 Well, Japan is an indispensable pillar of our entire presence in the region, hosting the bulk of our air and naval power, not only in the Pacific, but deployed overseas. And we are nowhere in Asia without Japan, and I find no debate about that. Japan policy is not a partisan issue in Washington. Prime Minister Abe at CSIS in February declared Japan is back, and he has ambition and drive. He wants Japan to remain a powerful and influential player. And I think Washington welcomes and indeed embraces and needs him to do that, to restructure the economy, to move beyond the so-called first two arrows of his economic plan and get to the real crux of the matter, the restructuring for long-term growth that is the third arrow. TPP is critical to that. His security agenda, which confused people at first in Washington and elsewhere who didn't fully understand it, is absolutely what's needed for the alliance. It involves strengthening his own internal decision-making with the National Security Council, removing obstacles to more effective collaboration with the U.S., not by revising Japan's constitution, but by changing some of the interpretations. These are all things that I think the U.S., Australia, almost all the maritime states in Asia, certainly India, welcome. He has a problem, though, and this is also a problem for the U.S. and I would think for Australia, which is China will, of course, protest and object to any strengthening of Japan's capabilities, and particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance capabilities or Japanese cooperation with India or Australia or the Philippines or others. That's expected. But if Korea stands in the way or opposes what Abe is trying to do, that's a problem because the United States, in particular, relies on strong coordination between our key allies to deal with problems in the region, whether it's the North Korean nuclear problem or this recent Chinese announcement of an air defense identification zone. If Seoul and Tokyo are at odds, that's a problem for us. In Washington, when experts debate problems in the Asia-Pacific region, before the Chinese aid is, the number one topic was, what do we do to get the Japanese and Koreans from tearing each other apart? We need these allies to work together. Is it really all about history and how can, I guess, Prime Minister Abe and his advisers be persuaded that really some of what we're hearing from Japan about history is really not in Japan's interests? Part of it is the U.S., Australia, and other friends and allies of Japan publicly stating, as the Obama administration and the Abbott government have, that we welcome Japan's modernization of its security policies and that we don't think Japan's a threat. And polls show that overwhelmingly in Asia, outside of Korea and China, people don't feel threatened by Japan, quite the opposite. In ASEAN, 96% in recent polling say they trust and like Japan. So part of it is giving credibility to what Abe is trying to do, and then part of it is his friends quietly talking to the Abe government about what their plans are to prevent Korea from becoming a hostile opponent to what Japan, the U.S., and others would like to see Abe do. Abe has toned down the history statements. He was saying some pretty problematic things during the election last year. But the Korean side has actually raised the ante and has raised the requirements for reengaging and having summitry. I think we need to talk to Seoul as well. And in my view, the U.S., Australia, friends and allies cannot intervene and solve this problem, but we can encourage both sides to be creative, open-minded, and strategic, and not let domestic politics or narratives about history get in the way of both countries' national interests, which coincide with our national interests. We need the democracies in Asia on side, not to contain China, but just to work steadily towards an open and rules-based order that welcomes China, but not a China that thinks it can rewrite the most fundamental of the rules. Before we close, Mike, and I think there's some really important points there. I know that you're a watcher of Australia as well, and I'm wondering if you've got any particular questions about the Australian perspective on some of these issues, because as you know, it is in flux a bit at the moment. Rory, before we close, I think it's important for people in Washington and around the region to understand Australia's perspective on all of this. The Abbott government has talked about the Anglo-sphere. Julie Bishop has said Japan is Australia's best friend and came out pretty hard on the Chinese announcement on the aid is. Should we be expecting some changes in Australian foreign policy towards the major players in Asia in the shift from Rudd to Abbott? Well, we've had a few shifts this year. Of course, Gillard, Rudd, Abbott, it's been hard to know where we stand, but there is continuity. Mike, I think there's a lot more continuity than some commentators in this country have suggested. I wouldn't emphasize the Anglo-sphere element as much as maybe Prime Minister Abbott's memoirs or his manifesto, if you like, did four or five years ago. I think his thinking is evolving. Certainly, this government seems to be identifying the same, the five or six key players in the region that the Gillard government and Rudd did. And that is the United States, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and South Korea. And I think we'll still see very great emphasis on those bilateral relationships. We will see a little bit of difference. Maybe some quite pronounced difference at first, but it will moderate over time is in a willingness to emphasize not only the role of values, but the role of rules and a willingness to play by the rules in the region. And I think that's one of the reasons why we've seen Japan singled out maybe too bluntly for some as Australia's, quote, best friend in Asia. I think Mr. Abbott and Julie Bishop made that point recently. We'll also see, I think, attempts to build bridges with Indonesia because we've had obviously some serious ructions there over the intelligence leaks. But at a strategic level, I think the Indonesia- Australia relationship is on a good track. And it's interesting that it was the Indonesian foreign minister speaking at your institute earlier this year that actually brought the Indo-Pacific concept into play as well as a way of positioning Indonesia quite centrally as a partner. And then finally, looking at India and China, I think there's a pretty strong foundation now for better relations with India and perhaps coordinating that with other countries. We don't have the thorn of the uranium band we had a few years ago standing in the way of that relationship. We're waiting to see how the Indian election plays out, of course, next year, but we're ready to deal with either side. China's the big one. I don't think that there is a confrontational attitude towards China, which some commentators suggest in this country, there is a lot of continuity. And it's interesting to remember that Kevin Rudd, when he was Prime Minister, had some serious spats with China in his first year or two. And these were not brought about by external circumstances, whereas the trouble we're having with China at the moment is very much a product of external circumstances, such as the air defence identification zone. I think the Abbott government will strike the right balance. But I also think that in doing that, it's made it quite clear it's not going to compromise Australian self respect. And it's not going to compromise the kind of rules based approaches that we've been hearing about. So watch this space, I'd suggest. Good. Good. It's good for us to know. Because when the US and Australia are generally aligned on these strategic concepts and on these specific policies, it disciplines both of us. And it sets a good context for other friends and allies in the region. And it sounds to me like we're converging rather than diverging on all the big issues. Well, I hope so. But events, let's let's see what the next year holds.