 Welcome everyone to Looking at the East. Thank you for tuning in and watching our show. We have a special presentation today. We're doing our semiannual roundtable looking at issues that are affecting Japan, China, and the Asia region. I have with us three very special guests, repeat guests from previous shows. We'll be starting with Jiri Miseki, who's a partner at Kitahama Law Firm in Osaka. Jiri is a regular on the show. Thank you very much, Jiri, for participating. Jiri is very interested in the topic today, which is the impact of the Ukraine invasion on Asia. We also have Robert Eldridge, who was on my show just a month ago. So Robert, you're doing overtime officially in terms of your participation in the show. Robert's the head of his own think tank and has a very illustrious career in political science with Osaka University and other institutions in the Kansai area. And then Paul, who I think is our returning champion, Paul has been on my show I think more than anybody else. Paul is a professor emeritus from Kansai Gaida University. He is also now professor at the Catholic University of Lille. Did I say that right, Paul? That's correct. Okay, and he lives in Paris. So he's going to give us an overview of how this war is being perceived in Europe. So that's what I want to start with, guys, is taking a look at the impact of this war on the various regions that you guys are familiar with. One reason I want to do this is that my class last week, I was doing a Zoom class and I have several students from Austria. And they began to text to each other and I think that they thought that they were just texting among themselves, but they were actually texting openly. And they were making many comments about the war. And so I brought it up as a subject. And even though, of course, this issue is reported daily in Japan, I could tell those students were taking it much more personally, that there was an emotional element to it, almost to the point where one student was in tears about this issue. So Paul, why don't I start with you since you're in Europe. How is this war being perceived? Well, it's an interesting question. If I were to drive from Paris to Kiev, it would take 25 hours. It's almost exactly the distance between New York and Miami, about 2000 something miles. And the war in Europe has been a shock. Europe at war again, although not an EU country. And it certainly did absolutely the opposite of what Mr. Putin could have dreamed that would happen. And that is Germany, which has always underspent its military budget, and has been criticized for that as well, that the new government has pledged 113 billion this year alone to modernize its country's weapons. There is some debate muted about whether the Europeans want to see Germany rearm. And Germany, a lot like Japan, has, it's a very, very, very long German word, about 17 letters, which is not uncommon in German. They have a public debate about what they call the problematic period of its recent history. That is, of course, a national socialism, Nazism. And basically, within the Japanese contest, it would be to become normal, whatever that means. France, and Mr. Macron, who is up for a reelection, has been a lead in this. And his approval ratings, or at least the polling for April, is that he will sweep in two election, in part because of his handling of this. And maybe if I can make one comment, Europe, as we all know, is heavily dependent on Russia for its oil and gas. Two-fifths of the gas Europeans burn come from Russia. So Europe is really dependent on Russia, extraordinarily so. And maybe one more point I don't want to, is that I asked my class this the other day, who has a bigger economy, Italy or Russia? And the answer is Italy. So when we talk about a powerful Russia, we have to look at really how strong that economy is. Absolutely energy dependent. Most likely, 60% of its GDP is energy related. There is a lot of debate about strengthening NATO. I think there's not as much hysteria, if I could use that, as in the United States, at least the commentary on BBC and on France 24, and on Deutsche Welle, and all these things that I watched. And the newspapers has been, they talk about total war, and they talk about a war in World War III, which it's not, the Russian army is not going to go through the full de-gap, and be it in the English channel in two weeks. This is hysteria. So that's less, it's more muted here, because it's so close. Thank you, Paul. Excuse me, Jerry. So you're an American living in Japan? Yes. I want to point out that you are also a Czech citizen. I am, yeah. And an official representative of the Czech government, are you still? Well, I know, I am not an official representative of the Czech government, but I have been involved here in Japan with the Czech community and the European community, members of various chambers of commerce, French chamber, German chamber. So yeah, I come at this from a number of angles, as you said, as sort of the American angle, the European angle, as a Czech and European, and also living here in Japan. And it's very interesting that each of the different sort of strands that I just mentioned, and perspectives are different. Japan looks at this different than many in the United States, than many in Europe, and particularly Central and Eastern Europe, which as you noted, Steve, is where your Austrian students were also located, and for people there, it really is. And even more than Austrians, Czechs, Poles, Romanians, who were once part of the Soviet Empire, if you will, do have a very, very emotional reaction to also having been dominated. Czechs in particular, before it was the Czech Republic, it was Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia has been mentioned sort of in two major contexts in this conflict. The first is what happened in 1938, when Hitler was basically the Munich conference, and Hitler was allowed to take Zudetman, which is a land where I think Germans lived around the Czech lands, and that led to the total annexation and overtaking the Nazis coming into Prague. And then in 1968, the Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Russians as well as other Soviet countries. So particularly for Czechs, it is a very sort of emotional issue to the point that I think you probably saw in the news that the three prime ministers, the Polish Prime Minister, Slovenian Prime Minister, and the Czech Prime Minister went to Kiev during the recent hostilities. Last month, I believe it was to show solidarity for Zelenski. So yes, it is coming at it from these three different directions. It is extremely troubling conflict. If I could add, I had Polish students, and you're completely right, Giddy, that if we can talk about the Eastern Europe, their experience with Russia is much, much different than here in France. So a lot of emotion, completely correct, the Polish students. And no matter how much people would criticize, and with good cause, NATO expansion, the Poles really wanted it. And so did the Baltic states. They really, really wanted that. So there's no debate there. Yeah, Czechs too. Absolutely. That's exactly my point. Yeah, exactly right. I'm sorry. Hey, Robert, why don't we turn to you as our representative in terms of the impact of this invasion on Japan, from your perspective. You're not Japanese, but you're a Japanese expert. And I know you have contacts everywhere. It's remarkable, your network. I'm always amazed at the people that you know. What are you picking up in terms of how this invasion is being perceived in Japan, and also the subsequent change in relationship potentially between Japan and Russia, which historically has not been so good after World War Two anyway. Right. And I would invite our listeners to view our show last month that you alluded to before. We went into a great discussion, I think, on the impact on Russian Japanese relations. But I'd like to thank you for inviting me again today. It's great to see Paul Scott, with whom I was extremely close in Kansai. And Paul and I worked on a book about 20 years ago on another war. And the co-editors, a different Paul. But our Paul Scott contributed a chapter to this book. It's on public opinion during the war on terrorism, and particularly from 2001, and then again with the invasion of Iraq. So it's great to be working with him on another project again right now, this series. And also, Jerry was a classmate at Colby University at the same time. Different offices, different faculty members who were studying under, but this show is allowing us to reunite. And I appreciate that. With regard to Japan, I think Japan really had no choice but to join the Western alliance against Russia, particularly joining the sanctions. Also, the foreign minister recently visited the region, particularly meeting with Polish leaders about accepting Ukrainian refugees to Japan, and they mobilized a government aircraft to help relocate Ukrainian citizens to Japan. So I was kind of relieved to see Japan step up quickly. As we know in the past, it's usually been somewhat slow in making decisions of such consequence. Although after the war on terrorism, the then prime minister very quickly relayed his sympathy to the United States, for example. So Japan over the past 20 years at least has been kind of more and more in step with the international community. Here in Japan, I think the real concerns have been about what does this mean for China? With China's intentions vis-a-vis Taiwan, as well as the territorial dispute it has with Japan in the form of the Senkaku Islands. So many people are in Japan are watching it from that angle. What are the lessons that China is drawing from Ukraine's or Russia's invasion of Ukraine? Another thing that, and we talked about the last show about how this will affect Russian-Japanese relations, and shortly after we did our show together, Russia basically announced its discontinuation of peace talks with Japan on a peace treaty, which it hasn't signed with Japan. And a couple days after that, Ukraine's President Zelensky addressed the parliament, the diet here in Japan. There are a couple of other things that I've noticed. So there is a great deal of distrust in the media reporting of the war. There's a tendency to be all in on Ukraine and not giving a more balanced perspective about the background to the conflict and what's really going on in Russian decision making. So I think it's increased the distrust that many in the general public in Japan have towards the media. And I think we see that in other countries as well. And then on a final note, since we're talking about the larger Indo-Pacific region, I think it's important to mention India in this discussion. And there's a lot of criticism about India's stance on this issue. And but there's a sort of a double standard that when China is, you know, acts neutral in this, it's given a pass. But when India does, it's not given a pass. But I would argue that India, because of its long standing relations with Russia, is in a much more delicate position in some ways. You know, for example, 85 percent of Indian weapons come from Russia. And roughly the same percent of oil that India imports also comes from Russia. And also foreign policy wise, roughly 100 percent of Russia and the former Soviet Union's voting in the United Nations has been in favor of India. So that country is really, really dependent on Russia. And yet we've been extremely, you know, critical of India's stance on this. And I think one of the aspects of this conflict is that I think we all need to be more aware of where certain countries are coming from. And it's not necessarily in the response, but in the day to day interactions where we build that trust. And I don't think we've done a good job with building trust with India over the past, you know, 75 years. And that's an area that we need to learn from. Interesting. We do have a question from viewers that came in. And it actually, it's to the point that Robert was making about what China will take away from this invasion of Ukraine vis-a-vis its relationship with Taiwan. So Paul, maybe you have some thoughts about that? Obviously, the invasion has not succeeded, at least on the terms of what it seemed like Putin wanted to accomplish initially. And to your point, Europe has moved dramatically against Russia. So there's been that ramification as well. Do you think that this invasion would make China less likely to engage in a conflict with Taiwan, maybe over the next five to 10 years? Or does it make no difference at all? I think it makes a great difference. And I think one great takeaway from this is China has zero experience in conducting military operations at sea. The United States certainly has great experience. And the invasion of Ukraine planned by the Russians was inept, logistic support, all of these things. So crossing 100 miles or crossing the Taiwan straits and invading Taiwan, it is extraordinarily much more complicated military operation. And if I were China, I would think about that a little more carefully than believing the propaganda, their own propaganda, about how weak the US military is. And by the way, the US military is not as strong, especially at sea as it should be. But it is incredibly capable. Robert knows this, and I know this as well. So that would be one takeaway. Jerry, do you have any thoughts on this? No, I totally agree. Of course, the question of the impact of our on Taiwan of what the West and other countries doing against China, I will also be interested to see what impact it has on Chinese expansionism in other ways. For example, the artificial islands and the much more aggressive military operations that they're doing in the South China Sea. I'm wondering if they're going to pause before they keep doing that, because over the years that China has become much more aggressive and blatant, and not just toward Taiwan, toward the Philippines, towards other countries as well. And I'm wondering if they're going to think about doing that. I'm also wondering whether or not other countries, again in the region, themselves get a little bit more aggressive and tell China that if they do continue with the closing off of certain trade routes or sea routes and also with the artificial islands, whether or not they're going to threaten consequences for that sort of expansionism. Robert, what are your comments about this? I'm sure you could ask this question many times. Yes, I do agree with both comments, but I can't help but play the devil's advocate and having served as the political advisor in the Marine Corps and interacting with the other services and throughout our government as a whole. I can't help but be worried about the ability to mitigate an attempt by China to invade Taiwan. I kind of think that we believe our own propaganda too. And there's a tendency when we look at this China-Taiwan issue that a lot of the peaceniks will say, yeah, China has no intention to invade Taiwan, so they dismiss it that way. And on the right, there's a tendency to dismiss Chinese capabilities. And so both of those views are, I think, are incorrect. We need to be aware of China's will or intention, which they've called for for the entire period of their existence, the PRC, and their capabilities have grown dramatically over the past 20-some years. Essentially, as of 2015, they were militarily capable of cease in Taiwan if they wanted to. In the interim, the past seven years, their fusion of civilian and military capabilities has only grown dramatically, as have their military capabilities. The Trump administration tried to stop that, but there's been a long decay over the years. We also have the US has the tyranny of distance it has to solve. Taiwan is much, much closer to China than it is to Hawaii, Guam, Hawaii, or continental US. And I think a Chinese attack is going to be sooner rather than later. It doesn't mean that the Ukraine situation hasn't given China pause about its planning or its concept of operations. If anything, I think it's allowed China to see what's gone well for Russia and what hasn't gone well. And the reason I say it's going to be sooner rather than later, if you remember exactly a year ago, a year and a month ago, Admiral Davidson from Hawaii from the Indo-Pacific command said that China would likely take Taiwan or try to take Taiwan anywhere from 10 or maybe even six years. And it was unclear why he mentioned six years. But in my research, I think the reason is because China has an advantage in attacking satellites. And the US and its allies won't have the true capability to defend the satellites for another five years or so. So last year, he said six years, I think it's because of the plans to introduce the satellite defense system in, and that's not the official name, but the satellite defense system in 2026, which I think is probably behind schedule because of COVID and the supply chain issues, particularly with semiconductors. So it might not be until 2027. My point is, I think China is going to move more quickly rather than later down the road. That's interesting. So to the extent that the Japanese government agrees, Robert, with your premise, I don't know if they do or not. The Japanese government had been even prior to the invasion, maybe in the last couple of years or so, attempting to build a stronger relationship diplomatically and otherwise with Taiwan as a part of a counter to the expansionist policies of China. Do you think that that will accelerate now, if indeed what you say is correct or high Japanese government officials agree with your perspective on this? I hope it proceeds. I've been calling for a Taiwan Relations Act for Japan since 2018, and they haven't done that. A lot of the pronouncements are basically political and diplomatic, but the best way to defend Taiwan, the best way to defend Taiwan is to end its diplomatic isolation. Interesting. Paul, do you have any thoughts on that? Absolutely. The messaging from the United States has to be unambiguous. It has to be clarity, and I agree with Robert completely. If China does decide to attack, it is the tyranny of distance as well for the Americans. There's only one aircraft carrier in the Pacific, home ported in Japan. I would recommend at least one more, and absolutely sanctions are not going to be an effective deterrent, and there has to be, like I said, absolute clear messaging from the United States. There is some talk, some chatter as far as Ukraine, to raise this, that really some people are saying that they don't want Putin to lose. In other words, they're not giving Ukraine the type of weapons it needs, and it's asking and begging for more offensive weapons, and really they want a negotiated settlement, and they do not want to turn Russia. We don't want this to be a Versailles peace treaty, so to speak, with Russia coming back even stronger and more vengeful, so of an equivalent of a giant North Korea, distrustful and vengeful and isolated. Those messages and the emotion, especially in parts of Europe and in the United States, on Ukraine, whether that can be, it's very, very high, high, whether that can be transferred to Taiwan would be an interesting question that I have no answer for. I think there's one interesting parallel between Russia and Ukraine and China and Taiwan. Both Russia believes that Ukraine isn't a separate state, right? It's a part of Russia, and China, of course, believes exactly the same thing. So Jerry, we're running out of time, but I want to give you the last word if you want to comment about this at all. Yes, I agree with the previous comments about, you know, maybe the challenges. The other thing I think to remember is there, in East Asia, we don't have an EU equivalent. We don't have a NATO equivalent. And if there were to be military action, it would really be interesting to see which countries would, you know, align. Would there be this forceful response that you have in Europe? And I don't know that that would be the case. That's a fascinating observation, Jerry, and maybe a topic for another show. Fortunately, guys, we've run out of time. I wish I had another half hour. I have more questions I want to pose here. But I do want to end on this one positive note. Robert talked about the initiative on the part of Japanese government to host Ukrainians. I was contacted a few days ago by an agency that's working with ICU, International Christian University up in Tokyo, and they're hosting Ukrainian students. So I'm starting that initiative now for Konsei Gaidai. And potentially we're going to have some Ukrainian students on our campus to offer them a safe place to be while things are sorted out for them, hopefully soon. We'll have to see how this all goes. Robert, Paul, Jerry, thank you so much for participating. I think I'm going to have to petition for more time when I get the three of you guys together again. Maybe we'll do an hour long special show, because half an hour is just not enough time to cover these issues. Very, very interesting conversation and insights by all of you. Actually, Jerry, I'm thinking maybe contacting Andrew in Taiwan and do a show with him. Andrew's a friend of ours who heads the Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan. Might be interesting to do a show on that. Thanks guys for participating, enjoyed it. 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