 Good afternoon, everybody, welcome to the press conference. Thank you very much, Fredrik, and it's good to see some of you again. And welcome to those I haven't seen during the weekend. We just had the opening session of the border governors. Of course, during the weekend, I've been working hard on the Ukrainian issue. And I could provide you with some updates about that if you're interested. And otherwise, on Iran, what I said to the board is that we have agreed on the way forward. I think this has been met with a general satisfaction. So I mean, your hands ask two particular issues that you would like to focus for today's meeting. Thank you very much. Any questions? Yes. Please identify. Hanna Kavianil, radio fighter. I have two questions, if I may. First, on Iran, since I know IAA is not a party to the JCPOA, but in the event of a deal, I want to know how are you collaborating with the parties, negotiating parties, and if the IAA is expecting, for example, additional resources for the verification work that it has to conduct. On Ukraine, I assume you have met Russian ambassador Mikhail Lianov today, as I saw a picture of it on Twitter. He, referring to the Putin-Macron call yesterday, seems to suggest that Kremlin rejected your proposal for a meeting at the Chernobyl facilities. I want to know this third country location or virtual meeting. Why did you want to meet in Chernobyl? And now, how is that going to go forward? OK. Well, many elements in your question. The first thing on JCPOA, of course, as you rightly point out, we are not a party to the negotiation, but we are, I would say, very present, accompanying the process, advising in the process on many technical matters. And of course, we will be implementing it. So we are very, very close to it. It is quite clear that once there is a deal, and if there is a deal, the work for the IAA will be huge, simply huge, because we will have to reconcile lots of elements, technical elements, and information that have not been subject to the stringent verification system mechanism that we used to have with the full JCPOA when Iran decided to stop applying this and to cease their permission for our inspectors to access and the implementation of the additional protocol. All of these resulted in a situation where our capabilities were reduced. I used to say we are flying blind. This is why we had to have a temporary technical understanding with Iran a year ago, more or less a year ago, whereby we were able to restore some of those capacities. But everything was very fragile. Everything was depending on the voluntary acceptance of Iran. And there were now and then problems in the implementation, even of these temporary agreements. So we hope to move if there is an agreement, to move into solid ground. But there is the gap. And this is what we have to do. Sometimes you hear at the London Tube, mind the gap. So there is a gap. And we have to look at what has been happening. We have to reconcile. We have to reconcile the information. We have to make sure that whatever has been happening and we were not being able to verify in the right way is perfectly accounted for to the ground. So it's a huge work. And yes, of course, we are going to be needing additional resources. The IAA does not escape the fate of international organization and the religion of zero growth budget. So we are requested to do more, more, more, more. With the same amount of people, with the same amount of material. We are very happy that our member states, when it comes to this, are always ready to come to our support by giving us extra budgetary contribution. So I don't have any doubt that that will happen. Regarding my initiative to come, there are two things. One is the substance of the initiative. And the substance of the initiative is, at the end of the day, what matters most. What are we going to be having in this agreed framework? Then there is the issue of the place and the logistics, which are not easy at a time of war. So initially, we proposed to come to Chernobyl. Chernobyl was the first facility in Ukraine being seized by the military forces of the Russian Federation. So it was obvious that my first intent was to go there, because it was the first place where we're having arrangements, ad hoc arrangements, to try to maintain the contact with the site and to maintain the necessary surveillance, safeguards-wise and safety and security-wise. My offer still stands. We heard from the Russian Federation that they would rather do it somewhere else. But this is going to be part of a process of consultation where we are going to be listening to the Russian side and to the Ukrainian side and see what is possible in terms of a place and other modalities, which, as I said, are going to be extremely difficult. But we have to do it. There is no way I said it today. We should not be losing time. Almost every day there is a new episode. The episode last Friday on the Zaporose nuclear power plant was extreme, perhaps. But there are some other episodes which indicate that we need to have an agreed, clear framework of what is supposed to be done. So I hope that my consultations in the next few hours are going to be successful. Thank you. Yes. Thank you. Hello. Hello. I'm sorry again for the voice of Narek. Yes. I basically have... Oh, I'm sorry. Very similar question as my colleague. Yes. I was wondering, regarding Iran, I was wondering if should there be an agreement? Have you already begun speaking with the Iranians about those additional co-operations that they would need to have with you? And also, and if there is no agreement, would that at all affect your recent agreement with Iran over the three undeclared sites? Thank you. No. Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that we are talking to the Iranians all the time, as you can imagine. We have a constant dialogue which includes, in an informal way, because in the absence of an agreement, we cannot be agreeing on things on a very concrete basis. But we are exchanging some indications of what is going to be needed. But at the end of the day, my team, my safeguards team, will have to look at the end at what is actually signed. And when we see that, as you know, this is a very complex agreement, and it has a number of steps, a sequence, as it has been described by the negotiators. With a conclusion day, a confirmation day, a preparation period, a re-implementation day. So within all of these, you know, segments, you will have different activities among themselves for Iran to comply and for us to verify. So this is a huge work ahead of us, and the team has been preparing for that for quite a while. And the second part was? And if there is no agreement, would that affect? No, my recent understanding, as you may have seen, by reading it, does not have any direct relationship. As I've always been saying, this is like parallels. You know, we look at each other, but we do not touch. Safeguard's issues and the correctness and the completeness of Iran's declarations are something that Iran has to comply with or without JCPOA or any other agreement with any other countries. So this is their obligation. This is why, quite clearly, it will not be the same. The atmosphere will be different, and things are going to be more complex perhaps. But we are going to, you know, we've been there, we have been working, you know, come rain, come shine in Iran, and we will continue in this way. Hi, D.G. Grossi, Jonathan Tyrone with Bloomberg. Two questions. Yes. A number of countries worldwide have used highly enriched uranium to produce molybdenum over the years. You are aware of that. Iran declared that they were using its HAU stockpile to create multi-99 targets. I'd like your reaction to that. What's the safeguard's risk, your risk assessment on the Ukraine-Russia issue? Can you clarify whether there's been any other multilateral initiatives, keyword things like observers? You are going there. My understanding is more in a mediation role to mediate between Ukraine and Russia to de-escalate the situation on the ground there. However, are there any roles? Are there any potential for other multilateral initiatives that could, say, implement observers around critical infrastructure? Thank you, Jonathan. Not that I know what we do, and I think the chances of success, frankly, of what we are trying to attempt, are predicated on the technical mandate of the IAEA. I think our counterparts, Russians and Ukrainians, are ready to entertain this because of the unique nature of our mandate. We have a mandate which is specific, and it has to do with the safety and the security of all of these facilities. What we will be trying to do is to agree on a framework based around the seven pillars that I outlined at the extraordinary session of the board last Friday, physical integrity, external power. In fact, these seven pillars are nothing but the distillation of what we have in the safety standards and, I would say, the broad consensus in the safety community all over the world. Nobody would challenge that. So what we are trying to do is to have a clear understanding that these things are necessary, and there are certain things which are not permissible. And if possible, we want to have some concrete measures in order to facilitate the transit, transportation, access for equipment, parts that may be necessary. So bear with me. If I just give you the general outline, it's something now that I need to sit down with our Russian colleagues. With Ukraine, this is in Ukraine, so the Ukrainians have to decide and tell me what they want in terms of these practical aspects. So this is, I would say, the idea. More than an idea, we have some elements that we are exchanging already with them, and we will try to build on those. We don't have much time, so I hope to be able to move as fast as possible before another episode takes place. You didn't answer the HAU molybdenum question. More specifically, yes, you affirmed that this. I want your assessment of Iran's declaration that it's using its HAU to produce moly targets. I don't have a comment on that. They can do that. What we are trying to ascertain is that what they declare is in conformity with what happens. I don't think there's a problem with that, or is it? Well, I mean, you've been telling us for months that there's no distinction between what they've been producing and weapons material. So now they're using it for a very common place, medical isotope production. I understand your point. It goes into the judgment of intentions. And so for us, it would be a bit difficult to say these intentions are justified or not. What we need to be is very alert, and we are going to be verifying that. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Grossi. My question to you in French, please. I'm here. You're here. Thank you. I'm here. You made a plan with the Iranians this weekend, which starts on March 20th and until June 22nd. It's an exchange of information between the two parties. Is this plan a pre-settled condition to reach the end, so to get an agreement with the Vienna talks? Or can we reach an agreement during the negotiations between the parties and work simultaneously with the plan between the agency and the Iranians? A second question. Can you assure us today that there is no risk concerning the nuclear power plants in Zapparodia? Thank you. Well, the first part refers to what we have agreed on this weekend and the relationship with the negotiation and the possible agreement around JCPOE. I would say there are no direct links. We know that Iran has to answer some questions that we have been asking for a long time. So the problem with that is that we didn't get to talk about the way in which sequence and what delay it would be necessary to advance in this clarification process. So, as you said, we said, here we go. We're going to do that. We're going to start answering with delays that go more or less to June. But as you know, there are no fixed dates or obligations for me to do it. I said in this agreement and we agreed with our Iranian colleagues to say, we're trying, we're working in the spirit with the intention, with a name as we say in English, to get to the end of this process at least in June. I would say that for what concerns the possibility that our process, if I understood correctly, that our process fails because of a lack of JCPOE agreement, that's really a bit of a political question. I couldn't tell you. What I would tell you is that we're going to work, we're going to start and we'll see as we advance. Are you okay? Ah, yes, excuse me. For the central one, as you know, the last Friday episode, it was a serious episode, very serious, and we were able to control it. The situation on site is still very tense, very tense. And there was, I would say, even a degradation in the sense that now we have been informed that the technical operators must accept certain activities, functions and decisions taken by the military authorities in place, which goes against all measures of security, of existing nuclear security. An operator must be let to work in peace and do his technical work. He shouldn't go looking for the permission of a military to do what he has to do. So we have, I am personally concerned, I told him, I told him at the council, earlier, I put him in my report from yesterday evening. So I hope we can correct that. We are developing discreet consultations in order to address this situation. A little clarification concerning the first question. The way of exchange of information between you and the Iranians, could you help to improve the chances of reaching an agreement between the Viennese? I think that, why not? I think that when we see from both sides that there is an atmosphere that improves, that there is an atmosphere of work that goes better, that we separate the better, that we can have access to information that we didn't have before. Finally, it's about the same country, isn't it? So I believe in the positive effects, in the externalities, if you like, in good work with Iran at these times. Hi, Digi. Francois Murphy from Royches. Always. Just trying to get a clearer sense of what you're up to in Ukraine. You sort of have two things going on at the same time. On the one hand, you're trying to bring both sides together and agree some kind of commitment to protect the security and safety of nuclear installations. On the other, something you've talked a bit less about recently, you have this plan for assistance to Ukraine that you mentioned before. And you've said you can't go into too many specifics for now, but one thing I was curious about is that you, at one of your many previous press conferences in the past week, you didn't rule out actually sending people to Ukraine. I'm just wondering if you can give us some sense of sort of the scale of that sort of what kind of, just what rough order of resources are we talking about here? Yes, we would need to, thank you for the question. We would need to, first of all, as I said, on Friday, we have, first of all, to have a framework. So what are the basic principles? Because, and the principles are not, I would say, a good to have. They are necessary because these principles, or basic points, if you want, indicate to you which are the areas where we are going to be concentrating. External power, communications, and they may have and will have a strong influence into what is in concrete terms what might be needed. We know, for example, that there are some pieces of equipment that the plants need or will be needing as part of the normal operation, not necessarily because of an attack or a malfunction now. In the normal course of events, had there not been a war, you would have that. And in the moment, now, you have that supply chain is interrupted. So we are already in contact with several countries with Energuatom in this case, because it's more the side of the operator than the regulator. And we know, more or less, what they are needing. So we also need to establish some understanding on how to do that. Shall we need to have observers or technical support personnel from the agency to be there, maybe, but that is something that we would not be able to define now at this point. The same could apply to safeguards, mind you. So at the moment, we are okay. We have remote monitoring, we have remote monitoring for the material there, but there may come a point where we might need to perform a function or not. So there are a number of things and the physical presence is not excluded. But we need first to have a more or less, user's guide to see. Hello, DG, Albert Otti, DPA, Chairman Press Agency. About the Saporizhia nuclear power plant, you described some of the problems that they're there with communications. So would you say that this power plant is still a safe power plant, safely operating power plant or not anymore, or how fast is the time approaching in your view that it's no longer safe? And the second question is about your planned talks with Ukraine and Russia on a safety framework, a safety security framework. Are you still talking, is the talk now about the logistics or are you also still trying to figure out is there still discussion on the content of the talks? Yeah, thank you. On the first part, I would say, I will not say it's not been operated unsafely. We are getting the reports and the assessments from the Ukrainian regulator and for the time being, this is the situation. That being said, the conditions are absolutely extraordinary, as I have been saying as well. This normal operation is a technical term, but there is nothing normal about what is going on. So there is safe operation, but there are many, many questions on the ability to sustain this for much longer if we don't support this in some way. And this is a good segue for the second part or your second question, because we are discussing both things. In a situation like this, modalities are also substance and substance has to do a lot with modalities. So the two things are really very, very intertwined. Hi, this is your welcome back. Hello, thank you very much. But my question goes to actually to Ukraine, Setsuko Inaki from Nippon TV. The Elysée Palette, the France announced that you had met President Macron before you went to Tehran and French suggested that the day would suggest IAEA, some measures to assist you in a negotiation to establish this framework. And actually that the day announced it, that this suggestion would come within hours. So my question number one is, have you received such suggestions? And then the question number two is, is your current sort of negotiation that you, I suppose that you're talking to separately on both side. So that is your sort of, is there an element in this discussion that is such concrete suggestions coming from some of the major nuclear states? Yes, yes, thank you very much, that's very clear. The, this initiative is the IAEA's initiative. I must underscore. It's an IAEA initiative and the main elements being discussed there are the elements that we as an international independent organization believe are those that are necessary. That being said, President Macron, and this is no secret, and it has been announced publicly also by the French government, so I don't have a problem in commenting on that, has been extremely generous in manifesting his support to this idea and not only that, as you know, he has been in conversation with President Zelensky and with President Putin and the IAEA initiative for the preservation of the safety and security of the nuclear facilities has been, if not at the center, one of the main points that they were discussing. French government has been generous enough to share with me their assessment and ideas. Of course, we are in contact and we receive suggestions as you are mentioning. Thank you very much, BBC Persian television. Two things, one on Ukraine, if I'm not mistaken, you spoke about several episodes, as you put it, that are concerning you. I just wondered whether you can give us a list of those very concerns and how concerned you are on each of these. On the Iranian front, I suppose if there is an agreement to return to the JCPOA, the first thing for that to be implemented would be for you to approve or to oversee what's going on on the ground in Iran, to be satisfied that everything is fine and peaceful. And if that's the case, do I take it that you would press for the implementation of the additional protocol as one of the very first steps of this possible agreement? Thank you. Well, the first thing you are asking for a list that I already gave you, because if you look at the 13 updates that we are producing every day, and this is a lot of work behind them because we are checking every information, there's a lot of fake and false information out there. So in order to give you and the international community good information, we have them there. But there have been issues in Kharkiv, there is an issue in Mariupol. There are many places where there is no accident, there is no release of radiation, there is nothing of the sort, but many problems that appear here and there. This is why I believe that all of these are indications, more than indications, confirmations, that we cannot go on like this. There has to be clear understandings, clear commitments not to go anywhere near a nuclear facility when it comes to military operations. And the second part regarding the JCPOA, well yes, the AP is part of the JCPOA. It would be very difficult to have an agreement of the width and the depth of the JCPOA only with a comprehensive safeguards agreement of the traditional sort. You have to have the ability to ask for accesses and to work in a more efficient way. So to the best of my knowledge, the application of the additional protocol was and is and will be part of the JCPOA reloaded if it comes to life. Thanks a lot, TG, good to see you again. Yes, hello. I want to pick up a couple of things that you said in your statement today, one on Ukraine and one on Iran. You talked about, you said I reiterate my call, that it be heard loud and clear when we must divert a nuclear accident, that it's not hide behind all or nothing at all solutions, and I wonder why you said this. And I guess under that question is whether Russia is setting conditions for you to go to Ukraine. And if so, what those conditions are, because clearly if they weren't, and they were saying yes, you would probably be there. And my second question is you talked again about the agreement on Iran of last February and talked about the difficulty of maintaining continuity of knowledge over such a large period of time. Now we know about courage and we know about the absence of cameras there. Is there any other reason why it's difficult to maintain continuity of knowledge? Do you have any other concerns that you may not get everything that you need from Iran? And just finally, very, very briefly, I guess we're coming up to another of the three-month periods where you need to get in there and update the cameras. I think the last was towards the end of December. Have the Iranians given you any assurance that you will get access to all the facilities? Thanks. Thank you very much. On the first thing, no one is putting any conditions on us. We are in the beginning of what I expect will be a very short consultation for the reasons I was mentioning, but no one is putting any questions. What I have in mind when I said that we should avoid all or nothing at all kind of approaches is that, of course, it is very, and perhaps logically, understandably conceivable that the sides will want to season this agreement with other elements, with elements that have to do with their basic positions on things that are perhaps not necessarily related to nuclear safety. And without that, they would not agree, or they would perhaps agree if we add this or that. And what I'm reminding everybody is I said it to the Security Council on Friday. I said it here. I'm not the Secretary General of the United Nations. I'm not the Security Council. I'm not a self-appointed mediator or negotiator. I'm looking for after nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. So I'm trying to, and it's not easy, and I have an understanding for the positions in Ukraine, for example, that has foreign military forces in their territory. So there is, of course, a drive to try to have elements which are not specifically related to nuclear safety. And this is my big effort. On the other part, yeah, you know, the gap is a gap that is chronological, which is very important and is also substantive because what has been happening over the past few months is that you had not only quantitative increases, you had qualitative progress in many areas, having to do with research and development, having to do with areas that the JCPOA explicitly forbade or forbids if it comes back. So our inspectors will have to really go through a very thorough process of consultation and checking with our Iranian counterparts in order to give a sound basis. It's going to be a lot of work, very hard work. Sorry. Sorry, DJ, the third question. Yeah, we are coming to that. I don't expect any problems with that. And may I remind you that Caraj was the issue and now these cameras have been, or we have installed new sets of cameras in Islam where the new facility for the production of parts for centrifuges is operative. So I don't foresee any problems there. Just a brief follow-up, you mentioned the Karakov physics institute. Can you clarify whether you verified that the neutron generator that's under safeguards is safe and secure? Well, apparently it's destroyed. So the neutron generator is destroyed? There's no radiation release. We haven't been there, of course. There's no radiation release. The whole place has been impact. So what we can say is that there is no, you know, this place has a very small inventory of material, very small. It is a subcritical facility. It's basically a place that produces neutrons for scientific experiments. It's a relatively new one. It was actually a part of a cooperation between the United States and Ukraine, as you know, Obama administration. So it's a scientific institution. So it's really very regrettable. What happened? But just to be clear, that site was under safeguards, correct? Or not? There is, yes, when there is nuclear material. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you.