 I'm going to ask you to come down, maybe sit in here for the Q&A. We have 20 minutes for questions. And I'm sure you have many. I'm going to ask you to try to be as brief as possible. Oh, Hernando Zuleta from University of Los Andes. Just one short question for Noam. So you just show us that there is a big preference for redistribution. But I'm not familiar with this literature, so maybe it's obvious the answer. But do we know about preferences for taxation? It's related to one thing that Santiago Levy said yesterday. In order to have redistribution, we need taxation. And it seems to me that we don't want taxes. Yes, I'm sorry. I forgot your name. The one who's writing, yes, hi. No problem. I can't see it from here. But in any case, do you have a theory for why it is that the legislators are to the right of the top 20%? One more question. This is for Leopoldo. So the narrative is, despite political inclusion and major economic advances, there's major economic advances in Latin America. By comparison to Asia and everywhere else, there are all these graphs of how Latin America started over here. Everybody else overtook us. There's only Africa below us now. So I wanted to comment on that. All right. Why don't we go first round of answers? I don't know who wants to start. Do you want to start? Yeah, I guess what your benchmark is. And I think you're completely right that we talk about the success of Latin America relative to perhaps some benchmark. And we're doing relatively well. But if we think about like, and that's not new, right? If you think about 19th century Latin America, our reference should be the US. So we did very poorly. Whereas if you take perhaps other reference, we're not doing this bad. But I agree with you and I was trying to sell the glass half full kind of story in the sense that it's not the things that have been still in terms of economic progress. And I do think that some countries and in particular the context that I was showing, Colombia does have some things to show in terms of reduction in poverty rates, increase in life expectancy, increasing coverage in health provision to its population. So there are all shades of grays and blacks and everything in this. But I just didn't want to be completely unfair with respect to everything has been still since. But I agree with you. And actually my benchmark is that we should be aiming higher and we should think of ourselves as falling far behind for where we should be. So, yeah. Thanks for both those comments or questions. So I don't think we have great data on preferences for taxation in the sense that or preferences for redistribution. Honestly, I mean, these questions are quite vague. I think where there are slightly more detailed questions about taxation on whom and for what purpose. Taxation on the sort of top of the income distribution in order to redistribute to the bottom of the income distribution are quite popular. But you have to ask these questions in a way that sort of suggests what's actually going to happen is something to do with redistribution. And there wasn't I think it was there was another paper in the in the program on, right, the sort of experiments on sort of expectations about, you know, whether the state is going to actually sort of do these things and things like that. So this is also a problem with sort of asking the question of preferences for redistribution because it's sort of contingent on whether you think the state will actually do the things. They actually redistribute rather than, you know, corruption, sort of taking the resources and things like that. But I don't think I don't think that if you looked at sort of these responses in southern Europe, for instance, that that would be very different. Whereas, you know, they do have higher levels of redistribution even in southern Europe. Why the elites are to the right of the top 20%. So I don't know. But one possible explanation was which is consistent with sort of what Marty Gillins and other people have found in the U.S. Is that the what those elites are actually sort of the preferences those elites are actually responding to are much narrower than the top 20%. They're the top 5% or the top 1%. And so to the extent you think those preferences are moving to the right, then that would be consistent with that. Good afternoon. I have a question for Mariano. Okay. Well, it was all, I took the information from Mariano and Pincey. I think it is Pincey. Sorry, I didn't remember your name. Ah, Pilar. Pilar and Noam. And what was common in all of your presentation was that Peru had one of the worst indicators in almost everything. Yeah. In Peru, you saw, as Pilar showed that the public schools, when you start increasing your income, you move to private schools because they are clearly better. In Peru, that's clear, clear. I live in there. I did my undergraduate course there. And I know that for a fact. And he's Peruvian. He can confirm that information. And I think you, Mariano, you showed us that in Peru there was little preference for redistribution. I think it was the worst country with preference for redistribution. And my question is for Mariano, because you showed that 243 Madrid, where you put some kind of equilibrium, right? In my opinion, Peru is located in the equilibrium where you have, like, when the rich and the middle income families, like, they joined and they left out the poorest of the population and they are not taking into consideration for anything. And that's my opinion of Peru. Well, for what I've seen. So I don't know if you know of any cases, any examples from countries where they were, which were there, like, standard in that position, but they did something that could change, like, the path of the country in order to get a better situation. Because it's not, for example, in this moment they have a left president. And what I have listened from Peruvian friends is that thanks to that president, at least in 20 years there won't be any other left president. Because he's not the best. So I don't know if you know of cases where they have turned out to change that path of development. Any other question or comment? I have a question for what you already raised, which is this tension between the two approaches that you are presenting. And I was wondering whether that tension truly exists from coming from different frameworks and whether we need Mariano to enlarge his framework to actually be able to help us rationalize these two views. Or whether there are situations in which weak parties can still provide a new fresh perspective with moderate distribution. And I want you to reflect on under what circumstances you think this may happen. Well, great. Thank you very much for the question. Thank you, Julián. And again, a pleasure to be here and part of this conversation. The question is very difficult, so I'm not going to answer it, but I'm going to say a few things related to that. One are very small things from my little model, then more important things relating to the later questions to your later questions. In this little model, I only have rich and poor models version with two groups. In that case, what you described at the Peru data point will fit the equilibrium that give me small taxation, small redistribution and inefficient state. So that Peru kind of fits in there in our data set. Of course, this is an extreme simplification. Another paper, I have two authors to my left who have worked on that. Once you include middle class, other things would happen. And there are very nice papers showing that there are some conditions under which the middle class naturally ally with the rich. And in those cases, those equilibria predict you have little taxation because that's what the rich want. You have some redistribution, but redistribution benefits mostly the middle class and doesn't get to rich and poor. That's a bit the story of many of our countries in some points in our history that truncated welfare states, etc. So that's observation number one. The second observation is a deeper point that was also to some extent common to the two questions. One thing is in this humble model, we try to explain equilibria and that is very hard in itself. Then explaining transitions is very complicated theoretically and identifying which theories are in practice is even harder. Perhaps going that way would be the way I suggest we should answer some of your question and your later question. How do we move to one equilibrium to another? It's quite natural in the history of humanity and that has been a great contributor to our understanding of that. We are moving to, on average, we are moving obviously to a more inclusive society, to a more inclusive state. They will focus on a particular democratic transition. Now we are going, Argentina underwent a second incorporation and some people have worked on that. And in this incorporation and the Colombian change in the constitution was part of that game. And as many people have said, some of us focus on institutionization, parties, the standard thing that works in the steady state. Obviously we want to get there, but sometimes to get there we have to try and say to incorporate the other people. And perhaps that's the tension we're seeing among those two stories. Yeah, I guess the one thing I would say that is related to this that sort of struck me, Leopoldo, this time that I hadn't seen last time. When you presented the emergence of new parties, almost all of them are indigenous parties. So the sort of the color that emerges as sort of the biggest. So the literature that I'm drawing on would say class-based parties is what's going to get you, so that's the European model. Ethnic parties are not going to do that. So if what you're considering inclusion is sort of encompassing both sort of marginalized class groups and marginalized ethnic groups, then you might be sort of including two different things that sort of the literature on parties would not, I think, believe has the same effects. And so if the inclusion that we're seeing in Colombia is sort of ethnic minorities, then you might not expect economic outcomes to be different. I don't know if that's the story, but I do agree with Mariano that there's an element of sort of change will sort of include some period of time of instability. And maybe we're at the point where the equilibria are sort of shifting and we don't know which way we're going. But I guess to that I would say that the experience of sort of social democratic parties emerging in Western Europe was a period of sort of change, but had kind of the prior sort of the ability to mobilize sort of social movements. And one feature of the region in the last 20 or 30 years is not the emergence of sort of new parties on the basis of sort of large social movements, but new parties because the existing parties kind of fell apart and new parties that are simply electoral vehicles, right? The kinds of things we see in Peru. And Peru has sort of new parties at every election because the same people run for election under a new party label with some sort of new coalition, but not really because there's a social movement sort of behind those parties. So maybe that's one of the big differences between the trend in Latin America and the kind of emergence that we see in other cases. So I was thinking differently, but as you spoke, I think that it really relates to what you two just said, which is I think context matters a lot. And we're looking at a context in which when we had sort of a strong parties in Colombia, the liberal conservatives, they were strong, but they weren't able to represent large cross-sections of the society. So of course, all else equal, I also want strong parties. And I also think that if you build strong parties that are able themselves to put together diverse but somehow coherent different views, then those are more likely going to say a kind of rich agreements are more likely to reduce uncertainty are more likely to have broad based redistribution. I fully agree with that. But the context of Colombia is one in which these strong parties were not representing large thoughts of the population and the form of political entry. And so this relates very much to what Mariano said was initially a form of political entry in which, you know, outside of these two parties, other groups that were not represented by them started entering. Actually, they started entering so much in so small parties that nobody liked it. And we did this 2003 reform and we fix that to some extent. But it is still the case that Colombia has not produced two or three or four large parties that within themselves can have diverse but nonetheless coherent kind of different views. So in that sense, when we show this data for Colombia, what we really have in mind is not, oh, now we have weak parties and that's kind of good because, of course, what we have in mind is, well, that's a sign of how political entry occurred. Now, had it occurred inside the liberal and the conservative parties, then, yeah, perhaps much better, but that's something that didn't happen. So, and that connects to what you're saying, which is these groups that were entering where, yes, in one of the graphs, majority indigenous, but when you look at who then got to power, then indigenous were important, black groups were important, women were important, former guerrilla groups were important. So these are all groups that didn't have access to formal political power. They just distrust this exclusive political party so much that it's only reasonable that they didn't do it within the strong political party system. So in that sense, I think that, you know, if I abstract myself from the Colombian context and if I just look at whether stronger weak parties are better, then, of course, I'm going to agree with you and I'm going to agree with the reduction of uncertainty, broad-based redistribution and so forth, but we were not so much looking at the effect of strong versus weak parties but as a measure of the extent of fluidity in political power and competition and contestation, which even in a strong party system you want to see. You want to see that, to see, if you see a very entrenched political power, you won't see broad-based redistribution, you would see some fraction of the elite over some fraction of the party controlling the party and staying in power and so forth. So that's an attempt at reconciling these views but I'm still thinking about it and I think it's a very interesting tension, the one that has arisen with the paper so this is just, you know, on the spot thoughts. Thank you. Thank you so much. You wanted to have it. Just one last word because I also like the two interventions and I still am passed, you know, by your deep question about how can we think transitions for, in your example cases like Peru towards a better, more inclusive, yet more cohesive and institutionalized equilibrium and I just, I don't have the answer but I look here at my famous friends who have power to organize things so I think we should organize to think better about this. Again, the notion of equilibria is useful to think about approximation to state states but many of our countries are in transitions and I think your paper is very nice description of the current state of the Colombian transition. If I had to throw one example but every country example will have somebody upset, I think you know I did a bit of a job or there were two parties and then a third one entered on the left and they kind of accommodated and they live in a rather civilized manner so we have to look for examples of that and my fear coming from Argentina is that in some of the cases the incorporation period makes you jump from elite domination to populist none of which is a good equilibrium for welfare or for the poor for that matter. Thank you. We have one last pressing question. Just more than a question is a suggestion for Pilar for future research and thank you very much for your presentation. I really liked it. At the moment what happened with COVID is that a lot of these private schools for the low income desiles were closed because they were bankrupt so I think it's a very nice opportunity to understand thinking about what you were of your paper to think what implications would that have and what implications is having right now. All these school closures and what we are seeing is that a lot of people migrating to public schools and public schools completely overflowed in many countries so I think that's an interesting opportunity for future research thinking on what you're doing right now. Thank you. Thank you very much everybody. Before you all go I will just take 30 seconds to basically draw your attention on this website. All of the papers that you've seen here discussed are going to start popping up on this website. There is very little yet in there but there is something useful which is you can follow us. You go there you put your email address and then you will get emails with a lot of interesting stuff that is going to be coming in the next few months and maybe some of the things that you are doing please bring into that so that we can actually be aware. I mean this conference has been great for that. Thank you very much. Thank you for the great.