 When we put the strategy together, ladies and gentlemen, what we did, we put some together, we called the four Rs plus S, S being sustain it. First R was to regionalize the approach. You did not start with Afghanistan, come up with a strategy, say, well, I guess now we better look at the countries around it and see what do we do as far as their inclusion. We started outside and worked our way inside. Next, we recognized we had to put more troops in. But the reason we had to put more to reinforce it, the second R, was for the third reason, realign those troops to supporting the Afghan security forces directly by training, advising, and assisting. What we had done is created an army, and then we pulled the training wheels off too early. And in that, I mean that only the Afghan special forces had mentors from NATO nations with them. And every time they went against the enemy, the Taliban, they won against the enemy. But spread out in penny packets around the country were Afghan security forces that we had pulled all mentoring away from. So we were going to look at this as a regional problem, reinforce the troops, and realign them so that more Afghan forces had our mentors with them with NATO air support. As you know, for those of you who've been there, when you fight in mountainous country, the high ground is very tough ground to take if the enemy's got it. With NATO air forces overhead, no longer prohibited from supporting the Afghan army, and I did say prohibited from supporting them, we would be able to always own the high ground. And that changes the tactical situation. It is protection of the people is what we are trying to do there. So in some cases, we surrendered ground where few of any people lived, since it's not a matter of militaries holding ground. The Afghan lads are doing the fighting. Just look at the casualties over 1,000 dead in August and September. 1,000 dead and wounded in August and September, and they stayed in the field fighting. And the Taliban has been prevented from doing what they said they were going to do, which was to take and hold district and provincial centers, also disrupt an election that they were unable to disrupt. But the most important was the fourth hour, reconciliation. And on that, you saw Ambassador Kalazazad has been presented with the portfolio. He's working it. He, as those of you who know him, know him. He's a force of nature, and he is hard at work on this. On an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation effort.