 Tony, U.S. troops are on their way home from Iraq as we speak, but the U.S. will maintain some presence in Iraq. What does the next phase of U.S.-Iraqi relations look like? Well, it's a good question, because when Prime Minister Maliki came here to talk to President Obama, it was after several years of negotiation. We have committee meetings, and we've made some progress, but we still have not defined the relationship that will exist under the Strategic Framework Agreement. What we do know is this. There'll be an office of security cooperation with several hundred U.S. forces. There'll be U.S. military contractors, because Iraq is ordering up to $11 billion worth of U.S. arms, M1 tanks, F-16s, and other systems. There'll be a police development program to replace the military program. This will be run by a very limited number of State Department officials and again by contractors. There'll be four areas that the U.S. will occupy diplomatically in Iraq. The embassy and three consulates, the key ones will be down in Basra and then up in the Kurdish zone, in Erbil with a real effort to stop tensions between the Kurds and Arabs from exploding into conflict. There'll be a total of some 10 areas where the U.S. has military presence, but all of them will be Iraqi bases, not sovereign U.S. bases. And the protection of the U.S. advisers there will be up to the Iraqis, not the U.S. What no one has defined is whether any kind of other troop presence will come back. What arrangements the United States would make to come to Iraq's help if it came under pressure from Iran? Because while Iraq was the dominant military power in the Gulf, in 2003 when we invaded, we destroyed virtually all the conventional forces. Iraq has no capability today to deal with Iran. There are other key aspects of this, intelligence support. Iraq has good human intelligence, but it doesn't have any of the technical assets, things like these unmanned aerial vehicles that we have, to provide intelligence on its internal security or what's happening on its borders. Beyond that, there's an aid problem. How will we provide aid in the future for the civil side? We have an important presence in many Iraqi ministries as an advisor. There are areas in the economy, in broadening the economy and liberalizing it, where we have small advisory teams, but we haven't defined the plan or the lasting relationship yet. This sort of brings me to my next question. Is Iraq better off today than it was before the U.S. intervention? No one can defend Saddam Hussein, but I think we need to recognize some grim realities. There's no accurate count on how many Iraqis died, but it has to be over 100,000. Several 100,000 Iraqis were wounded. Others were displaced, forced to give up their homes, sometimes their businesses. We're talking about a country which is still deeply divided between Sunni and Shiite in Arab and Kurd. The overall levels of significant violence have gone down, but lower level areas of violence, kidnappings, terrorism and the rest, arguably according to some measures by our National Counterterrorism Center, Iraq is a more violent place than Afghanistan. So we do not have peace. We have an elected regime, but that regime still doesn't have a stable government. It doesn't have a minister of defense or a minister of interior, for example, because of Sunni-Shia tensions. The relationship between the prime minister, the security forces, the other parties with the legislature, the Council of the Republic remains undefined. So we do not have a functioning democracy. What we have is an elected government which may become a functioning democracy. And when you look at the economy, we used up over $100 billion worth of Iraqi money, as well as $68 billion in USAID money. It's very hard to know exactly what we accomplished with that. We certainly did not develop the economy. And when you look at where Iraq is today, its per capita income, is 161st in the world. Now to put that in perspective, that's about the level of Gaza. But if you look at the rest of the Gulf, Qatar has the highest per capita income in the world. And when you look even at the lowest other country, which is Iran, it's something like 84th where it's doing twice as well as Iraq. So it's pretty hard to say that the result of our invasion helped the Iraqis, even if it did get rid of Saddam Hussein. There's many lessons that you've pointed out and written about that we should take from the Iraq war. What is really the biggest takeaway that you could say right now as we disengage our troops? I think that there are really three interrelated lessons. First, don't try to transform a country you're trying to help. Help it fix itself its own way rather than trying to impose our values too soon from the outside. Second, the minute you see an insurgency, a problem begin to arise, don't deny its importance. React quickly to stop it from growing and becoming a crisis, a mistake we made in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And finally, 10 years on in Afghanistan, nearly eight years on in Iraq, we have failed to integrate our civil and military efforts. We have a very weak structure in aid. Some very good people in the field, but a group in the State Department that after 10 years in Afghanistan, eight years in Iraq, has never produced an assessment of what our aid accomplished with measures of effectiveness that shows where the money went. And that's critical because if we're going to do these things, there has to be a civil-military partnership that's more than vacuous rhetoric. Tony Korsman, much to talk about going forward on this issue. Thank you very much. Thank you.