 Thank you very much. My paper on Prabhachandra has turned out to be work in progress because as you will see immediately the criticism leveled at Prabhachandra need to be investigated further and even substantiated in terms of Akalanka's works in order, I think, to reinstate him. Hence my preliminary findings have turned out to be an Apology of Prabhachandra's views. In his now well-known work Jain Ontology, Dixit conveniently divides the history of Jain philosophical speculation into three so-called ages of logic after having dealt with the age of Agamas. The word logic in the ages of logic may be understood as the logic of the arguments by Jaina thinkers in different periods or ages, namely the arguments both against non-Jaina views as well as those in support of their own position on philosophical issues. The ages are divided chronologically in terms of important texts by renowned thinkers. Dixit seems to want to clearly demarcate Shwetambara and Dighambara contributions in the different ages. So the first age regards Siddhasenna and he quotes the text Sanmati, Malavadi, Naya, Chakra, Jina, Bhadra, and then the Dighambara thinkers that he mentions for the first age are Kunda Kunda and Samantapadra. With Kunda Kunda's date, we have a big problem as we already know. It is also interesting to see what he says about Abta Mimamsa, Dixit, he says the Abta Mimamsa was rather poor in content, though brilliant in form. The second stage is made up by Haribadra as the Shwetambara thinker, then Akalanka and Vidyanandin. And in his works, in this section of his work, Dixit quotes these texts from these authors. The third stage, and this is where Prabhachandra comes in, is he is the first one in the third stage and the Shwetambara thinkers are Abhayadeva, Vadiadeva, Suri and Yashou Vijaya. It is significant that Prabhachandra's name is first in the third stage because he would be the link from the second stage and for those who come after him. So for example, Vadiadeva's Syaadvada Rathnakara resembles Prabhachandra's Pramaya Kamala Matanda closely. The threefold division of ages of logic in contrast to the age of the Agamas is based on the view that certain tendencies characterize the ages of logic, namely to vindicate the doctrine of Anaykanta Vada, to establish the Pramanas, to evaluate non-Jainic views, and to defend traditional Jainic philosophical views. And this is the reason for him to group them into three major sections, namely Anaykanta Vada, Pramanas, and then the traditional defense of Jainic positions. This threefold division of the age of logic takes into account 12 thinkers and 25 works from about the fourth to the 17th centuries. The advantage of this classification is that it groups a specific number of thinkers and texts in order to facilitate an overview of Jainist speculation on specific themes directly or indirectly related to ontology. His work is called Jainist ontology. That the scheme is practical may be seen in the fact that although, for example, Manikya Nandin's Parikshamukha is not mentioned, and is conspicuous by its absence, he quotes Pravachandras, or he mentions Pravachandras Pramaya Kamala Martanda, which is a commentary on the Parikshamukha. One could argue that the scheme is an over-simplification of 13 centuries of Jainist speculation and disregards a vast amount of ideas by other thinkers. This would no doubt be true. If thinkers are left out like Manikya Nandin and many important works ignored, for example, Vidyanandin Satyashasana Parikshamukha, we certainly get a limited picture. In other words, Dixit's work has to be complete, consulted with caution and with exhaustive experimentation. Moreover, many of his remarks have to be carefully weighed in the light of their opinionatedness, as for example, in the case of Pravachandra. All of us have been quoting Pravachandra throughout this conference, and let's see what he says about Pravachandra. So I'm quoting directly from Dixit. On page 102, he says, the Degambara author who followed Vidyananda was Pravachandra and as has already been hinted, I couldn't find where, he was an inferior genius as compared to the former. Then he says Pravachandra too, like Vidyananda, he means Vidyanandin, surveys the contemporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalankar's discoveries, but his insights had its limitations. The result was that Vidyananda gave us two of the most advanced philosophical texts coming from the pen of a Jaina. So Tatvatos, he mentioned these works, Tatvatos Shloka Bhattika and Ashtasahasri, while Pravachandra gave us two textbooks to be used by fairly gifted schoolboys. And he's referring to Nyayakumar Dachandra and the Prameya Kamala Mahatanda. This is only a selection of what he says I, for this purpose I have in my paper all of them. He then says on page 103, but certainly the reigned of Pravachandra's inquiry was less comprehensive than that of Vidyananda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter. As a matter of fact, a study of Pravachandra is a good preparation for that of Vidyanandin, that it is a good preparation, argues for Pravachandra's work, worth, that it is only a preparation, argues for his limitation. Pravachandra made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his time. Quite positive. Pravachandra's level of discussion is decidedly less advanced than that of Vidyananda. Of course, two questions are somewhat new in Pravachandra. Thus in the Nyayakumar Dachandra, there occurs a detailed refutation of the six Vaisheshika padarthas and the 16 Nyaya Padarthas, the former, which is more important being repeated in Prameya Kamala Mahatanda in Vidyananda. I'm still quoting Dixit. Such a refutation was just hinted at. Similarly, in both Nyayakumar Dachandra and Prameya Kamala Mahatanda, there occurs a detailed treatment of the theories of error maintained by diverse philosophical schools. Vidyananda is unfamiliar with this problem. Pravachandra's writings should serve as a good introduction to those of Vidyananda. Pravachandra's writings have the advantage that they contain one discussion at one place. The Nyayakumar Dachandra is to be studied not so much for the sake of the light it throws on Akalanka's works, words, as for the independent philosophical discussions it incorporates. We can understand all these points as Dixit's opinions contradictory as they may sound in some places. He's no doubt entitled to them. But what about this? Pravachandra's commentary on Akalanka's famous verse, Gyanam Adhyam Matihi Sangya Chinta Chavino Abhinibodham, etc. This is from the Akalanka Garanta Triyam and specifically from the Pramana Pravesha, which is part of the Lagiya Straya. Dixit says, here Mati was a wrong reading for Smriti. Vidyananda has the correct reading and yet Pravachandra had no difficulty in commenting on it and in the course of it, in attributing an arbitrary meaning to the phrase Gyanam Adhyam. I think this is quite a serious charge that has to be dealt with in some detail and I think at least in three major points. So I was wondering where he got this criticism from because in the footnote number 51, Dixit gives exact references, so Nyayakumar Dachandra page 403 and for Vidyananda's reading he gives the quotation. So I was wondering whether he really read these things and this is what I want to present to you. It is a moot question whether Dixit in 1971 merely repeated a point already made in the Hindi introduction by Kailash Chandra Shastri to the first volume of the Nyayakumar Dachandra first published in 1938 who begs forgiveness in pointing out an error in Pravachandra's reference to the said stanza of Akalanka. The other point to consider is whether the introduction by Shastri that Pravachandra sees Smriti, Pratyabhigyan, Tarka and Anumana in opposition to the Jainic tradition and therefore incorrectly as Shrutta. It seems to me that this reference by Shastri in his introduction is taken from the statement in the Nyayakumar Dachandra where Smriti, Adi, Avishadam, Gyanam, Shrutam, Ityaktam and that their cause is erroneously seen as Mati and this probably refers to Nyayakumar Dachandra where Pravachandra says the introduction goes on to say further that no one in the Jainic tradition has regarded Smriti as Pratyaksha and this probably refers to Pravachandra Nyayakumar Dachandra where he talks about Mati here and uses Pratyaksham as the cause of that. So when I read this I had to reconsider a few things. In 2002 in an article about epistemological categories in the Akalanka Grantha Trayam I tried to see diagrammatically which Pramana belongs where in which work including Akalanka's Lagiya Straya for which Prabhakar Chandra's Nyayakumar Dachandra is a commentary and I drew up a scheme of the Pramanas in Akalanka and I came up with this scheme. So Pratyaksha and Paroksha and the different Pramanas under each of them where Mati comes under Indriya Pratyaksha and Smriti under Anandriya Pratyaksha. So when I read all these things I started shaking because I had to rethink the scheme that I had drawn up in 2002 and I am happy that I have the opportunity now to go back to this. So I started looking around and I was fortunate to come across Goshal's translation of the Pariksha Mukha by Manikya Nandin and he very interestingly gives a scheme of Akalanka in the introduction to his translation. This is just to show that I wasn't completely false. He has a bit more than I had at that time but the basic structure seems to be the same where Mati comes under Indriya Pratyaksha and Smriti under Anandriya Pratyaksha because these are the words that are significant in this serious criticism of Prabhachandra by Dixit and it seems also by Shastri in his introduction. In my appendix to my paper I quoted the introduction part of the entire introduction on Akalanka and I want to mention just one part of it for my purposes here. Goshal says in his introduction to the Pariksha Mukha text and translation how to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyaksha we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Paroksha is denied. Undermining the oldest authorities like Umaswamy, Akalanka has written that Mati, Smriti, Sangya, Chinta and Abhinima Niboda will be Pratyaksha so long as these remain in the mental state. And these are connected with words that is are expressed in words they will become Pratyaksha and he goes on to say thus Akalanka has accepted Mati etc. as Pratyaksha in one sense and Pratyaksha in another sense. According to Akalanka Shruta is what is heard and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sangya Vaharika Pratyaksha. So what we need to do is to analyze the text more carefully to see which Pratyaksha Prabha Chandra is referring to something that Kailash Chandra Shastri in his introduction to the Pramaya Kamala Mahatana does not seem to have done. In any case dictates statement that the error pointed out by Kailash Chandra Shastri has to be reassessed in the light of Akalanka's own words and Prabha Chandra's use of them. So the basic question now is do both Dixit and Kailash Chandra Shastri do Prabha Chandra an injustice? Is it possible that Prabha Chandra was a bit like a daisical at the place concerned because he should have hinted at Akalanka's complicated system especially in his Pramana Pravesha. And this is the question that I would like to seek a complete answer to. Thank you very much.