 Professor, do you also incur that fist-milk now is safe? Yes, certainly. I'd have no reservations in saying that. I think the residual issues relate to certainly the possibility that there are still some very drums there, although we've got clear evidence that the vast majority of drums were removed in two separate incidents. Any material which was in those drums after 20 years, if it was liquid, will have volatilized off or move down as mixed air. So there's a question mark in relation to groundwater, which is going to be pursued by CFA in terms of the firewater treatment system. Obviously, issues have been raised there recently and are being addressed by CFA, but there's nothing in my report which would lead me to conclude that there's any inappropriate or significant risk to people on the site at present. What would you like to say to the people who claim they are now ill because of the result of what's happening? Well, it's an open question. And the dilemma here is that the events are so far removed in time and there are so many confounding variables in people's lives, but it's going to be difficult to draw firm cause and effects between exposure to fiscal, other exposures which people may have had in their lives, and other factors. We're not dealing with a relatively straightforward situation as you are, for example, with a spesloss, where there's a very clear causal pathway between exposure to a material and a consequent health outcome. Now, I'm not a medico and that's why it's important that we move from here into the area where epidemiologists and medicos are involved, but it is a fraught area. It's going to be difficult to reach firm conclusions. What sort of chemicals have you thought that you could remember? The sorts of materials which came in in these drums and remember there's no very limited documentary evidence after all this time and because the materials were gifted, it was not the sort of thing which gave a rise to a whole paper trail. So we're going basically on what people remember and basically what they remember is that the materials were various solvents and solvents cover a vast range of potential materials. Paint used and out of spec aviation fuels and things of this sort. So clearly there are materials which are potentially dangerous when handled if you're breathing in the fumes over a long period, dangerous when burnt if you're exposed over a long period to the fine particles and various chemicals which may be absorbed onto those. But we simply don't know precisely what the materials would be, we can infer from what we do know, but certainly there were hazards associated. Those hazards were particularly concentrated on the limited number of people who were actually dealing with the raw chemicals, the people who set up the fire simulations on the training area and particularly to the full-time instructors who were exposed over an average period of about three and a half years, but some for much longer, to the products of combustion, to foam and to recirculated fire water. The facility was one of the last to realise that these practices were dangerous or at least cease them with 96% to 99%. Why did it take so long? Well, I guess that's a good question. It's come about because people have actually started to draw possible links between what they're now experiencing in terms of ill health and thinking back to what was happening at Fiskville, what they were exposed to there. I think that this is the sort of thing that often does emerge in that sort of way. But the main changes I've said earlier was a change in the 1990s. It was a recognition which was, unfortunately, driven more by the grassroots than by management. And as I've said before, management were slow to really take this up. But if the CFA knew that materials were dangerous and every other training facility wasn't using them, why did it take so long? Why didn't the CFA look into it when they ceased the practices because they were dangerous? Well, I'm not sure that every other training system back in the 70s and the 80s wasn't using similar sorts of materials. But they had stopped using them because they were dangerous? Well, I'm not aware of that. The investigation which we've done only explored to a limited degree what was going on in the state. But what I have concluded is that by the late 80s or early 90s, people in the state were starting to become concerned about this. And in a similar time, people down on the grassroots at Fiskville and in the dangerous goods area of human resources were also becoming alert to it. The problem is that senior management was slow to do this. Can I have the last couple of questions, please? I'll just have the last one.