 Great. So my speech today I shall be delivering in three parts, one on the global context of benchmark reform. I shall then dwell briefly on the EU idiosyncrasies to benchmark reform and of course recent legislative changes and then conclude I guess with what is the most important part is what do we now expect from the private sector because I shall be making the case that the public sector has done quite a bit. The public sector has driven this process, not least through the working group. So I wish to thank the working group, the ECB for hosting the working group, ING for providing the chairmanship, a very able chairmanship of this working group and I think we have come a very far good way in reforming eyeball rates and that is why at the end of the day now there is also a role for the private sector. Now the global context is pretty obvious. Iosco started to think about interest rate and FX reforms in 2012. I think the maintenance of this reform was clearly that panel bank benchmarks, so benchmarks that require rate contributors are not sufficiently robust, are prone to manipulation and lately also suffer from a scarcity of contributions. I think therefore the international consensus was that the existing rates must be made more robust while we need to embark on a serious effort to find alternative rates which can be produced either replacing existing panel bank rates or in some jurisdictions existing alongside the panel bank rates. But the consensus internationally is that panel bank rates have a few idiosyncrasies which make them somewhat vulnerable to the willingness to contribute and of course to manipulation. Now the EU has acted quite quickly so after Iosco has started this reform effort and alongside the FSB in 2012, the EU has come out with a benchmark regulation in 2016 and the decisive feature or the defining feature rather of that benchmark regulation is that it doesn't just cover interest rate benchmarks, it also covers foreign exchange and a host of other benchmarks, commodity benchmarks, even regulated data benchmarks. So there was a lot of criticism that the EU went beyond the original aim which is to reform panel bank interest rate benchmarks and of course panel based FX rates but on the other hand our benchmark regulation has served us pretty well I would say now that it's time to come to a serious reform of the interest rate benchmarks and that is as Isabel mentioned we like seat belts, we like safety nets, we like to have a reform where we can actually get along the reform without being too concerned on impacts that it has on huge trillions worth of legacy portfolio. So the benchmark regulation has served us very well in that sense because it gave us a forum to be the first jurisdiction worldwide and I'm quite proud of this to have a safety net so that we can take care of the legacy stock and that the worry about the legacy stock does not eclipse the serious works that we have to do on finding suitable replacement rates because I think one of the biggest issues and one of the biggest breaks on a successful phase out of unstable rates and in favor of transaction based rates is the huge worry that we had how will this affect the legacy contracts, how will this affect trillions worth of derivatives, how will this affect debt which is issued and a series of other financial instruments which are in scope of the benchmark regulation and that whole concern about legacy contracts has eclipsed and has put a break on the series efforts to find the new generation of more reliable benchmarks because you can't reform benchmarks if you don't give the financial sector sufficient certainty how to accomplish contractual continuity with respect to their legacy rates. So on the 30th of November we have achieved a political compromise on a new benchmark regulation and this is a benchmark regulation which gives the European Commission powers to designate statutory replacement rates for critical benchmarks which would be a URIBOR and for benchmarks which are systemic for the European financial infrastructure which is LIBOR and as you know LIBOR is no longer a critical benchmark as of the UK's departure but nevertheless it will remain a systemically relevant benchmark hence this somewhat dual formulation of our powers and I don't want to dwell into the exact details of the powers because we are going to have a Q&A session at the end of the formal presentations. The thing that I want to say at this stage is that these powers are optional they may be exercised but we would also be quite happy not to exercise them but they do constitute something which is important for this reform process and that is a safety net so whatever happens in the future reform we will be able to deploy a safety net to ensure that there is contractual continuity in the huge outstanding legacy portfolio that we have on the balance sheets of our banking sectors and I think that legal certainty that there is now a safety net as we move forward in these reforms is of crucial importance but that brings me to the third part of my short opening what do we now expect from the market participants so while the legislator has actually done its job we are the first jurisdiction which has replacement power which work by statute so they will by statute automatically replace all IBO references in existing legacies once they're triggered not all of the IBO rates of course may have statutory replacements recommendations by risk-free rate working groups such as the Euro risk-free rate working group or the ARC in the United States or the risk-free rate working group that is convened by the Bank of England so there is a first limitation to any of these statutory replacement powers which is that not all disappearing IBO rates or not all IBO rates that will be reformed and therefore this be discontinued over time will actually have necessarily statutory replacements so we have to be very careful that we do not rely on this safety net even if there is no risk-free rate working group recommendation it will be very difficult to work it we do then have a public consultation process but our preference is clearly that the legacy rate so the rate for the legacy stock which still has to be wound down is something which is recommended by the private sector itself or by the risk-free rate working groups that are convened by various central banks not all of these fallback rates will have an agreed spread another important feature of our fallback rate is that it requires a recommendation by the stakeholders on the base rate it requires a recommendation by the stakeholders on the applicable spread which is the spread that avoids the value transfer on the legacy stock and of course not all jurisdictions will possibly have a credit sensitive rate so a rate with a spread and therefore again these powers may have some limitations it is a safety net there is no guarantee that it will be deployed for all IBO rates we can however deploy it if the conditions are met which is that there is a consensus among stakeholders either because the central bank convened risk-free rate groups have agreed on such a rate have agreed on a spread have agreed on the consequential changes that the introduction of this replacement rate means for existing legacy contracts in that case we can act if those three conditions are not fulfilled we can still act but it will be more difficult hence we have built in an additional window of consultation to cover also those cases where recommendations or stakeholder consensus has not yet been achieved and a final feature of this benchmark reform is that we have extended the so-called EMEA relief provisions so there will be no margining there will be no additional margin requirement or no clearing requirement triggered solely on the basis of having to change a IBO reference in an existing contract so this will any amendment which is triggered by the statutory replacement will not be considered as triggering either a clearing obligation or an additional margining requirement so in conclusion the public sector has done a lot and I wish to thank especially the participants of the risk-free rate working group here at the ECB the legislators have sprung into action I would say have created a safety net to cushion any panel value transfer in the existing stock as we move away from panel bank rates now over to the private sector to continue the contractual negotiations to do as much in the private sector approach as possible because the safety net will work in some circumstances but there are no guarantees that it will capture every aspect or every single IBO rate that may in future be discontinued this is a safety net it is an additional safeguard but as most of these things it is not entirely perfect so I would like to conclude there and yet again express my sincere thanks for the participants in the risk-free rate group for the excellent work that has been accomplished and of course also look into the future and with confidence look at the additional challenges that we will be facing together thank you very much