 In 1858, the Atlantic telegraph cable was run along the ocean between North America and Great Britain. The cable reduced communication time between the two continents from nearly two weeks to only a few minutes. It goes without saying that the telegraph was one of the most significant innovations of the 19th century, probably only second to the railroad. But only a month after the cable was lain, it broke somehow. And by 1861, the cable still had not been fixed. Thus, the communications between Britain and the United States at the outset of the Civil War had to be conducted the old-fashioned way. A message was sent to Britain on an ocean steamer taking nearly two weeks, and the response was sent back taking another two weeks. In normal times, this amounted very little, but when the Civil War began, the United States was facing a diplomatic crisis with Britain that seemed to threaten the possibility of a war with British Canada. Cooler heads prevailed, of course, or this history would be very different, but many people at the time believed that this broken telegraph wire, forcing long delays in communication, allowed at tempers to cool so that diplomats and political leaders did not make the rash decisions that they would have made if they'd been communicating via telegraph. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute podcast, Historical Controversies. In the last episode, we talked about the straining relationship between Britain and the United States, which was increasingly made worse by the poor diplomacy of William Seward. In today's episode, we will see how this tension nearly culminated in a war between the United States and Britain after the United States interfered with Confederate diplomats. There are, of course, entire books written about Confederate diplomacy, but I don't intend to talk much about it because, frankly, it isn't very interesting and didn't amount to much significance, but to give a brief overview of Confederate diplomacy that contextualizes this episode. At the outset of the war, the Confederacy sent two diplomats to Britain, William Yancy and A. Dudley Mann, and two to France, T. Butler King and Pierre Roest. The goal was to get Britain and France to officially recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation. Today, this would be done by the United Nations, but in the 19th century, each individual country could decide whether it wanted to recognize a nation as sovereign and independent. The importance of this, of course, is that there were international laws in place to govern warfare between sovereign nations. So if Britain or France recognized the Confederacy, then the Union war actions would have to be judged in the context of international law rather than sovereign domestic actions. Trade would also be a goal, and the King cotton diplomacy that the Confederacy is known for is representative of that, which is most famously represented in James Hammond's quote that Europe would never wage war with the South because, quote, without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, we could bring the whole world to our feet, end quote. Of course, he would be proven wrong in this as European powers simply found sources of cotton elsewhere. But there was a period in the early part of the war in which the southern supply of cotton was a genuine concern as the textile industry in Europe depended on it. But that shouldn't obscure the importance of obtaining recognition as a sovereign nation from the major European powers, which doesn't sound as significant by modern standards as it would have been in 1861. But the first four diplomats to Britain and France had no success in obtaining recognition. They were largely inexperienced for one thing, and slavery was a genuine issue for much of Britain, which had emancipated slaves in 1833. But more importantly was the fact that no country wanted to throw its lot in with a country that was unproven. It was a frustrating dilemma for the Confederacy. They needed European assistance to win the war, but they were unlikely to get European assistance until they demonstrated that they could win the war without them. So in August, the Confederacy appointed two new diplomats to try their luck in winning over Britain and France. This would be James Mason, who was appointed as the British diplomat, and John Slidel, the French diplomat. Their instructions were to bring focus to the Union blockade, which I've only mentioned so far in the podcast, but I will be talking about in more detail in just a few weeks. This was the first hint at the Confederacy's cotton diplomacy. Ostensibly, the focus on the blockade was to demonstrate that it was not effective, so they could negotiate treaties of commerce. And this would compel the two countries to recognize Confederate sovereignty because of their need for southern cotton. But they didn't want to make it seem like the Confederacy was threatening Britain and France with a prospect of withholding cotton. So the instructions were given to make, quote, a delicate illusion to the probability of such an occurrence, end quote. By September, Mason and Slidel were instructed to make it even more clear to the European powers that any war that prevented southern cotton exports was a war, quote, directed as much against those who transport and manufacture cotton as against those who produce the raw material, end quote. Confident in the power of cotton, the Confederacy believed that this would convince Britain and France to recognize Confederate independence and give them negotiating power for commercial treaties. But the Union blockade, weak as it was in 1861, was a problem for Mason and Slidel. They needed to get out of the port of Charleston without being stopped by Union ships. When they first tried to depart, they spent three weeks on a privateer ship, the Nashville, with plans to run the blockade. But bad weather held them up. While they were delayed, two more Union steamers showed up off the coast, strengthening the blockade around Charleston. So Mason and Slidel moved to a new privateer ship, the Gordon, which was lighter and faster and therefore more suitable for getting past the blockade. Mason convinced the Confederacy to commission the Gordon to carry the diplomats on October 8th. And to maintain secrecy, the owner of the ship changed the name of the ship to the Theodora. When the Nashville finally left Charleston harbor, Mason and Slidel weren't on it. But the Union ships didn't know this, so they pursued it in vain while Mason and Slidel prepared their actual departure on the newly renamed Theodora. They were to be taken to Nassau, the capital of the Bahamas, where they plan to transfer to Havana and move to a British mail ship to complete their journey. When they finally departed, Slidel bringing his wife and three children with him, there was a rainstorm that helped the ship sneak past the Union steamers, which were at one point only a mile and a half away. The trip to Nassau was uneventful, and they moved from there to Havana, arriving on October 22. Havana was incredibly friendly to the US South, and the women in Havana even presented a gift of a large Confederate flag to the Theodora upon its arrival. Mason and Slidel were treated like royalty there as they waited for the British mail ship, the Trent. The fact that the ship was a British vessel is of obvious importance. By making it safely to Havana, Mason and Slidel believed they were in the clear, and Mason even wrote to his wife that quote, everything else is plain selling because under any foreign flag, we are safe from molestation, end quote. The United States would be insane to stop a ship flying the British flag. But Mason wasn't counting on Captain Charles Wilkes, who took command of the USS San Jacinto on August 28, and was just returning from a trip to the African coast, where he was hunting for Confederate privateers. He made it back to the Caribbean right around the same time that Theodora was carrying Mason and Slidel there. The San Jacinto stopped at Cienfuegos on October 23 to refuel, and there Captain Wilkes got word of Mason and Slidel's stopover at Havana. He also learned that on November 7, they planned to depart from Havana on the Trent. So now Captain Wilkes had information that he didn't know what to do with, so he consulted with the United States Consul General Robert Shufelt, who was in Havana. The two Union men met with the Governor of Cuba, Don Francisco Serrano, who assured the men that he had nothing but disdain for Mason and Slidel, despite having warmly received them upon their arrival. After the meeting, Wilkes and Shufelt discussed the legality of detaining the two diplomats. Shufelt didn't believe it would be legal. After combing through several books on international law, he concluded that the detainment of the Confederate commissioners, quote, would seem to be a violation of the rights of neutrals upon the ocean, end quote. But Wilkes wasn't convinced. Honestly, it was very clear, even to Wilkes himself, that he did not know the legality of the action, but he was concerned with how much of a threat the two commissioners could be for the Union war effort. He decided that he was going to intercept the Trent despite Shufelt's counsel, and Shufelt gave little resistance to the matter when he informed the State Department of Wilkes's plan. Words spread, apparently, and a few days before the arrest was actually made, the wife of the British Consul General in Havana spoke to the Shufelt's and brought up the rumor that a U.S. ship called the San Jacinto was planning to intercept a British vessel. She asked, quote, did you ever hear of anything more ridiculous, Mr. Shufelt? To which Shufelt replied, no, madam, never heard anything so ridiculous in my life. The idea that a U.S. ship would intercept a British vessel was simply inconceivable. On November 7th, 8 in the morning, the Trent set off from Havana with a cargo of one and a half million dollars in specie and 60 passengers, including Mason, Slidel, and Slidel's wife and three children. As it moved along the coast of Cuba, the San Jacinto, moved back and forth near the Bahamas. As they kept an eye out for the Trent, they boarded two Spanish ships, be gained no new information. More than 24 hours after the Trent departed, now November 8th at 11 40 a.m., one of the sailors on the San Jacinto shouted, sail ho, off the port bow, sir. Wilkes immediately brought his officers into his cabin to tell them his plan. He waited until the last minute to tell them what he was doing because he believed some of them to be Confederate sympathizers, so he didn't exactly trust all of his officers. Shortly thereafter, the Trent came in plain view of the San Jacinto. When the sailors on the Trent spotted the San Jacinto, they didn't know what it was. The Trent's captain, James Moore, thought it looked like a warship, but it wasn't displaying any flag, so he had his men raise the British flag and dependent for the Royal Mail Company on two separate masts. Still, the warship gave no identification. Then, minutes after 1 p.m., the San Jacinto raised its flag as it fired a blank warning shot at the Trent. The two ships were now so close that the people on the Trent could see the guns of the San Jacinto aimed at them. Captain Moore ordered the engines to be cut off, and he asked to the San Jacinto, what do you want? Somebody on the San Jacinto simply answered that they would send a boat to board the Trent. Wilkes was not among the men who boarded the Trent, but his most immediate subordinate, Lieutenant Fairfax, was. Fairfax was the only person with whom Wilkes confided the plan before the Trent had been spotted, and he strongly disagreed with it. Fairfax believed it would bring war with Britain, and he urged Wilkes to let the ship pass, but Wilkes refused, so now Fairfax was on the ship, carrying out orders that he believed to be destructive to the Union and its relationship with Britain, along with Fairfax were several other armed men. Fairfax's orders were to demand to see the Trent's papers, its clearance from Havana, and a list of passengers. Then he was to take Mason and Slidell prisoner and bring them back to the San Jacinto. If anybody tried to resist, Fairfax was given permission to use force to carry out his orders, and he was also instructed to seize the Trent as a prize of war. But Fairfax had resolved to disobey this last order, which, in retrospect, we might see as a wise decision on his part, as seizing the Trent could have easily been the difference between war and peace with Britain. But that's just speculation, of course. Captain Moore greeted Fairfax coldly and immediately made an objection to the way the San Jacinto stopped them. Fairfax responded by demanding the ship's papers and informing the captain that he believed Mason and Slidell to be on board. Captain Moore refused Fairfax's demands to sow the papers and asked what would happen if he refused to comply, to which Fairfax told him that his orders were to seize the ship if need be. His orders, of course, were to seize the ship regardless, but Fairfax was altering that on the fly. Captain Moore then admitted that Mason and Slidell were among his passengers, but he said that Fairfax would have to resort to force to extract them as he would not be giving them up peacefully. Hearing this, Slidell stepped forward and said, quote, I am Mr. Slidell. Did you want to see me? Mason also stepped forward. They said that they would not leave the Trent voluntarily. Many of the passengers on the Trent were Southerners, and as they started to realize what was taking place, they became enraged, and some yelled, throw the damn fellow overboard. Fairfax responded by telling Moore that if he couldn't keep order on his ship, they would face a, quote, unquote, heavy battery that was currently aimed at the Trent. As Moore did what he could to calm the tempers of his passengers, Fairfax brought forward several armed Marines. He reopened discussions about the voluntary surrender of Mason and Slidell, during which Commander Williams, the British male agent on board, interrupted several times to tell Fairfax, quote, in this ship I am the representative of her Britannic Majesty's government, and in the name of the government, I protest against this illegal act of piracy, which you would dare not attempt on a ship capable of resisting such aggression, end quote. Fairfax ignored him and continued to speak only with Captain Moore. Waving his Marines forward, Fairfax repeated his request for the commissioners to come with him peacefully. Mason, an elderly man in 1861, responded, quote, I have only to reiterate what I said at first. I will not leave the ship unless compelled by force greater than I can overcome. Fairfax responded by grabbing the collar of Mason's coat and calling on his men. Gentlemen, lay your hands on Mr. Mason. As the other Union men grabbed him, Mason said, I yield to force and Commander Williams added under protest, Mr. Mason, under protest. Mason said, yes, I yield to force under protest and we'll go. Now Mason knew what he was doing at this point. Before Fairfax took him, Miss Slidell had asked Fairfax, who commanded his ship, and he responded, quote, your old acquaintance Captain Wilkes. Miss Slidell was amused by this. A week prior, the San Jacinto had accidentally collided with a French man of war, damaging it greatly. The ship, along with one other French ship, had arrived at Havana prior to the Trent's departure and Miss Slidell told Fairfax that the two French captains were already furious with Captain Wilkes for damaging their ship. Now he was arresting a French diplomat, her husband. She said, quote, really Captain Wilkes is playing in our hands, end quote. Mason politely shushed her before she could tell him anymore. He saw the rest as an opportunity to bring Britain into the war against the United States. So when he said that he would only submit to force, he was really just making sure that Fairfax had to demonstrate the willingness to use force on a British vessel, which is why he yielded to force so readily. It was a political showing and Mason believed that his arrest would do more good for the confederacy than his trip ever could, especially given the protests of the British male agent, Commander Williams, who made sure to remind Mason that he was submitting under protest. Slydell would not go so easily though. He and his wife had returned to their room during the commotion and Fairfax went to find him after Mason's arrest. When he got there, Slydell's oldest daughter, Matilda, stood in the doorway barricading Fairfax from her parents behind her. She argued with Fairfax in a way that one witness called a quote, aggravated attack of hysterics. When Fairfax tried to convince her to move out of his way, she slapped him three times. The Fairfax forced his way past Matilda and into the compartment as Slydell jumped through a window into the ship's cabin. As Matilda screamed, Fairfax ordered his marines to catch Slydell. Cornered on the ship, Slydell was captured quickly enough and as he climbed onto the boat to be taken to the San Jacinto, he told his wife, Goodbye my dear, we shall meet in Paris in 60 days. Like Mason, he recognized that his arrest could be beneficial for the confederacy. They were taken off to prison at Fort Monroe, where they were treated quite well as important prisoners traditionally were at this point in the war. In the north, the capture of Mason and Slydell was generally seen as a great victory over the confederacy and it brought about a much needed morale boost for the Union. After the defeats at Bull Run, Wilson's Creek and Balls Bluff, many people saw this as the first real victory over the confederacy. Consequently, Captain Wilkes was greeted as a hero when he finally disembarked from the San Jacinto in Boston on November 25th. Now that the deed was done, everyone in the north turned into an amateur legal scholar as people started trying to justify the legality of the arrests. One British novelist in the States, Anthony Trollop, remarked that, quote, before 24 hours were over, every man and every woman in Boston was armed with precedents. And he thought it was, quote, pretty to hear the charming women of Boston as they became learned in the law of nature, end quote. One woman when discussing the matter to him told him authoritatively, quote, Wheaton is quite clear about it, referring to Henry Wheaton, a famous legal scholar at the time. It's kind of funny reading this kind of history and realizing how similar popular opinion was in history compared with today. Every time some new issue makes the news, everybody suddenly shows that they've always been an expert on the matter, right? It's easy to think that this kind of faux expertise is the product of people's ability to just Google stuff and read a quick Wikipedia article about it, but these pseudo-intellectual tendencies were just as present in 1861 as they are today, apparently. But people who actually did have some expertise on the matter were less excited about Wilkes's behavior. Charles Sumner, for example, was quite an expert on international law, but he stayed mostly silent on the matter for political reasons. In fact, when Sumner failed to show up to a banquet thrown in Wilkes's honor, Wilkes sought Sumner out and forced the senator to admit that he believed that the United States government would have to release the prisoners. Wilkes responded angrily saying that at least the citizenry, quote, had the nerve to take the proper stand, end quote. But if the union was happy about the capture of Mason and Slidel, so was the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis's Secretary of War, Judah Benjamin, believed the arrests to be, quote, perhaps the best thing that could have happened, end quote. If the United States destroyed its relationship with Britain, it would be that much easier for the Confederacy to win the country over. In the Lincoln Cabinet, there were mixed reactions to the arrests. Lincoln's Secretary of War and Attorney General readily showed their enthusiasm, and Sam and P. Chase only regretted that the Trent was not seized. But Montgomery Blair, Lincoln's Postmaster General, believed the arrests to have been illegal and improper, and the rest of the Cabinet shared his concerns. But the most important figures would obviously be the Secretary of State William Seward and President Lincoln himself. Prior to the capture of Mason and Slidel, Seward was already inquiring about the possibility of a plan to have all the Confederate agents in Europe arrested and brought back to the United States as prisoners. Lincoln had misgivings about such an ambitious plan, and his misgivings did not change after Mason and Slidel were in prison. As he watched the people outside the White House cheer, the President said, quote, I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants, end quote. White elephant is something that somebody possesses that causes more trouble than it's worth. But with the morale boost that the Union sorely needed being brought about by the arrests, Lincoln couldn't simply come out and overturn Wilkes's action either. He was stuck between a rock and a hard place. If he denounced the arrests, he would upset the citizens who sorely needed a victory. But if he openly gave his blessing for the arrests, he would potentially destroy the already fragile relationship with Britain. So Lincoln decided that the best policy was procrastination, and the policy of delay was only made possible because of the broken telegraph cable that prevented Lincoln from communicating immediately with Britain. Instead, correspondences had to travel overseas, taking nearly two weeks for a one-way trip. Now, if you haven't listened to last week's episode, you might want to, so you can have some background about where British-U.S. relations were by the time the Trent affair occurred. The short story is that the relations weren't great at this point. Shortly prior to the arrest of Mason and Slidel, word of the plan to stop the Trent had made it to Britain, and the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, brought the matter up to Charles Francis Adams. Palmerston revealed that he believed that a United States ship was planning to interfere with a British ship to capture the two commissioners. Adams responded by reading the orders to the Union Navy captains, which instructed them to pursue the Nashville, but made no mention of interfering with British ships. Adams thought it was inconceivable that a U.S. ship would apprehend a British vessel, so Palmerston was satisfied for the moment. But on November 28th, the London Times ran the headline, quote, Outrage on the British flag, the Southern commissioners forcibly removed from a British male steamer. The news of the arrests caused an uproar in London. Many people thought it meant war. One American in London at the time wrote to Seward, quote, The people are frantic with rage, and were the country polled, I fear 999 men out of a thousand would declare for immediate war, end quote. Even if Palmerston wanted to avoid war, the public pressure was so intense that he might give in to avoid being replaced by the opposition party. British public opinions swung heavily in favor of the South following the Trent affair. People in London were talking as if war had already been declared. And this is where the broken telegraph cable may be the crucial element. If the British government were able to communicate with the Lincoln administration moment to moment, it's very likely that the heated pressure of public opinion would have compelled political officials to take direct action. But within two days, tempers had already quelled to some degree. But this doesn't mean that war was off the table. Patriotic tempers were still high, but people were able to talk about possible solutions rather than resorting immediately to war talk. But the British press was still fanning the flames, running editorials that in some cases put forth what are essentially conspiracy theories about US intentions. The London standard wrote that the Trent affair was quote, But one of a series of premeditated blows aimed at this country to involve it in a war with the northern states. End quote. The belief was that the United States and William Seward in particular wanted to make war with Britain in order to take Canada. Not every paper believed these conspiracies, but they gained enough traction to matter. And for some people, this gave credibility to Lord Lyons' fears about Seward trying to make a play for Canadian territory. People in the British government who previously viewed Lyons' fears about Canada with amused skepticism were now reconsidering their positions. This included Prime Minister Palmerston who said quote, There can be no doubt that Seward is actuated in his conduct toward us as by the belief that Canada is insufficiently defended while he treats the French with great respect because they have no vulnerable point but have a fleet which could do the northern mischief. End quote. So this is important. In the case of the Trent affair, Seward really had no responsibility to bear, but his dealings with the British since Lincoln took office had so damaged his reputation that British officials were ready to accept that he was behind every union misstep and that all of this was at least potentially part of a ploy to take Canada. Seward's poor diplomacy laid the foundation for the British reaction to the Trent affair. So war with the United States had to be considered. When Palmerston asked Lord Russell for counsel, Russell told him quote, The United States government are very dangerous people to run away from end quote when Russell spoke to the sailors on the Trent about the affair. It was clear that Wilkes had acted illegally. Palmerston agreed describing the incident to Queen Victoria as an outrageous violation of international law. The conspiracy theories about the US were not helped by a large purchase of British salt Peter that was taking place right as the Trent affair came to light in London. The purchase of salt Peter was a coincidence. The United States needed to strengthen its supplies of salt Peter as it was ramping up production of weapons for the war. So Washington authorized a purchase of 2300 tons of salt Peter from Britain and another 1000 from India. US ships arrived to carry out the salt Peter the day after the news of the Trent affair reached London. This was all just a coincidence of timing of course but British officials didn't know that now that they were seeing the Trent affair as evidence of a US planned a wage war with Britain and sees Canada the unusually large purchase of salt Peter looked suspiciously like a plan to deprive Britain of necessary war materials immediately prior to drawing them into a fight. Lord Russell called for the government to halt the transaction and prevent the shipment of the salt Peter and the British police complied searching the US ships and preventing the shipments from taking place. The London Times reported that the purchase of salt Peter showed quote the intention of offering an outrage to England and was the cause of the hasty dispatch of this extraordinary order. Now the British government was concerned about any US purchases of British arms and ammunition and reports of such sales started to flood in. Officials were worried about the loss of war supplies to the very country they were increasingly starting to believe they might be waging war against. On November 29th Palmerston called the cabinet meeting where he said given the possibility of war with the United States quote would it not be an act of folly amounting to absolute imbecility to let those who may soon be our enemies go on extracting from our warehouses and workshops the means to make war against us end quote going further he asked quote if our men were shot down by rifles made by us and with gunpowder supplied by us should we not as a government be laughed to scorn as unfit to conduct the affairs of the country end quote following the meeting he asked the queen to deliver a royal proclamation prohibiting the export of any war materials from Britain to the United States now the United States had to worry about depleting its meager supply of salt Peter as it seemed to be losing the war forcing us officials to look to smaller markets to try to procure supplies as well as resorting to smuggling supplies out of Britain no matter the cost. Meanwhile Lord Russell drafted a message for the US demanding reparations for the front to the British flag his original draft was hostile enough that Queen Victoria and Prince Albert offered revisions to soften the tone but was still quite firm. Russell sent lions with the ultimatum for Seward giving him seven days to respond to the British demands as all this was going on the original Confederate diplomats to Britain had decided not to press for Confederate recognition just yet that would seem tactless but they did send reports that British recognition of the Confederacy was only a matter of timing everything in London looked promising for the Confederacy as Britain away to the response from the United States it began to prepare for a potential war the British Inspector General of fortifications gave briefings on how to best defend Britain from Union invasion of Canada and he said that Maine was the safest point for Britain to invade the United States if need be Britain's leading military theorist Patrick McDougall who wrote a very highly regarded book titled theory of war held no doubt that the Trin affair was deliberately staged to provoke a war with Britain he believed that since the United States was already losing the war this would allow them to say face once defeated by the Confederacy and that a winter time invasion of Canada would make the most sense McDougall seconded the advice to invade Maine but also recommended an occupation of Portland and some other territories around the Great Lakes in New York the British Secretary of War believed that the US would make a dash for Montreal or some other desperate attack he advised sending forces to Halifax and endorsed some of the other plans for British occupation of various strategic territories I could keep going but suffice to say at this point Britain was taking the prospect of war with the United States very seriously and its most well-respected military experts not only were giving advice on how to conduct the war but they seem to agree that the Trent affair was proof that the United States was already intent on waging it while still waiting on Seward's reply to the demand for reparations the British cabinet agreed that there was a clear need to reinforce Canada and by the beginning of December British soldiers were boarding ships destined for Halifax throughout December troop movement to Canada was taking place regularly by December 20th the Canadian government decided to start training its own small army of about 38,000 soldiers in preparation for the coming war but all of this tension was building while the messages between Britain and the United States were slowly being delivered across the Atlantic Ocean again the broken telegraph cable bought the United States time the message from Britain arrived in Washington on December 13th when word of the ultimatum spread panic spread as well investors dumped their American stocks in favor of silver or commodities anticipating an economically destructive war commodity prices skyrocketed according to speculative estimations about the coming wartime scarcity Seward didn't help matters when he was overheard by British journalist William Russell at a dinner party telling somebody that if the United States and Britain went to war quote we will wrap the whole world in flames no power is so remote that she will not fill the fire of our battle and be burned by our conflagration in quote other war Hawks in Congress made similar statements in December 16th and 17th saw a heated debate between the peace Democrats and the hawkish Republicans some members of Congress believed that Britain should have to compensate the United States for the crime of carrying its enemies Seward seven day deadline came on December 21st and he admitted to Lord Lyons that he still did not have an answer and begged for more time Lyons agreed to give him two more days on December 23rd Seward still had no answer for Lyons and he asked for even more time reluctantly Lyons gave him until noon on the 30th Lincoln was not eager to release Mason and slide out they had provided too much of a morale boost for the union when Seward told him about the British old a made him Lincoln simply said no after Seward reminded him of the potential ramifications of refusing to release Mason and slide out Lincoln said quote no matter I will never give them up to this Seward responded then I should be obliged to ask you Mr. President to write the reply to Earl Russell for the strength of the argument from our own past policy so far as I can see is in favor of a compliance with his demands and quote at this point Seward was the one urging the release of Mason and slide out while Lincoln was the one determined to keep them in prison as debates ran through Christmas a decision was still not reached and Lincoln told Seward on Christmas quote Governor Seward you will go on of course preparing your answer which as I understand it will state the reason why they ought to be given up now I have a mind to try my hand at stating the reasons why they ought not to be given up we will compare the points on each side end quote the next day the cabinet met in Lincoln's office and listened to Russell's report followed by Seward's proposal they agreed that they could not count on France to help them if they went to war with Britain the matter looked grim finally Chase spoke up to say that it was clear that Wilkes had violated international law he didn't want to surrender the scoundrels as he called them but he felt that there was no other option after this more members of the cabinet started to speak up in favour of their release finally a decision was made and a meeting adjourned Seward held back after everybody else had left and spoke to Lincoln quote you thought you might frame an argument for the other side to which Lincoln replied I found I cannot make an argument that would satisfy my own mind and that proved to me your ground was the right one end quote with the decision made Seward spent the rest of the day drafting his reply to Lord Russell the reply was rambling and illogical Seward had little knowledge of the laws he was dealing with and his reply he asserted that Mason and Slidel were contra bands of war and as such Wilkes was within his right to stop search and seize the Trent it was basically saying that the capture was legal and justifiable something of a middle finger to the British but then he went on to contort his way out of his own defense of Wilkes in order to accommodate British demands if Seward said Wilkes had released to the Trent involuntarily then the United States would be obliged to keep Mason and Slidel however since Wilkes released to the Trent of his own volition Wilkes had effectively waived the right to keep the prisoners this then was the illegal act for which Seward conceded that Britain deserved reparations not the search of a neutral vessel but the fact that the neutral vessel was not seized it was logical gymnastics and it had no actual basis in maritime law but that's what Seward said but with this note he accommodated the British demands sufficiently to stave off a war that neither country wanted I mentioned the broken telegraph cable and the communication delays that it forced the two countries to deal with as contributing to the avoidance of a war with Canada this is the view that many historians take and it's a belief that many people at the time including lions held but some people disagree so we can really only speculate as to whether a working telegraph cable would have significantly altered the outcome of this history but what is interesting and hardly ever mentioned in the histories of the Civil War is how incredibly close the United States came to war with Britain so close that Britain was readily transporting thousands of soldiers to Canada and discussing strategies for invasions of the United States the Trent Affair would not turn out to be the strategic disaster for the Union that the Confederacy hoped it would be but it certainly came close and at the end of 1861 it is almost certain that a war with Britain would have cost to the Union the Civil War when Mason and Slydell were released they did make their way to Britain and France with the opportunity to appeal to the British and French governments for recognition had passed tempers had cooled intentions had alleviated Britain would maintain its neutrality after all and this way then the Trent Affair may be seen as a minor and very narrow Union victory in the next episode we will look at an even less well-known element of the war as we discuss the early alliances made particularly the Cherokee historical controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute if you would like to support the show please subscribe on iTunes Google Play or Stitcher and leave a positive review you can also support the show financially by donating at Mises.org slash support H C if you would like to explore the rest of our content please visit Mises.org that's M-I-S-E-S dot O-R-G