 Part 3 for Positions 31 to 35 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org recording by Morgan Scorpion. The Ethics by Benedictus Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Elworth, Part 3 for Positions 31 to 35. For Positions 31. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul. Poof! From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything, we shall ourselves love that thing, Part 3 for Positions 27. But we are assumed to love it already. There is therefore a new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered. Hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing, Part 3 for Positions 27. If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it. In other words, we shall be subject to vacillation. Part 3 for Positions 17. Note. Hereafter, that demonstrates random. Coalery. From before going, and also from Part 3 for Positions 28, it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to love what he himself loves and to hate what he himself hates. As the poet says, As lovers, let us share every hope and every fear. I in hearted were he who should love what the other leaves. Footnote 9. of it, Amores. Part 2, Chapter 19, 4.5. Spinaurta transposes the verses. Spiraemus parator, parator metorhannus amantes, firaeus est, siquis, quod sinit alter, amat. Note, this endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition. See Parts 3, Proposition 29, Note. Wherefore, we see that every one by nature desires, apaterre, that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition. When such a desire is equally present in all, every one stands in every one else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all becomes mutually hateful. Proposition 32. If we conceive that any one takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about, that the mind in question shall not gain possession thereof. Poof! From the mere fact of our conceiving that another person takes delight in a thing, Part 3, Proposition 27 and Coalery, we shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by another's delight in its object. We shall therefore endeavour to prevent his possession thereof. Part 3, Proposition 28, Coalerat Demonstrandum Note. We thus see that man's nature is generally so constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportions to his own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to experience, we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said, more especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying. Moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of whatever they conceive as delighting others, inasmuch as the images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return. Poof! That which we love, we endeavour, as far as we can, to conceive in preference to anything else. Part 3, Proposition 12. If the thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in preference to anything else. Part 3, Proposition 29. In other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is, Part 3, Proposition 13, note, that it should love us in return, called in that demonstrandom. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency. Poof! We endeavour, Part 3, Proposition 33, as far as we can, to bring about that what we love should love us in return. In other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves as cause. Therefore, in proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected because of us, our endeavour will be assisted, that is, Part 3, Proposition 11, and note, the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take pleasure in the fact that we pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure, Part 3, Proposition 30. Therefore, the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected, etc., called in that demonstrandom. Proposition 35. If anyone conceives that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival. Poof! In proportion as a man thinks that a loved object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of his self-approval by the last proposition. That is, Part 3, Proposition 30, note, of his pleasure he will therefore, Part 3, Proposition 28, endeavour, as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him. This endeavour or desire will be increased if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire. Part 3, Proposition 31. But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image from the loved object as joins to itself. Therefore, Part 3, Proposition 11, note, he will for that reason be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival. That is, he will be, Part 3, Proposition 13, affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival. Part 3, Proposition 15, corollary, which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object, called Irat Demonstrandum. Note, this hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wanted to derive from the reciprocated love of the third object, and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by the one whom he himself hates, and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman, for he who thinks that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another will feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but also because being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her. We must add that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him pain as a lover, as I will now show. End of Part 3, Propositions 31-35 Part 3, Propositions 36-40 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Morgan Scorpion The Ethics by Benedictus Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Ellers Part 3, Propositions 36-40 Proposition 36 He who remembers a thing in which he had once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Poof! Everything which a man has seen in conjunction with the object of his love will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure. Part 3, Proposition 15 He will therefore desire to possess it in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight. In other words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Quod irat demonstrandum. Covalry A lover will therefore feel pain if one of the aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing. Poof! For insofar as he finds some circumstance to be missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or circumstance by the last proposition, he will, insofar as he conceives it to be missing, feel pain. Part 3, Proposition 19 Quod irat demonstrandum. Note! This pain, insofar as it has reference to the absence of the object of love, is called regret. Proposition 37 Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater. Poof! Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of activity. Part 3, Proposition 11 Note! In other words, Part 3, Proposition 7 diminishes or constrains the effort wherewith the endeavours to persist in his own being. Therefore, Part 3, Proposition 5, it is contrary to the said endeavour. Thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain. But, by the definition of pain, in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity. Therefore, the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed to remove it. That is, the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again! Since pleasure of Part 3, Proposition 11, Note! increases or aids a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure. Lastly! Since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love, called Irrat Demonstrandum. Proposition 38 If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love. Truth! If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his appetite is put under restraint than if he had never loved it, for love is a pleasure. Part 3, Proposition 13, Note Which a man endeavours as far as he can to render permanent. Part 3, Proposition 28 He does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably. This endeavour is greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the endeavour to bring about that that the love should return his affection. Part 3, Proposition 33 Now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love. Part 3, Proposition 13, Corollary, and Part 3, Proposition 23. Wherefore the lover, Part 3, Proposition 11, note, will for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has been greater. That is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object, wherefore the lover will regard the beloved object, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater, called Erat Demonstrandum. Proposition 39. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself. On the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same way, seek to benefit him. Truth. To hate a man is, Part 3, Proposition 13, note, to conceive him as a cause of pain. Therefore, he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or in other words a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby, and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury, which he abstains from inflicting that injury. Part 3, Proposition 28, and the strength of his endeavour, Part 3, Proposition 37, will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of this proof precedes it in the same manner. Wherefore, he who hates another, etc., called Erat Demonstrandum, note, By good I hear mean every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces there too, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil I mean every kind of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings, for I have shown Part 3, Proposition 9, note, that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good. But contrary wise, we deem a thing good because we desire it. Consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from. Everyone therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse. Lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser think that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst. An ambitious man desires nothing as glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil. Part 3, Proposition 28 But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both people fear to be very great. Proposition 40 He who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return. Proof. He who conceives another as affected with hatred will therefore be affected himself with hatred. Part 3, Proposition 27 That is, with pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But by the hypothesis he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is his enemy. Therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by someone, he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of his enemy. In other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Quadirat Demonstrandum Note. He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will Part 3, Proposition 30 and Note be affected with shame. But this case, Part 3, Proposition 25 rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate. Part 3, Proposition 39 He therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain. He will be affected with pain or fear. Accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause, in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy as I said above. Corollary 1 He who conceives that one whom he loves hates him will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For insofar as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is determined to hate his enemy in return. By the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves him, wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. Corollary 2 If a man conceives that one whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion has done him an injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind. Truth He who conceives that another hates him will, by the last proposition, hate his enemy in return and, part 3 Proposition 26 will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully. He will moreover endeavour to do him an injury. Part 3 Proposition 39 Now the first thing of this talk which he conceives is the injury done to himself. He will therefore forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind. Quote Irat Demonstrandom Note The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called anger. The endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called revenge. End of Part 3, Propositions 36 to 40 Part 3, Propositions 41 to 45 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Elvis. Part 3 Propositions 41 to 45 Proposition 41 If anyone conceives that he is loved by another and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return. Confer Part 3, Proposition 15 Corollary and Part 3, Proposition 16 Proof This proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding one. See also the note appended there too. Note, if he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will take pride therein Part 3, Proposition 30 and note This is what most often happens Part 3, Proposition 25 and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another See note to preceding Proposition This reciprocal love and consequently the desire of benefitting him who loves us Part 3, Proposition 39 and who endures to benefit us is called gratitude or thankfulness. It does appears that men are much more known to take vengeance than to return benefits. Corollary He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he hates will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition. Note, if hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour to injure him who loves him. This emotion is called cruelty especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred. Proposition 42 He who has conferred a benefit on anyone for motives of love or honour will feel pain if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude. Proof When a man loves something similar to himself, he endures as far as he can to bring it about that he should be loved thereby in return. Proposition 33 Therefore, he who has conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire which he feels of being loved in return. That is, Proposition 34 From the hope of honour or Proposition 30 Note, Pleasure Hence he will endeavour as far as he can to conceive this cause of honour or to regard it as actually existing. But by the hypothesis he conceives something else which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour. Wherefore, he will there at feel pain. Proposition 19 Quad Erat Demonstrandom Proposition 43 Hatred is increased by being reciprocated and can on the other hand be destroyed by love. Proof, he who conceives that an object of his hatred hates him in return will there upon feel a new hatred while the former hatred by hypothesis still remains Part 3 Proposition 40 But if, on the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he will to this extent Part 3 Live himself with pleasure and Part 3 Proposition 29 In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him Part 3 Proposition 41 This endeavour will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred and through which the man endeavours to effect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Quad Erat Demonstrandom Proposition 44 Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love and love is there upon greater than if hatred had not preceded it. Proof The proof proceeds in the same way as Proposition 38 of this part for he who begins to love a thing which he was warned to hate or regard with pain from the very fact of loving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from hate given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred. Part 3 Proposition 37 Accompanied by the idea Note Though this be so no one will endeavour to hate anything or to be affected with pain for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure. That is, no one will desire that he should be endured in the hope of recovering from the injury nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being and to ward off pain as far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable namely that a man should desire to hate someone in order that he might love him the more thereafter he will always desire to hate him. For the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred wherefor the man would desire that the hatred be continually increased more and more and for a similar reason he would desire to become more and more ill in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health. In such a case he would always endeavour to be ill which Part 3 Proposition 6 is Absurd Proposition 45 If a man conceives that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself which he loves he will hate that person. Proof, the beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it. Part 3 Proposition 40 Therefore the lover in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred in other words, Part 3 Proposition 13 by pain. Consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause that is, he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves. Part 3 Proposition 41 to 45 Part 3 Propositions 46 to 50 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict D. Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elwes Part 3 Propositions 46 to 50 Proposition 46 If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone of a class or nation different from his own and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause under the general category of the class or nation the man will feel love or hatred not only to the individual stranger but also to the whole class or nation where to he belongs. Proof Evident from Part 3 Proposition 16 Proposition 47 Joy arising from the fact that anything we hate is destroyed or suffers other injury is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us. Proof This is evident from Part 3 Proposition 27 For insofar as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain we ourselves feel pain. Note this proposition can also be proved from the corollary of Part 2, Proposition 17 Whenever we remember anything even if it does not actually exist we regard it only as present and the body is affected in the same manner where for insofar as the remembrance of the thing is strong a man is determined to regard it with pain. This determination while the image of the thing in question lasts is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing but is not destroyed. Hence a man only feels pleasure as far as the said determination is checked. For this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated every time we remember that object of hatred. For as we have said when the image of the thing in question is aroused in as much as it involves the thing's existence it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was want to do when it actually did exist. However since he has joined to the image of the thing other images which exclude its existence this determination to pain is forthwith and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men conceive a danger they conceive it as still future and are determined to fear it. This determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom. This renders them secure afresh therefore they rejoice afresh. Proposition 48 Love or hatred towards for instance Peter is destroyed if the pleasure involved in the former or the pain involved in the latter emotion be associated with the idea of another cause and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion. Proof. This proposition is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred. Part 3. Proposition 13 Note. For pleasure is called love towards Peter and pain is called love towards Peter simply and so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part vanishes Quaterat demonstrandum. Proposition 49 Love or hatred towards a thing which we conceive to be free must other conditions being similar be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. Part 1. Definition 7 be perceived through itself without anything else. If therefore we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain we shall therefore part 3 Proposition 13 Love it or hate it and she'll do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity we shall then by the same definition 7 part 1 conceive it not as the sole cause but as one of the causes of the emotion and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Quaterat demonstrandum. Note. Hence it follows that men thinking themselves to be free feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else. To this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in part 3 Propositions 27 34 40 and 43 Proposition 50 Anything whatever can be accidentally a cause of hope or fear. Proof. This proposition is proved in the same way as part 3 Proposition 15 which see together with the note to part 3 Proposition 18 Note. Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. Now in so far as such omens are the cause of hope and fear. They are by the definitions of hope and fear given in part 3 Proposition 18 Note. The cause is also of pleasure and pain. Consequently we to this extent regard them with love or hatred and endeavor either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for or to remove them as obstacles or causes of that which we fear. It follows further from part 3 Proposition 25 that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for and with difficulty in that which we fear. Moreover we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence there are ever risen superstitions whereby men are everywhere assailed. However I do not think it worthwhile to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear. It follows from the definition of these emotions that there can be no hope without fear and no fear without hope as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further in so far as we hope for or fear anything we regard it with love or hatred. Thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred. End of part 3 Propositions 46 to 50 Part 3 Part 1 to 55 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Morgan Scorpion The Ethics by Benedict Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Ellworth Part 3 Propositions 51 to 55 For position 51 Different men may be differently affected by the same object and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object. Truth The human body is affected by external bodies in a variety of ways. Part 2 Postulate 3 Two men may therefore be differently affected at the same time and therefore by Axiom 1 after Lemma 3 after Part 2 Proposition 13 may be differently affected by one and the same object. Further by the same postulate the human body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another. Consequently by the same Axiom it may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object called Erat Demonstrandom. Note We thus see that it is possible that what one man loves another may hate and that what one man fears another may not fear. Or again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated or may be bold where he once was timid and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better and what worse. Note It follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions. Footnote 10 This is possible though the human mind is part of the divine intellect as I have shown in Part 2 Proposition 13 Note Hence, when we compare some with others we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions and star some intrepid others timid others by some other epithet. For instance I shall call a man intrepid if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear. If I further take into consideration that in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me I shall call him daring. Again a man will appear timid to me if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil which is not sufficient to restrain me I shall say that he is cowardly and in like manner will everyone pass judgement. Lastly from this inconsistency in the nature of human judgement in as much as a man often judges things solely by his emotions and in as much as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent are often purely imaginary. Not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded to in part 3 Proposition 28 We may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure and at another with pain accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what our repentance and self complacency. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause. Self complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free. Part 3 Proposition 49 Proposition 52 An object which we have formally seen in conjunction with others and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many will not be regarded by us for so long as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself. Poof As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others we at once remember those others Part 2 Proposition 18 and note and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object and this is the case with the object which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many for we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects but when we suppose that we conceive an object something special which we have never seen before we must need say that the mind while regarding that object has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only therefore an object etc. called irate demonstrandum note this mental modification or imagination of a particular thing insofar as it is alone in the mind is called wonder but if it be excited by an object of fear it is called consternation because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil if however the object of wonder be a man's prudence industry or anything of that sort in as much as the said man is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves wonder is called veneration otherwise if a man's anger envy etc be what we wonder at the emotion is called horror again if it be the prudence industry or what not of a man we love that we wonder at our love will on this account be the greater part 3 proposition 12 and when joined to wonder or veneration is called devotion we may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence and the other emotions as associated with wonder and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech when it is evident that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations and with an accurate knowledge of their nature to wonder is opposed contempt which generally arises from the fact that because we see someone wondering at loving or fearing something or because something at first sight appears to be like things which we ourselves wonder at love, fear etc we are in consequence part 3 proposition 15 corollary and part 3 proposition 27 determined to wonder at love or fear that thing but if from the presence or more accurate contemplation of the said thing we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear etc the mind then by the presence of the thing remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it than of those which are in it whereas on the other hand the presence of the object would cause it particularly to regard that which is therein as devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love so does derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear and scorn from contempt of folly as veneration from wonder at prudence lastly we can conceive the emotions of love hope, honor etc in association with contempt and can then seduce other emotions which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name proposition 53 when the mind regards itself and its own power of activity it feels pleasure and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness where wizard conceives itself and its own power of activity proof a man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body and the ideas thereof part 2 proposition 19 and 23 when therefore the mind is able to contemplate itself it is thereby assumed to pass through greater perfection or part 3 proposition 11 note to feel pleasure and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity called erat demonstrandum corollary this pleasure is fostered more and more as a man conceives himself to be phrased by others for the more he conceives himself as phrased by others the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself part 3 proposition 29 note thus he is part 3 proposition 27 himself affected with greater pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself called erat demonstrandum proposition 54 the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity proof the endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof part 3 proposition 7 but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do not that which it neither is nor can do therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity called erat demonstrandum proposition 55 when the mind contemplates its own weakness it feels pain there at proof the essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is or can do in other words it is the mind's nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity last proposition thus when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness we're merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity it is checked in its endeavour in other words part 3 proposition 11 note it feels pain called erat demonstrandum corollary this pain is more and more fostered if a man conceives that he is blamed by others this may be proved in the same way as the corollary to part 3 proposition 53 this pain accompanied by the idea of our own weakness is called humility the pleasure which springs from the contemplation of ourselves is called self love or self complacency and in as much as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues or his own power of activity it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits and displaying the force both of his body and mind and also that for this reason men are troublesome to one another again it follows that men are naturally envious part 3 proposition 24 note and part 3 proposition 32 note rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals and feeling pain at their virtues for whenever a man conceives his own actions he is affected with pleasure part 3 proposition 53 in proportion as his actions they more perfection and he conceives them more distinctly that is part 2 proposition 40 note in proportion as he can distinguish them from others and regard them as something special therefore a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others but if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animal in general to be so greatly pleased he will on the contrary feel pain if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others this pain part 3 proposition 28 he will endeavour to remove by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals or by as far as he can embellishing his own it is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred fostered by their education while parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honour and envy but perhaps some will scruple to a sense to what I have said because we not seldom admire men's virtues and venerate their possessors in order to remove such doubts I append the following corollary no one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal proof envy is a species of hatred part 3 proposition 24 note or part 3 proposition 13 note pain that is part 3 proposition 11 note a modification whereby a man's power of activity or endeavour towards activity is checked but a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything which cannot follow from his nature as it is given therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue which is the same thing to be attributed to him that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own hence his desire cannot be checked nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in someone unlike himself consequently he cannot envy such a one but he can envy his equal who is assumed to have the same nature as himself quad irat demonstrandom note when therefore as we said in the note to part 3 proposition 52 we venerate a man through wonder at his prudence, fortitude etc we do so because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him and not as common to our nature we therefore no more envy their possessor then we envy the trees for being tall or lions for being courageous end of part 3 part 51 to 55 part 3 propositions 56 to 59 of The Ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Morgan Goldfranch The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by Part 3 propositions 56 to 59 proposition 56 there are as many kinds of pleasure of pain, of desire and of every emotion compounded of these such as vacillations of spirit or derived from these such as love, hatred, hope, fear etc as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected, proof pleasure and pain and consequently the emotions compounded thereof or derived therefrom are passions or passive states part 3 proposition 11 now we are necessarily passive in so far as we have inadequate ideas and only in so far as we have such ideas are we passive that is we are only necessarily passive part 2 proposition 40 in so far as we conceive or part 2 proposition 17 in so far as we are affected by an emotion which involves the nature of our own body and the nature of an external body where for the nature of every passive state must necessarily be so explained that the nature of the object whereby we are affected be expressed namely the pleasure which arises from say the object A involves the nature of that object A and the pleasure which arises from the object B involves the nature of the object B where for these two pleasurable emotions are by nature different in as much as the causes whence they arise are by nature different so again the emotion of pain which arises from an object is by nature different from the pain arising from another object and similarly in the case of love hatred, hope, fear, fascination etc thus there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure pain love, hatred etc as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected now desire is each man's essence or nature in so far as it is conceived as determined by any particular action by any given modification of itself part 3, proposition 9 therefore according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure pain, love, hatred etc in other words according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner so will his desire be of one kind or another and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of one desire as widely as the emotions differ where from each desire arose thus there are as many kinds of desire as there are kinds of pleasure pain, love etc consequently by what has been shown there are as many kinds of desire as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected quote errat demonstrandom note among the kinds of emotions which by the last opposition must be very numerous the chief are luxury, drunkenness lust, avarice and ambition being merely species of love or desire displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object with which they are concerned for by luxury drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition etc we simply mean the moderate love of feasting drinking, venerary, riches and fame furthermore these emotions insofar as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects where with they are concerned have no contraries for temperance, sobriety and chastity which we are want to oppose to luxury, drunkenness and lust are not emotions or passive states but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last named emotions however I cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects nor if I could would it be necessary it is sufficient for our purpose namely to determine the strength of the emotions and the mind's power over them to have a general definition of each emotion it is sufficient I repeat to understand the general properties of the emotion and the mind to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions thus though there is a great difference between various emotions of love, hatred or desire for instance between love felt towards children and love felt towards a wife there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions Proposition 57 the emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual only so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other Proof this proposition is evident from axiom 1 which see after lemma 3 proposition 13 part 2 nevertheless we will prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions all emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure or pain as their definitions both given show but desire is each man's nature or essence part 3 proposition 9 therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another individual only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other again pleasure and pain are passive states or passions whereby every man's power or endeavor to persist in his being is increased or diminished helped or hindered part 3 proposition 11 and note but by the endeavor to persist in its being in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction we mean appetite and desire therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished helped or hindered they are every man's nature where for the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man only in so far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other consequently any emotion of one individual only differs etc quote Erect demonstrandom note hence it follows that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt the brute's feel only differ from man's emotions to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation but the desire of the form is equine the desire of the latter is human so also the lesson appetite of insects fishes and birds must needs vary accordingly to the several natures thus although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being yet the life where in each is content and rejoices is nothing else but the idea or soul of the said individual and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another lastly it follows from the foregoing proposition no small difference between the joy which actuates say a drunkard and the joy possessed by a philosopher as I just mentioned here by the way thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man in so far as he is passive it remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active proposition 58 besides pleasure and desire which are passivities or passions there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire which are attributable to us in so far as we are active prove when the mind conceives itself and its power of activity it feels pleasure part 3 proposition 53 now the mind necessarily contemplates itself when it conceives a true or adequate idea part 2 proposition 43 but the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas part 2 proposition 40 note 2 therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas that is in so far as it is active part 3 proposition 1 again the mind both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ideas endeavors to persist in its own being part 3 proposition 9 but by such an endeavour we mean desire by the note to the same proposition therefore desire is also attributable to us in so far as we understand or part 3 proposition 1 in so far as we are active quote Eric Demonstrandom proposition 59 among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire proof all emotions can be referred to desire pleasure or pain as the definitions already given show now by pain we mean that mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked part 3 proposition 11 and note therefore in so far as the mind feels pain its power of understanding that is of activity is diminished or checked part 3 proposition 1 therefore no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active but only emotions of pleasure and desire which by the last proposition are attributable to the mind in that condition quote Eric Demonstrandom note all actions following from emotion which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding I set down to strength of character 42 though which I divide into courage animositas and high mindedness generosity by courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason by high mindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavors solely under the dictates of reason to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship those actions therefore which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage those which aim at the good of others I set down to high mindedness thus temperance sobriety and presence of mind in danger etc are varieties of courage courtesy mercy etc are varieties of high mindedness I think I have thus explained and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit which arise from the combination of deep primary emotions to it desire pleasure and pain it is evident from what I have said that we are in many ways driven about by external causes and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate but I have said that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions not all that might be given for by proceeding in the same ways above we can easily show that love is united to repentance scorn, shame etc I think everyone will agree from what has been said that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways and so many variations may arise there from as to exceed all possibility of computation however for my purpose it is enough to have enumerated the most important to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be more curious than profitable it remains to remark concerning love that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for the body from the act of enjoyment acquires a new disposition whereby it is determined in another way other images of things are aroused in it and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh for example when we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavour we desire to enjoy that is to eat it but whilst we are thus enjoying the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed if therefore when the body is thus otherwise disposed the image of the food which is presently stimulated and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also the new disposition of the body the resonance to the desire or attempt and consequently the presence of food which we formerly longed for will become odious this revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness for the rest I have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions such for instance as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter etc for these are attributable to the body only without any reference to the mind lastly the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points I will therefore repeat them interpolating such observations as I think should here and there be added End of part 3 Propositions 56 to 59 Recording by Morgan Goldfranch For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elves Part 3 Definitions of the Emotions Definitions of the Emotions Definition 1 Desire is the actual essence of man insofar as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself Explanation We have said above in the note to Proposition 9 of this part that desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. Further that appetite is the essence of man insofar as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own existence But in the same note I also remarked that simply speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire For whether a man be conscious of this appetite or not it remains one and the same appetite Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of totology I have refrained from explaining desire by appetite But I have taken care to define it in such a manner as to comprehend under one head all those endeavors of human nature which be distinguished by the terms appetite, will, desire or impulse I might indeed have said that desire is the essence of man insofar as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity But from such a definition cf part 2 Proposition 23 it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness it was necessary to add insofar as it is determined by some given modification etc For by a modification of man's essence we understand every disposition of the said essence whether such disposition be innate or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought or solely under the attribute of extension or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes By the term desire, then, I hear mean all man's and of or's impulses, appetites and volitions which vary according to each man's disposition and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another according as a man is drawn in different directions and it knows not where to turn Definition 2 pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection Definition 3 pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection Explanation I say transition for pleasure is not perfection itself for if man were born with the perfection to which he passes he would possess the same not the emotion of pleasure This appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion pain No one can deny that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection and not in the less perfection itself for a man cannot be pained in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree Neither can we say that pain consists in the absence of perfection for absence is nothing whereas the emotion of pain is an activity where for this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection In other words it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained CF Part 3 Proposition 11 Note Definitions of merriment stimulation, melancholy and grief because these terms are generally used in reference to the body and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain Definition 4 Wonder is the conception imagination of anything wherein the mind comes to a stand because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts Part 3 Proposition 52 Note Explanation In the note to Part 2 Proposition 18 we showed the reason why the mind from the contemplation of one thing straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged that one follows the other This state of association is impossible If the image of the thing be new the mind will then be at stand in the contemplation thereof until it is determined by other causes to think of something else Thus the conception of a new object considered in itself is of the same nature as other conceptions Hence I do not include wonder among their emotions nor do I see why I should so included As much as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects but merely from the absence of a cause which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another I therefore recognize only three primitive or primary emotions as I said in the note to Part 3 Proposition 11 Pain and Desire I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names when they are referred to the objects of our wonder I am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt Definition 5 Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it Cf. Part 3 Proposition 52 Note The definitions of veneration and scorn I hear pass over for I am not aware that any emotions are named after them Definition 6 Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of course Explanation This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property but not the essence of love and as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence they have been unable to acquire the conception of its properties accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure It must however be noted that when I say that it is a property of love that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object I do not hear mean by wish consent or conclusion or a free decision of the mind for I have shown such in Part 2 Proposition 48 Definition 7 Neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand for love can be conceived without either of these desires but by wish I mean the contentment which is in the lover on account of the presence of the beloved object whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened or at least maintained Definition 7 Hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Explanation These observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition CF also Part 3 Proposition 13 Note Definition 8 Inclination is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure Definition 9 Aversion is pain accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain CF Part 3 Proposition 15 Note Definition 10 Devotion is love towards one whom we admire. Explanation Wonder arises as we have shown Part 3 Proposition 52 from the novelty of a thing If therefore it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us we shall cease to wonder at it Thus we see that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love Definition 11 Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality which we despise in an object which we hate Explanation Insofar as we despise a thing which we hate, we deny existence thereof Part 3 Proposition 52 Note Part 3 Proposition 20 But since we assume that man hates that which he derides the question is not without alloy CF Part 3 Proposition 47 Note Definition 12 Hope is an inconstant pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue Definition 13 Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue CF Part 3 Proposition 18 Note Explanation From these definitions it follows that there is no hope unmingled with fear and no fear unmingled with hope For he who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything is assumed to conceive something which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future Therefore he to this extent feels pain CF Part 3 Proposition 19 Consequently while dependent on hope he fears for the issue Contrary wise he who fears in other words doubts concerning the issue of something which he hates also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question To this extent he feels pleasure and consequently to this extent he hopes that it would turn out as he desires Part 3 Proposition 20 Definition 14 Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed Definition 15 Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed Explanation Thus confidence springs from hope and despair from fear. When all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed this comes to past because man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such or else because he conceives other things which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt for although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event Part 2 Proposition 31 Corollary It may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it for we have shown that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it Part 2 49 Note Thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future as concerning the conception of a thing present. This I have already shown in Part 3 Proposition 18 to which with its note I refer the reader Definition 16 Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past which has had any issue beyond our hope Definition 17 Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past which has had an issue contrary to our hope Definition 18 Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves CF Proposition 22 Note Part 3 Proposition 27 Note Explanation Between pity and sympathy, there seems to be no difference unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action and the latter in reference to a disposition Definition 19 Approval is love towards one who has done good to another Definition 20 Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another Explanation I am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned but my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words but the nature of things I therefore make use of such terms as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification One statement of my method will suffice. As for the cause of the above named emotions see Part 3 Proposition 27 Corollary 1 and Part 3 Proposition 22 Definition 21 Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him Definition 22 Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we hate him Explanation Thus, partiality is an effect of love and disparagement and effect of hatred so that partiality may also be defined as love insofar as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object Contrary wise Disparishment may be defined as hatred insofar as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object CF Part 3 Proposition 26 Note Definition 23 Envy is hatred insofar as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune and to rejoice in another's evil fortune Explanation Envy is generally opposed to sympathy which by doing some violence to the meaning of the word may therefore be thus defined Definition 24 Sympathy is love insofar as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune and pain at another's evil fortune Explanation Concerning envy to Part 3 Proposition 24 and Proposition 32 These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external as cause either in itself or accidentally I now pass on to other emotions which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause End of Part 3 Definitions of the Emotions Part 3 Definitions of the Emotions Continued of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elves Part 3 Definitions of the Emotions Continued Part 5 Self-Approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action Definition 26 Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind Explanation Self-complacency is a post-humility insofar as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action but insofar as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind it is supposed to repentance which we may thus define Definition 27 Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind Explanation The causes of these emotions we have set forth in part 3 section 51 note and in part 3 section 53 54 and 55 and note Concerning the free decision of the mind see part 2 section 35 note This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions which are commonly called wrong are followed by pain and all those which are called right are followed by pleasure We can easily gather from what has been said that this depends in great measure on education Parents by reprobating the former class of actions and by frequently chiding their children because of them By persuading to and praising the latter class have brought it about that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure This is confirmed by experience For custom and religion are not the same among all men but that which some consider sacred others consider profane and what some consider honorable others consider disgraceful According as each man has been educated he feels repentance for a given action or glory is therein Definition 28 Pride is thinking too highly of oneself from self-love Explanation Thus pride is different from partiality for the latter term is used in reference to an external object but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself However as partiality is the effect of love so is pride the effect or property of self-love which may therefore be thus defined love of self or self-approval insofar as it leads a man to think too highly of himself To this emotion there is no contrary for no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself insofar as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that for whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing he imagines this of necessity and by that notion he is so disposed that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do For so long as he conceives that he cannot do it so long is he not determined to do it and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it However if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion which will find conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself for it may happen that a man sorrowfully regarding his own weakness should imagine that he is despised by all men while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him Again, a man may think too meanly of himself if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to the future time of which he is uncertain as for instance if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base etc We may also say that a man thinks too meanly of himself when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things with others his equals venture We can therefore set down a luxury to pride and emotion which I will call self a basement for as from self complacency springs pride so from humility springs self a basement which I will accordingly thus define Definition 29 Self a basement is thinking too meanly of oneself by reason of pain Explanation We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature We are want to call proud the man who boasts too much part 3 section 30 note and who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults who wishes to be first and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station on the other hand we call humble the man who too often blushes who confesses his faults who sets forth other men's virtues and who lastly walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire however these emotions humility and self a basement are extremely rare for human nature considered in itself strives against them as much as it can see part 3 section 13 section 54 hence those who are believed to be most self-abased and humble are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious definition 30 honor is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own which we believe to be praised by others definition 31 shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own which we believe to be blamed by others explanation on this subject see the note to part 3 section 30 but we should hear remarked the difference which exists between shame and modesty shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed modesty is here or dread of shame which restrains a man from committing a base action modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness but the latter is not an emotion as I will truly show however the names of the emotions as I have remarked already have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire definition 32 regret is the desire or appetite to possess something kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it explanation when we remember a thing we are that very fact as I have already said more than once disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present but this dispositions or endeavour while we are awake is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the emotion of pleasure as though it were present but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question where for regret is strictly speaking a pain opposed to that of pleasure which arises from the absence of something we hate CF part 3 section 47 note but as the name regret seems to refer to desire I set this emotion down among the emotions springing from desire definition 33 emulation is the desire of something and gendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire explanation he who runs away because he sees others running away or he who fears because he sees others in fear or again he who seeing that another man has burnt his hand draws towards him his own hand and moves his body as though his own were burnt such an one can be said to imitate another's emotion but not to emulate him not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him who imitates that which be honorable, useful or pleasant as to the cause of emulation CF part 3 section 27 and note the reason why this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from part 3 section 32 and note definition 34 thankfulness or gratitude is the desire or zeal bringing from love whereby we devote to benefit him who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us CF part 3 section 39 note and section 40 definition 35 benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity CF part 3 section 27 note definition 36 anger is the desire whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate CF part 3 section 39 definition 37 revenge is the desire whereby we are induced through mutual hatred to injure one who with similar feelings has injured us CF part 3 section 40 corollary 2 and note definition 38 cruelty or savageness is the desire whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity explanation to cruelty is opposed clemency which is not a passive state of the mind but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge definition 39 timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil which we dread by undergoing a lesser evil CF part 3 section 39 note definition 40 daring is the desire whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt definition 41 cowardice is attributed to one whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter explanation cowardice is therefore nothing else but the fear of some evil which most men are warned not to fear hence I do not reckon it among the emotions bringing from desire nevertheless I have chosen to explain it here because in so far as we look to the desire it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring definition 42 consternation is attributed to one whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears explanation consternation is therefore a species of cowardice but inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering that he is not able to remove the evil I say bewildered insofar as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement I say wavering insofar as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil which equally torments him whence it comes to pass that he knows not which he may avert the two on this subject see part 3 section 39 note and part 3 section 52 note concerning cowardice and daring see part 3 section 51 note definition 43 courtesy or deference is the desire of acting in a way that should please refraining from that which should displease them definition 44 ambition is the immoderate desire of power explanation ambition is the desire whereby all the emotions see part 3 section 27 and section 31 are fostered and strengthened therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome for so long as a man is bound by any desire he is at the same time necessarily bound by this the best men, says Kikiro are especially led by honor even philosophers when they write a book condemning honor sign their names there too and so on definition 45 luxury is excessive desire or even love of living sumptuously definition 46 temperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking definition 47 avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches definition 48 lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse explanation whether this desire be excessive or not it is still called lust these last five emotions as I have shown in part 3 section 56 have on countries for is a species of ambition CF part 3 section 29 again I have already pointed out that temperance sobriety and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind it may nevertheless happen that an avaricious and ambitious or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking or sexual indulgence yet avarice, ambition and fear are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness and debauchery for an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another's man's expense and ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret and if he lives among drunken and debauchies he will from the mere fact of being ambitious be more prone to those vices lastly a timid man does that which he would not for though an avaricious man should for the sake of avoiding death cast his riches into the sea he will nonetheless remain avaricious so also if a lustful man is downcast and cannot follow his bent he does not on the ground of abstention cease to be lustful in fact these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting drinking etc as with the appetite and love of such nothing therefore can be opposed to these emotions but high mindedness and valor whereof I will speak presently the definition of jealousy and the waverings of the mind I pass over in silence first because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described secondly because many of them have no distinctive names which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them however it is established from the definitions of the emotions which we have set forth that they all spring from desire or rather that there is nothing besides these three wherefore each is born to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens if we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind we shall be able thus to define the emotions insofar as they are referred to the mind only general definition of the emotions emotion which is called a passivity of the soul is a confused idea whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence existendivis greater or less than before and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another explanation I say first that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea for we have shown that the mind is only passive insofar as it has inadequate or confused ideas part 3, section 3 I say further whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before for all the ideas of bodies the process denote rather the actual disposition of our own body part 2, section 16 corollary 2 than the nature of an external body but the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body or of some part thereof because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished but it must be noted that when I say a greater or less force for existence than before I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body which in fact involves more or less of reality than before and in as much as the essence of mind consists in the fact part 2, section 11 section 13 that it affirms the actual existence of its own body and in as much as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing it follows that the mind pulses to greater or less perfection when it happens to affirm concerning its own body or any part thereof something involving more or less reality than before when therefore I said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body or of some part thereof an idea involving more or less of reality than it had already affirmed concerning its own body for the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object lastly I have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another so that besides the nature of pleasure and pain which the first part of the definition explains I might also express the nature of desire end of part 3 definitions of the emotions continued end of part 3 part 4, preface definitions and axiom of the ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by OK the ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Ellways part 4, preface definitions and axiom part 4 of human bondage or the strength of the emotions preface human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage for when a man is a prey to his emotions he is not his own master but lies at the mercy of fortune so much so that he is often compelled while seeing that which is better for him to follow that which is worse why this is so and what is good or evil in the emotions I propose to show in this part of my treatise but before I begin it would be well to make a few prefectory observations on perfection and imperfection good and evil when a man has purposed to make a given thing and has brought it to perfection his work will be pronounced perfect not only by himself but by everyone who rightly knows or thinks that he knows the intention and aim of its author for instance suppose anyone sees a work that seems to be not yet completed and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house he will call the work imperfect he will on the other hand call it perfect as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end which its author had purposed for it but if a man sees a work the like whereof he has never seen before and if he knows not the intention of the artificer he plainly cannot know whether that work be perfect or imperfect such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms but after men began to form general ideas to think out types of houses buildings towers etc and to prefer certain types to others it came about that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer this seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena which indeed are not made with human hands perfect or imperfect for men are want to form general ideas of things natural no less than of things artificial and such ideas they hold as types believing that nature who they think does nothing without an object has them in view and has set them as types before herself therefore when they behold something in nature which is not wholly conformed to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question they say that nature has fallen short or has blundered and has left her work incomplete thus we see that men are want to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon now we showed in the appendix to part one that nature does not work with an end in view for the eternal and infinite being which we call God or nature acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists we have shown that by the same necessity of its nature whereby it exists it likewise works part one proposition 16 the reason or cause why God or nature exists and the reason why he acts are one and the same therefore as he does not exist for the sake of an end so neither does he act for the sake of an end of his existence and of his action there is neither origin nor end wherefore the cause which is called final is nothing else but human desire insofar as it is considered as the original cause of anything for example when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house we mean nothing more than that a man conceiving the conveniences of household life had a desire to build a house wherefore the being inhabited insofar as it is regarded as a final cause is nothing else but this particular desire which is really the efficient cause it is regarded as the primary cause because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires they are as I have often said already conscious of their own actions and appetites but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined to any particular desire therefore the common saying that nature sometimes falls short or blunders and produces things which are imperfect I set down among the glosses treated of in the appendix to part 1 perfection and imperfection then are in reality merely modes of thinking or notions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species hence I said above part 2 definition 6 that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing for we are want to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus which is called the highest genus namely to the category of being where to absolutely all the individuals in nature belong thus insofar as we refer the individuals in nature to this category and comparing them one with another find that some possess more of being or reality than others we to this extent say that some are more perfect than others again insofar as we attribute to them anything implying negation as term, end, infirmity etc we to this extent call them imperfect because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect not because they have any intrinsic deficiency or because nature has blundered as for the terms good and bad they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves but are merely modes of thinking or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another and what so ever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass as for the terms good and bad they indicate no positive quality in things one with another thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad and indifferent for instance music is good for him that is malinkally bad for him that mourns for him that is deaf it is neither good nor bad nevertheless though this be so the terms should still be retained for in as much as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature in my view it will be useful for us to attain the terms in question in the sense I have indicated in what follows then I shall mean by good that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature which we have set before ourselves by bad that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type again we shall say that men are more imperfect in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type for it must be specially remarked that when I say the demand passes from a lesser to a greater perfection or vice versa I do not mean that he has changed from one essence or reality to another for instance a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man as by being changed into an insect what I mean is that we conceive the things power of action or as this is understood by its nature to be increased or diminished lastly by perfection in general I shall as I have said mean reality in other words each things essence insofar as it exists and operates in a particular manner and without paying any regard to its duration for no given thing can be said to be more perfect because it has passed a longer time in existence the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence for the essence of things involves no fix and definite period of existence but everything whether it be more perfect or less perfect will always be able to persist in existence with the same force where it began to exist where for in this respect all things are equal definitions one by good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us two by evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end three particular things I call contingent insofar as while regarding their essence only we find nothing therein which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it four particular things I call possible insofar as while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced we know not whether such causes be determined for producing them in part one proposition 33 note one I drew no distinction between possible and contingent because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately five by emotions I mean those which draw a man in different directions though they are of the same kind such as luxury and avarice which are both species of love and are contraries not by nature but by accident six what I mean by emotion felt towards a thing future present and past I explained in part three proposition 18 notes one and two which see but I should hear also remark that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit that is all objects distant from us more than 200 feet or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive seem to be an equal distance from us and all in the same plane so also objects whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive seem to be equally distant from the present and are set down as it were to the same moment of time seven by an end for the sake of which we do something I mean a desire eight by virtue virtuous and power I mean the same thing that is part three proposition seven virtue in so far as it is referred to man is a man's nature or essence in so far as it has the power of affecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature axiom there is no individual thing in nature than which there is not another more powerful and strong whatsoever thing be given there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed end of part four preface definitions and axiom recording by