the corresponding superposition of addresses. For a time being, it is unknown how a working qram can be built. From another perspective, the absence of large qrams and the fact that a qram of size O n can be simulated with a qram circuit of size O n make it meaningful to conduct research in an attempt to reduce or even avoid the use of qram in quantum algorithms. Next we introduce the definition of simpler v2. Simpler v2 is a family of limitations that support inputs of 128 times b bits, where b is a number of branches. When b is equal to 1, simpler v2 consists of 12 rounds aes with different constants. When b is greater than 2 or equal to 2, simpler v2 is a generalized bestial structure with round function f that consists of two rounds of aes. We denote simpler v2 family numbers with b branches as simpler b, though as shown in figure, it is a round function of simpler 2. The round function f consists of an add constant operation and two rounds of aes, while emitting the add round key operation. Next we introduce some of the techniques needed to find the conclusions. The first one is the super xbox technique. As shown in figure, the target is to search for a pair of values whose difference satisfies the truncated differential from delta z sub 0 to delta w sub 2. From each of the 2 to the 32 differences at state z sub 0, since the operation mz is linear, we compute the corresponding difference at state x sub 1. For each of the 2 to the 32 differences at state w sub 2, we compute the corresponding difference at state y sub 2 and store them in a list l. Then given delta x sub 1, we search for pair of values whose difference satisfies the differential trail from delta x sub 1 to delta y sub 2, where delta sub y2 is belong to l. Here we divide the search process into 4 parts that can all be computed independent. Each part contains 4 bytes and we call the operation of changes values of those 4 bytes from the state x sub 1 to state y sub 2 as a super xbox. As shown in figure, one of the super xbox is highlighted. From each of the 2 to the 32 pairs of input values to a super xbox at x sub 1, we compute the corresponding output difference delta y sub 2. Similarly, we perform the same analysis for the remaining 3 super xbox. In the above program, both the time complexity and the memory complexity are 2 to the 32. And we can obtain 2 to the 32 pairs of values that satisfy the requirement. In the quantum setting, to apply the nested Grover's algorithm to compute the pair that confers to the differential from delta z sub 0 to delta w sub 2 with an additional time complexity of about 2 to the 16 without q ramp. The second technique is rebound attack. The rebound attack consists of an inbound phase and an outbound phase, as shown in the figure. In the inbound phase, the actor efficiently fulfills the low probability part in the middle of the differential trail with a meeting in the middle technique. The degree of freedom is a number of matched pairs in the inbound phase, which will act as the starting points from the outbound phase. In the outbound phase, the starting points of the inbound phase are computed backward and forward through w sub bw and w sub fw to obtain a pair of values which satisfy the differential trail. Suppose the probability of the inbound phase is p, then we have to prepare one of the piece starting points in the inbound phase to expect one pair confirming to the differential trail of the outbound phase. Hence, the degree of freedom should be larger than one of the piece. In addition, our attack has a special property that the inbound phase consists of more than one inbound part. In the paper, we present the collision attack on simple two and simple four. Firstly, we introduce the collision attack on nine rounds simpler two, as shown in the figure. In the inbound phase, the two inbound parts that happen in round three and round five are surrounded by the red dashed line and reduce the starting points by applying super S-box and Groove algorithm. In the outbound phase, propagate the starting points to the beginning and the end of the cipher to check if it leads. In classical setting, if the probability of the outbound phase is p, then traverse one of the piece starting points to find the right one. In quantum setting, we can apply Groove algorithm to find the right one. The query complexity is the square root of one of the piece. For simple four, the four branches are denoted as A, B, C, D. Collision A, B means the collision happens in branch A and B. A new 11 round direction of simple four is introduced in figure, in view of which we built a series of collision attacks with any two branches. Next, as shown in figure, we make a slight change to the 11 round differential by attending one round before and peeling off its last round, and a better differential trail for the condition attack on the last two branches. In the end, we summarize the results of the main attacks of simple V2. It is given in table. The first table is the summary of the result for simple two, and the second table is the summary of the result for simple four. That's all. Thank you for listening.