 Playing difficult videos, I'm financially supported by the generosity of my Patreon and YouTube members. Members get early ad free access to videos, usually Monday or Tuesday before it's released on the main channel. You can also get other perks depending on the pledge, including your name at the end of the video. Right, well thanks for listening to me talk, back to the normal scheduled dose of well me talking. So for the past few months I've been building up to this subject in my previous videos, and this is about the worryingly long list of concrete construction failures in the state of Florida. I believe all I've covered so far failed before actually was complete, but today's video is an outlier, as it had been completed and occupied for quite a long time. The Champlain Tower's failure also marks a dramatic increase in the number of victims and financial costs. It is also the most recent entry in Florida's building blunders. My name is John and welcome to Plainly Difficult. Today we're looking at the Surfside Condominium Collapse, a place to escape the cold. Surfside in the early 1970s was a retreat for Canadian holiday goers. It was considerably cheaper than Miami and offered a no-frills quiet place to get away. One of these Canadians was Nathan Rieber, the lawyer-come-real estate developer from Ontario set about pushing a proposal to Surfside for some new luxury apartments. This was in August 1979, but there was a slight snag at the city. Their sewage system wasn't up to snuff. This had placed a moratorium on new residential developments, but a mere hurdle Rieber must have thought, as his development offered $200,000 to the city that had required water upgrade. This was roughly half the total build the city needed to cough up. The developers whined and dined officials in an effort to speed permits through. In November 1979, the initial proposal for an overall development at Surfside was approved by the city. The original buildings were to be named Champlain North and Champlain South, and the southern tower was placed at 8777 Collins Avenue, Surfside, Florida, with the north a block away. There was also an art deco building already standing in between them. This was the site originally of a hotel which had been bought up by Canadian investors for $475,000 in 1970 and was the site of an earlier failed attempt, which would be taken up in the late 70s by Rieber. The project ran into issues in May 1980 when their lead contractor resigned. A new one was brought in, but there was a lot more trouble ahead. The south building by mid-1980 was well underway, but one of its site cranes collapsed and by the end of the summer it was discovered that over $10,000 worth of timber had been stolen. At the end of the summer season, a new contractor was hired, Arnold Nickman. The original towers were to be 12 stories high, but in August the developers applied to increase this with the addition of a penthouse level. Architect William Friedman didn't object nor did structural engineer Sergio Breitemann. Interestingly, both men had slightly dodgy pasts, with Friedman having his license suspended in the late 1960s for a dangerous sign structure that had collapsed. Breitemann had also got into hot water in the mid 1970s for signing off a car park without steel reinforcements. In November, the penthouse was apparently approved, but in just the same month the permit was revoked. The town manager who revoked the license got into hot water himself, being accused of being a peeping tom. He resigned and the penthouses were finally allowed once more. The original issue was that Champlain Towers would exceed height restrictions. They had been brought in to try and stop Surfside turning into a mini Miami with its towering seaside buildings. The town kind of had its hand forced by allowing the extra height, as the developers had already started building them, meaning if they were stopped and pulled down, the city would have had to deal with a hefty lawsuit. The South Tower was completed in 1981, followed by the North a few months later in 1982. Reba would see several lawsuits brought against him for failing to pay for works completed, and even part of the construction consortium that owned the towers also ended up in court with him. Reba did get a pretty good payday, however, with the sale of the apartments, some $22.5 million, making him one of the largest developers in Florida. So what was the design of the Champlain Towers? Most notably the south one. The design. As we know during its turbulent construction, the South Tower underwent several changes, and this is reflected in the changes to the building's plans between 1979 and 1980. Some were rather worrying, where support beams were removed in the building's final iteration. The tower was when looking down into it in the shape of an L and had 12 stories with penthouses on top. It had a total of 136 apartments varying in size from 1 to 4 bedrooms. The eastern side of the building had lovely views of the Atlantic Ocean. The building was constructed of steel reinforced concrete. It made use of a standard column and two-way slab design. Slabs were between 9.5 and 8 inches thick. The slab were reinforced with Reba, and at the point that the column connected with the horizontal floor with Reba went through the column's Reba cage. The columns in the building ranged in size, but for the purpose of this video, I'll only talk about three types named A, C and N. Type A columns were largely around the southeast side of the building and were 24 inches square. Type C were predominantly located at the north perimeter and central areas and were 16 inches square. Type N were 8 by 16 inches and were placed on the south eastern perimeter underneath the pool deck and on the western perimeter. Oh yeah, did I mention the complex had a pool deck. This area was on the first floor and housed a heated pool and a number of planters, creating a nice outside area without the need to venture onto the beach. However, the planters, the very heavy planters, were not actually originally specked out in the plans. This caused extra stress over the smallest columns, which rather worryingly was where some of the beams had been removed in the plans. The waterproofing for the pool deck was placed on a flat surface instead of with a slope. This would prove troublesome as the building aged not allowing water to properly run off. The building's columns were supported by piles that had been driven into the ground. This acted as an anchor holding the building in place. Above the pilings was the lowest accessible section of the building, the car park. It had the rough footprint of the building above and was accessed via a ramp. Issues. So not only did the project see issues with the city in getting permits and the like, but problems arose with the plans right from the start. The columns in some places were too narrow on the plans, which meant the contractor would have to make a choice. Use the narrow columns and overcrowd the rebar, increase in the risk of corrosion, or remove some rebar, which weakened the structure. Of course there was the option of refusing to build it, but we all know that wouldn't have happened. Clearly parts of the building were not up to code, however this didn't stop construction and as we know the building was actually completed in 1981. But that wasn't the end of the issues. Almost right from the start, after the first residents started moving in, cracks started appearing in the car park level concrete. Seawater was known to seep through the foundations at high tide, causing the car park to be constantly damp. And in particularly bad days, could be up to 2 feet deep. Pumps were employed to combat this, but it was a persistent problem on site. But it wasn't just the car park that had standing water and seepage. The roof also had constant complaints of leaks. Over the years, the building fell into disrepair. And to hinder any repairs, the condo association was mired in arguments, stalemates and cost cutting. You see the condo board was a volunteer organisation, usually made up of people who were owners and residents themselves. As such this often means they aren't the most professional property managers. Because of this, professionals are brought in and are paid from a reserve fund that the board collects. In the UK this is what a sinking fund is. Do you call that the same thing in the US as well? Anyway, the board by the time the apartments were approaching their 40th year was very low on money. This meant that when repairs were required, the board had to go directly to the residents for the money. Rather than being spread out over months and years of ownership, you might get hit with a massive bill. As such residents and the board's relationship broke down. Board meetings would erupt into arguments and votes would be locked, all while the tower deteriorated. Many of the exterior railings of the tower were rusting away, constant lakes in the car park and cracking columns were a concern to many. Eventually the board managed to get an assessment done on the building's deteriorating condition and no surprise is it wasn't good news. Morabito consultants issued a report on the building in 2018. Noting major construction errors on the pool deck, cracking and spalling in the car park, facades cracking, soffits rotting, window seals failing, improper flashing on doors and windows causing leaks and serious cracks on the columns, revealing rebar were all major points. They even said that parts of the building, especially around the pool deck, were beyond their useful life. So none of that was good and the bill for repairs wouldn't be any better. This would result, again in arguments and frustration with the condo board. And in 2019, six of the seven board members resigned. A new round of board members took over in 2020 and managed to secure a $15 million loan for the repairs. Which, nearly two years after the report, had grown in need and cost. In a presentation from the board members to residents, the point was bluntly put across. But how would this multi-million dollar loan be paid off? Well, the residents would have to bear the cost in what's called a special assessment. This put condo owners on the hook for between $80,000 and $200,000 depending on the apartment size, paid up front or monthly for 15 years. But although falling apart and with expensive repairs due, the Champlain Tower's location and views still made it an attractive investment opportunity for prospective buyers. Several properties sold over the next year, including one of the penthouses for close to $3 million. In April 2021, the special assessment bills were sent out to residents. But for the residents, it wasn't just a financial disaster on the horizon. The collapse. It is the early hours of the 24th of June 2021 and passes by, near the Champlain Tower's south, hear noises from the building that sounds like a car crash. A tourist films through the gate to the garage, where rubble and water can be seen pouring onto the ground. Residents inside the building are awoken by cracking, as one person would describe as construction like sound. This is around 1.14 in the morning and the noises were increasing. Roughly 1.21 in the morning, the ground floor deck gave way, followed by the central portion of the northern side of the building. Shortly after, the eastern section also plunged into the darkness. The dramatic collapse happened in just 12 seconds. The western sections of the building surprisingly remained precariously in place. Within minutes, the first responders arrived on the scene and in one of the gruesome modern wonders, the disastrous aftermath was recorded with body cameras. The air in the immediate aftermath was thick with dust, obscuring street lighting in the night sky. Over 80 emergency response units would race to the scene immediately and begin frantically trying to recover any survivors. Within hours, hundreds of police officers and firefighters from agencies across Miami-Dade were in attendance. Survivors were carried from the standing portion of the building and severely damaged sections in stretches and even on the first responders' backs. A cherry picker was employed in an effort to reach people trapped on the higher sections of the remaining structure. Evacuations took place in the hotel next door. Luckily, due to the building being flanked by the beach on the east side, no one else was at risk within the immediate vicinity. As the hours dragged on, more specialist rescue units began scouring the wreckage but it wasn't looking good. Rescue dogs sniffed over the rubble. 35 people were rescued during the first few hours. An on-site triage was set up and various levels of wounded were treated on-site and sent off to hospitals across the Miami-Dade area. A state of emergency declaration was signed by the Miami-Dade County Mayor at 4.33pm. By the evening, the missing list was increasing in length. A fire had broken out within the depths of the rubble and was spreading horizontally. By the 26th of June, 127 people had been accounted for. Five were confirmed dead and 156 missing. Champlain Towers North was voluntarily evacuated due to it being built around the same time with the same developer. This also happened alongside the evacuation of Champlain East, which was built in the 1990s. The still-standing portion of Champlain South was announced to be demolished on the 4th of July and this would be using explosives. It was planned for the structure to fall into its footprint and into Collins Avenue to try to not disturb the recovery efforts on the east part of the site. For the best part of a month, rescue workers would continue scouring the site for survivors. However, it was more a case of body recovery on some days just one body and on others as many as 15 would be retrieved. By the 17th of July, 97 bodies had been pulled from the rubble, with all but two being identified. On the 23rd of July, the Miami-Dade Fire Department stopped the rescue efforts and left the area. By now, all 98 were identified. Vital evidence in the form of an important structural debris was removed and stored off site for investigation. Some of the damaged cars and personal property from the tower was transported to a field 10 miles away. Surprisingly, in 2022, the site was sold off for redevelopment for $120 million to Dubai-based developer Damak. But what was the cause of the collapse? The investigation. Now this might actually be the first subject I've covered on this channel, but the investigation hasn't actually been complete. It has fallen on the feet of the NIST. But although there isn't an official verdict yet, we can go into the most likely causes. As investigators and the media dug into the past of the building, unsurprisingly, the buildings to mulch as history came to light. The 2018 report was made public information. But although it highlighted many serious issues, not all could have caused the initial spark that caused the collapse. Luckily, there was some footage of the building pre-disaster, the collapse beginning at the base of the building. This was because, as you can see, the upper floors stayed intact as they fell, meaning their supports had gone closer to the bottom of the building. This coupled with the footage of rubble in the car park pre-collapse showed that the initiator was likely around here. The second part of the collapse, as seen on the video, shows us that the middle section removed the support for the eastern section. The western section didn't collapse. This also gives us a hint. But it was built slightly differently with stronger columns of their type A variety at 24 inches square. The shear walls on each side of the central section were different, with the western wall being thicker than its eastern counterpart. Post-collapse photos also hinted at a cause of the overpopulated concrete with rebar, most notably in the narrower columns. This meant that the concrete didn't fill the gaps in between the rebar, allowing air pockets to form, potentially creating areas that said rebar could corrode. They also found on the concrete floor slabs that some had delaminated from their rebar, that is, the rebar had pulled away from within the concrete floor slabs. But we already knew the building wasn't very well built. But it did last 40 years. Well, this is where poor maintenance comes into play. With not addressing the gradually appearing issues over the four decades, the built-in floors would only make themselves worse. For example, not painting the concrete at regular intervals to protect it from the corrosive seaside air. Anything neglected will eventually fail. The building during its lifetime had rather a lot of construction projects undertaken around it. The aforementioned Champlin Towers East was thrown up in the 1990s. Also next door, there was the 2016-87 Park, which began construction. And in 2019, a beach replenishment project was undertaken, which would involve large heavy trucks of sand being brought along the 88th street, which was along the building's northern perimeter, exactly near where the collapse had begun. It was also found that during the 90s Champlin Towers South was experienced subsidence, of just under 1mm per year. Although leading up to the disaster, this had seemed to have stopped. There had been reports of the pool deck having issues with, in the 1990s, the concrete underneath the pool needing repair from the carpark side. This involved removing the damaged concrete and rust-proofing the rebar, then sealing it in with water. Spooling had to be repaired in 1997, again around the underside of the pool deck, and waterproofing was also looked at. Personally, I think the issue was inadequate concrete and rebar specifications, which allowed to weaken beyond the point of holding itself up, due to woeful maintenance in an area which loves to rust things away, i.e. by the sea. But hey, what do I know, I'm just an idiot on the internet. The official cause, we will still have to wait from the NIST, so now I need to look at the aftermath. A lawsuit was filed against Champlin Towers South Condominium Association on the 24th of June 2021, initially for $5 million, and this would be joined over the months by many more residents. It would result on June 23, 2022, with a $1.02 billion settlement for victims of the collapse. It was estimated that the collapse also caused around $1 billion in property damage, making it one very expensive disaster. The disaster has put the focus on condo boards and how strict rules would help associations keep on top of maintenance and holding enough funds in for repairs. So I'm going to call this disaster an absolute dumpster fire. And, unfortunately, due to the event being so recent, I'm not going to give it a legacy scale just yet. This is a plain difficult production. All videos on the channel are created because of attribution-share-alike license. Plain difficult videos are produced by me, John, in the currently surprisingly sunny corner of southern London, UK. I'd like to thank my Patreon members and YouTube members for your financial support, and the rest of you for tuning in every week to watch my videos. I have Instagram, Twitter, and a second YouTube channel, so check them out if you want to see behind the scenes stuff and random photographs. All I have to say is thank you for watching, and Mr Music, play us out please.