 It's very hard to follow Eric because, you know, when I taught at Warwick University, generations of Warwick students have had the foster degree at Thalbeck measure, if not engraved in their hearts on their brains, so it's one of the most outstanding and useful pieces of technology. So I've actually got only about two or three slides, which is fine, but my first slide actually is going to cram 30 odd years of development history into one slide. And actually, this is partly done if we get to some Q&A to get your reactions. This is my kind of thought about what's happened over the 30 years. And you might think, well, why 30 years? OK, why 30 years? Well, 30 plus years. Well, Wider itself was founded in 1985, OK? And in some ways, that was extraordinarily fortuitous. Because period since then, we have seen immense global change. We've seen some of the largest numbers of people move out of poverty, historically ever. We have seen the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Not without failure, but with also some success. We have seen the rise and possibly the fall of globalization. So a tremendous amount of change in really three plus short decades. And Wider, fortuitously, was there. So inevitably, with any kind of typology, the problem one has is the change in the way development economists and development studies folk and anthropologists have thought about the issues doesn't match quite the decades. But let me start with the 80s. Now for us who sort of began our careers in the 80s, this was in some ways a very exciting period. It was a period of contesting ideologies. It was a period of orthodoxies versus heterodoxies. It was a period when, in some countries, but not all, market liberalism began its triumph, although that proved relatively short-lived. It was a period of deep macroeconomic crises. I began my career in Tanzania in 1980 amid the sort of wreckage, the macroeconomic wreckage of the Tanzanian economy. And that's where I actually learned much of my development economics. So development macroeconomics was really on the table. You know, Tanzania, you would have Adjitzing, you would have Rolf van der Hove, and these guys would come into the offices. There would be a big fight about how far Tanzania should devalue the IMF programs. Countries were very, very short of foreign exchange. And a lot of the debate in development was kind of driven around how are we going to pull these countries out of these macroeconomic crises. But at the same time, you know, every decade, although you can say the 80s was defined by the rise of market liberalism, the transition from central planning, the rise of globalization. Every decade contains a kind of seed of what's going to come next. And some of the seeds that developed in the 80s or grew in the 80s were seeds that had been planted in the 70s. This was basic needs. This was the work that Eric and company did at ILO. The World Bank, while at the same time it was engaged in structural adjustment programs, was putting in place the first living standards measurement surveys. So we're getting that expansion of the household data revolution. And at WIDA, we had one of the very first projects, a WIDA project, which was Amartya Sen, John Philippe Plateau, a number of other very eminent economists, Martha Nussbaum from Philosophy, working on food security, hunger, etc. The excitement of the period was contesting ideologies in some ways. I remember, because I was working with the bank team in Washington on a program to try and introduce some poverty into adjustment programs. The bank and the IMF for a long time didn't want to know. I would travel up to New York and meet Francis and Richard Jolly and Andrea, who were working on adjustment of the human face in UNICEF. And it was a little bit like sort of being the Red Cross. You were sort of crossing the battlefields of the First World War, and intense debates in the countries. Okay, the 1990s moving rapidly along. You could say it was a period of recovery and growth. A lot of work among economists about cross-section growth estimations. A lot of discussion about the role of trade as a driver of growth or as a consequence of growth. One thinks here about the earlier debate in the 80s that Joe Stiglitz referred to this morning, the dominance of the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm, the idea that simply trade liberalization would drive economic growth. The counterweight of the work by Danny Roderick and others, arguing that opening up to the global economy is not that simple or straightforward. So an immense amount of discussion about how globalization was starting to take us forward. Obviously influenced by the rise of China, which was itself inspired by the Asian tiger economies. But interestingly, as you know, failure has no father and mother and success has many fathers and mothers. Everybody was claiming that the East Asian success story was their success story. We actually have a project at wider at the moment, the Asian Transformations Project, which in some ways picks up from the Gunnar Mardel discussions and looks at the evolution of Asia over that next 50 years. Alongside that, we have this rather sad story of destruction of state fragility, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the rise of the analysis of conflict as an economic issue. I remember in my naivety saying to Paul Collier and Francis Stewart, you know, what economics got to do with conflict? Isn't it just political? Well, you know, that was the naivety of some of us at the time. And then as problems evolved in some of the transition economies, in the movement from the plan to the market, a lot more discussion about the appropriate regulatory framework that you have to put around the transfer of public to private assets. And in some ways, private ownership. And in some ways, we've seen that come back to bitus, as Joe referred to in the morning, because we've had enormous accumulations of assets by very powerful oligarchs, not just in the former Eastern Bloc countries, but also in many other countries in the developing world. And that's led to a pattern of income distribution and growth, which we're now living with the consequences of that. Now, we said at this time, you know, the sort of germ of the seed of basic needs of poverty analysis in the 80s, that inevitably led to the rise of the Human Development Index, led by UNDP. It led to the, it was the 1990 World Development Report on Poverty, where the World Bank returned back in some ways to refocusing on the poverty agenda, marked the work of Martin Revalian and others. So we started to bring that back in. And of course, the rise of the institutional discussions, which Kunal is going to come with, which I won't dwell on in any great detail. So we're starting to get this build-up of a new momentum in the 90s. We have a return to poverty reduction. We have a return to human development. We had a lot of crises along the way. We had the Mexican-Bexo crisis. We had the Asian crisis of 98, which was an important pushback, because the IMF and the fund had been very, very gung-ho about capital account liberalization. Wider had a role in part of this debate through its promotion of the new structural economics, through the work of Ocampo and Stephanie on capital account management, and was an important pushback from research to development macroeconomic thinking. So although we might characterize the 1990s as a return to growth and poverty reduction for some countries, and of course the China motor is motoring and gathering speed at all of this time, it was also an era of state disintegration, the then Zaire, Somalia, Rwanda, the consequences in some countries of which we live to today, and it was also a period of continued macroeconomic crisis in some countries. We come to the 2000s, and in some ways, the agenda of the 2000s has been very much the agenda of delivery in the social sectors, delivery in education, in health, very much an agenda driven by an expansion in foreign aid. Almost it seems that sometimes donors, and you see this reflected in the MDGs, it's almost come down to, well, development is, the market will drive the economy, we will gather the tax revenues, and then we will then spend it appropriately, or in the best way that we can, on quality, education, and health. And it's very difficult to disagree with that agenda, and it's very difficult in some ways to disagree with some of the delivery of the impact, the fact that, you know, now far fewer children in Africa suffer from malaria, for example. But it does have a weakness, which is, in a sense, it was leaving the structure of the economy to the market, and where is the role of the state, something that we're discussing this morning with Joe. It fits in very well with the rise of philanthropy and the influence of the philanthropic donors at the time, the rise, and perhaps four, of microfinance interventions, turning everybody into an entrepreneur. So, an important and influential agenda, but also a rather limited agenda. 2000s, climate change analysis, the Stern report becoming a very robust piece of work, wider-conclaim early work by Das Gupta on the environment in the early 90s, and more financial crises, financial crises in every decade, so we must have a financial crisis very soon. 2010 onwards, where are we now? I think we're back to jobs, but jobs, not in terms of thousands or hundreds, but in terms of millions, we're not talking about just 10 jobs or 20 jobs from one NGO project as good as they are, we're talking about jobs expansion at scale and how are we gonna achieve that, and that brings us to the structural transformation agenda. We're talking much more about gender equality, the creation of women's livelihoods in particular, I must apologize for the lack of gender balance on the panel, by the way, that's my fault. The rise of the SDGs, the SDGs, when it was being discussed initially, the claim was we will have a quantum leap in livelihoods, the quantum leap, Star Trek. Is it happening, will it happen? It's an issue that we could discuss going forward. And of course, starting in the 2000s, a real rise in the evaluation literature, including the random mister literature, and I asked a question yesterday of Martin Revalian, actually whether we've reached peak RCT and that's something we might come back to, because RCTs, excellent, very well suited for evaluating health, social sector programs, some of them, but where are the general equilibrium effects, as Michael Grimm said yesterday, and also how do we think about creating the jobs in millions and not just hundreds? Okay, so let me just end now by saying, what do we think's gone right over 30 plus years? I think what's gone right is lots more data, households, enterprises, public finance, the new agenda around transparency, but not enough panel data. What's gone right, we've had an excellent focus on absolute poverty reduction, which in many ways is delivered in the poverty numbers, although a large part of that story is driven by growth in China. We now match that with a new attention to inequality, which was the panel of yesterday morning, and some attention more to gender equality, but perhaps we don't have enough spatial and geographic focus. We're not learning enough from our colleagues in geography and other disciplines. We've got more evaluation evidence, but I do worry about the overconfidence of the randomists. One thing that the history of development economics tells you is that fashions do come and go. We have more knowledge about fiscal incidents, which has been extraordinarily important in reallocating public expenditure, and we have a new focus, which is rather late in the day, however, on tax policy and its importance. What are the concerns? I think the concerns must be the crossover of political and economic power, the fact that those deep inequalities in assets that were built up in the privatizations of the 90s and the 80s have led to an extraordinary concentration of political power within what are nominally democracies by wealthy people controlling the conversations. We have excellent growth rates in some countries, but not enough structural transformation, and we are still faced by crises. And finally, I think the resource base of our continued prosperity is under immense stress, we still do not have enough discussion about how we are going to deliver the materials from both the renewable and the non-renewable sectors to deliver increased prosperity and more poverty reduction in the developing world. The oil, gas, mining industries are still treated as relative pariahs, but we sit around in a world of materials and energy. So how are we going to bring the sustainability together with the development to deliver the sustainable development goals? If you want to know more about that, come to the session after lunch. Extractive Industries, thank you very much.