 Good evening, good morning, or good afternoons, depending on where you are. My name is Steve Tsang. I am the director of the Sours China Institute. I would like to welcome you to this joint event with the Center for African Studies at Sours together with the Sours China Institute. Or if you prefer, you can call these three Stevens show, because it would have occurred to you that both of our speakers are Stevens. And the chair is also a Steven. Before I introduce the subject and the speakers, let me just remind you in terms of how we are going to run this evening's panel discussion webinar format. The two speakers will introduce the subject for about 10 minutes each. Professor Steven Chen will speak first. And then Steve Toku will also speak partly responding to what Steven would have said. And then I will engage with them in some conversations on some subjects. We will do that for about 40 minutes or so, and then it will be open to general discussions. We will be running it through the webinar format, which means that you will be able to raise your questions or your comments through the Q&A box at the bottom right hand corner. When you do so, if you would like to remain anonymous, you must feel free to request that. But it would be still very helpful if you could say who you are and where you are. And that will enable me to pick the questions with better representations more generally. But if you request that your name be kept anonymous, this wish will be respected. Now, for the subject of discussions this evening, it is Chinese vaccine diplomacy in Africa, a global perspective. And this is obviously a particularly important and timely subject. In some ways, we could not have chosen a better time because we are now at a time when many different countries across the world are looking at the issue of vaccination and vaccine distribution. And it has not been a particularly pretty picture. China has played a more proactive role in distributing vaccines to Africa than some of the other countries where vaccines are also being produced. It also happens to be a time when we are hearing that some of the Chinese vaccines happens to be fake, not only for those who have been exported elsewhere, but domestically within China itself. And that is a subject which I hope our panelists will discuss with us as well. Now, I'm not going to go into much into this subject, and I will leave that to our experts. And they are Professor Stephen Chan, OBE. Stephen holds the chair of World Politics at SOAS, where he had previously served as Dean of Law and Social Sciences. Before SOAS, Stephen was an international civil servant and as such, he continues to be very actively involved in engaging with the world beyond academia. He has published extremely widely in academic journals and, as far as I can count, 35 scholarly books. The other speaker is Steve Yitapu. He is a research associate at the Center for African Studies. He earned his PhD from us at SOAS and has taught politics and international relations here as well. He's also a program and policy consultant with WS Breathings. He is somebody who is particularly well acquainted with many leading political figures across Africa. I think somebody may use a slightly different ways to describe his connections with many leaders in African countries. With that, I will hand over to Professor Stephen Chan for his introduction. Thank you, Steve. It's a great pleasure, ladies and gentlemen, to be here. It's also a very great pleasure to be reunited with Dr. Steve Yitapu. We're all friends and, of course, he has vast diplomatic experience, having been a special assistant to Nigerian President Dabasanjo. And basically, I think the two of us want to bring together some perspectives on this whole issue of COVID, China, and vaccine diplomacy. And I want to set this whole question of Chinese vaccine diplomacy into some kind of context. The first, of course, is that China has been active in Africa for a very long time, since independence, since even before independence. It declared what it wanted to do at the 1955 Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian Nations and said it was going to try to be of assistance to Africa. Now, of course, there have been epochs where this assistance has been problematic. We're probably going through one of those epochs right now, where there's a great deal of ambivalence about Chinese interests in Africa, Chinese influence in Africa. But what I'm going to say at the outset is that I think that the vaccine diplomacy is something which is not designed just to win friends and influence people, and they are winning friends and influencing people from a long time back. But I think it is a genuine desire to be of assistance in a humanitarian situation. The second thing that I wanted to say is that the Chinese are there because there's a vacuum of assistance when it comes to vaccine diplomacy. The West has been very, very slow to move. And although the West has subscribed to the African Union WHO COVAX scheme, that scheme is only just now starting to roll out. And although Western nations, as I said, have contributed to the scheme, they have not made available any of their excess vaccines. So despite the brave words by someone like President Macron in France, not even France and certainly not the United States, in fact, President Biden categorically said he would not provide any American excess vaccines for Africa. So giving money for a slow motion program underneath WHO and African Union auspices is one thing. Getting vaccines into the continent, into different countries, that is something that the West has been very slow to do. So the Chinese have been acting in a vacuum created by the West. The third thing I want to say is that the West responded to the Chinese diplomacy in an almost typical fashion of panic and fear mongering. Here come the Chinese again, that go to try to steal, as it were, your support internationally by giving away goodies. But I wanted to basically give you today's figures. These are the latest figures. And so far the Chinese, and I'm talking about their principal vaccine, the Sinopharm vaccine, it has reached 19 countries. Now, that's a very small percentage of the 54 recognized African countries. The 55, if you count Somaliland, for instance, that they're not yet have diplomatic recognition, but which is a functioning government. So 19 out of 54, when you look at the percentages of population that the Chinese vaccine can cover, you're actually looking at a valuable input that all the same is very small. Basically, what you've got, I'll give you some examples from today's figures. In a country like Egypt, for instance, some 350,000 doses of Sinopharm have been made available. But Egypt has also been able to access 50,000 doses of AstraZeneca. So people are not just relying on the Chinese. Some are. So Sierra Leone has received a donation of 200,000 Sinopharm doses, and an equal number of syringes and needles. People forget that you're going to have to be able to administer the vaccines. That is not a given that every single country is going to have sufficient syringes and materials by which they can administer the vaccine. Zimbabwe has made the news that received 200,000 doses of Sinopharm. They go to purchase another 1.2 million doses. When the Chinese received the information that these Zimbabweans would purchase, then they doubled their donations. So now it's going to be a total of 400,000 doses donated, but with a further 1,250,000 to be purchased. Mozambique has been given 200,000 doses of Sinopharm. But they're going to also receive 100,000 from India. And a country like Guinea stands out as being the only one that has received shipments of Sputnik, but very much on an experimental trial basis. In other words, the Russian vaccine is not really part of this. The Indians are a bigger player than it seems at first sight, because although it seems that they're only a minor player compared to the Chinese, and so far as the COVAX scheme from the WHO, the AU, is being rolled out, and so far it's reached countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, for instance. The Indian vaccine, sorry, the WHO AU vaccine, the COVAX is actually manufactured in India under license for AstraZeneca. So AstraZeneca is playing a part, even though it made under license in India. As the Indian vaccine drive gears up, and don't forget that the world's largest and in many, many ways most prolific vaccine manufacturer have a huge pharmaceutical vaccine industry, noted up to now for its generic production, but very, very much capable of making very sophisticated vaccines. Then I think you'll see a second stage of all of this that begins to rival the Chinese, and that is the Indian phase of the rollout of vaccines. And a surprise additional player is likely to be Cuba. People forget that in the years of diplomatic isolation, that Cuba has devoted itself to development of scientific and medical research. Last time I counted, they were publishing 200 scientific journals, that's quite a number. Some of them are actually quite good. And when they say they've got the capacity to develop their own vaccine, it's about to enter into trial stage now, I actually believe it. This is something born out of necessity. So what you're going to see are the beginnings of a vaccine diplomacy that encompasses a great number of providers. The West coming quite far down the list, the Chinese leading, but very much as I say, the Chinese are leading because the West has left the vacuum. Now, of course, the question is, will there ever be enough for such a vast continent? Are the figures that we're getting out of Africa accurate because of a lack of testing mechanisms and modalities? Is there some kind of, let us say greater resistance to COVID because of past pandemics that have swept through Africa? All of these are open questions. And of course the question is, will any of the vaccines, Western or Chinese, be fully efficacious against the new variants, the variant coming out of South Africa? For instance, more contagious, whether or not it's more deadly is another question entirely. But early indications are that almost all of the vaccines on the market right now will be efficacious against serious infection, not necessarily against mild infection, but the death rate is likely to be reduced significantly by the rollout of the vaccines, including the Sinopharm. So then what's happening now is likely being led by the Chinese to have a very, very beneficial effect on Africa. Is this vaccine diplomacy as its core going to lead to lasting links with China from African countries? Well, it will to an extent. A country like Zimbabwe has got nowhere else to go, for instance, the death profile is so huge that the Chinese are the only ones prepared to extend forms of conditional liquidity to Zimbabwe. The Chinese provision of all of these vaccines to that country, that is something which definitely does tie in Zimbabwe even further to the linkages it already has with China. However, if you look at other countries, then what you've got in terms of Egypt, for instance, that is not going to greatly change Egyptian links with China. The Chinese are first, but as I said, the Egyptians are buying in doses of AstraZeneca and they've got the capacity to do that. They'll take advantage, of course, of the Chinese generosity in being first, but they know that they will not have to depend on China for the vaccines or indeed for almost anything else. So what you've got in terms of the vaccine diplomacy is that some countries, yes, will be sucked more deeply into the Chinese orbit, but many countries will maintain their independence and basically be grateful for Chinese assistance because, of course, it is genuinely humanitarian. It's greatly helpful. It came when the West was not prepared to act. And so the Chinese are seen in a good light, but it doesn't tie the majority of those receiving donations into a perpetual Chinese orbit. So the point I want to make is to put this into context, the rollout of the vaccine, the scale of the vaccine diplomacy is so far small. It's the start, however, of a multinational vaccine diplomacy which will see many players involved in the whole process. It will not tie the majority of the beneficiaries into a Chinese orbit. Basically, they'll still be able to play a proper international diplomatic game. The Chinese know that they're creating goodwill, certainly. And in terms of creating this goodwill, the point that I made at the very beginning, this is part and parcel of a continuum. The Chinese have been involved beneficially as well as problematically in Africa since the very beginning. And when you look at a country like Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the fact that Zimbabwe has got nowhere else to go right now, the Chinese have been involved there since before independence. The liberation struggle conducted by two liberation movements, but the Triumphant Liberation Movement, led by Robert Mugabe, they were trained and equipped by the Chinese. So that when I was part of the transition process in 1980 in Zimbabwe, the ceasefire that led to elections that declared the country finally under majority rule, then the liaison offices, some of the guerrillas with whom I spoke, seeing I was Chinese, would put up chopsticks from their webbing, from their rap bags and say, your country came to help us when no one else did. Ladies and gentlemen, that's the point I wanted to make. China is creating waves because it was the first. They came to help when no one else did. Thank you. Thank you, Steve, and the very important points to end on. Let me hand it over to you, Steve, and obviously African views are very diverse, but at least there is a very authentic voice in you. Thank you so much. I couldn't have said more than what Professor Steven Chen, as I actually said. Fantastic presentation. I couldn't have agreed more than that. Having said that, I think I want to take it from another perspective. And yes, COVID-19, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the first aspect of it was the mask diplomacy, I mean mask, and then later it shifted to the vaccine diplomacy. I want to look at it from the political aspect. I think there is a contention. The contenders in this whole vaccine diplomacy is just three countries involved, USA, China, and then Russia. Even though America played itself into a v-team right from the beginning, because of the type of leadership the Americans had at that particular time, which was Trump, there seemed to be a restart or a reset button in the US diplomacy based on the fact that Biden is now trying to rally around his allies and then jump into the fray of the vaccine diplomacy. And Russia is also in the midst, and then China. Now, like what Steve in China has actually stated earlier on, China is actually playing on the vacuum left or vacuum created by the Western states or Western allies, because as far as we're concerned for now, Africa has been abandoned in terms of AIDS, assistance, and all sorts of free meals they've been having from the West. And so China has been trying to catch up on the vacuum by doing what they're doing currently. At the end of the day, where China has actually succeeded so greatly is being in Central Asia. And through what has been feeling this vacuum, what has become the Belt and Road Initiative, which is the BROI, that's what they're also trying to use in Africa. And they succeeded largely because if you can still recall, the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was built by China single-handedly without the help of the Western world. And so they've been in total control of what is happening. I think that is beginning to show as if it's their complete domain in international politics. Now, what is our plan now? Even though from the African perspective, the understanding in Africa is being that China is no longer trying to play, even though the general perspective has also been that China is also playing this vaccine diplomacy on the basis of trying to avoid a career status by trying to cover the story with the origin of the COVID-19 coronavirus. Many Africans still appreciate what China has done so far in terms of the economics. I think that is somehow reducing the pressure on China in the event of why the West is questioning China on the origin of coronavirus. Africa is not doing that because of the fact that they've actually benefited largely in terms of investment and a lot of goodwill from China. Now, Steven Chan also mentioned something about Sinofarm, which has actually gone around a lot of the countries in Africa in 19 out of 54. Two countries like Egypt, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and then Nagini. The question and the fear in Africa is just a perception, the perception of the Chinese vaccines. How would they be successful in Africa? How would they be successful in the event of based on the fact that majority of, yes, China has done so much for Africa, but what are the perception of the Africans, not the leaders? Because the perception in Africa is the fact that China always associates with the strong main leaders. In a sense, these are unpopular persons in Africa. While the American or the Western governments in terms of ease and other, they've also interacted directly with the African people. That has not been the case with Africa, with China. In the sense of giving a lot of scholarship because I first am concerned from empirical research is the fact that a lot of Africans still have this predetermined mindset of being pro-Western in their retention. Based on the fact that you have a lot of Africans studying Western universities across the world, you have a lot of Western Africans in Tamari with a lot of Western nations. That is not what has been seen on the other side of Asia concerning China. So yes, the vaccines, I believe that this is not the time to start playing the victim. And playing the victim to say, well, China has been responsible for the origination of vaccine. There's a time to rally the entire world into one single unit and become a global force to put an end to the pandemic. Fantastic, I think that is the way to go. But how do you convince the African people in terms of making the vaccines more popular? Because a lot of Africans are also seeing that a lot of Africans perceive China has aligned itself with the strongmen leaders in Africa and so to the detriment of the African people. And so that has been the bottleneck in determining the exact level of acceptance of the Chinese vaccine. Now, the dynamics of this whole thing is that even while China is attempting to enter, to expand its vaccine diplomacy in Africa, it is also going elsewhere, especially in the South American and North American countries, Chile, Brazil and the others, and they're making a source of that. A lot of presidents, a lot of countries are gladly welcoming the vaccine, usually of these vaccines in those countries. What the Western government is doing now, which is in the sense of trying to play the big thing is using India in order to checkmate China in many countries of the world. Like Steve in China has actually mentioned, yes, Astra Zeneca's vaccine has been sent to Ghana and some other African countries through World Heritage and the Western government. That was, I think, the COVAS program. That's what has been done. And India is also playing that to using all the neighbors, countries like Bangladesh and others. All what they're trying to do is to checkmate China in the, checkmate China and then this beat maybe to expand this diplomatic frontiers. Russia on its part too is also in the midst, like I stated earlier on. So, but in all this, what I'm foreseeing in all this calculation is that we are going back into a second cold war. Second cold war based on the sense in the sense that during the first cold war, a lot of African countries with other developing countries came together to form what is known as the non-aligned movements. And informing that movement, the decision of the body was that we were going to remain neutral in the politics of the, remain neutral in the political war or in the international war or in the international diplomatic war on influence between Russia and the United States and America. Now, what the three power nations are doing now, Russia, China and the United States of America is to go through this non-alignment movement in order to win more global influence in trying to get more countries to a side. I think that's what is happening. So, but at the end of the day, like I mentioned earlier on, in spite of all these intrigues in terms of this power play and others, at the end of the day, the positives from all these rivalries, whether Chinese vaccine diplomacy or the vaccine diplomacy going to be employed by United States and its allies or Russia is that fighting this disease as a far long been used as a means of extending soft power and winning friends. It is normal. In politics, like they say, all ambitious are love who accept those ones that climb on the credulities of mankind. Now, the superpower drivers for influence really need to have sometimes even been positive. If they, if only they could come together, it could be positive because the sources of the small post eradication that happened in the past was in part fuelled by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. So, and then responding to SARS, there was SARS before coronavirus in 2002. China provided assistance. China provided assistance to the entire world and supported to give support to all the affected countries in order to bolster its global power, including Taiwan, even including Taiwan, that is part of its test relations with Taiwan. They still provided that. So, at the end of the day, what we end up being the end game in this whole gambit. Now, the more than 100 non-aligned countries will they still remain neutral between China, between Russia and between the United States? My answer will be no, because the great powers are doing all the cool to swear loyalties within the non-alignment movement, which, that is where Africa finds its own setting. But whether we like it or not, like I earlier mentioned, the entire world is slipping back into a second cold war. It is in swing votes. The China and Russia are working on doing what they can to minimize global support for the United States of America. Unfortunately, for the Western allies, Mexico, for an instance, has pulled out, is already looking to diversify its alliances. I think that is what Africa should do, because a lot of African countries, despite the fact of how the non-aligned movement, a lot of African countries also had through maybe second line diplomacy or third line diplomacy, also had relationship with the United States, with Moscow. So, I wouldn't be surprised if Russian president does not visit America basically very in time soon, because in terms of this vasten diplomacy, their interest has always been pointing straight to Russia all the time. Why is India in the midst? India is dominant in this particular period because the Western governments are using it because the United Kingdom is actually using the Serum Institute of India, which is producing the vastens. They are using it much as a needed ballast against China and Russia. So, India is not tossing with China over neighbor such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Indian mid jobs have also arrived in South Africa, but the results have been missed here as tests have cast out on the fascist efficacy because of the local strain. Meanwhile, Sputnik has already appeared and has already been applied for approval in South Africa. But in spite of all this progress, in spite of all these intrigues and in spite of all the noise about the vasten diplomacy, what is the way forward? I gave a glimpse earlier on, what is the way forward? The way forward is this, the global response to COVID-19 has thus far tended to be uncompretive and divisive. It is clouded with casting blames by the Western government, which is not good enough for China. China is actually out to fill a vacuum. This is a vacuum that was left unattended to by the Western government. As far as we're concerned, the African states or the African nations have been abandoned for far too long. And these policies are spreading or seeking to spread distrust, should be discouraged. Why the Western states have been spreading distrust without filling the vacuum? The Chinese government or the Chinese as a nation is also capitalizing on that to fill the vacuum. And so they should not be blamed. Now, the bill is excluded from the benefit of the vaccine science and innovations demands, whether we like it or not, a global, a truly global response. The first Chinese vaccine diplomacy is being used to turn China because if you, oh, China created a virus, so they are using this as a soft power to get to a lot of African states. And so because of that, they are going to extract a lot of influence as against the Western states, that is wrong. So what we need, and I repeat it again, is a truly global response. A more equal partnership for health, for all citizens of the world. This will determine not only the course of COVID-19, but the impact of the next epidemic. If we politicize the handling of COVID, how then can we handle any future pandemic? Conscience, let me just wrap it a little. I know I'm just about crossing the line. When consigned by China using the vaccines to sway all that countries and boosts geopolitical and global influence are narrow-minded, I don't agree. I agree with the fact that it is narrow-minded. Any discussion, any discourse on that should be considered as narrow-minded. And whether you like it or not, if somebody is trying to solve a problem, such institutions or nations should be appreciated because it is also what could be regarded as a global public good. It's not the case of what the United States is doing in working with allies like Japan, India, Australia, and the rest, in order to make sure the rest in order to distribute COVID-19 in Asia in order to counter the evilness of China. I will end it here for now. Thank you. Thank you very much, Steve. That's very, very thoughtful. We already have a few questions being put by the audience. And we are getting pretty close to the point that I was originally planning instead we will open this to the general thought. So I will not raise many of the issues that I have with you. But in the way how you were responding to Stephen and highlighting the issues, you already underlined the importance of making a distinction between governments and people, which I think is very important, very valid. Can I push you a bit further and ask you, does it even make sense for us to talk about Africa as a whole, about Chinese vaccine diplomacy in Africa? I see if Africa were one unit. As Stephen reminded us, there is a continent of 54 different countries. The kind of diversity in that place is absolutely enormous. So does it even make sense to talk about Africa in that way, even though we're dealing with a global pandemic, we wanted to have a global response, which is why we're talking about China and Africa? If you were asking me that question about 10 years ago, I would say yes. But for now, in the present, I would say no. And I'll give you the reasons. 10 years ago, we had an organization called the African Union, or the Organization of the African Unity, which transported to what is now known as the African Union. Then we had leaders who could be called leaders, who could stand tall and be called leaders. We had leaders who could rally around themselves, rally among themselves and reach a decision and all will stand by that decision by a simple and common resolutions by the African Union. Unfortunately, we don't have that anymore. Africa cannot speak with a voice any longer because of the diversity you just mentioned, not just in diversity in terms of culture, language and others, but in diversity in the sense of allegiance to certain powers across the world. And those allegements are caused by economic benefits, trades, deals, support for other dictatorship or support for those elected in terms of fraudulent elections in Africa. So unfortunately, Africa cannot speak as one voice any longer because Africa does not have leaders who mobilize the others. When we had people like Obasanjo, we had people like Kimberki, we had people like Mandela, we had people like Butifleka of Algeria, we had people like Mubarak of Egypt, we had leaders like Mama Gaddafi of Libya. You could sit then, you could sit five, six, seven leaders coming together to say, look, this is the direction of Africa, let us summon a summit, we could hold a summit and then reach a resolution and then all Africans taste more stand by it. Imagine in the early 2000s, when Bashir was the president of Sudan, the International Criminal Court had indicted Bashir for international crimes. Now, in terms of leadership of the African Union, it was done in terms of rotation. It came to the tone of our Bashir to be made the chairman of the African Union. But it took only 24 hours mobilization by presidents like Obasanjo and others to say, look, in the face of this condemnation, in the face of this indictment by international criminal court, we cannot give it to this man. So they went to Sudan, had the summit there, but they moved it. With the understanding of Africa, they spoke with one voice, but that cannot happen now because of interest. Okay, Stephen, would you like to come in? No, I think there's a point that you were suggesting that the big cleavage between the Chinese state and its approach to Africa as a continent and the reaction of African people, they can constitute the greatest diversity, of course. It's not just 54 different countries, it's 2,000 different languages, about 300 of which are actually spoken in West Africa and the Nigerian region. So you've got this incredible diversity. And I think the Chinese have been guilty of approaching Africa in far too general a sense, but they're not the only ones. I mean, here in the United Kingdom, in the foreign and Commonwealth and Development Office, there's a minister for Africa in the United States, there's an assistant secretary of state for Africa. In other words, looking at Africa and its complexity and its diversity, there's something which has escaped the Western world and the Chinese world. What complicates things for the Chinese state is of course the very bad behavior of many Chinese nationals who are working in Africa. Some of that behavior, on the part largely of private individuals has been catastrophic in terms of public relations and in fact, not to put any easy words on it, it's been from time to time, gracious. So China has got to overcome all kinds of mistrust of the sort that Steve was talking about, but in a situation where bakers can't be choosers and no one else is putting the vaccine into these regions. And the Chinese vaccine is the only show in town and is easily transportable. It doesn't need deep refrigeration, just ordinary refrigeration, does it? And if you don't have enough syringes, needles, the Chinese will provide those too. I think they're notwithstanding all kinds of local, individual superstitions and suspicions about the Chinese, then the diplomacy around the vaccine probably will be beneficial to China in the end. But yes, every one of the great powers has got to take a more diversified look at Africa. And yes, Steve is completely correct. Africa also needs to get its act together. In other words, it's got to mobilize its diplomatic weight. It's got to use the African Union in a far more coherent way than is possible right now. We may never have the era of giants anymore in African politics. For those who are leading in African politics could do a little bit better or the same. Okay. Okay, let me now bring in some of the questions from the audience. The first question I picked comes from Mandipa Machacha. And it's directed, first of all, to you, Stephen. I will invite Steve to come in as well to comment. The question is, vaccine hesitancy in Zimbabwe is very high. As of last week, out of 400,000 doses that they have received of Sinovac, only 25,000 have been vaccinated. We are now hearing that the state in Zimbabwe is coercing people to take the vaccine by saying that those who are not vaccinated will not get jobs or will not get essential services. It has also been said that China is trying to test its vaccines against the 501 YZ2 variant by donating the vaccines to Zimbabwe. While Sinovac is clearly useful, do you think China is doing it properly by targeting that dependent countries in this way? I think that China is doing it as best anyone can. Don't forget that we're distributing the vaccine in places like Brazil as well. And vaccine hesitancy is something which is not just part of the Zimbabwean scene. To give a more rounded picture of what's happening in Zimbabwe, I think you'll also find that the Zimbabwean government is actually having some trouble rolling out the vaccine. In other words, the country has melted down to such an appreciable extent that infrastructure is not reliably working anymore. So getting the vaccine up, even on these minimal refrigeration conditions, it is a very, very great difficulty. And also you've had a health sector that has been at war with the government. The doctors and the nurses have been on strike. It's down on the populated health sector. So just having people who are educated and trained enough to administer a simpler injection, that is not necessarily gonna be the case, particularly once you get outside of the cities. In terms of bullying people, well, we're bullying people here too. Everyone talking here in Europe about vaccine passports before we can get onto an airplane again and things of that nature. So the drive to make sure that you've got everyone vaccinated really speaks to something which is more fundamental in that this is really the only strategy the entire world has against COVID-19. If the vaccine doesn't work, we're back to square one. We can't go into lockdown on a perpetual basis. These Zimbabweans have had lockdown after lockdown and basically they've been crying out for a vaccine. Now that it's there, you've got a combination of, oh, now shall we finally get it? Now the lockdown has been lifted. Can we trust it? And can the government get it to us? So there's a multiplicity of factors there. They can't be reduced to just a single one of those factors. Okay, Steve, would you like to come in or are you happy to move on? Like what you said, what Steve Enchan has stated, there's a high level of hesitancy in Africa. And this could be attributed to the fact that Africa is made up of religious people. Religious people in the sense that they believe that without verses, they could be cured through religious prayers, through prayers to God and all those stuff. And also don't forget the conspiracy theories that has been so rampant in the continent. The conspiracy theories to the effect that this is all about the devil, that the vaccine is all about the product of the devil in trying to, or the work of a Satan or the Satan. And that by taking the vaccine, the microchips have been planted in people's body that could bring about this world order. And so that's the level why there's been assistance. Now many have discovered that these microchips are not being given. So the next complaints or the excuse now has also been on the fact that they're waiting for their relatives or friends who have taken it to see whatever impact the vaccines will have on them, whether they leave or they die before they take such decision to say, well, it is safe for us to take. And so that is the reason for that reluctancy. And you see everything been done by African governments is also been treated with distrust. They also believe that the African leaders, their governments will bring, we budget a lot of sums of money just as an excuse to steal it and then also loot the funds and then bring ordinary water. So they have to be sure that what they're being given is the original vaccine, not the one that may have been treated through corruption. So that is the reason for this distancing. Thank you. Okay. Next question I picked comes from the Leadenance from Francine. She would like to ask you, Steve, that while you said Russia and China are trying to minimize the global support for the United States, partly through the vaccine diplomacy. Should we then argued that China's vaccine diplomacy or vaccine supplies to Africa? Should be seen as a means rather than an end? How does the agency of Africa and Africans come into this? Is the Chinese supply to vaccines to Africa or African countries a means rather than an end itself? First of all, let me correct that impression. I didn't say maybe Russia and China is trying to minimize. It's an open field. It's an open field for playing for every international operators or players in terms of diplomacy. There's no restriction in the fact that China is trying to outplay or maybe they're trying to frustrate the work of America. China has never gone out to Africa to say, abandon your relations with America. They've only gone to America to discuss either bilateral deals or multilateral deals in the terms of the Belt and Road Initiative. And when we say as a means, it's not that we're not seeing it as a means that may be making an attempt to get into Africa, for instance, let me make this point before I go on the issue of the means. Russia has been a long-term adversary of the United States of America. They've done, it's historical. China was a giant that was asleep for a long time. Now they've risen up and they are making other powers to not be conscious of their interest into the global power play. So whether we like it or not, China is here to stay. So China is not directly going to Africa to say, stop your relations with Russia or stop your relations. There's nothing like that. So I didn't, if I said that earlier, or maybe I was miscontrude, it's an open field of play in terms of diplomacy or political international relations. It's an open field of play for international politics. Now in terms as a means, before coronavirus, China has always made these diplomatic forays into Africa. I come from Nigeria. I know the number of projects China has in America, in Nigeria, for instance. I know the number of projects they have in Chad. I know the number of projects they have in Sudan. I know the number of projects they have even in countries like Egypt and the rest of Africa. And these are massive, they're massive in numbers. So they've done all what needed to be done before now. I think what they're doing with the vaccine for now is just to complement what they've done in the past in terms of economic aid, in terms of economic investments are not to stop. In Nigeria, for instance, they are building the bloomed Nigerian government to build new rail lines across the country. So it's not a means to an end as far as I'm concerned. It's not a means to an end, but at the end of the day is what is the value? What we should be concerned about now is the value of what the diplomatic initiative in terms of vaccine will bear on Africans. I think that's what should be more of interest. Thanks. Okay. The next question is about the BLI. It comes from two members of the audience. Graham Leslie would like to ask whether the vaccine diplomacy is this, or at least the motivation behind the vaccine diplomacy is the same as that for the Bell and Rode initiative or is the former, the vaccine diplomacy a mix of altruism and creating stronger ties whereas the Bell and Rode initiative was wholly economic self-interest. With the knowledge that perhaps eventually it may reach to China having potentially even military bases in some of those countries eventually. And the other questions come from Lily Russell Jones at the LSE. And she would like to ask whether the vaccine diplomacy is being used to supplement the BLI at all. Is there a connection between the countries that are receiving Chinese vaccines and whether they are part of the BLI or not? Who do you want to answer that Steve? Steve first and then Stephen. Oh Steve first, okay. To me, I don't see a difference. A difference between the BLI and the vaccine diplomacy. I think it's more or less like an attempt to consolidate its relationship and then follow up to what they've done in Africa. Okay. Stephen? I think that Africa was to a certain extent to a prototype for what we now call the Bell and Rode initiative. Things like the Pizarra Railway that linked Zambia to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania at the height of the White Settler Rebellion in Rhodesia, for instance, was a major infrastructural project. All kinds of highway and railway projects in the Horn of Africa, well before we heard about the so-called Belt and Road Initiative. But vaccine diplomacy is, as it were, parallel to this. It doesn't take the place of the Belt and Road Initiative. It adds to the possibility of the Belt and Road Initiative being expanded. By that, I mean, you'll note the Chinese really mean business in terms of the Belt and Road and tying it into the vaccine initiative if they also help the African states develop pharmaceutical capacities so that they can research and develop vaccines of their own. There's a crying need for that, for instance. Hebbeler outbreaks in Central and Western Africa. If the Chinese really do mean business, then that certainly would be a test case of allowing Africa to develop the capacity to stand on its own feet when it comes to these matters. Now, having said that, although everyone talks about the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of its original meaning of transport routes, communications networks, Africa is still yet to be fully penetrated in any meaningful sense like that. And in fact, the West is still in the way of some of this so that the original Chinese proposal to develop a communications and transport corridor across the entire South of Democratic Republic of Congo was stimmed by the West. That would have joined up Democratic Republic of Congo. You would have made the entire Southern part of the country governable. It would probably have ended the terrible wars in Southeastern Congo. And the interesting thing about that was that the Chinese were not only going to build this gigantic transport and communications corridor, but build hospitals and universities along the route. That's what I mean. The True Belt and Road Initiative, one that is truly developmental, has got to go beyond the traditional Chinese provision of things like transport and communications and develop capacity. Building hospitals and universities are a case in point that should indeed point towards the eventual Chinese assistance in developing pharmaceutical industries that could rival India's, for instance, at some stage in the future. So that hopefully at some stage in the future, vaccine diplomacy won't be necessary. Perhaps at some stage in the future, we'll be asking African countries to provide us with vaccines that they manufacture for our own needs. Okay, the next lot I gained two questions. They asked kind of commentaries to each other. The first questions come from a ethnic Chinese person who prefers to stay anonymous. And the question is, do you think China would come and help when Western players cannot? Is it due to the better domestic conditions in China in coping with the COVID crisis? Or would China try to help no matter what for political interest, especially given the traditional relationship between China and African countries? So if China, that is the bit I'm interpreting, will China still be quite as generous in sharing vaccines if there is a change in the social circumstances in China and they need to vaccinate quickly in China? The second question comes from Graham Hutchings. He says, I sense that our speakers are moving from the premise that China has moved quickly on the vaccination front and with projects in Africa generally to the conclusion that the PLC is a kind of altruistic state, almost without national interest of its own. As an historian, I have never encountered an altruistic state and therefore he would like your comments. Stephen, if you would go first and then Steve, you could come in. Yes, of course. There's no such thing as a purely altruistic state. I fully agree with that. We have this country at the phenomenon called tied aid. We make sure that the aid we give, even though the amounts reducing, is conditional on purchases, access to markets, things like that. So all kinds of, as it were, little tricks go to this game of apparent altruism. The point I was making earlier, however, was that China doesn't need to do that with the vaccine. It's already done it by all kinds of predecessor programs. So I do think there's a genuine element of altruism and humanitarianism in the vaccine drive. And they are able to do this because don't forget, and we're very, very quick to point the finger of blame towards China for the origin of the COVID pandemic. That just may be, but it also gave them the lead time to begin developing responses to it. In other words, they've been working on the vaccine for quite some time. They've got a head start on the West. And because they were impacted early days by COVID-19, their progress has been such that they can roll out the vaccine not only for themselves, but for others. There is, of course, a massive vaccination drive in China itself. There's been some vaccine hesitancy even in China itself. But the country is by no means fully covered in terms of vaccine. So no one knows how long it will take for China to be fully vaccinated. And no one knows how long it will take for Africa to be fully vaccinated. I think the trick is to get these continents vaccinated to a point of relative safety. You're always going to have COVID in the background. It's not going to go away just like that. But what that means is a great benefit for international relations. It makes interaction more possible. It makes travel more possible. It makes production more possible. It makes market penetration, not just for China, but for others, far more possible. So in what is probably more properly called a competition of soft power, what you've got are possibly benefits for everyone, not just China and Africa, but it will also help Western contacts with African countries that Africa becomes a safe place for travel and investment again in the future. OK, Steve, would you like to come in? Yes, just one single point. I think what China has done is just been trying to be proactive in Africa in the sense that the level of infection in Africa is very low compared to the rest of the world. And so in starting over, we're starting with a quick dispatch of vaccines to Africa was also to help prevent the infection level from spreading and going higher than what it is presently. OK. Next question I picked comes from Kua Li. With its vaccines diplomacy, does China give vaccines to African countries for free? Or does it add more debt to some African countries with a view to gain more support and dependence from those receiving the vaccine? Basically, what seems to be appearing to be the trend is that the Chinese make an upfront donation to selected African countries. And the figure seems to be a standard 200,000 doses at this point in time, doubled in the case of Zimbabwe. As I said, Zimbabwe got its first 200,000 doses and were then promised that it would be doubled only after it had agreed to buy another 1.2 million doses. Now, they're probably buying it on preferential terms. Everyone knows Zimbabwe has got no money. But yes, at some point in time in the future, what you've got after you've exhausted your donated vaccines is you are going to have to go into negotiations to purchase further vaccines, even if they are on preferential terms. Now, having said that, by that stage, the COVAX drive to distribute vaccines should have gotten into at least second gear. It's been very, very slow right now because of building up sufficient stocks. It's also been very, very slow because, of course, the African Union is not exactly endowed with heavy-duty transport aircraft and things of that nature. Hopefully, those logistical problems will be addressed by the time that a second phase of vaccination begins in African countries. So yes, they'll be purchased. Yes, it will add to debt. In some cases, African countries will be able to buy the vaccine without going into debt. And there are other locators, other providers who could also provide competitive terms. We don't yet know what terms the Indians will be providing their homegrown vaccine, what terms they will be pertaining to that. Other countries like Rwanda have already decided to make their own purchases of Pfizer and Moderna, for instance. They've gone for the Western vaccines and they're buying those. South Africa seems to be looking very, very strongly towards the American vaccine by Johnson and Johnson. The single-shot vaccine has an awful lot of benefit in that. And that one shot does the trick, as it were. You don't have to induce people to come back for a second shot when it's already hard enough to get their first shot. So this competition, if you want to call it that, has many, many permutations. And what is the case now? There's not going to be a static case. It's a dynamic, shifting environment. And I think it'll become even more complex and shift even more within, say, even two months from now. OK. Before I hand it over to Steve for response, I want to follow up here. Somebody else would like to follow up here. And, Steven, you can come back to it perhaps a bit later after Steve's got a chance if it's not been already addressed, which is that in the offering of vaccines to countries in Africa, is there a pattern there in terms of what kind of countries in Africa receive Chinese vaccines? Are they friendly ones to the African countries that are known as not particularly friendly and amenable to Chinese diplomatic priorities like Taiwan? Do any of those get anything at all? Steve, over to you. And if necessary, we'll come back to Steven on that. Zimbabwe, for instance, that was mentioned earlier on. I want to answer the last question. Zimbabwe that was mentioned not too long ago, Zimbabwe under Mugabe was a pariah state before the common way to musicians and the Western governments. And China was one of the countries that actually took sides with Zimbabwe, helped them with the economic crisis and then before the death of Mugabe. Now, I want to believe that the vaccines being sent to Zimbabwe by China was done on the grounds of friendly nation. But to answer the question, is there any country in Africa that is not friendly to China? I don't think you will find one because almost all the countries in Africa have received one benefit or the other from China. So and the number of countries that have not actually gone to China to collect this vaccine is just based on the point I raised earlier on in my introductory remarks, the fact that majority of the citizens in many of these countries are pro-Western in terms of retention, in terms of everything they do. So the question why some countries have not actually requested for vaccine or received some of the free donations from China is the fact that or fear of the fact that when these vaccines are received, are they going to be, are the people, are the citizens going to be receptive of such usage? That is the fear so that you don't receive vaccine and then it ends up in the beans or ends up being abandoned or not used at the end of the day. And so that is the caution, that is a caution. Unfortunately, I cannot leave my hands on so many of the cartoons I've seen in most of the African newspapers in the sense of if you bring Chinese vaccines to this place, let the leaders try it first. Let the leaders try it first. In essence, if the vaccines leads to death, let the leaders die first because they're not even popular with us. So that's the reluctance, the hesitancy is also based on this notion. And so at the end of the day, a lot of African countries, as soon as it is, you see, for instance, Putnik, the one done by Russia, at the beginning said, oh, Russia, China, they stole the intellectual properties in the making of these vaccines in the Western world. They hacked into laptops, hacked into data. So, oh, whatever has been produced in Russia is not right. But last set, the medical journal has confirmed the efficacy of this Putnik. And I understand they are also in the process, if they've not done that already, for that of the summoning of the China, the vaccines being developed in China. So with this certification from these recognized medical bodies, these vaccines will not start spreading and being accepted in Africa. I think that asks us these questions at the end. It's been given to a friendly nation because there's no nation in Africa that is hostile to China. I've not found, I've not seen anyone. I've not heard of anyone. I don't think any nation is not friendly with China because there are all the recipients of economic aids. And then to answer whether is this vaccine for free? Like I was still in China mentioned earlier on, in an initial stage, even the ones being provided by India and the Western government through COVAS and the World Health Physicians, all the ones that be dispatched to Africa, they are free. But I believe subsequently, African governments and African states will start paying for the vaccines because that's the only way to show some elements of responsibility. The only fear in Africa is that corruption is not introduced into the act of receiving these free vaccines and in buying the vaccines. Okay. Stephen, are you happy to let this pass and then move on? Well, I just make one quick comment just to amplify what Steve was saying. You don't have any country in Africa that is not in some way having some form of good relations with China, but also with the West. And so countries that are very favorably tied to the West like Egypt depends on American foreign aid. Egypt has received Sinai Farm. Very happy to have done that. The country that is regarded as extremely francophonic, the epitome of France in Africa, Senegal. Senegal has been very happy to receive Sinai Farm. So I think that you've got a more general approach here that's not reducible to being bribed or being asked to take part in a particular power struggle. People are simply desperate to get some kind of vaccination program up and running in their countries. Okay. Let's move on. The next question I pick comes from Ghanian Alice at the University of Edinburgh. Can we link China's vaccination actions to its desire to secure domestic stability in some African countries? Particularly linking to the idea of limiting any domestic unrest as a result of the COVID pandemic. Is there a correlation between where the vaccines are being sent and the African states which are of high strategic importance to China? For example, in major oil, British and country like Angola. Right now, as far as I can tell, and as I say, I was trying to give you today's figures of the status of play as of this morning. Angola has not received huge shipments of anybody's vaccine. And then places that you would have suggest automatically to be highly strategic like in the Horn of Africa. I don't know what the status of Ethiopia is, for instance. I don't think they've received a huge roll out of Chinese vaccines. And nor even in an oil-producing country like South Sudan, which was very, very fast in achieving diplomatic relationship with China on independence in 2011 when previously there had been enemies. But even so, South Sudan has not been a noted recipient of Sinofarm. The big question you've got to ask is, even if the Chinese wanted to, could they provide coverage for 55 countries? No, you can't. Not even a Chinese miracle of an industrial scale that could do that. In other words, I think they're giving what they can. I do insist that there is a humanitarian element, at least to this, there's a competition of an international nature, of course, also involved in this. But beyond a certain point, not even if you put all of the providers of the entire world together, are you going to be able to vaccinate the entire world, let alone one continent like Africa overnight? So it's a struggle. It was never going to be easy. And I think what we're seeing in fact, we'll look back on this in due course, is to look back on a year of actually quite amazing endeavor on the part of many nations, both to control the pandemic internally and seeking external help when it is available. And as I said, right at the beginning, Sinofarm and China are very attractive because the West has not been up there, has not stepped up to the plate. Where else are people going to go? Okay. Steve, would you like to come in? No, it's okay. Because I think that answers the whole question. I think the major problem is not, I think that the discretion of this vaccine from China is not based on the interest, maybe to stabilize certain countries on the basis of unrest, or maybe as a basis of strategic importance. I think it's based on, I think logistics. Nigeria, for instance, came up with a figure in Jurati, which they came out to dispute that the logistics, maybe to distribute vaccines across the entire 36 states of the Federation and to all the local governments and the towns would amount to more than 36 billion Naira. And by the time you put that into further breakdown, you discover that the cost of that was even more than the vaccine it got itself. So China, I don't think there's any country in Africa that is not strategic. I think the majority of the countries in Africa have been treated equally by China. And what I think, I think they are tending to, they are distributing these free vaccines on the basis of the nations that need it more than the others in terms of the level of infection. Yes, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, those are the areas that we've seen cases of, South Africa has the highest number of infection and deaths. Nigeria still has below 2,000 in terms of the number of two to deaths. So I think it's based on the needs. They're using the statistics based on needs to do these distributions. And then so why send vaccine to countries that don't actually need it when you have all the cases of infection less than 20, less than 10? Okay. Next question I pick comes from somebody who works for an international organisation in Europe who is particularly interested in the split between African people and their governments regarding China. And the question he has is, do you believe that the Chinese government has an interest in reaching out to individual people in Africa or are they very happy just dealing with governments? Steve first and then Stephen. Yes, I mentioned that earlier on in my introductory remarks. Yes, I think that's where China is doing it wrong. The perception of many Africans is the fact that most of the loans from China is not being monitored. It's not being monitored to find out what those loans, those investments, whether they had been used for the exact purposes. And the perception of a lot of Africans is that most of these monies from China to Africa is being moved in planes. We have ministers and others put a lot of monies in their pockets and they give them money in order to look the other way in terms of the genuineness of the investments and the products. Now, that is what has caused a sort of divergence between the leaders and the lead in Africa. That's why you have a lot of protests in Tanzania for instance, Zambia for instance also and then also in Nigeria for instance, because there's a railway line being constructed from Lagos to Zaria. And then the total cost of that railway construction, when you compare it with the same construction on that railway area around Zambia and others, there was huge disparity in terms of the funds. So in essence, we're going back to what was in the days of the Abacha regime, where the World Bank, IMF and others gave a lot of loans to African nations and Nigeria in particular, whereby they never had a machinery in checking whether these loans were being used for what it was set out to achieve. And that cost a lot of unrest in Nigeria and other African countries. So what China is not doing now is, China does not have a mechanism to measure these loans and then the investment in Africa. And because of that, there seemed to be a divergence between the original objectives and then the perception of Africans. Now, if you compare that to the West, the Western style has always been through aid agencies, where apart from giving aid to government, they also have this sort of working relations with the African people. US, for instance, has created a lot of libraries in Africa, created what you know as the USAID, the United States Aid and the Investment Development. And they've also created investment platforms where Africans could also export their products directly to America. And then given a lot of scholarships. Cuba, for instance, Russia, for instance, gave a lot of scholarships to Nigerians, to Africans to go study. Some of the returnees even ended up being leaders in Africa and there was changes between the 60s, the 70s and the 80s. And then from the 80s, it started dropping. The quality of leadership started dropping. But unfortunately, that is what China is not doing. China is not reaching out to the people. China is only dealing with the elites. At the end of the day, it may end up backfiring, if not corrected. Now. Okay, Stephen, would you like to come in or we move on? I think we can move on. I think Stephen said something very nice there. Well, next questions come from Adrian Dost in Berlin. If it is a problem that the Chinese vaccines are being associated with strongman politicians, how can this narrative be changed? Does China have an interest in changing this narrative? Or is this the main target of their vaccine diplomacy that people empower instead of the general population? Well, I think that it's got to reach the general population at least to an appreciable degree. I mean, the ruling elite said small by comparison to the bulk of the population. However, having said that in a country like Zimbabwe, for instance, where four cabinet ministers recently died of COVID, including the very senior minister of foreign affairs, what you have is a sudden panic on the part of the ruling elite because they had on their watch allowed the health sector to run down to catastrophically low levels. And because they couldn't travel to get treatment outside, they themselves were now doomed to suffer and to die in the same underfunded rundown health sector. So the elite certainly had an interest in this, but at the same time, ordinary people facing lockdown, after lockdown, after lockdown, particularly those without any kind of job security, no furlough, for instance, those who are in informal sector jobs and not being allowed to leave their houses, people who are desperate for some kind of relief, some kind of release. So that despite hesitancy, I think it has been a general appreciation that it lasts for some kind of light at the end of the tunnel. And I think that gradually the uptake of the vaccines will become greater, but it does depend on logistics, as Steve said, not only in the continent as a whole, but within the individual countries. You've got to be able to get from point A to point B. You've got to be able to do that with refrigerated capacity. Now that means that you're gonna have to reach hospitals at the other end that have got electricity that is reliable. All of these things pose all kinds of infrastructural problems quite on top of what you've got away of the health problem. Okay, Steve, would you like to come in? You mentioned something about looking away from the strong men. How can they avoid this idea of a strong man? In fact, is that what you said? Yes, and do the Chinese government even care? Yes. When I said strong men, strong men leaders is the fact that these are detectives in the democratic garb. And what China has been known to do right from mis-engagement in Africa is overlooking whom our rights abuses, overlooking corruption, overlooking whether the elections have been free of fair. All they just consigned with is the political elites who have been, who are in power. And so because of that, they overlook all this. I think it will make them a hell of good if they could also maybe adopt some of these democratic principles of the Western governments. Even though, even though the Western governments, they could condemn, criticize but they still work with such governments. But I think if there's a sort of collaboration in terms of maybe changing his ways in Africa in not overlooking these things, I think that would then de-add them to the people of Africa, not just only to the leaders. Okay, we have three minutes left. I want to squeeze in one last question if you can give pretty sharp answers, responses that will be really helpful. And these questions, I'm paraphrasing it, modifying it somewhat. It comes from Maud Nakano. And the question really is to ask you whether China's approach in Africa can be described as a neocolonialist. Do you agree or do you not? Why? I don't think it's neocolonialist. I don't think that word is adequate. That's a word that you could certainly apply to Western relationship with Africa in the years after, immediately after independence. There'd be a very great deal of growth and maturity despite problems in Africa. They're not just there as easy prey. That's such a colonial view of Africa, in fact. But countries like Angola, countries like Ethiopia have become extremely adept at pushing back with extremely sophisticated diplomatic capacity. Nigeria pushes back. I mean, Steve was part of that. He was one of those with the skill sets to push back. So it's not just that you've got this completely helpless continent anymore. That is the colonial attitude right now. OK. Steve, last word. I don't think that statement is correct. I don't think any other country in the world can colonize Africa anymore. I think it's a sort of partnership. It's a economic partnership and development partnership. No country in its right sense would reject such help, such massive help, whether it is misconstrued or not, whether it is corrupted or not, has some practical and physical prisons in Africa. And at the end of the day, it benefits Africa. So I will support that. And that whatever China is doing in Africa is of help to Africa, is of the global public good. Thank you. All right. Thank you very much. We are spot on at 6.30. And regrettably, it is my duty to draw these webinar panel discussions to a close. And I must apologize to some of you who have raised very interesting questions that have not been able to fit into the time frames that we have. Nonetheless, thank you very much to our two fantastic speakers for their interesting thoughts and to those of you who have raised very, very good questions. I hope to see some of you again next week at our next webinar. Thank you and goodbye. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.