 Analysts disagreed on whether Putin may remain in power, yet a rush without Putin could be even more concerning. Similarly, we agree with the panelists that strengthening European defense and security structure is crucial. It was, understandably, a foremost concern for gas honoring Ambassador Bustayko. A lot has been said about the 2% goal in defense spending, with several governments seeking to defend their budgetary flexibility. Democratic governments, nevertheless, tend to defray peacetime investments in the armed forces in favor of election-winning commitments to other public services. As we have heard, this approach comes at a price. The outbreak of war in Eastern Europe, unforeseen as it was to too many, throws this folly into sharp relief. European governments are scrambling to invest in long-neglected forces with immediate capabilities too often exchanged for future capabilities. We risk sun-setting capabilities before we can bridge the gap to sunrise capabilities. We face systemic deficiencies in material, munitions, and vehicles in the midst of a global supply-side shock. Stop-start spending is destructive, moreover, to defense capacity, strategic relationships, and subsequently, deterrents. But spending more is only half the solution. It is as important to spend effectively. For too long, investment in humans has given way to platform-centric capabilities and budgets. For example, Allied intelligence has proved such a vital asset in preempting the Russian narrative. And yet, the UK military consistently under-recruits intelligence analysts, one of our strongest national assets. Today's conference also highlights the need for sophisticated decision support, including through war-gaming and red-teaming, and in turn, leveraging the natural and social sciences to precisely target our adversaries' weaknesses. It's not just professionals. We have seen the symbolic departure of high street shops from the streets of Moscow and ethical hackers broadcasting anti-war propaganda on state television. The government could and should coordinate these hitherto unilateral actions in support of the overarching national strategy while adhering to the constraints of democratic governance. But while an offensive strategy like this is all very well, we also need to establish a whole-of-society approach to defense. Societal resilience and weaning ourselves off clear external vulnerabilities, such as Russian energy, is a national security priority. It should have been since at least 2014. We need societal resilience, stronger supply chains, larger stockpiles, the end of just in time. Indeed, the good times are over. Further, greater domestic capacity in two key areas is desperately needed, economic crime enforcement and energy security. One fine was issued for facilitating sanctions breaches to UK financial and legal firms in 2020-21. One, the London laundromat needs to end. Similarly, UK energy policy has long left itself vulnerable, as Helen Thompson spoke about earlier. We have known about Russian strategic use of energy supplies for years, yet done nothing to address it. Nuclear power plants falling off the grid with no replacements. Our cultural and political institutions must also be protected. Our politics have been vulnerable to Russian action from misinformation to buying influence, whether hosting parties in Italian villas or donating political parties. The West needs to strengthen its soft power, including cultural empathy and a strategy to deal with the full spectrum radicalisation threat that the Russian regime is demonstrating. The disinformed are victims, too. This includes ensuring the proper resilience of citizens, establishing a cultural strategy for the individual, inculcating democratic values and preventing the spread of misinformation. Lastly, a word on the future. Russia's war in Ukraine has supplanted, not replaced, the security threats of the 21st century, climate change, failed states, and great power competition. Thank you.