 In some ways, this session is a little bit where the rubber hits the road in terms of Indian naval strategy in the Indian Ocean in response to perceptions or to a significant extent in response to perceptions about what China is doing in the region and we have two great speakers, Abhijit Singh, who's a senior fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, former Indian naval officer and Dushana Barua, who's now with Karnagi India and Abhijit will be talking about how developments or Indian perceptions about how recent developments in the South China Sea impact India's security thinking about the Indian Ocean and potential Indian responses and Dushana will be talking, focusing on India's thinking about maritime domain awareness and the need to develop a more comprehensive maritime domain awareness system in the Indian Ocean, obviously at least in part in context of whatever is happening with China. So if I could ask Abhijit Singh. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, David. Thank you for inviting me. It's a real pleasure and a single honor for me to be here, speaking to all of you. The trouble with speaking in the last session is all that you wanted to say has already been said but advantage of speaking in the last session is that you go back with a light conscience because the audience hasn't understood something's not your fault. So I've been asked to speak on India's maritime strategy in response to China's strategy in the Indian Ocean region. But what I'll do is that before I get there, I'll make a set of four specific observations and some followed by some general remarks. I think it's important for me to make these four observations because with my experience of having served in the Navy, there might be a certain perspective that I might bring to bear on some of the discussions that have happened since morning that have tend to discuss a few issues. And I might feel and I do feel that on certain operational issues Indian maritime thinkers might think just a little differently. So here's my first point. Now the India-China maritime dynamic is complex but it's complex not just for the policymaker and the practitioner. It's also complex for the analyst, for the person that's studying the issues and for people that are talking to each other on these issues. An incident that comes to mind is that just two years back we had a delegation from China visit the IDSA. I was then a part of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis. This was a very, very official sort of delegation. It had analysts from the Fudan University. There were some from the Academy of Military Sciences. There were some from the Social Sciences. It was like a mixed, but we thought this was a very good opportunity to speak to them about the issues that were bugging us. And it was very interesting that they wanted to talk to us about the OBOR, that is the one belt, one road, and we didn't want to hear anything about the OBOR because the OBOR to us was just so vague. It was about gateways and some, you know, core cities and some win-win and all of that didn't make any sense to us. So we told them, we said that we had enough of this dribble. It makes no sense to us. We were honest with them. Please tell us. What do you think about? What is your view about China's maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean region? And they said that doesn't make any sense to us. We never heard about such a thing earlier. We don't think the Chinese have a maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean, in the Indian Ocean region, which actually goes to the crux of the problem, which is the inability of the two sides to empathize with each other's strategic concerns. The Indians, I sensed at that time, I was not, of course, not heading the delegation, the Indians were too anxious to know about what the Chinese would do once they would set a permanent base in the Indian Ocean region. We didn't care very much about whether they had an economic strategy, they had a problem with, you know, the one road, one belt, one road, there is a Xi Jinping-spec project. Their anxiety was that the OPOR must succeed at all costs and that we must, in some ways, convince India to join the project. And that lack of strategic empathy or communication was really what broke down the talks at that point because we couldn't move beyond a certain point. The second point that I wish to make is that as maritime analysts, it might seem a bit odd for a former naval officer to say this. It is very clear that we, as maritime analysts, we tend to play up the maritime dimension of things, the maritime operations dimension of things, the rivalry between the two sides. I think this is really a conflict of geopolitics. It is a conflict of vectors and counter-vectors. So if you have the OPOR, which is really a geopolitical project, you have, on the other hand, you have India's low-east or act-east policy, which is equally geopolitical in character. And if the Chinese come up with a maritime silk route, well, we have a spice route, we have mossum. So it is a contest of proposals and counter-proposals to have the balance of narrative in one side's favor. So you try and socialize the region, you try and gain more friends, you try and gain more influence. This is really a contest of influence. And what's happening is that when we try and play up the maritime dimension of things, we create further anxieties where none should exist. Now, I will tell you about an interesting conversation that I had with Admiral Surish Mehta, who used to be the chief of the naval staff a couple of years back. And after he retired, he took over as the chairman of the National Maritime Foundation, where I was a research fellow. We were having a discussion with some of the Chinese friends and I asked him, I said, isn't it true that we treat the Indian Ocean exactly the same as the Chinese treat the South China Sea, which is a backyard, an Indian lake? And he said, no, my dear friend, there's a big difference. For the Chinese, the South China Sea is a core interest. It is non-negotiable and that it is something that they will dominate at all costs. For us, that is not quite the case. What he was trying to say is this, and I'm just quoting a very interesting thing he said. He said, you see, China is like the big, big bully on the block. It has to dominate the region. We are more like the secretary of a housing society. We have no special privileges, no special rights, but we have a responsibility to protect the region. And we have a certain power that comes with being the secretary of a housing society. So you've got to look at it in this way that none of the indigenous powers in this part of the world will accept India having a special right over the Indian Ocean region. But in the South China Sea, the Chinese are claiming to have some such special right, which is, this is a narrative that we've got to put out to say that. So in the morning when it was being discussed, and this is where I might have a slight difference of opinion, India does not actually look at the Indian Ocean region as a proprietary zone. It doesn't think it has a proprietary right over the Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean is an ocean. South China Sea is just a small part of the sea. But the Chinese are extremely protective about their stakes in that region. And that is something that we have to take into account when we are making our maritime strategy. My last observation is this. You know what the Chinese strategy, or rather the OBOR, which at this moment exemplifies the Chinese maritime pitch towards the Indian Ocean has done very effectively, that it has soared confusion in the minds of Indian analysts. Earlier, there was almost a broad agreement that this was not good for India. At least the maritime Silk Route was not good for India, because this meant that China was expanding its footprint into the Indian Ocean region. Now, if there is an admiral Raja Menon who will talk about Chinese strategy in the Indian Ocean region, there will be another analyst, like Avigya Sakuja, who says that it's good for India to join up with the MSR, take advantage of Chinese proposals. So the Chinese pitch to come in with a great amount of economic offerings has in some ways played on the minds of Indian analysts. And now there's much confusion within the Indian academy about how exactly should we tackle this problem, which actually plays to China's interests, because the government and its policy now, I mean, Prometh Baal mentioned this in the morning, is doing nothing not because it doesn't want to do nothing, but because it's confused. It doesn't know whether doing something is a good thing or doing nothing is a good thing. That confusion, I think, in the long run might play out to the advantage of the Chinese. Now, having said that, let me just make a few points about the India-China relationship at sea, particularly the naval relationship at sea and how that plays out. I think there's four parts of the story here. One is the question of whether India shares a relationship with China or not. And the point to be made there is that really speaking, that relationship is non-existent. We do cooperate with each other on tactical issues, piracy, search and rescue, other search issues. But really speaking, there's no broader narrative. It's not as if there's a strategic convergence of interests. We don't even have a dialogue to that effect, which means that we are discussing the immediate problems that the region faces. But when it comes to discussing the big anxieties that we have about each other's presence in our perceived zones of influence, there seems to be a breakdown. The second is India's perception of China's interests in the Indian Ocean region. And it is very interesting that the start point of these discussions for most Indian analysts is Chinese submarines in the South Asian literals. It's very interesting that in the past, just in the past three years, there have been close to six Chinese deployments, six deployments that we know of, of which two have been nuclear submarine deployments. And the Indians will always point out to you that a lot of these submarines that came and spent more time in the Indian Ocean literals than they did in the waters of Salala where they was actually supposed to be doing the anti-piracy event. Now, it's not as if the Chinese are not entitled to send submarines. They can obviously send submarines. But what's a submarine doing in anti-piracy operations? Submarines have nothing to do with piracy. It's not so much the brazenness of the claim that they said, but that it's a deliberate absurdity. Almost as if to say that we will send it to shoot the birds for all UK. I mean, we are a big power. We can do anything. So the Indians perceive this to be a slight to say that we are sending in submarines when submarines are coming in for anti-piracy. Now, none of these submarines that come into the Indian Ocean region most often these deployments are not talked about publicly. So the first time the Chinese sent a nuclear submarine in 2013 to the Indian Ocean region, that was well publicized. There was a whole article in the Wall Street Journal. The Indian Attachee and the others were told about it, that the Chinese are going to be sending it. But that was almost a statement the China was making that we are now going to venture into the Indian Ocean region. But since then, there has been no deployment that India has been really kept in the loop about or told about, which Indians do find a bit offensive. But the Indians also say that look at their mode of operations. It's literal that the submarines come very close to the Andaman and Nicobar islands. These submarines are birthed in Karachi, Colombo. They spend a lot of time trying to familiarize themselves with the environment of the Indian Ocean region. There are these amphibious ships these days, the Cheng Baishan class, which is type 71. It's a huge 20,000 ton ship, which also does a lot of expeditionary operations. That now comes with the anti-piracy deployments, which means that the Chinese are trying to understand the literal environment of the Indian Ocean region. And also we have now these Chinese frigates that come in, these guided missile frigates. And they all have land attack missiles. So the types of deployments also point to the fact that China is getting more interested in the Indian Ocean region as theater of regular operations, which is worrying for India. But Indian maritime analysts will also point out three other things that you might find interesting. One is the manner in which the Chinese do the maritime diplomacy. So a lot of these ships that come here, under the guise of anti-piracy operations, end up spending a lot more time in the region. They visit these places. They're doing exercises with Tanzania, African countries, Tanzania, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Iran. They're trying to gain more friends, become more popular, have more influence. So the whole diplomacy dimension of China's maritime deployments cannot be ignored. That's point number one. Second is the Chinese understanding of maritime operations other than war, M-O-O-T-W. The Chinese like to treat M-O-T-W as a mission that runs parallel to combat. So they have separate task forces. They have a separate command and control system. They treat M-O-T-W as a tool of foreign policy. So for India, rescuing some of Indians from a foreign land is just part of the game that navies are supposed to do. It's just one of your tasks that you're supposed to do. For the Chinese, it is a primary task because it also showcases your presence and your influence in a region. So just the way the Chinese treat M-O-T-W is also very unique. And thirdly and importantly is maritime bases. Now this whole talk about China coming and making bases in the Indian Ocean region might be misplaced because we are not in a world where nations need bases, but the Chinese definitely have these places these days in the Indian Ocean region. These are dual-use places that are essentially commercial facilities, as Indian maritime analysts will point out, but that can quickly be upgraded to military, low-level military facilities that come in very handy during peacetime operations and peacetime power projection. So conflict is one thing and we are very, very clear that for the next, at least about a decade or so, there's no conflict that is going to happen. But power projection is quite another. You can have a low-level maritime place and from there you can project power. And so the Chinese intentions, now that they have Djibouti with them and there is a very clear sign that the Chinese might go and try and acquire more places within the Indian Ocean region, whether it be Guadar or Colombo, Amantota, Seychelles, Maldives, wherever. But in the course of time, they will have greater number of places from where they can do more operations and project greater power. My third observation would be about India's own interests in the South China Sea. I think there are three reasons why the Indians have got interested in the South China Sea. One of them is that India's trade that passes through the South China Sea has been growing quite substantially. Nearly about 55 to 60% of our trade these days flows through the Malacca states. And because we have economic interests in that part of the world, it is only fair for India to also have some maritime presence in that region. The second point that Indians often point out is that India has now become an important player in the international system. And it wants to be seen to be taking a position on matters of regional interest and governance. So the South China Sea, for instance, the arbitration that happened between Philippines and China was something on which India couldn't have sat on the fence. So as opposed to say 10 years earlier, when maybe Indians won't have made a statement about this, it is important for India to make a statement to show where it stands on these issues, which is why we came up with the vision document with the US. And I agree with Pramit when he says that Modi was the driving force behind this because he wanted to give the impression that we weren't ambivalent about what was happening in the South China Sea. So the second reason why India has been taking a lot of interest in that part of the world is because maritime governance has emerged as an area of contestation. And on this front, India must seem to be playing a leading role. Thirdly, and most importantly, I think there is always the balance of power argument. The Indians realize fully well that if China could consolidate its hold over the South China Sea, then it can project power more effectively into the Indian Ocean region. In fact, then the Chinese foray into the Indian Ocean region strategically is almost a given certainty. It's inevitable that Chinese will come in and they will come in in a way that they will they will have more number of places where they can set up permanent or a sustained presence. So for India, it's important to make sure that if there is an issue with the South China Sea, it's pointed out and that these anxieties that China faces in the geopolitical context continue to play on. And so that's third reason that India is taking so much interest in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. What are the salient aspects of India's Indian Ocean strategy? I have to tell you that there's two things that are common about India's Indian Ocean strategy and the South China's and the Chinese White Paper. I can't say so much about Chinese maritime strategy, but officially China does not have a maritime strategy. Professor usually made a very compelling presentation in the morning, but that's extrapolation from what you what you think China is trying to do with with its tuition strategy. Officially the Chinese White Paper simply says this, it says that we are going to move in from active defense policy of active defense to open seas protection. Now many analysts within India thought this to be a sign that the Chinese are not going to come into the Indian Ocean because it's open seas protection. But the Chinese would clarify to you as they did in some of our interactions with them to say that this simply means that we are going to move from a literal coastal approach to an approach that covers the entire first island chain and maybe even beyond, but has nothing to do with the Indian Ocean region. So the Chinese White Paper actually does not talk about the Indian Ocean at all. The Indian Ocean does not appear there. Similarly the Indian Navy's new maritime strategy that was released last year does not talk about the South China Sea in a way that it is an area of interest. It just says it's an area of secondary interest and were there to be a contingency India would be there. But it goes out of its way to play down the tension that India has with China. So the strategy officially does not say very much anything about confronting China in the maritime commons. However, I have to say this, if you look at political statements that have come out and speeches made by some dignitaries, seniors, senior people, it becomes clear that there definitely is a plan for the Indian Ocean and there is a plan for the South China Sea. For instance, if you look at Foreign Secretary Jay Shankar's speech very recently at the Indian Ocean Conference in Singapore, it was a very smart speech in which he made some clear references to what India's policy is going to be with regard to the oceans. Jay Shankar makes it very clear that India treats the Indian Ocean region as a coherent and integrated space, as he calls it. He says that this is a space that has a character, it has a particular personality to it. And the illusion is that India is a key player, is a key enabler, and it will always play a central role in the security of this region. He also mentions the neighborhood first policy. And he says that India will do what it takes to build the capacities of its neighbors, not just land neighbors, but even sea neighbors. And this is exactly what has happened in real terms. If you look at the maritime developments, only in the past six months, or maybe about an year, it becomes very clear that there is a plan. So India has been setting up maritime infrastructure in Seychelles, in Sri Lanka, Maldives, other places, radar chains, automatic identification stations, other maritime infrastructure. Doing a lot of capacity building. Barracuda is a big, nearly a frigate size ship that India has presented to the Mauritius. We've given that is aircrafts, patrol aircrafts to the small island states. So there's a lot happening. Plus, India has also been strengthening the infrastructure at the Andaman Islands. So the Andaman Islands are being prepared as nearly like strategic garrison. There's now stealth frigates that are deployed to the Andamans. There's a whole chain of radar stations that's been set up. It now has an airfield. And there's many other things that India is doing to showcase its presence within the South Asian literals. And that is an example, I think, of the neighborhood first policy. Thirdly and most importantly, I think Modi has identified that maritime is not just about navies and contests. It's also about development. So there's this whole new focus now on blue economy projects, developmental projects. So the fisheries, aqua, marine sciences, and the Modi government is trying to make sure that it can take up some projects with these smaller nations that can develop greater employment for their people. So there is also a whole developmental tenor to the discussion that is now being developed. And that, again, plays into Indian interest because that means that India then becomes an indispensable partner for the region. I'd like to say one other thing about the politics of the One Belt One Road, because finally, all the discussions come back to the One Belt One Road. Recently, there was a Chinese captain of a ship that said that as long as China has a Chinese company in a particular location that can be used as a forward point for the Navy. Now this comment was picked up in India and discussed in maritime circles, what did it mean? And it essentially meant that for Indians, it meant that the Chinese model of expanding their power in the Indian Ocean region does not just have a maritime component, it also has a very strong commercial component to it. So the Chinese, the plan is to invest heavily in the maritime sector, get your companies there, base there, get them to develop islands or locations, build infrastructure there, and then take over that infrastructure, which is why, as it was stated in the morning, when the Chinese sent their submarine in 2014 October to Sri Lanka, it burst at a location that was controlled by a Chinese company. Now these are little Chinese enclaves within the Indian Ocean region, which with China in a manner of speaking controls or owns. And even though they are the sovereign territory of another nation, these are little places from where China can project its maritime power. So this is a component of Chinese maritime strategy that cannot be ignored. The second instance that was very interesting is that the Chinese state oceanic administration came out of a full length feature article on the maritime silk route recently, which stated that these projects essentially were meant to break out of the US imposed three island chain, the maritime silk route. It said it was meant to exert Chinese maritime power and project China's maritime rights and interests. And there was no talk of any bin-bin cooperation when it came to the MSR. So this was another sign to the Indians that there seemed to be a maritime component to the Chinese diplomats in the region. My last point is this. Regardless of what China and India do in their respective domains, it's very clear that the politics of this is going to remain heavily contested. For instance, it was pointed out just sometime back that the Chinese had initiated a dialogue with India to get India to participate in some non-traditional issues within the Indian Ocean region. This was a dialogue that was held in February last year. But apparently, there was an unwillingness from the Indian side to move ahead on these proposals because there was no clarity to what the Chinese were suggesting and almost seemed as if the Chinese were creating an excuse for sending in their maritime forces to do some exercises with the Indians because that would in some ways legitimize China's presence in the Indian Ocean region. Now, the Chinese will obviously deny this, but that was a very clear sense that India got. Second, most importantly, when the Chinese talk about being a maritime power, it's very interesting that they have a concept of strategic management of the oceans. They don't mean maritime power in the sense of a naval power, but in the sense of a power that can dominate the region in complete terms, in comprehensive terms. So developing the oceans, exploiting the oceans, controlling them, making the rules there, and even if the Chinese didn't have their navy in that region, they will want to play a strong part in the governance of the Indian Ocean region. So even if India did not pay so much attention to the maritime or the naval side of the strategy, the governance side of the strategy is going to have an effect on the way India makes its own counter strategy to Chinese forays within the region. I think I'll stop here and I'll take some more points during the question and answer session. Thank you. Thanks very much, Abhijit. When we get to the Q&A, I'd like to foreshadow my question to you. Do you think that China has a legitimate or there could be a legitimate naval presence, Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean? And do you think that China could play a legitimate role in Indian Ocean governance? Dushana. So Dushana Birura will now talk about maritime domain awareness. It's an issue that we're going to be hearing an awful lot more of in coming years. Thank you, David. Last speaker in the last session, day-long conference, no pressures at all. I'll be talking about maritime domain awareness as a critical outcome of India's evolving naval strategy. The context has already been placed through the day why we need to have better maritime domain awareness. I'm just going to say MDA from Huron which is maritime domain awareness. In the Indian Ocean is an evolving policy and it's a work in progress in terms of revising what already exists. The most recent event that changed India's policy on MDA was the Mumbai attacks in 2008 which exposed India's vulnerabilities in its surveillance and protection of its coastal waters. Terrorists from Pakistan sailed up to the coast of Mumbai and opened fire on public places. It was a harrowing and a very embarrassing incident for the Indian government and the Indian Navy. Until then the mechanisms in place for coastal security were enough for the security environment that was in the Indian Ocean but it is changing and it is changing not just in our coastal waters but in the larger Indian Ocean. After 2611, the Indian Navy took a lead in establishing a number of measures in beefing up its capabilities in its coastal surveillance structure. Without going into details, India installed a chain of identification system receivers and coastal radars along the mainland and the islands. It's also set up an information management and analysis center and the National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network. This network collates data on all vessels operating near the Indian coast from multiple technical sources. In short, India today has a strong surveillance system for its coastal waters including better coordination between the Indian Navy Coast Guard, Indian Navy Coast Guard Marine Police and different agents of the state and the central government. There are some gaps that are being addressed in the second phase of the MDA integration but New Delhi today has much better eyes on all activities in its coastal waters than ever before. 2611 in some sense reflects India's confidence in the Indian Ocean strategy because New Delhi did not anticipate any intrusions in its maritime domain. It was like a big joe to India and India's maritime policies because a strong security of its coastal waters should have been a natural and a first policy in place for a dominant power in the Indian Ocean. It took a tragic incident to wake India up to its changing maritime security domain which has now set the ball rolling. Having secured its coastal waters, now India is looking to expand that awareness beyond its coastal waters and across the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy so far has worked by itself on this issue but the need to work together with actors in the region is constantly growing. We've heard through the day about India's advantages in the Indian Ocean which allows New Delhi the space to play a dominant role but in order to maintain that advantage the Indian Navy needs to be aware of what's going on in the Indian Ocean whether it's from a hostile nation or a friendly nation. The maritime security strategy released last year in fact mentions MDA as a critical requirement for maritime security and an essential tool to deter adversaries and maintain a strategic advantage. It is important to be aware of submarines present in these waters. Scouting for submarines in open sea is a very difficult task and in terms of better eyes and ears in the Indian Ocean a common narrative is India's better access over the Malacca Straits through its Andaman and Nicobar Islands. But it's not the submarines transiting through the Malacca Straits that India is worried about because the Malacca Straits are shallow enough for the submarines to be monitored and follow where they're going. The problem is when these submarines enter the Indian Ocean through other entry points such as the Lombak and Ombi Straits and follow where it's going. The problem also comes when India does not see a Chinese submarine in its waters and a few days later there's a submarine in the Karachi port. Now it's difficult for any one Navy to monitor the Indian Ocean region because it's a vast area. Countries who have a better MDA in the Indian Ocean such as the Americans are working with partners on surveillance in the Indian Ocean. The entire point of the MDA is for the Indian Navy to be aware of the developments in its area of primary interest and adapt, develop and manage the situation rather than wake up in shock one day to the changes that have occurred. And this requires friends and partners. India obviously is realizing these developments as making an effort to work together with friendly navies in the region, but India is still more comfortable working with the smaller island nations in the region than bigger nations. We've heard of India's engagement with island nations such as Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka and India has put in place a series of coastal radar networks linking it with India's own MDA network. India is also helping build coastal protection capabilities for these islands. It deployed surveillance aircrafts in Seychelles's exclusive economic zone as recently as March 2016 for the first time and assigned a couple of agreements with Mauritius and Seychelles to develop strategic infrastructure in an effort to extend its surveillance reach in the southwest Indian Ocean. Still there are large gaps in India's ability to monitor subsurface vessels in the Indian Ocean and through the Indian Ocean. MDA is crucial for India to maintain its dominance in the Indian Ocean. India has taken baby steps in establishing a MDA relationship with other navies in the region. India signed a white shipping agreement with Singapore, Australia, US and Vietnam and looking to sign the same agreement with a number of other nations including Japan. Australia was actually the second nation that India signed the white shipping agreement with but it's for purely commercial ships. There's nothing sensitive about the information that is being shared that they want to share with no military angle but this sets the base to develop the next stage for perhaps military information sharing. None of the agreements are operationalized yet due to technical difficulties and a system is still being worked out how India can best exchange the information with the countries that it has signed the white shipping agreement with but most importantly this is a significant development and trust building between India and the countries that it's that it's looking to work with. There needs to be much more trust between India and its friends in the region to begin sharing information and this is a good place to start. There's a great deal of concern that India's information that the information that India shares will be shared with other parties especially within the alliance system and more importantly possibly sharing it with Pakistan. India needs much more convincing on this and there's a great deal of concern in sharing information with other countries despite a much warmer relationship with most of India's partners today. From a policy point of view the MDA is not about containment. It's accepting that China has perhaps gone to a league above itself and the strategic competition between China and US is going to widen. It's about securing its position and interest and working together with friends and partners India's comfortable with who respects India's concerns and allow India the space to grow as India's beginning to come out of its isolation. The significant difference in the government the current government is the political will whether it is to do something or even whether not to do anything there is a clearer will than in the previous decade. So I think that's making a lot of difference. China is a big neighbor and we have our problems we have our concerns regarding a strong China-Pakistan relationship so I don't think so we can completely ignore China's sentiments in what we do but perhaps we need to stop looking at India's policies and actions as a reaction to what China is doing or as a containment policy because I don't think so it really is a containment policy. It's about what we need to do to secure our to India's strategic interest and maintain its dominance or its role in South Asia, India, Indian Ocean and as an aspiring global power. This is a good time for India to start conversation because India is still in a position where it can negotiate its terms of engagement. Nations are willing to listen to India, consider India's concerns. Nations want to work with India and India has its restrictions but we are at a favorable position to talk now then come to a stage where we might need greater assistance. We are in a favor of a multi-polar security order in across the Indo-Pacific and most nations are in favor of India playing a strong security, a strong and a larger security role. This brings us to the question of capabilities and resources whether we have it to play that role. On MDA, Indian Ocean is too big for any no any nation like I've mentioned before so you have to work with partners. India has identified a few friends it can work with but there are a lot of traditional thinking that the military establishment in India needs to come out of. India may have an advantage in the Indian Ocean but China is catching up faster than expected New Delhi may be willing to work better with other nations but China holds advantages elsewhere. So despite a stronger will India has to be very calculative in its maritime approach because of its threats along its continental border. India's threats from its land border is more immediate and real than from the sea. At sea for India at this point it's more about strategic advantage and power play. So given the troubles along our border with Pakistan and increasing stronger China-Pakistan relationship India has to be calculative and prioritize its defense resources based on its budget and its priorities. Within these limitations and the maritime domain I think a feasible framework would be a division of labor over areas of common interest. Perhaps India needs to start talking about concepts such as shared responsibility and burden sharing. These are all completely new areas and there are going to be problems before India can reach any kind of effective and comfortable model but we need to start this conversation and I think we are setting the stage just for that. In terms of Sino-Indian competition and how India and China will engage with each other in the maritime domain. Engagement with China in the maritime domain has been limited but India's engagement with other nations have increased definitely. As Pramit Palsaudry pointed out India has insulted that China does not dig New Delhi seriously and I agree that China does not consider India's concerns but I think the competition from China's end was never with India it was always with the United States. My sense from interactions is that China will build ports. It will look to expand its presence and they put it through like it's a fact it's a right and it's going to happen and the tone is such and so Delhi can figure out what it wants to do so it's not about containing China because India's got the we've gone beyond that stage it's about how does India manage its interest and secure it in the unfolding Sino-Indian strategic relationship so instead of contain China strategy India's perhaps investing its limited resources in building its relationship and strengthening its advantages as a response and seeing what works best. I see two immediate challenges in India's new maritime evolving policy within the MDA. One is a backlash from within for all the new changes that the current government is trying to bring in. I think a good example is the logistics exchange memorandum of agreement publicly known as SLIMOA with US that we just signed. The government went through with it but there was a lot of criticism from all sections from politicians to former defense minister to the strategic community where people just could not understand why India would want to sign something like that with the United States and and you know give away its I guess its own freedom because the narrative from from for people who opposed it was that if you get into such a closer relationship with the United States then you're going to get dragged into their problems across the world. It has taken a huge amount of push and political will to go through with it but it has already made India conscious of perhaps moving too fast in building its relationship with nations still viewed with some suspicion. So logistic agreements with countries like Australia and Japan even if it makes sense or even if there is no strategic threat from it is going to be slow and in the back burner. The other is our ministry of defense which is still primarily focused on the northern borders and on our army so priority as far as defense is concerned is going to be land-based threat so despite so regardless of our stronger vision from the Indian Navy the developments are going to be slow and calculated even within the maritime policy there's going to be a lot of priority rising and right now I think it's a good thing that engaging in establishing maritime relationship with the Indian Ocean region players is one of India's priorities which is although it's at a diplomatic and a strategic level on the concluding note I think we're beginning to see some changes in India's MDA and it certainly is evolving China has definitely been a factor in this evolving policy but it's more about a strategy for a change in security environment for India in its primary area of interest rather than just a reaction to China's increasing Chinese presence it's a long way to go but there are some mechanisms in place and if India and this current government can keep up with its political will to take a call on the decisions that it takes its approach and effort keep up its approach and effort it definitely will head somewhere and possibly toward a favorable position in the Indian Ocean thank you thank you very much to Shana. Abhijit if I could if I could impose on you first just to have your thoughts about really in your view is is there a legitimate Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and probably more importantly do you see them as playing a legitimate role in Indian Ocean governance and what would that be? Well you know this is a it's a hard question for me to answer but let me just say this there was a term that was used in the morning to explain China's presence in the Indian Ocean it was said it is an it's an exterior line path this is something that Matt and I often discuss you have interior line paths and exterior line paths which means either you're an indigenous state that has a geographical advantage in a particular you have your flexibility for operations or you come from the outside so weird exterior line paths to the South China Sea China's exterior line path to the Indian Ocean region when an exterior China will be the first exterior line path by the way to be coming into a into a new theater of operation the US did it sometime back but the key is this there has to be a degree of strategic reassurance for the for the indigenous states and the US did that quite effectively because the it's it's not as if nations don't care about their their national interest I think US cared greatly about its own national interest but you have to create a narrative in which the smaller the states or the weaker states within within a within a theater feel reassured about about your presence in the region I think the issue with the India China equation is that Indians have never got the sense that China is in the Indian Ocean region for reasons other than China's own resource interests and the reason the Indians are often pointing to the fact that there might be a larger strategic game plan in this is because the Chinese have done nothing whatsoever to convince us that they will be able to provide the public goods when they come into the Indian Ocean region which is why when we have a dialogue with them and we often do we just had dialogue with them in February and we were the point I was mentioning and we were trying to ask them that do you have any concrete proposals of what you can do together they had nothing really concrete to offer and the sense you get is that that they simply want to legitimize that they want to be a legitimate presence but for doing that legitimate for being legitimate there's a quid pro quo you got to do something to reassure the other side I think that until that thing does not happen I think there's going to be some suspicion in the minds of the Indians about what's the big Chinese plan I we are very sure that the Chinese don't treat the Indian Ocean region as a South China Sea it's not a core interest for them this is intensely geopolitical but it is very clear that the geopolitically want to dominate the space in order to be a legitimate presence and once they do that then India's strategic leverages in that region get attenuated to some extent the India is not the the net provider of security India is not the big big naval power that all nations go to when there is a regional calamity or a crisis that will be China and that doesn't play very well that doesn't sit very easily with with Indian mines thank you and to China just quickly you described India developing its broader maritime domain awareness system with a focus on southwest Indian Ocean the islands and and demands in the northeast but there's major gaps obviously one is in the northwest Indian Ocean Persian Gulf etc the other is through the other straits through the Indian Ocean do you think India could ever have a capability to build a system by their thereby itself and if not what shocks might be needed to actually move India to into partnerships I think the shocks already come I mean you know India is now looking for partnership I think it's just going to be the base of how quickly they go on to build these partnerships I don't think so India is looking India is definitely looking to build up its capabilities by itself but it also realizes that's going to take a while it's going to take a long term and then there's a lot of limitations and restrictions be it resources from budget wise priorities everywhere in different parts of in the defense so the sensible thing right now is to do to kind of what I said about working with other countries in the region but again building up which countries are we comfortable working with where we can get to a point where we can you know build a network of domain awareness in the straits I think commander Singh said about strengthening up Andaman and Nicobar Island so that's been one key area where India is now focusing more on it building up even you know building up even the for trying to see something in the Bay of Bengal and Japan is actually the I think the only country who's been allowed to invest in infrastructure building in the Andaman Nicobar Islands and the and the Northeast India where both foreign funding is kind of restricted so India is finding it's come like you know countries where it can work with not necessarily directly from a military point of view but from where it can get some support in the it's also it has a it's it's got some sort of listening post in Oman it's got there is there are some places mechanisms in place but how I think India is looking to strengthen is generally it's West Asia policy and like you know where it is going to build up something and try and look it hasn't happened is yet we have focused right now we're focused in an immediate neighborhood just outside our coastal waters and you know so it's so we've covered kind of the island nations and Andamans which is the first line that you know that once you we've developed then you go so I think the Middle East is going to come in next and surely so but by itself I don't think so it can kind of at this point I don't think so it can kind of build up something good afternoon Nick Floyd from the Department of Defense both both speakers thank you very much for your remarks so far this afternoon both of you have indicated that there is a I guess a willingness and an intention to some extent of India to to reach out to a number of different Indian Ocean nations in a in a fairly benign but very complementary and cooperative way one nation that that hasn't really been mentioned at this stage and I realize it's a great opportunity for Australian commentators to realize exactly how small we actually are in some other eyes but what do you see would be some of the opportunities for Australian Indian relationship to complement what you've been talking about I think the India-Australia relationship is already doing quite well you know until just a few years ago there was virtually very little contact between the Indian Navy and the Australian Navy but just in the past two or three years I think there's been a lot of movement forward you know we did the aus index about a year ago and it's very it's it's worth noting that a lot of exercises that were held during that exercise were exercises that we don't quite do with some of our closest partners ESW exercises interdiction so that that jump from you know just sort of benign a benign relationship to a relationship that's now looking at closer integrated operations has been very so these are the kind of cells that we do with the US and Japan and during the Malabar exercises but yes I mean there's there's always scope for greater greater expansion I think there's there must be more interaction at the service to service level you should have some Australian officers visiting us we should have this there should be some cross postings and that's the kind of thing that that develops greater bond homie and greater interoperability so I think and I think there's also a case for more frequent exercises the kind of thing that we have say with the US we have been you know every couple of months we have something or the other that maybe a US ship that comes down we are doing you know some past six exercises and other things so operationally I think it's a good start has been made by or or syntax but we could take this further by by having more more frequent visits more frequent exercises um yeah I think I agree that the India-Australia relationship has been doing pretty well but I think a lot of it is also because there was just nothing before Modi's visit here so there was so much ground to be covered that you know the fundamental steps were easy to do out like you know because there was space for cooperation collaboration on a lot of areas now that has happened so it'll be interesting to say how far it goes and how quickly it goes but I think there's still a sense both in India and Australia that we are very far for each other I think that notion still somewhere exists that you know how the do we play in each other strategic strategic interest I suppose in one way and the other thing that I have noticed from Australia's point of view is that every time Australia mostly when Australia looks in India in the current geopolitical context it's looking at Australia to the lens of China in the sense that okay China is rising and this is what's happening so what can India do to balance that rise so the expectations are different whereas India is looking at Australia as like you know just a bilateral relationship in the Indian Ocean and what can we do together so I think there's a difference in expectations both from Australia and the Indian point of view we need to build trust it needs to be a lot more trust and I think there are some mechanisms in place but push is I think more from Australia at this point than from India India is definitely responding but I think it's going to be a bit slower than what Australia is expecting this question or comment and question really extends beyond our current speakers I think there may be others from the the China experts and the Indian experts who might want to respond one of the one of the things that is not new but stands out again out of today's presentations is is the issue of transparency or lack of transparency and it's been mentioned the words been mentioned a couple of times today already we've seen in recent times China producing defence white papers and the like now yes they're open to various interpretations but at least it gives the community a sense of where they're trying to head in India's case we've seen some excellent indeed I think quite articulate maritime strategy documentation coming out the Indian avians publication that was released earlier this year I think so an excellent piece of work and also the updated doctrinal work however we still don't see anything like white papers or so on coming out of India so and and to an extent this applies to China so it means that you know for today's discussion about the India-China relationship and for the rest of us who are affected by that one way or the other it leaves us all guessing and second guessing I heard the former assistant national security advisor in India respond to my question IDSA in 2014 as to why India doesn't produce defence white papers and the like and his response was well we want to maintain our strategic flexibility we don't want to be held to account which I thought was interesting but when are we likely to see a change or are we likely to see a change in this particularly at a time when both these emerging powers are exerting more or exceeding seeking to exert greater influence in and around the region I mean we're aligned at the moment on various policy and pronouncements and speeches for you know you know the look east moving to act east policy that sort of thing but overall it's very hard to understand exactly where India is trying to head and to a lesser extent although I think it's clearer where China is trying to head thank you sir you you mentioned a point that actually goes to the heart of a problem that the services have been facing in India with regard to national defence policy that we don't have a national defence doctrine we don't have any integrated guidance of the matter now this is this is an issue that we need the entire conference to sort of discuss this issue we've debated this you know for for for us and days at end in the IDSA I mean you were there with us when you were there but but let me just say this the issue with with with Indian foreign with Indian military policy thinking is that a lot of analysts feel that ambivalence is by itself a tool and that it it should be should be exploited to your advantage and that when you're very clear about a we take a very clear stand on an issue you in some ways reduce your own space for maneuver it's a it's a very popular thought that was Prakash man the answer also and and it's not just him I've heard many admirals including Arun Prakash at one point tell me that how do you know that strategic ambivalence is not a it's not a strategy by itself so I mean these are these are questions that we have raised with our own senior people but but but but the problem is not with the military as much as it is with the with the political class that they're really unwilling to to to to take a call on what exactly are the issues that need to be flagged and what positions need to be taken as a result of which what happens is that there is a bit of ad hocism in the way we structure our our responses to certain challenges but but but that's just the way that Indian strategic culture is and I think we will just have to we will just have to kind of live the but having said that I have to say that that a lot of forward movement has been made in the past two or three years for example if you look at the Indian Navy's own strategy that came out it took certain positions on issues that would actually that would have otherwise been highlighted in in a in a white paper especially with regard to the neighborhood the how how what what the Indian Navy is going to do in terms of operations within the neighborhood and what sort of capacity building will it do this these are all things that would have come but you're talking about the South China Sea you're talking about the western Pacific and what exactly is the white paper about that that is an area that the Navy does not have the mandate to go into until it doesn't get a very clear direction from the political class and that sadly hasn't happened so far but I suspect it might stay like this for a few more years Dushana do you want to say anything about yeah I mean I think come on this thing is pretty much wrapped about like I've heard the same thing like how do you know how do you know that you know strategic ambulance is not a tool in itself but I think on white paper overall defense strategy there has been some attempts in like writing a few I think third part already mentioned that there were and I've I've also known that there has been some attempts but it's never I've never seen them really being released or like I know that they've been written and that people who have worked on it but this I've never seen anything come out of it so I don't know if it's like a MEA or MOD thing that you know that they can't agree on things and it never goes forward from it and you know maybe those points that because actually it's some things that if you leave it just to the Navy I think it would be much more stronger stand and maybe a bolder approach like even for a Malabar the Navy was happy to call it a trilateral march before it got a go-ahead for it and in the end it says like permanent representative, Japan's permanent representative at the Malabar and bilateral exercise with the United States and at the same point for the you know like if you ask the Indian Navy about what is the problem with doing a joint exercise where Australia, Japan and US and the answer would be like you know we do individual with them anyway so from a technical point of view it saves resources in time if we bring them together but try getting that through MOD or MEA I mean it's it's never going to and if I was at of that the other problem is that we are not truly integrated sir because of that what happens the Navy is a forward-leaning service it almost considers itself to be a foreign policy an instrumental foreign policy you know it does benign operations it does you know diplomatic it considers itself to have a diplomatic role the Army and the Air Force don't see themselves in in that light at all and so while the Navy might be agreed to do a lot in the Pacific I will I can't say the same thing for the Army or the Air Force and because there is a disconnect in between the way the three services think I mean I know this is a bit like Washington and and public but that's just the way it is with with the services that that they don't agree on certain issues and in the absence of that agreement it's very hard to come out with a national security strategy some of you would be aware that we have this Friday a the next round of our Australia Indian Narasimha dialogue which is part of this new suite I think Darshan I was mentioning as a new suite of sort of such dialogues that have produced things like you know the white shipping agreement for me having worked on India on and off for quite a few years you can really tell the difference between an initiative or a dialogue or a piece of bilateral architecture that does engage India's interests and those that don't engage in India's interests and and this one quite clearly does and there's been follow-up on both sides there's engagement there are decent delegations they happen on time they produce work lists and they review work lists and see what's been done and what hasn't been done so as you say I think it's you know slowly slowly but the the pace and the scope of our interaction both sort of military military defense to defense and in terms of strategic conversations about Indian Ocean matters and otherwise has is is remarkably more healthy now than it was just a few years ago it has some it has a long way to go but it has some real substance to it it's probably because the defense attache at the Indian High Commission is a navy fellow so he knows the importance of strategic engagement might I just say this ma'am that you know we often talk interoperability and how navy should come together and work together you know learn each other's course and procedures I think the interoperability even before you begin to begin to come together as services and do things together we should be able to come together as people and and and do things together I remember I was part of a India US dialogue when I was I was in service and what I found very interesting is that that discussion that we had the American counterparts was very very creative and imaginative so there were questions like are we getting ready for a world of unfamiliar challenges where you might have state actors involved with non-state actors where and you know that was the time when there was a if you remember just about three four years ago there was a Pakistani warship that was very nearly hijacked by the Al-Qaeda and it was just some last-minute security forces you know they just came in and they sort of foiled the attempt but if that would have happened that ship would have been commanded by a bunch of you know radicalized and they were they were serving naval officers some young sub-leftans and leftans and these these ships would have launched attacks on on Indian ships and American ships and this was held right in the aftermath of that and we were discussing about how there are these open ungoverned spaces wherein the non-state actor is increasingly empowered and the non-state actor also has the backing of the state actor so we were we were thinking of a scenario in which maybe the Pakistani some elements of the Pakistan moment had maybe supported these these gentlemen that had that had nearly taken over the ship so are we getting ready for for for a scenario where we might have some such thing and at that point I remember maritime militias for example something that now comes up for discussion very often with in the context of China that was the time when the Americans that first told told us that you have got to get ready for a world where in you will face militias we're facing militias in in the Persian Gulf and and our allies in Southeast Asia are facing these militias that are that are Chinese but are you getting ready to face Pakistani militias the point I'm trying to make is this that that interoperability I didn't need to reflect itself in operations at sea even though that's where it should operate even in our dialogue in our interactions it was very clear that there was that there was a meeting of minds and that they could preempt the threats that we could that we could face in the future and that we could tell them some things about they there was a genuine concern for you so you answer your question that genuine warmth sometimes I don't see in the India-China relationship I suspect that warmth is there in the India-Australia relationship too because it's easy for us to talk to the Australians I've never been in a dialogue with the Australians but I hear from what Dashana tells me she's organized a few for the ORF that it's that the dialogue's pretty frank and I think ma'am you make an excellent point that if we continue talking to each other and just knowing each other I think the relationship is going to get stronger and that will reflect on our interactions at sea okay with those uplifting words thank you very much Abhijit I'd like to I'll I'll finish up here and I'd like to give huge thanks to all of our speakers some of who have come from a long distance Professor Yuji and and Pramitpal Choudhury who who spent most of yesterday sitting in beautiful Melbourne Airport where his bags probably still are and and Abhijit Singh and Dashana Burua and JD Yuan and Jian Zhang who unfortunately had to go so again I thank you very very much for your contributions I think it's been an incredibly interesting discussion covering all manner of issues and I certainly come away with a lot of different ideas and I hope we can certainly continue this discussion about the India-China relation and its impact on Australia which is only going to increase so thank you very much