 I think we're absent a speaker, I'm afraid, but we might just get started and if necessary change the order and I'm not going to join us during. So first of all, welcome to USIP this morning for this discussion of security and justice in post-revolution Libya and welcome also to those of us or those who are joining us by webcast online. We had a very active conversation yesterday, my first anyway Twitter live chat pulling apart some of the issues already and we had Ambassador Deborah Jones and Ambassador Aaron from the UK and a huge number of Libyan civil society journalists and Libya followers around the world. So I feel like we've already kind of gotten the discussion started but this morning we'll do it a little bit more the old-fashioned way. A couple of things to start out with. We have some good news and we have some bad news. Firstly our moderator also disappeared so I'm afraid that bad news is that you have me. I would be double-hitting a little bit setting out some of the introductory points and then handing over to the other panelists. The good news although maybe it's bad news too is that we managed to rescue Najee from the clutches of a French airstrike but now we've lost him in DC but we are assured he's on his way. In terms of order what we were planning, although we may switch it around, is that I will start out by talking about some of the seeds that were sown for the current security and justice breakdown that come really from the Qadhafi era. Then Najee will talk about where we are today in terms of perceptions of security and justice and also how it's feeding into the current crisis. Christina will talk about some of the analysis points in that security and justice breakdown and in the crisis and on some of the ongoing challenges in reasserting security and justice at state level. And then finally we have Najee here today who's our former country director. She used to be based in Benghazi and is now doing some study in America. She's going to give some reflections from the perspective of a locally based lawyer, a civil society activist and a major participant in the revolution. So to put my presenter head on and start out, as I said, I think a lot of the time we skip into analyzing the security and justice situation in Libya without going back to some of the legacy points of the Qadhafi regime and some of the decisions that were made in the immediate aftermath that have affected and contributed to this sort of overcrowded and chaotic security scene that we see today. And much of the damage and the limitations of the security and justice institutions are rooted in Qadhafi-era policies. Qadhafi who systematically dismantled much of the central state institutional architecture and created sort of diversions of power to parallel structures which were much more closely controlled and also created this sort of competitive and overlapping, confusing set of functions in the security and justice realm, playing different ministries and different institutions off against each other. Many thinking that they each were carrying out a function which was sort of divided and perhaps also overlapping from another institutional perspective. And going back in this sort of history point, I thought we might start by looking at the military. And the military of course is in ways how Qadhafi, the tool that Qadhafi used to come to power, but subsequently there was a coup attempt and a number of power struggles with some of the people within his own alliance and so they sealed their fate. From then on Qadhafi went about sort of systematically chipping away at their strength until really when the revolution hit there were barely a shell, a very top-heavy structure which had lacked recruitment and funding for many years. The MOD was essentially shuttered for a long time with Qadhafi personally controlling it. But then you had also this sort of parallel structure aspect where yes the military itself was weak but of course there were some incredibly strong brigades but those were much more tightly held. So for example the Mies Brigade, which played an important role in the revolution as well. Looking then at the ministry of interior structure and the police, the national police was never strong. And speaking to those who served as national police before, they have this sort of inferiority complex, this notion that they were neglected, that they weren't really used. During the Qadhafi period again there was this much tighter held internal security structure and extensive intelligence networks. Though the police could carry out very basic functions like traffic management, basic criminal processing of criminal low-level crime, the reality is that was because they held the upper hand in terms of force. And when that flipped during the revolution, there's been a sort of a loss then of that ability to even leave the station. Such that police, when we interviewed them, essentially said, we're here to take reports but in order to affect arrests, we need to contact a Qadhafi. There is this situation of course where militias and ordinary citizens now are much better armed than the police as well. And this split negative that the police themselves feel, both being seen as a tool of Qadhafi and yet themselves feeling that they were weakened by Qadhafi. Moving on then to look a little at the history of the justice system. In 1973 Qadhafi merged the secular and the civil system and the religious court structure in order to create a sort of a hybrid. This structure lay very much under the control of the Ministry of Justice with little independence. And although this independence issue has structurally been corrected in the post-revolution period, unfortunately because of the security situation, in reality judges have not felt able to exert that independence. And have been very much inhibited and targeted. There is a history of executive interference. In addition to executive interference in the basic way of going in and interfering with court rulings, there was also things like in 1981 Qadhafi abolished the bar, essentially making all lawyers publicly salaried positions. Removing competition, removing the sense of merit and financial incentive that comes from a bar structure. And although that position was reversed in the 90s, many lawyers that we spoke to have said that it created an irreversible damage to the reputation and the way that that profession operates. Probably more serious than that is the parallel courts that were set up, the people's courts. And again, this was a parallel structure much more tightly controlled by the regime. Disbanded, but in ways the practice that was operated, the special procedures that were operated in the people's courts, have actually in ways over the years seeped into the regular practice, creating this sort of confused type of law being carried out by either structure. In the post-revolution period, these institutions fractured. And in particularly with the police and the military, many didn't fight particularly even with Qadhafi during the revolution, but stayed home or fought with the other side. One of the phenomena that has been observed in the post-revolution period then though is this localization of security and justice and a divergence between national level initiatives that have been attempted and what are the local level realities of the way that security and justice are carried out. And there's been very little, and this is one of the major comments that we make in the reports, very little visioning or high level debate in this post-revolution period about what kind of system do you want, what kind of post, what after, you know, Qadhafi era has ended and a vision then about what the future of security and justice and maybe I should or will look like. There's been very little mapping of that. Instead, what has happened is sort of an ad hoc absorption of different militia groups into the system, anointing different militia groups as state entities without really creating the control mechanisms necessary to truly bring them under the state. And some of the actors that we mapped out and discussed in the report in which Naju will give a bit more of an update on are, for example, under the Ministry of Interior, though some of these have shifted over time, the Supreme Security Committee, the Anti-Crime Unit, the Libyan Revolutionary's Operation Room, the New Diplomatic Police, of course, and becoming very controversial in the current frame, the Libya Shield, not only under control of the Ministry of Defense, but I don't think any of us here would say that in reality that's the case. And so you've got this sort of messy set of actors, none of which have been properly assigned separate roles. And so as moderator, I suppose that's sort of where I'll end setting up, but to maybe throw out some of these themes for the rest of the panel, this idea that you have parallel and competing entities, but that they're both a feature of the post-revolution period, which sort of we've all been following, I think, but also a legacy point and now sort of repeating in the post-revolution period. And then this split between local and national in terms of level control and actors and relevance for actors. And then this point about what is the vision for security and justice going forward? Christina, I feel bad. You're supposed to have 20 more minutes, but that's okay. I think as we all know, if you work in post-conflict environments, flexibility is a huge asset. And so we will all hopefully sort of be able to use that here in Washington DC as well. So, you know, what we were hoping for is, you know, to have Najee present on where we are today. And so we'll add that sort of complexity in later on in the presentation. But it brings us to sort of the question of what do we do now? And we've all been hopefully, for those of you who've been following Libya, you understand sort of the complexity of the violence happening, particularly around Benghazi and around Tripoli, as well as down in Sabah and now moving even more westward to the border of Tunisia. And so the key question that, you know, I think we all really want to sort of have a conversation about once sort of we're all done presenting is, how do we move forward? What do we do to build rule of law in Libya? How does the international community support Libyans to do that? So what I'm going to do is walk through a couple of different themes that sort of are both challenges as well as sort of observations of the security first in Libya than justice and then some sort of outline points to sort of highlight. So starting with the security landscape, I think that Fiona's point of these parallel sort of the legacy of parallel structures is really an important one to note. In our presentation, we really highlight sort of the reality that this is quite negative in terms of rebuilding rule of law. And sort of what we found is there's you can look at sort of both throughout the Gaddafi era and throughout post revolution and fortunately, even into today, there's sort of the reaction of how to build security institutions. Let's just create new ones. And so what you're finding is sort of a number of different actors that are being given of legitimacy by the state, yet they don't have distinct roles and functions. And in reality, very few fall under the sort of de facto command and control of a state ministry. What we saw early on in the summer, which we thought was somewhat positive is the anti crime units were actually being sort of dismantled and fully put into the police directorates in each of the localities in Libya. And we really saw this as a positive sign of coalescing around sort of one state function that was providing law and order in communities in Libya. What we've been hearing over the past week, unfortunately, is sort of anecdotally, a number of different militia groups in particular, I think, are looking to actually reassert those anti crime units, because they don't feel like they actually control policing in their communities. And so, you know, I think it's a legitimate question to ask, why is it a problem to create these different functions? And so what we've really found is, first, it creates these multiple actors, sort of with overlapping roles and functions, and honestly, leaving significant gaps in providing law and order, because nobody's sort of fulfilling everything. And then even more so, they're now competing against one another for power for legitimacy. And one of the key questions, because often they're paid different salaries, is are they competing for sort of economic resources of the state? But sort of there's actually a second reason why we're even more concerned about this and why sort of some of the more recent conversations we've been hearing by different Libyans about sort of bringing back some of these different entities that in theory have been disbanded, is that they're potentially going to be used as proxies for these national level conflicts that are ongoing. I, you know, I think Najee can speak even more eloquently to this effect, but the reality is that if you have sort of a militia group that is asking to be anointed as an anti crime unit, because they don't trust the policing function, they feel the policing in their communities actually controlled by a different militia group, you're basically potentially having sort of these localized proxy fights for national level conflicts in Libya. There is sort of a second, that's sort of the first theme, these, how do we unravel these parallel structures that keep being created? The second theme is the fact that if you look at rebuilding rule of law and justice and security, unfortunately, very little progress to date has been made on institutional reform of the security system in Libya. The, what we found is that the Ministry of Interior is incredibly bureaucratic heavy with a lot of different rules and regulations. You can, I think it's safe to say you could be sort of have to move through a number of different offices and yet never really get much change. And unfortunately, there hasn't been a lot of sort of change management of these institutional functions in order to, I think, oversee the new sort of policing that Libyans seem to want. Sort of a fourth theme is that while there's, I think, a lot of problems on the security side in Libya, it's also important and what we also try to do in our report is to highlight where there are some successes. And so I think it's important to note in terms of providing sort of law and order, there are some limited successes and it's worthwhile potentially to try to do more to study why. And so I'll just sort of point out a few. First, the traffic police. The, you know, it's still a functioning entity. So and I think some initial of our initial studies sort of found they have a very different legacy than most of the other police. But it's probably really important to better understand sort of their legacy, but why they're functioning, how they have a relationship with the community in which they're able to sort of sit out at traffic lights and not be attacked or sort of threatened. The second is, and actually was highlighted during our Twitter chat yesterday, are some sort of community based examples where they've been able to create functioning police. And the ones pointed out yesterday were to Brooke and Mizrata, in which the police are able to function without any interference from any armed groups. You know, to the extent, and I will just say this, sort of putting it out there, we didn't study to Brooke. And so I don't want to comment on it, but the comments yesterday through the Twitter chat were that the community was able to sort of work collectively and create their own plan of security in order to sort of have the police reassert themselves. And so these are opportunities to study, to better reflect and understand why they've been able to create sustained change, it seems, even in the face of some of the violence that's happening in the rest of the country. So the last comment I'll make on the security side is, I think as we've all unfortunately seen, there has been, unfortunately, no disarmament in Libya. I think after the revolution, there was sort of this hope, we have our final panelists, I think there was hope that disarmament would be sort of achieved through integration of a lot of the armed actors. I think over the last six months, unfortunately, not only have we not seen disarmament, what we've actually seen is rearmament. And it's what we found last year, which I think is sort of reasserting itself much more visually this year, is that most Libyans have not felt the revolution is fully over and they've felt that for now three years. And so one of the questions is sort of how do Libyans move forward in order to sort of fully come out of what they were fighting for in terms of independence in a new Libyan state? So that's sort of my comments on the security side. On the justice side, what we're still seeing today is that few courts are operating. If they are, they're doing sort of basic, very low level civil law divorce and those types of proceedings. By and large, justice actors have no security. A number have been targeted, assassinated, threatened. And there's also sort of a competing challenge for them in that the political isolation law, it's very unclear how it's going to be fully carried out. And so this has caused a number of strikes in the justice system. What that means is that you're seeing significant prison overcrowding and sort of while there were some initial gains on the prison side of the Ministry of Justice, reasserting command and control of some of the prisons. Most of that has unfortunately over the past few months reverted back to sort of militia or tribal control. What that leaves in terms of actual, you know, justice mechanisms for Libyan people is unfortunately, or depends on how you look at it, self-help, vigilanteism, sort of tribal dispute resolution and religious leaders in the development of religious courts. You know, one of the interesting things is more and more you're seeing people sort of comment on the role that tribal leaders can play. And one of the, so I thought it would be worthwhile just taking a moment to comment in terms of what we found in our research. But I will also say that I think that this is one area that could use a lot more sort of anthropological type research to better understand sort of the roles, mechanisms, norms that are being utilized. But what we by and large found is that sort of tribalism in Libya is really very much a social connection, a social cohesion and historically played that role. But and sort of following their evolution, what they've been doing, where there's been this justice vacuum and the lack of any mechanism to fully resolve a lot of the disputes. They've been trying to step into quality violence, very much sort of akin to a ceasefire. But they aren't able to provide solutions to the root causes of a lot of the violence that's been occurring, particularly intercommunal violence. What's interesting is that Gaddafi really took a lot of measures to try to undermine the influence of tribes. There's some really, really interesting anthropological studies from the 1970s that look at the role that tribes played and that by and large, you know, the further you get away from sort of Gaddafi's strongholds, the more they may play a role. But by and large, there's no sort of historical customary norms that you find in a lot of sort of tribal justice systems to deal with crime. And it's just really important to note such as how to address homicide and murder. And so and then the last thing is as we talk to a lot of these tribal leaders, what they've said is they don't want to step in to play the role of the state in creating justice. What they want is to have peace. And so they're trying to do anything they can in the interim measures. But what they wish is what they wish to see is sort of a neutral, you know, functioning state justice system. And I think that that's sort of an important lesson actually for the broader Libyan people, which is what we've by and large found, which is they have a desire for the state to be providing justice and security. And so it's just sort of a question for all of us to reflect, have we missed that window of opportunity to try to sort of galvanize around that desire? And if we have, like, how do we maybe reopen it? Sort of my last thoughts really are also sort of that a number of the challenges that we're seeing overtly as justice and security challenges are underlying that our political, social and economic issues. I think that there has been significant attention given to the political and social challenges. But what we're often forgetting are sort of these economic challenges, the fact that a lot of sort of the youth bulge need economic resources. And so it's just, you know, something that has had little progress, particularly in terms of diversifying Libya's economy, but also sort of trying to make sure that the oil fields are reopened. And there's a bit of a chicken and an egg, but I just throw that out there that sort of to be cautious about trying to put rule of law solutions on sort of political, social and economic problems. Okay. So we now welcome Najee, who we have located in the grid of Washington, DC. We tried to explain the grid last night, but apparently failed. Let me just pull up his presentation really fast. In our defense, lawyers are generally really bad at using technology. So please work with us for just a minute. Maybe I'll grab a baby. But just to introduce Najee, Najee is one of Altai's consultants based in Libya. He's been working on research on perceptions of security justice, security providers, Islam for the UK and the US governments. He's traveled very widely within Libya and has access to many Thouar and political groups. Najee is a fluent Arabist, has a master's degree in law and international security from Sciences Po, and is also a founding member of the Paris-based think tank, Norya. Let me just see if I can get this PowerPoint. Thank you very much, Fiona. And good morning, everybody. And thank you for being here. Sorry for the delay again. It's not very difficult to find your way in Washington. But for me, it wasn't a bit complicated this morning. So I'll be mainly talking about the effects of the current political crisis on the security sector in Libya today. And so the main topics I'll be I'll be talking about before digging into the security sector aspect of things. It's a brief introduction about the political landscape in Libya today. The political strategies and their impact on the security sector, their impact more precisely on the local security sectors, their impact on the legal security actors and the question to know whether the current political crisis is an opportunity for Salafi policing actors to emerge in Libya. And of course, the ever awaited question about the jihadist momentum in Libya today with all the jihadist movements thriving in the region. So first, the political landscape in Libya. And actually, I'm here trying to describe the two camps that are emerging in Libya today. The so-called Islamist Revolutionary Camp, which is a heterogeneous alliance between cross-national Islamist coalitions. And here we're talking about parties like the Muslim Brotherhood branch of the Libyan Brotherhood offshoot, which is the Justice Construction Party or the former IFAG members who founded their own parties, which are allied actually with local communities and local tribes, notably in Misrata or in Zawiya or in Sabrata and other locations, of course. However, despite this Islamist outlook, the main political power of these of this coalition relies on local legitimacies and mainly legitimacies that is driven from three different from the support of three different groups. The first ones are the Karagla, which are from Turkish origins, Turk Arabs. They are mainly based on the coast in Misrata, in in Zawiya, Sabrata, in Mirazi and Derna. The other, the second group is mainly tribal or subtribal groups that were major marginalized under the former regime and who perceived the revolution as an opportunity to improve their share and under the rule in the political process, economic process in Libya. For example, we can talk here about Awlat Sulaiman in Sabrata, who perceived the revolution as an opportunity to counter the influence of prominent tribes that were that had constituted the social base of Gaddafi's regime, like the Gaddafa or the Walfalla. Adding to these two categories, we have ethnic minorities such as the Amaziyar and Zwarra, who are allied today with Misrata as opposed to the Zintani. So it's a circumstantial allies, but it broadened the the the social base of this Islamist revolutionary camp. Why Islamist? Actually, the main idea here is this camp relies, bases its support on local communities, but its leadership is increasingly Islamist because it's there is always a good it's it's a vector of legitimacy, this religious outlook. And also it is for some an opportunity to obtain regional support from from some countries within this Islamist and broad Islamist spectrum. Some of you had this elements do exist and are taking an increasing role especially within this context of polarization. The second camp is the institutional conservative camp. It's a bit of a technical word, but anyway, it is as it is heterogeneous as the the former one, it is composed of the on the so-called honorable tribes that constituted Gaddafi social base in this in the West and in the south of Libya, which is a circumstantially allied with Assad, the tribal alliance in the East. These eastern tribes actually did participate in the revolution, but are afraid of being marginalized in the current process, notably by in their point of view, Islamist forces over Mishrata back forces in the East. So they are they participated to the same conference called Libyan Tribes Conference in May 2014, that actually constituted kind of a momentum for a new camp in Libya, a new alliance between Eastern and Western tribes that were actually not in very good terms under Gaddafi. Their popular constituencies are mainly tribal, adding to them some military officers mainly coming from the same tribes, but who else have this worry of preserving the privileges within the military establishment. It also includes independent figure and civil society activists, institutional is because actually the deep state in Libya today and despite the revolution is still dominated by these tribal elements, even if some changes did occur at the leadership level. And this is one of the main subject of conflict between the two the two camps. We can talk about this subject for for hours. So just a quick geographical repetition of the two camps, actually. And the problem is in Libya today that most localities outside big cities like Tripoli, Ben-Razia and Sabha are have very strong political identities and this is fueling political tensions and inter-fragile tensions. There is no place for pluralism within these cities, actually. Representative bodies, which are local councils, civil society institutions and the brigade leaders, very in most cases share the same cause and the same interest. So we can take the example of Tobruk, which is a tribal constituency where the population is mainly composed of tribal elements. But Tobruk hosts a community from Miss Rata and the community from Miss Rata settled in Tobruk from at least half a century had to issue a communique lately to declare its support to the House of Representative and to deny any links with Miss Rata. So there is a kind of local dictatorships being implemented across the territory where there is no real room for pluralism. As well, security actors actually are suffering from the same syndrome where most security actors when we know they're coming from one particular city are associated with the city and have a very clear political identity, which prevent them from doing fulfilling policing activities outside their areas of origin. So as of today, three different vectors of legitimacy are structuring one security actor's identity in Libya. The local legitimacy seems to be the most important one and Libyans tend to trust local groups and personal connections as to provide security services. The second vector of legitimacy and this is according to the survey conducted by Altaik on starting in collaboration with US AP in June 2014 is the legal legitimacy in a sense that Libyans are still very eager to see a national police being reinforced or at least established in certain areas. Aware of this, post-revolutionary actors are trying to to endorse this legality label and to have the monopoly over the legal use of violence in Libya. Here we're talking about groups like the Libyan Shield Forces, the Supreme Security Committee which was created in 2011 as a gathering of different revolutionary brigades to do policing activities actually and was disbanded in 2013. However, the groups that belong to the Supreme Security Committee still exist today, still respond to the Ministry of Interior, at least nominally and pretend to operate in the name of the law and to respond to the Ministry of Interior, which Ministry of Interior is the one in Tobruk or in Tripoli. This is another layer as well. The third vector of legitimacy, actually these groups are trying to to mark it is the religious legitimacy. We know Libya is a very conservative society where Salafi ideas are very popular. And here we're not talking about Jihadist Salafi idea. We're talking about more Hieti Salafi ideas more in line with the Saudi school of Salafism. And actually in a society that was traumatized by the by the revolution where the youth is hardly controlled by the elders. Salafi is a very good option for many tribes in Libya as to accept people with at least a good public morality with strong using the hard way to impose public order in cities that were particularly divided by the revolution. Here we're talking about cities like Sert or Darna that were deeply divided during the revolution between tribes which supported the regime and others that supported Gaddafi. These actually Salafi groups are developing a very interesting discourse about Islamic unity beyond the revolutionary fourth lines that are actually used by most of the revolutionary or entire revolutionary actors. So this is how they succeeded to impose themselves even in tribal areas like or cities like Sert. So. The how the question is today how the current political crisis had impacted actually the security situation and more exactly local policing actors. As you can see on the graph here the most popular option for Libyans to be as a policing actor is the community itself. After no one of course. And we can see as well that a local brigade popularity or rule perception of rule has substantially increased from three percent in 2013 to 12 percent in 2014. It tells a lot about the increasing role of local actors in Libya. However, in the problem is today with the new strategy of territorial expansion of certain brigades not only with the operation down of Libya. Certain areas are actually emptied from these local brigades which were in charge of security and we are facing in Tripoli, for example, an increasing risk of of security vacuum that that would be hardly actually filled by the new de facto forces present in Tripoli. Ms. Rata is trying actually to play an interesting role today in Tripoli and in the West in general. And some observers did call it the Pax Miss Rata, which is a new order, a new peace in the West in the south of Libya where Miss Rata will try to impose a certain political solution to competing communities. And here we're talking about Bani Walid and Warshafana. And many actually signs were given by the heads of down of Libya forces to reassure these communities. It is not guaranteed that these this strategy will work considering the importance that give Libyans to local actors and their distrust toward any what they call foreign actors, or at least not originally, not from the same origins as they are. I will talk here about the particular case of Tripoli and actually Tripoli, we can see very clearly the impact of having local groups that are that have social that belong to the community they protect. We have two two cases that are interesting. I will not talk about all the info that are on this slide, but two cases are worth noting. Sukul Juma is reputated for being the most secured neighborhood in Tripoli. It is guarded by Salafi Brigade, which members are inhabitant of Sukul Juma and belong to the social tissue of Sukul Juma. On the contrary, in in in cities like in areas like Abu-Slim, Salah-e-Din, Qasir bin Ghashir, perception of security are less positive and even though actually the the brigades that are in control of these areas are as well Salafi and have Salafi credentials, but the explanation here would be the fact that the personalities in charge of the brigades in these areas, Abu-Slim, Salah-e-Din and Qasir bin Ghashir belong to to communities that are not that do not constitute the majority of the population in these areas. Qasir bin Ghashir, Salah-e-Din and Abu-Slim are populated with with tribes that were loyal to Qaddafi and they perceive the new brigades in charge, the revolutionary brigades are being intruders or at least do not benefit from the required legitimacy from their point of view. The same scenarios will likely to happen again today with Misrata controlling brigades. Despite the fact that Misrata and brigades are trying to control their elements to play a relatively positive role in reassuring the different communities, as mentioned earlier. However, repeated clashes were reported lately, even between Misrata and their allies in Tripoli, like in in Sukel Shum'a or in Fashloum. So here again, the down of Libya operation could threaten the local security mechanism that were implemented over the last three years and may disturb, in a sense, the social order and security order in Tripoli. Now we'll talk about actually maybe we're short on time or it's fine. So we'll talk about the impact of the current crisis on the legal policing actors. And here we're talking about the national police and the national army. But before talking about that, we'll maybe talk about the struggle over the security sector reform, security sector reform in Libya and how both operations down of Libya and dignity operation aim at controlling the legal security sector. Each party is, as of today, claiming to detain the monopoly over the legal use of violence. So what are the arguments of the Islamist Revolutionary Camp? First, a distrust toward the security institutions, most of which were involved in the repression campaigns in the 80s and the 90s. When we talk to some young brigade members in Ben-Razi or in Misrata, they will always refer to a parent, a big brother, who was a victim at one moment of these repression campaigns. And so there is this dimension. The Egyptian scenario did actually create a certain paranoia among the Islamist Revolutionary, within the Islamist Revolutionary Camp and eager actually to preserve a certain military means in their hands as to protect their interests, facing maybe what they perceive as hostile security institution. Here we're talking about the Libyan National Army and the National Police. Also, there is another, there is an additional argument that is being brought by certain Islamist elements, Islamist milieu notably in the East is acquisition against notably Haftar's affiliated forces of continuous exaction they report to random checkpoints kidnapping of Islamist element. So this is the kind of element that you will bring to justify their will to preserve their military structures. Sorry, also the inefficiency of the integration strategy is an is an additional argument. Most Islamist and revolutionary actors do refer to the fact that what the integration strategy is not working well and mainly due to the lack of will of those who are in charge of integrating in a meaningful way, revolutionary commander into the into the milit security sector structure at a leadership level. On the other side, on the institutional conservative campsite, also they have a lot of arguments. The shadow of Islamist terrorism and and indeed many of the security institution serving officers have participated in the events during the 90s and the repression of the ex-LIFEG members. So they still have the same maybe state of mind regarding these regarding this person. Another argument is the assassination campaign against security and military officers. And one must say that there is no as of today like material proof of who is behind the assassination, but the political aim seems to be very clear in the mind of on the mind of the security military officers interviewed and in Benrazi. There was a triggering event actually, which was the assassination of Abdul Fattah Yunus, the chief of staff of the Libyan rebellion in July 2011 by some extremist Islamist element. And at that moment, the the mutual distrust since that moment, the mutualist start has only increased between both camps and each camp was trying to build up its own military institutions, bodies and independently from the other. Another argument. And here, when we talk mainly with the serving officers as a middle management level is the incompetence of revolutionary elements that are not enough trained. And so there is kind of corporatism that is motivating serving officers, at least those who are serving under the former regime, actually motivating them to reject any new elements, revolutionary elements, the SSR management as well created a lot of frustration in a sense that actually many revolutionary what were much more paid than policemen or soldiers. And this is something policemen did complain about at many at many occasions. And of course, the last argument, but one of the most important is the accusation against the Islamist Revolutionary Camp of willing to implement a substitution strategy. This is something that was mentioned indeed by some of the Islamist Revolutionary Camp leadership. And with the idea, notably of the National Guard, which had a name to create a reservoir for a new National Army to replace the existing National Army in Libya. So these are the main arguments of actually the two camps that are today making any security sector reform approach exclusive of the of the other camp in the point of view of each of the two camps, actually. So, yeah. From the Islamist Revolutionary Camp point of view, it's mainly the military and police and national police institution reluctance to integrate any elements, notably at a leadership level. They integrated, normally, a lot of revolutionaries, but it remained without effects at most of the times, actually. So as of today, for both camps, whether dignity operation or down of Libyan operation is how to control the security sector. This is one of the main objectives, because both camps are aware that benefiting from a legal mandate would over to their detainers the possibility to enhance their acceptance by a population, by the population. As revealed by this graph here, the Libyan population is still very keen to see the national police in charge of security and the national army as well. So having this legal mandate would, of course, facilitate the acceptance of the different security actors by the different population, especially when these security actors are operating outside their areas of origin. This is the case of Misrata and Tripoli, and this is the case of Misrata playing a kind of role in Sabha as well. Haftar in Ben Ghazi, he's not from Ben Ghazi originally. So having this legal label is determined for all of them, actually. And actually, we're trying, we're starting to see the consequences of this down of Libyan operation, dignity, military failure is preventing them from implementing any meaningful reforms. But down of Libya, after their control of Tripoli, they're trying to reform the security sector, or at least the national police in Tripoli, in a way that is in line with their interest. So we know that many a series of nomination did occur in Tripoli and were taken by the Minister of Interior following the the victory of down of Libya operation in Tripoli. Several police stations, notably in areas that were under the control of Zintani affiliated brigades, were taken over by forces that were considered as being closer to the down of Libya operation. Here we're talking about Salafi the Irneuah brigade that was operating in Abu Slim and took over the police station in Roj Sha'al and an Amazik brigade that took over the control of Al-Andalus police station. Both police stations are actually very strategic in a sense that both police stations did benefit from the international communities support and police training programs. So I think there is a very clever strategy behind these these different moves. In addition to the impact on the legal policing actors and we can see the limits of both actually vectors of legitimacy. The first one is the local one very clearly brigades operating outside their areas of control cannot rely on the vector of local legitimacy and will need to rely on local groups and the legal vector is also disputed as the boundaries of legality in Libya are still very very vague. So here intervenes actually the religious vector of legitimacy and notably the Salafi one. And this actually relies on the fact that Salafi ideas are very popular in Libya and notably this is a USAID study that was conducted by Altaï consulting in January 2014 and actually which allows to to measure which allowed to measure the the popularity of the Salafi ideas and notably through for example a certain number of example. But one question is was do you agree with the creation of the of the promotion of virtue and combat of vice committee which is actually based on a Saudi model of religious police and that was marketed at one moment by certain forces in in Libya and actually we can see that at least fifty-five percent of Libyans do support in a very strong way this initiative and up to almost seventy percent supported I think yeah twenty percent additional twenty percent supported relatively. So aware of this reality many brigades actually did develop a certain Salafi outlook and espouse Salafi ideas and here confusion we should not make the confusion between Salafi KDs groups and Jihadist groups that are mostly considered as being deviant by most Libyans according to the same survey. And actually these Salafi groups are succeeding to impose themselves notably in communities that were particularly divided during the revolution and we think we will take we'll talk here about cert where following the liberation of cert in late 2011 some brigades from Misrata and Menrazi did form an SSC unit in cert but the SSC unit with strong revolutionary credentials in 2012 actually the unit had to leave a cert following the pressures of certain local tribes and actually operated the same elements operated the return in cert starting in mid 2013 under a new label which was the promotion of virtue and combat of vice community had completely different discourse not referring at all to the revolutionary discourse more talking about public morality, Islamic unity and this this kind of terminology and actually Ansari Sharia while they used this promotion of virtue and combat of vice community at the beginning came unveiled the real identity shortly afterward by July 2013. We can see on the picture here and this picture was published by a Raya media group actually which is affiliated to Ansari Sharia where they conduct social awareness campaign in schools and and provide different kind of social services. Actually in many aspects the jihadist dimension of Ansari Sharia in cities like cert Sabrata or or even certain areas around Tripoli is exaggerated to a certain extent unlike the case maybe in Menrazi or or in Darna these like these these organizations are taking benefit from the support that is offered by the population to Salafi groups in general. So I will go a little bit faster. So here we were we were we were talking about the Salafi groups and indeed there were a number of Salafi groups operating in a very efficient way in Tripoli and Soekil Juma for example which where we saw that the population had a very positive perception of security the movement the special deterrence force in charge has Salafi leaning. So what about the jihadist threat everybody is talking about today in Libya. There is of course some jihadist organizations operating in Libya and actually we saw like it is the case of Ansari Sharia not only in Salafi but also in Menrazi we we move from a stage of charity association to late September a Darna based group with Islamic Youth Tourism Council that announced its allegiance to ISIS lately. So several several dynamics are actually today structuring the evolution of jihadist movements. First they are gaining growing autonomy vis-à-vis their former revolutionary allies and and here we're talking for example about some Islamist mainstream parties in Menrazi we're talking about some tribes in the in the south like Awlat Sulaiman who might have seen an opportunity to gain additional support by allowing themselves to some jihadist groups and now the jihadists are taking increasing economy autonomy in in the south. Also they are increasingly violent toward their competitors and Darna many clashes were reported between Ansari Sharia offshoot which is the Shura Islamic Islamic Youth Tourism Council and the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade which is a revolutionary group. I think as of today our best chance to combat the jihadist elements in Darna under the command of Salamud Derby and which to a certain extent benefits from a local legitimacy unlike maybe the the Shura Council. The jihadist movement are looking to expand their territory control as well and we can see a number of locations Tripoli, Saba Janzour, Zawiya and Sabrata and for the first time Ansari Sharia has made public its presence in Libya in Tripoli, sorry late August 2014. However, maybe the only good news in this different elements I like the Islamic State in Syria Jihadist movement in Libya are mainly composed of local elements who are at least in their public discourse eager to preserve certain certain links with their local communities. Of course, if the situation continued to the fighting continued to to exist in Libya it will be very difficult to contain the jihadist elements. So I think the ceasefire that was declared yesterday maybe maybe a good news that will maybe at least prevent this kind of jihadist movement of growing in Libya. Thank you for your attention to us a bit long. Thanks very much, Sennazi. And now finally sorry, our final panelist, as I mentioned, Nejla is our former country director in Libya. She's also a professor of criminal law at Benghazi University, former lawyer in Libya, Libyan activist and a practitioner in restorative justice. At the moment, she's studying conflict transformation at Eastern Mennonite University as a Fulbright scholar and continues to provide a lot of support for our justice and security work. Hello. Thank you for this presentation, Nejla and also Fiona, it's very actually significant report and I think it's highlight a lot of many aspects. And what I like about the support, the report, actually, it's really highlight the causes of the conflict and try to analyze the political aspect of the situation in Libya. It seemed a little bit dark and and mess, but we know the conflict and the post conflict area where we have this legacy we carry in our shoulders as a Libyan now. It's a huge issue how we think about how we can transform this legacy in a way will be, you know, solve that conflict because really we need to think now, OK, after all that analysis, what the solution now, what we can do. And there is no one answer for that. And it's not easy also answer, but definitely there is no possible. And what really I want to encourage everybody here as a policy makers and as a donors and as a petitioner, we should think about creative way to solve that conflict. We need to think about how we can really, you know, use mechanisms, maybe a very simple mechanism as an international community, as people who believe in peace and we need really to support what's going on in Libya in a way we can reduce that conflict. So there is many things in my mind, but first of all, I would love to start with this legacy can be transformed in a way we can really see significant change. And now by mentioning the traditional leaders several times, and there is a huge difference between the religious leaders who try to use the political issue as umbrella and between the traditional leaders who really promote the social coherent to the society. Now we have a big division in the Libyan society between who support the dignity and who support the down, who support the parliament and who support the members in Tripoli, and that really, really it's a dangerous sign because one of the things we rely on as a Libyan is the social coherent. And this is was the things really every even when we went through the conflict with the old days and the revolution. It was one of the things really support everything. So I'm thinking now how we can do that. I think the problem solving approach is one of the things we should focus on as a practitioner, as a policy makers. Luck of, you know, luck of information, luck of awareness and education. It's one of the issues now we facing in Libya. Trauma also, the trauma as Nashim mentioned, the trauma with the youth, the trauma with the Libyan who support the revolution from the beginning until now. Really it's, it's, it's, it is one of the obstacles now to reach the population there to try to encourage them because everybody just stuck in one place in the circle of violence. Everybody disappointed. Most of the activists I know, I know like flee outside the country now because they start threatened by different groups with different agenda. So Tunisia now more than two million Libyan people now in Tunisia and double that number now in Egypt. OK, we now find a way to try to reach those people, try to, you know, train those people, those people really seeking help. Like I have a friend of mine, they just keep asking me if we can just communicate with some international organization, they can provide support and help. We need to just train ourselves in a way when the country will be more secure, we can go back and then train the people. So you can have the solution to provide, to train local expertise, have the capacity to help, you know, what's going on in security. Rule of law and security. It's a big obstacle also because we have luck of institution. We have biocratic systems. We have people deal with old mentality. So how we can change that? I mean, one of the things I was like reading about North Island when they have the issues about the police and they can sit together as a police and as a traditional leaders and prosecutors and lawyer together in groups and ask questions what we need, what will bring justice for us and how we can, you know, think about a way, how we can support the security sector in our ground, in our countries, in our cities, in our community. And there is actually many signs that happens now in Libya. Like I was in conversation with one of my friends yesterday and there is traditional leaders actually trying really to reach the wise traditional leaders, really try to reach some lawyers in one of the neighborhoods in Benghazi and try to bring them together and say, hey, what we can do as a community now? How we can face these challenges without being threatened or killed? And this is actually a sign of hope for me. And the people have passion and the people really, really seeking help and really need support, but they don't know how they can do that with the security issue. So this is one of the things. The other thing about the traditional leaders, the traditional leaders actually, they have a negative and positive aspect. The good thing, they really have the power and the moral and the respect really to sort the conflict. But it's just for short term. How we can make that process more healthy and create sustainable, sustainable peace. We can do that through training those traditional leaders with some group of the civil society, the principles of restorative justice. And we have that already in our religious. But informally, we just focus, you know, people try to use now the religious in a bad way and try just to ignore all these principles and values we already have. And it was really one of the solution for many countries in the world, like Somalia and like Keeney. I have a conversation and Tristan conversation, one of the traditional leaders there last week. And really they do great work there and sorting the conflict and try to implement many principles in terms of trauma, healing and restorative justice. So why we can't support that as international community? Why we can't think about that to provide capacity that capacity can really support long term the security reform? I mean, as a lawyer, really what my my my first tension will be, you know, the rule of law and I was really struggling with the corruption in the legal system in my country. But how we can reach that? How we can fill the gap now? If we don't have government capable to provide strong institution, we know governance and we know the rule of law and how we create healthy institution, it takes years. But to be able to do that at least we can have people can believe in that can help us to push very hard to create change. And it's not easy for me to come today and speak about change. I lost my mentor this summer, Salwa Baghees succinated. He just was the first woman I saw when I went to the court and I lost also one of the beautiful, you know, youth in my city, Benghazi, just last week, Taufiq bin Saud. And it's not easy to speak about peace and hope and how we really create a change. But really I'm coming today because really I believe those people have passion and they die for a reason. And we should fight. This is our battle. This is I believe also the change should become from the Libyan people, but also we need support in that. How we can work as insider and outsider together to create sustainable peace in Libya. There is many ways for that. And I think you know better than me in the way how we can create that. But I'm just give you examples and just thoughts and ideas just encourage each other. And I think this is the critical moment now to support the Libyan people. We lose people every day. For political cause, for reasons, for power, for weapons everywhere. And we can't we can't change it in one day. I know that. But we can't start of the change. And I hope that happens from from from today. Thank you very much. Thanks, that's a good note to end on. Now we have plenty of time to open it up to questions. I know there is a roving mic that for DOS has, but it's also not a terribly large room aside from the buzzing air conditioning. How Hamid Lelou, operational cultural analyst on Marine Corps University, but at this way I'm not here to present them. So can I start with three quick questions? Very quick. No comments. Great presentations for all of you. Where do you put the Senussi Brotherhood and Haftar, General Haftar, in your security equation? You put that security equation there, but you didn't mention the Senussi and Haftar. Number two, in your opinion, what would be the top three or five criteria is when selecting new recruits to be trained in the US or in Europe? As you know, we have failed doing that. And we know that. Some of the recruits fled while being trained in Poland and other countries. And lastly, in your analysis, you presented a comparison between the Salafiyah Jihadiyah and Salafiyah and Al-Almiya without naming them. Where are the Salafiyah Siyah Siyah? Like the ones we have in Egypt with Noor. Are they playing politically or not? Thank you very much. Since we had three, we'll take one more question in this lot and then we'll we'll do some answers. OK. Hi, Doug Brooks. Great presentations. My questions would be on the external actors who has the most influence inside Libya in terms of countries, in terms of groups, in terms of individuals, who who is able to influence events inside Libya from outside. Thank you for your questions. So concerning the Senusi Brotherhood role in the security equation, as far as I know, and I'm not sure about my info, but they don't play any security or political role anymore in Libya. They're more a symbol rather than a real political security actor. And not it's been the case since a very long time, since Gaddafi came to power where he sought to actually destroy any reference to the past before Gaddafi didn't exist to Gaddafi. So concerning Haftar, actually, he's he's certainly playing a crucial security role as he represents kind of the military wing in the eastern in eastern Libya of this institute institutional conservative camp. And I think many of the eastern tribes are are supporting Haftar and he represents to a large extent his there only hope to try to counter the influence of brigades that are considered of being Islamist or bagged by Misrata in the east. So of course, he's playing a crucial role, especially that now he's benefiting from kind of a legal coverage mandate with the House of Representatives naming Al-Nazuri, his chief of operations as as the new Libyan army chief of staff. So yeah, he's certainly gaining political power. And but on the military front, well, he hasn't been very successful so far, which creating a lot of doubts around his usefulness, actually, and even among his supporters. So they might might turn to a new new actors. Um. Concerning the Salafi SESC and the political Salafism, it's it's very active in Libya, and they're playing an important role, notably the former Al-Aifid Libyan Islamic fighting group members actually who during the year 2000s renounced to jihadism and to political violence and actually it's both kind of mainstream Islamist under the patronage at that time of Ali Salabi and Ben Ghazi and with the support of Qatar who tried to mediate and help the mediation between former Al-Aifidji members and the Qadhafi regime. There they found that political parties today and they're part of the political game in Libya and yeah. So they're former jihadists converted into political activism, actually. And unlike has been new in Egypt, which comes from more qietist school and moved into the political arena following the Egyptian Revolution. Yeah. Maybe you want to answer the one thing that I might jump in on is talking about this issue of the criteria of selection of new recruits. And I think that's really important. But actually I think what we need to do when we're talking about these issues of integration and new recruits is actually rewind quite a bit. So before you can decide about what kind of recruits you want to select, you want to decide what kind of institutions, what kind of specialties you lack, what kind of specialties you need to develop, what kind of institutions you want to have, what style of police or are you going to reconstruct an intelligence service? Is that going to be entirely dismantled? These things haven't been properly mapped out, discussed. And this is what I was referring to earlier when I was talking about this need for a vision, a new vision for security and justice. And when you develop a plan about what institutions you're going to have, then you can talk about what kind of people are needed to be recruited into those kind of institutions. But another point that needs to be addressed, and I was sitting here drawing triangles because this is what one of the Suwara did for me when I very first went to Libya, is that at the moment, you know, what they were talking about in terms of recruitment is having all of the Suwara go in here at the bottom, which is in ways important because there is a lack. We talked about this sort of inverted triangle, this top heavy institutions with very far more senior level generals and colonels than you have, you know, patrol officers. But at the same time, Suwara aren't going to be happy to insert here at this level, unless they also were able to have some of their commanders at this level. It's just not going to work. And so, I mean, there have been some discussions, and I know that certain people who were involved at the upper echelons of the SSC, for example, have had very complex conversations. But I don't think that there were ever good decisions about how you integrate not just at this level, but also at this level. Another point on the integration piece is that I think that going back to your point from earlier, it's not, I don't think it's even just about where the decisions for the incentives for integration, not just about the incentives or who you need to incentivize, but also about like a lack of planning and a lack of management of that of that integration process. And what's interesting is it's not that integration has failed in all places. It's it's very context driven. And so, for example, in some towns where the chief of police may be defected and became part of the revolution, well, then the revolutionaries are much more willing to join that police force because this guy is in charge that they believe in, that they want work for, that they're happy to work for. They're less happy to work for an institution where you have an old Gaddafi guy coming back into his position as senior police and then they're not willing to work with or for that person. So I think that's interesting and it was really interesting to interview cadets and senior police and former police at different levels about their feelings about integrate and it changed hugely from town to town. And even within we, with the 2013 research, we interviewed four different neighborhoods in Tripoli. It was vastly different in each one. But another piece is to go back to sort of this incentives point as well. One of one of my favorite people because he was so candid that we interviewed this border guard from Ismail and he used to be a border guard under the Gaddafi regime. He's also wildly active smuggler, but that was fine. It was sort of at a permissive level. But he joined during the revolution, he joined and subsequent to the revolution, he joins Libya Shield. And I asked him, I was like, but I don't understand you're acting as a border guard for the Libya Shield. But you were already a border guard. Like why didn't you just go back to your old job? Why did you join the Libya Shield? And he's like, well, with the Shield, I get, you know, three days on, four days off. So that's a lot better. And I get paid more. So which would you choose? You know, I think it's been there has been some attempts to balance that out. But when you talk about incentives and then the only thing I'll add to that sort of conversation is sort of particularly on training, developing that is, you know, a command and control issue that I think we highlighted. And so not just who are the individuals that were recruiting, but who are they aligned to? And I think that there are a number of different issues at play in that simple question alone that are politically motivated, economic. I mean, it's I think the really tough nugget to crack, but I would say that without sort of having a knowledge of whether or not those recruits are actually going to go back and go under state command and control, there's a lot of potential harm to actually training them as well. About the reintegration and disarmed groups, I think to be honest, the responsibilities both from our government and also with the UN and the international organization who tried to join them, because we, as we mentioned, we don't have, we are now facing the attitude, we are dealing with luck of capacity with the people who are in charge. So I think at this point, those international organizations like the UN when they come and the one to do the disarmed and the reintegration program, they just make it really in a way just find for alternative job for those people or pay money for them. And this is not the way how they can actually design the project. They use the advantage no people understand exactly or know exactly how that program should work and how they can deal with these groups. And I can't blame what happens now in Libya, like even just 20% of that because the program was failure and there was really short time process that didn't work very intentionally with those traumatized group. They didn't actually try to satisfy their needs. And then what was the solution? What was the consequences? They was like just having money and they should just try to run their money and then just try to have salaries from the government to support those different militia groups. So in the end, like Fiona mentioned, there is no loyalty to the people who are in charge. Loyalty will be always to the head of the commanders or to the militia. Because there is no actually process can really implement those people or can change or shift those people attitude. So I think also there is really luck and there is understanding. I think we should go back and try to check some lessons learned have been done in the early days in Libya and how that really affect the consequences now. So I hope that will open our minds and try to think about alternative ways to deal with that. And about the Libyan shield, like I just heard yesterday, like now they try to shift their the way how they now control Benghazi. So they create the Shura Council in Benghazi, which is now bin Hmeid and Zahawi, both of them, and they control now the city. But they know that the people, they are not happy with them. So they don't want to announce themselves, you know, publicly everywhere. But also the city now is surrounded by the jaysh, those Haftar military. And now the people actually between both of them. And even who was supporting the dignity in the beginning because they was thinking this is the only way to follow those militia. Now they change their position because the circle of violence just continue every day. So what we should do? Should we keep fighting or engage those militia? Try to engage them and think about how we can sort that. On the issue of external actors, we were kind of actually debating this over dinner last night. And I think there's a lot of there's a lot of difficulties for everyone because because access is so difficult at the moment. And that not he had an opinion who might share. So yeah, it's really hard to say. Many, many countries have particular interest in Libya. But maybe you have the impression that we have two camps that are emerging in the region on one side, Qatar and Turkey, trying to support the so-called Islamist revolutionary camp. And on the other side, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates obsessed with the idea to counter an Islamist influence in the region. So backing the Zintani conservative camp, Egypt and Algeria are allegedly allegedly playing as well a role in Libya. They have a security concern, concerns concerning the security situation in Libya. And at the international level, the Great Britain seems to play an important role and to engage with all parties. So yeah, they have a wide range of contacts and maybe to a lesser extent, but still very influential the U.S. as well. French trying to, but the Libyan diaspora, not as far as I know. But with the exception of the ones in the room, let's take a few more questions here. Ali, for you first. Ali Abouzakouk, member of the House of Representatives, the ones who are boycotting Toprak. No, I need to really look, first of all, thank you for wonderful presentations. I live in Libya, so I see now how you look at Libya, this country that I live in and how you analyze the situation of security and justice. I think challenges are magnificent. I mean, in many ways, we are facing a problem of building the country from the very scratch. Institutions are not there, so arms are there and military institutions or military structure is completely the outdated regime. But in my listening to some of the presentations, I like to challenge your claims that it is an Islamist versus conservatives. I don't think so. Libyans are all very conservative Muslims. You have to look at Libya this way. And the word Islamist means people who believe that Islam has a political role. All Libyans know and believe that Islam has a political role. You might be alluding to the political party, for example, like the construction, justice and construction party which is aligned with Muslim brothers. Could be, that's one. But that's one point which we need to realize. When we speak about Libya, we are speaking about a very conservative Muslim society. And then we can analyze the degrees of conservatives or Islamism. But it is not Islamic versus conservative. This is, I think, a notion that we need to revisit. The other one is the use of the word jihadist. I'm really shocked because I'm a Western educated Muslim and I lived here for so many years. Jihad itself is a wonderful concept. I think we are using those who are using arms. And we are giving them a very beautiful concept. I mean, not in any culture. We shouldn't be calling those who are resorting to arms as jihadists. They are either criminals or weapon carriers, whatever it is, call it anything, but not jihadist. This really a front for me and front for many Muslims who have been considered jihad is a beautiful thing that starts with the individual. But that is a problem of the Western culture when it deals with Libya against Salafis. There are Salafis who are Muthalis. That's, I think, the question of our friend. Muthalis are Salafis who always accept the ruler. And they do not rebel against the ruler. Paat, Waleel, Amr is for them paramount. So we have to differentiate between those kind of Salafis and the other Salafis who are part of the mainstream, so to speak. The other point that I... One more. One more point. Only one. And then we're going on to know. Najla, when you said that there are two millions in Tunisia and double of that in Egypt, who was living in Libya? Libya only has six millions. I just wanted to... No, but I am sure about this information because... Two millions in Tunisia and double of them in Egypt? Two million in Tunisia. Just check the UN website in Tunisia about the displacement because I'm doing research about the refugee now in Tunisia and in Egypt. Next question from Bill here. Bill Lawrence. I came late, so it sounds like you didn't... I mean, these will be useful questions, but if you already covered this, don't feel like you have to repeat what you said. First of all, let me echo a couple of things Ali said. Two million in Libya, four million in Egypt and you only have five and a half million in Libyans. These numbers are way off and they come from border crossings that the Tunisian government talks about. I think maybe we're talking about 800,000 Libyans in Tunisia, maybe a few more. Now that's massive, which gets me to my question on that point, which is if you have so many civil society activists on the outside and so many people in general on the outside, why not use that to your advantage? Why not start organizing the Libyan communities in Tunisia and Egypt to work proactively on a whole range of issues? You can put together working groups. You've got people from all the different sectors. So instead of lamenting why, justifiably, why you can't do things in Liby because of the security situation, if half your population is outside, then start now on the outside. That's a question and a comment, I guess. The next point is we used to talk in Middle East studies about the Islamic revival as a big thing and then Islamism as a subset of it and how the West didn't really get how. And whenever I see the data, famously the NDI poll last year, where pretty much all of Libyans were for democracy and engagement with the West as a criteria for political parties and leaders and for Shadiah and quite conservative social more is you really have as extreme aversion as I've seen in any MENA country of a clash between the Islamic revival, which is central to what's going on sociologically and this Islamism piece which has not been sorted out. And when you see this sort of the happiness in your polling about these committees, that's right at the heart of what I'm talking about. So my question and Ali might even want to take the answer of dear over lunch, if not now. My question is who's going to take the leadership about separating between getting Islam right and getting politics right? And now within Salafism you have an effort. You have a separation from the Salafism, the Dawey Salafists, the Dawey Salafists and which we've got into a little bit in this discussion. But Lydia and again this is a question comment but Lydia really needs some leadership now on getting Islam right separately from getting politics right. I'll stop there. I was asking this question from an international development perspective, which is I know Nigel talked about this group of, oh sorry, this group of Libyans who are in Egypt and in Tunisia and I know you mentioned that they are ready to be trained. So from an implementing partner perspective, what are the most important trainings to offer these individuals? And also in terms of in-country support and in-country training, what are the priority items that you need training in or that people need access to? I wanted to go back to the USID survey that you had referred to about, I think you had said 60% of Libyans were had a tendency to this Sedefi, please correct my wording, the Sedefi ideology or right, right. But I wanted to ask about when they asked those questions, did they also have follow-up questions? Because I would think the way it was described, I would say that it was a little bit, it can be a little bit deceiving as to the picture that it gives Western supporters or populations. Because for example, a lot of times if you ask them, should there be a moral police in the sense of regulating alcohol and the dress code of say, not necessarily not hijabi, but bikinis or something like that, most Libyans would say, oh yeah, of course I support that. But they would not necessarily have a Sedefi, I know I'm simplifying it a little bit, but not have Sedefi tendencies overall, they or very conservative a bit of tendencies, if you kind of investigated further, then they would disagree with a very conservative perspective, they would tell you, oh no no, we're just middle of the road and they do believe in the individual freedom to a certain extent in those aspects. So I guess I'm asking about the USAID survey, not specifically that question, but overall, is there a possibility of getting that data, is it published, and were there just general questions or were there follow-up questions? Because I also think experience with surveys is another thing. You know in the West we take surveys all the time, but over there you might ask them a survey question and they don't know necessarily that they can give you a little bit more or what exactly you're referring to or is it an overall question I can't go more into detail. No, that's great. What I'm gonna demand from the panel is super, super fast answers because there's a lot of hands up and maybe we can do another round. Super fast answers to extremely complex questions. Maybe I'm sorry, Mr. Ali, actually, and the division between Islamist and anti-Islamist spheres and I do agree with you on the fact that it's not the only way to analyze the situation in Libya but it is a dimension that is not to be underestimated. We have political parties and when we talk about Islamism here we're talking about political Islam and not Islam as a religion. So we're talking about people who are doing politics in the name of Islam. Concerning the use of word jihadist, well, this is the common scientific term. So it wasn't my role today to review it. Can we take a bow? Can we take a bow? Of course, we take it. And Salafi al-Mathaliyah, that's true. Salafism is born with all the Mathaliyah al-Bani schools but they're not the only Salafi school. We have political Salafism and jihadist Salafism which is kind of offshoot of the mother Salafism. Faster than that. Who is in charge of separating politics and religion? I think there is a key point in Libya where there must be a way to prevent religious institutions from using the religious status to do politics or to serve a political cause. And there were propositions because the rule of the Mufti was, in the point of view of some, a bit controversial as he was considered of siding with one camp at the expense of another one and there were some propositions to make a collegial House of Iftar where the committee would represent all the trends that exist in Libya today, all the trends that are the Malikism, Salafism, even Ibadism in the Amazigh community. So it might prevent from using some religious institution for political purposes. We can talk about it. What about by using it to ask for it? As well, yeah. Do you want to answer the methodology question? Yes, concerning the USID survey, actually you're right, the question when it was isolated from the overall survey which was composed for 40 questions could be misinterpreted but if I allow myself to take it isolated from other question because we had other question that confirmed a certain penetration of so the Salafi ideas within the Libyan society, notably due to a lot of TV channels actually broadcasting in Libya. I'm not saying actually up to only 30% of Libyans according to the survey again would define themselves as Salafi. Most of them would define themselves as Maliki but that said even within the Maliki sphere many of them would adhere to Salafism not as a radical way of seeing Islam more as a way of conciliating modern way of living like in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf countries and a certain Islamic identity. I think it's a more of an instinctive addition to Salafism than real addition to this way of practicing Islam but in fact there is an important addition to some Salafi ideas. Unfortunately not. One other point just on methodology is we were with doing the perception study on justice and security. We were really careful especially with the 2013 one to balance it quite actively with qualitative. So we did the quant survey but then we allowed the quantitative interviewing to sort of filter in and balance some of those answers. One in particular that was really, really almost a comical response was when asked in a survey do you own a weapon? I can't remember the exact number because we didn't put it in this name but it was like incredibly low and then in our qualitative interviews they would say no and then you would sit for a minute and just look at them and then they go, well I mean there are those five AK-47s that we have and we got, so it was really interesting because we could see how we got that sort of incorrect. Or I mean it seemed like a skewed answer. The better I think than the five AK-47s was when somebody pulled an RPG shooter from behind the couch in an interview. It was interviewing them. And I think it was somewhere, it was around sort of a 20% positive response rate to owning weapons. And so you can see sort of there are certain types of questions because technically owning a weapon in Libya is illegal, right? The Ministry of Interior has to provide licenses and only sort of various under law, very specific subsets are allowed to own them. So there's some understanding to how you get different answers. I'll try to also go quickly unless you have something else to say. Oh, okay. So on the topic that things can't be done in Libya I want to apologize if we sort of gave that impression. I don't think we were trying to. I think that the international community in particular, I know for us, like as USIP, right now there's just incredible limitations due to the insecurity. But a number of Libyans are still trying to rebuild their country. And I think that's an important message to sort of take into account while there are also a number that are sort of both displaced outside of Libya as well as displaced from their homes inside of Libya. There are a number that are staying in their communities and continuing to try to deal with the situation and build rule of law, build better governance. And so we've found sort of trying to come up with creative ways, bringing them outside to do trainings, but not just sort of trying to give them technical skills and abilities, but working with people that have gone through similar situations. My colleague in the back, Katam Al-Qaqani, she's been working on a lot of our programs in Iraq. And so what we've been trying to do is to build up relationships between our Iraqi partners and our Libyan partners to learn from one another and support one another, sort of coming up with those type of creative solutions. In terms of the type of sort of skills and needs in terms of trainings, I think that you can't underestimate the need for coaching and mentoring. The revolution in Libya happened so fast that most civil society activists were not actively trying to operate in a conflict setting. And so I think that's also an important thing to keep in mind to what they're trying to do now is very different in terms of sort of their operating status than it was during the revolution. And trying to sort of build up their resiliency to that I think is also really, really critical. But I'll stop there. Hejla, three key skills. Dialogue skills, mediation and facilitation. Three of them. From the government level to the civil society. Thank you very much. My question been very brief. I'm just wondering if anybody could speak to the talks on Monday and who in fact was talking to whom, sorry. It's very unclear from the open source information. Maybe Mr. Ali could help us in that regard. We understand that some members of the House of Representatives in Tobruk were talking to some of the misrotted and elected members of the House of Representatives that had boycotted or were they talking to members of the Tripoli-based GNC or were they talking to any of the militia leaders? Any clarity on that would be very appreciated. Thank you. Hi, I'll try to be quick. I asked this question to the folks at Carnegie as well when they had their conference. Given the expertise and skill set of the panel here, we're sitting in the temple of conflict resolution. I guess, is there a Gandhi option? Whatever the nuclear option is a piece. Is there anything that hasn't been tried? Have every resource been put to bear on Libya? Or is there a level of escalation of engagement that has not been attempted based on the best practices of your discipline recognizing that Columbia is not Libya and every child is special and every place is unique? But is there anything else that should be done or could be done that we're holding in reserve? Thank you. We didn't get to. Thank you. My name is Senator Wilson and I'm a graduate student at Georgetown University. I just had a question. You mentioned the Salafi jihadists and the rise of those. And you basically qualified it would be that they were quite local. Is there any noise of the Southern based kind of international jihadist Salafists? Like the people who went over from Mali. I think we'd come on to that. Anybody wanna jump in on what happened yesterday? And just to give you an example. When you wonder, is there a Gandhi? Actually, we need leadership in Libya and this is one of the things really, you know, the reason we will have this struggling and this crisis. But I just, I want to mention to you when I, before I came here and study the peace studies, conflict transformation. I was activist. I was working there since 2011. But if I'm gonna tell you what kind of information and knowledge I gained when I came here and know about all these strategies and strategies included nonviolent movement for example and how to be create good leaders or how to support or coaching or all that stuff. I was hoping if I knew all this information before since the revolution started. So this is just small example shows how the education, the awareness is very important in our context. And this way we can create, I mean, definitely the leadership is one of the gift in any society but how that leader can really push and try to create change without people aware or educated about what he's doing exactly. To believe in that message and support it. I don't have an answer to question number one. But also I think in term, I definitely do not think that we have put, we being collectively both Libyans and internationals trying to build peace with Libyans sort of done every option. I think that, and I can say this honestly sort of going into Libyan 2001, 2011. I think that there were, no, never. Sort of there was a lot of assumptions that were made that sort of likely ended up turning out false. And I think that we're still sort of learning and uncovering what a number of those are. I think like Nezha said, there are things, you can't underestimate the amount of sort of knowledge, skills and enhancing abilities that can be done in Libya. And then the one thing I also don't think either Libyans or the international community has done well enough is actually creating linkages among civil society, local government and others around Libya. Not sort of, I think a lot of the focus had been on creating the linkages between the central government and the communities, but not among the communities to be a resilience against sort of the use of force as sort of a political agenda item. And so I think that there are a number of things that can still be tried to develop that type of sort of resilience and peace. Yes, I think Mr. Ali is better entitled to answer the question on what happened yesterday and Gaddamis and who participated, maybe we'd like to answer it. I said members from the House of Representatives in Tobruk with members who are boycotting the sessions in Tobruk. Only those, only the two sides who met in the Gaddamis yesterday. Crystal Bull here, it's great. Maybe. Yes. Some spokesman of political rights and some Islamist figures did boycott actually the conference and the talks, yeah. Concerning the Jihad-Salafi presence in southern Libya, it's true that maybe we have a higher proportion of foreign elements in southern Libya, unlike maybe the eastern Libya, or western Libya where you have fewer Tunisian elements, but in southern Libya the situation appears to be different. However, their presence is important because they are trying to take benefit from inter-tribal divisions and they're allowing themselves with some local groups which is allowing them to be present. Otherwise, in many cases it's exaggerated, the presence of Jihadist-Salafi group in southern Libya, it's mainly internal dynamics and they're not the only foreigners actually present in southern Libya. We have a lot of groups present in southern Libya today, so I'm fine. I'm just gonna say a final word as faux moderator on Mr. Dietrich's point. One thought, and again, not to treat cases as generalizable or one point of inspiration for me having been able to travel actually back to my own country and talk about some of the conflict resolution issues in Northern Ireland is some of the methods that were used in that case for this. One thing that strikes me and has struck me all along about the political deadlock in Libya is that it might be served well by breaking up some of those political deadlock issues into smaller pieces and dealing with them in committee pieces with, like they did in Northern Ireland, a theoretically neutral arbiter and a neutral arbiter that also engages in their own, both local and international empirical research on how to design a new institution, how to redesign and how to rehaul institutions. Because one thing that I think we haven't mentioned, and I'm reticent to say it because I don't wanna jinx it and I'm sure that it won't come to anything because you get a bit jaded on these points, but the C60, they're still talking and still moving as far as I understand forward and so maybe that's one example of the Committee on 60 on the Constitution. So if they were able to break that piece for the moment, look, if they don't solve the political issue, that whatever solution they come up with won't mean anything, but at the same time, being able to break that off and to deal with it in a more specialized environment potentially may be a way to move things forward by breaking it down. But I think we have to wrap up there. Thank you very much for coming along. I understand that USIP is doing some rethinking on events, if there's someone of these under each of your chair, I think, or the back, and then the Libya Working Group for members who are here is going to convene in the next room just down the hall. Thanks very much for coming.