 My name is Jennifer Cooke, I'm director of the Africa program here at CSIS. We're going to get started because we do have to end on time, but I know a number of more people will be joining us, I think we'll let them trickle in and catch up on their own. Today we're having the official launch of a project, a year-long project that CSIS is hosting on strengthening US support for police reform in Africa in particular. This is our premise in this is that policing and police reform as a component of the broader security sector reform have been largely neglected and under resourced in Africa, both by African national governments and by the US governments and the broader international community. Second, that many of Africa's current emergency emerging security challenge are probably more appropriately dressed by accountable professional police forces than they are by military forces, although military responses tend to be the default response in many of these cases. Third is that accountable, competent police forces linked to functional judiciary systems are critical elements in democratic consolidation, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, and so forth. Fourth, while the US has provided increasing attention in Africa to military engagement with the establishment of AFRICOM and so forth, training and support for police reform has remained fairly disjointed, underfunded, hamstrung by kind of enduring legal constraints and lacking a real strategic focus or profile, I think. And I think there's perhaps a concern that the advent of AFRICOM continues to kind of reinforce this preferential approach towards the military and to preference military responses over, again, policing solutions to the continent's problems. And at the same time, though, there remains with the advent of AFRICOM, there remains a lot of uncertainty about where kind of ultimate responsibility and oversight for policing programs will reside within the US government. Our hope is that, you know, this has been a problem that people have acknowledged for decades, but the response that you often get is, it's very important, but it's just too hard. Our hope is that this takes advantage of kind of a shifting understanding of security challenges in Africa. It takes advantage of kind of a new administration that I think is still trying to grapple how it engages with the continent and how it balances the various 3Ds of development, democracy and diplomacy. And it comes at a time when there's broader rethinking of how the US might do foreign assistance in Africa. There's the QDDR within the State Department, the NSC Initiative that's looking at security and development issues. There's a congressional effort to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act that may come in a decade or so, but there is a moment, it seems here, that it would be important to profile the issue to be able to say something and to be able to put forward some kind of succinct, feasible recommendations at this particular time. We're not trying to produce great, you know, original new thought because there has been a great deal done on this in Washington and around town. We've got two of the longstanding experts here with us. Bob Perrito couldn't come today, but that's another person who comes to mind as someone who's worked on this for such a very long time. But what we do hope to do is kind of tackle one by one some of the obstacles, the legal obstacles, the programmatic obstacles, the political will challenge working in African governments to again kind of bring expertise and say something succinct at this kind of opportune moment to the US government to Congress and so forth. It's how we do police reform is incredibly complex. We found out and Richard Downey, a fellow here, has been doing a range of interviews along with Brian Kennedy and Alex Snyder who are working with the Africa program. It's very hard to map out exactly what we are doing in order to say how we might improve it. And our hope is that we can at least provide that baseline picture of what is happening now and where the room for improvement might lie. We wanted to open up today with, as I said, two longstanding experts on the issue to kind of help us frame it. I don't think your work has been so specifically focused on Africa, at least in your case, Dr. Bailey, but kind of on the broader themes of reform and police reform. But I think that's important to start with that much, that bigger, broader context picture. So we're going to turn first to David Bailey. I don't think you are. Aren't you going to do, I think you're going to do like Oh, okay. Michael Burkow, who is president of Ultegrity Security Consulting currently. This is a consulting firm that provides product services and solutions, including training, information and consulting to law enforcement agencies and the federal government. But Mr. Burkow has a long career in policing. He's chief of the Savannah Police Deputy Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department. I won't go through the whole list because it's all over the place and has, and I think has been extremely useful to us as we've been preparing for this. I'll turn to you first and then I'll turn to Dr. Bailey, who is distinguished professor in the School of Criminology at SUNY Albany. He's written a number of books on the topic police for the future back in the 90s. What works in policing changing the guard? That's developing democratic police approaches. And most recently with Bob Perito, the police in war, I wish I had a copy I could hold up of the book. Fighting insurgency terrorism and violent crime. Oh, there we go. Excellent. And there's order forms at the back of the room. Okay, so with that, so throughout the course of this, we'll be holding a series kind of unpackaging kind of the legal aspects, the programmatic aspects, the international component and perhaps get some folks down from the UN as well. We'll try to keep this on a regular schedule. We'd like to get a kind of a draft of recommendations out early in the fall that we can vet around for final publication in late 2010. We're also trying to be opportunistic in bringing African voices here from Kenya, from Nigeria, Liberia and South Africa. Those are kind of our focus countries in terms of potential case studies to talk about kind of what their plans and what their experiences are on the ground. With that, I'll turn to Mike. It always feels a little strange for me. I've been in the private sector for about four months. So a 30 plus year career in policing. I lost my first name long ago. I've been a chief of police for 14 years in different departments. And so I haven't been called Mr. Berko. I started looking around for my dad. The company that I'm working for is the CEO is Mike Jocasti, who's a former prosecutor and has quite extensive reputation. He was the monitor for the Los Angeles Police Department. And my boss, my immediate boss is Bill Bratton, who was the chief of police in New York and Los Angeles. We're obviously involved in a lot of international work. And I'm a proud, I think there's some Isitap folks here. But I was a proud alumni of Isitap. Back in 1993, I was hired by Chris Kristevich, who the day after he met me sent me to Haiti. And the day I met Bob Torrito, he sent me to Mogadishu for a year, I might add. So I've had, and I've continued to do a lot of international police work, short term missions all over. I was asked by Richard and Jennifer to speak a little bit about Africa. And I have some context in my remarks to make a few broader comments. I'm going to use a PowerPoint. I don't know what the best seed arrangement program is. Am I all right where I'm at? It seems to me that when you talk about international policing and police assistance from the United States, the first thing you have to realize is everything's done in a continuum. We're providing police assistance to we've talked a lot about Afghanistan and Haiti in the failed state sort of model, but we're also providing police assistance in a lot of places that aren't failed states. So we go down to Costa Rica and we go to Chile and we do a number of countries where we're providing police assistance in fairly well operating police departments. Somewhere in the middle, there are a whole wide variety. So we provide help for Jamaica, for example. And you can go to these police departments. I've done a lot of work with the Jamaican police, you know, we could 1130 at night, we can go to a police station, there'd be a group of police officers standing up, standing roll call, they'd go out and get in a car. If you dial 999, you'd get a police dispatcher and you could get the police sent. I think you also need to overlay over this what we're now talking in terms of permissive and non permissive environments and what David just wrote about in terms of working in times of war. Really Somalia was one of the first times where we tried to do that, where we tried to reestablish a police force in the midst of a conflict. And it truly was the midst of a conflict, which brings about a whole different set of issues. When my cops in Mogadishu came to me and said, we want rocket propelled grenade launchers, was like, wait a minute, that's really not a police weapon. You know, the concept of collateral damage is a military concept, not a police concept. So you have to overlay that reality when you're thinking about where in the continuum you're providing assistance and how you do that. And I think when you're talking about these states, particularly when you're talking about, and we do spend most of our time talking about the failed states, what we've come to recognize over time is we really got to get involved with the entire criminal justice system. And it's not sufficient to just do police redevelopment and police rebuilding. You know, and we should have learned that long ago, we're slow learners in some ways, I think. You know, I remember in Somalia, you know, we arrested people and said, where do you take them? And the first jail in Somalia was a 40 foot shipping connex with holes caught in the side for ventilation. And I remember in Haiti, asking for prison advisors and legal advisors and you know, Carl Alexander showing up in Haiti in the early days, you know, to try and start, start some of that process. And it's fascinating to me how these issues repeat. That'll be part of my, my comments will be the issues repeat. The questions that we're wrestling with in Afghanistan right now, what law to apply, okay, are exactly the same issues we wrestled with in the past in places like Somalia. In Somalia, we had some places they apply the traditional elder rules. You killed my brother, the elders that get together, that's 15 camels, and they'd work it out. Some places they applied Sharia law, Islamic law. And in 1962, some American as a Peace Corps volunteer in Somalia had written a classic US penal code. And that was running around Somalia too. And in some places they were actually pulling out the old blue and white penal code book and trying to do more Western kind of charging. So these issues we've recognized we've got to have a broader approach. I think, regardless of where you are in the continuum, you've all you've got to think about them in a similar way. And, and I would suggest to you that really, this is what we've got to talk about. And, and where you are and what country you are becomes irrelevant, this becomes a framework that you use. And I think really, we have to be acutely sensitive to the local cultures. I've seen us repeatedly try and export US policing. And I'm not even sure what that is after 30 some years in the business. I've become convinced it's absolutely leader centric. Police departments change depending on who's the chief. And they're radically different depending on the parts of the country. I went from LAPD, a very storied PD, a very, you know, truly one of the great international police departments had our bumps in the road at times, but truly an outstanding police department to the deep south. Totally different tradition of policing, different tactics, different strategies, different philosophies. So I think you have to pay attention, not just to the country, but in our country, we're where you're actually practicing policing. You have to pay attention to the values and the ethics and this concept we throw out of rule of law. The only place that I'm aware of, and it may have happened elsewhere, but David Bailey was brought to Bosnia by Bob Wasserman and wrote a democratic framework for the police to follow. And I think that was hugely useful, although controversial at the time, which sort of not uncommon. And and then I think these other things are things you've got to have. And we spend an over amount of time thinking about logistics. I mean, and logistics are key. And I'll make that point even stronger in a second. But I think those all have to underlay these other core principles. This has way too much text. I'll just I've seen us repeatedly fail to pay attention to local culture. I think we've done it again in Iraq, you know, we built sort of we didn't pay attention to the history and we built police forces based on you know, we're gonna have a highway patrol because we have highway patrol in America, you know, we didn't really think it through in some places. And I think it's critical that we really start to pay attention to the local realities. I also really think that it's very much about the concepts and the and the reality of policing operational realities and not training. We spend a huge amount of time focusing on training. Training is a tactic. It's easy to measure seats on butts times hours, you know, butts in seats times hours. So it's really easy for us to say we have delivered x number of hours to x number of people in this course. But there's a whole different thing about knowledge transfer and there's a whole different discussion about what's the environment into which you put your trained individual can they operate in that environment. And I'll talk a little bit more specifically when I get to Africa, I'll put some slides up I was in Afghanistan and in December and I'll probably use that as a more recent example. And I think even with all of our focus on training and we've done a lot of training, we've trained lots and lots and lots of police officers all over the world. And I would argue to you is to tap in particular is very, very good. We train a lot of people. I'm not sure if you get at the 50,000 foot level, you can really tell that. And even in the training, there isn't a lot of agreed curriculum. And what's the policing doctrine? I mean, you know, I've I've been involved in these multinational things. So we get to Haiti, we used to have these massive food fights at the police academy, the French police were absolutely certain they knew it was best. You haven't really had a fight until you've dealt with an RCMP guy from Quebec. And, and, and, you have this whole argument, what's acceptable police doctrine? What should we be training? How do you talk to someone about clearing a room or stopping a car? How do you approach an individual? There isn't clear doctrine. And so there you get into these kinds of discussions and that that's somewhat been lost in the focus on training, training, training. Training can be a driver. Training can be a key tool that a chief can use to transform our organization. But by itself, it's very transitory and limited effects. I would also say logistics. And I'll mention this, and I'll just a Somali story is worthwhile. We had a great logistical tale in Somalia. Issa Tap, we were there on the ground. We were there after the US troops left. The UN had a bunch of police trainers there. But they didn't have a textbook, they didn't have a table, they didn't have a facility, they had no money to do it. And so what we did was we built that stuff and we partnered with them and got them involved. You've got to have logistics to get this. And one of the reason particularly in the failed states that the military plays such a huge role is they're the only ones that have the capacity. They have the surge capacity. They have the helicopters and the generators and the life support and they can get anywhere in a big way. And so they drive many of these missions, which can be very problematic in some way. I've partnered with the military many times, but oftentimes they view police as an exit strategy. And I think now they're really starting to understand building a police force is fundamentally different and requires a different set of time and skill. So if I can go to Africa where I've been asked to talk about, first of all, I'm not going to talk about all of the US imposed obstacles. I'm going to leave that for Dr. Bailey, who's written books about it. And so I will leave the discussion of what the US government is doing or should be doing for someone else. I will say that when we talk about Africa and we talk about developing countries, we've got to remember Maslow's hierarchy of needs. And I was struck by this in Afghanistan in December, you know, we're talking about how to deliver high level training. And you know, there were some interesting discussions. But these guys aren't getting paid. Or by the way, they're being put into a neighborhood where they can't get food. And even if they got paid, the local population won't sell them the food. Well, before you can really worry about what kind of policing they're doing, they got to survive. So you absolutely have to keep in mind, you know, Maslow's hierarchy needs, we got to deal with basic human needs before we get to some of these other higher level issues. And I think sometimes we fail to do that. I think the other thing in Africa that's absolutely critical is to pay attention to the history. The colonial history plays a critical role in the police forces today and what their traditions are. And you can see that in the different police departments. I've trained, you know, in Tanzania and in Yemen, in Botswana and Kenya. And you can really see the roots, you know, they're more British than the British in certain ways. You know, Somalia, which had Italian influences and West German influences and British influences. Again, we have to be very mindful of what were their backgrounds and their roots. And I think when you think about specific places, they are going to be specific issues that are unique to those countries. This is from Afghanistan. One of the things that I had never dealt with in my career internationally or domestically was the issue of sexual abuse within the police force, which is absolutely an issue in the Afghanistan national police and drug addicted police officers in the 25 to 35 percent range. So unique set of issues in each country. And as you're developing whatever kind of police assistance you're developing, you've got to be mindful of that and take that into account. In Somalia, which is part of Africa, you know, we think of the technicals and the chaos. What we don't realize is if you go back in history in 1964, the Somali police were the finest police in Africa. And I have a copy of the Somali police yearbook from 1964. If you dialed 991 in Somalia in 1964, two Somali cops showed up in a Volkswagen Beetle with a blue light on the top. And they had a forensic lab and they had a SWAT team called Darwishta. And they had an aviation unit made up of Piper Cubs. And they had a police academy and they had found a way to operate in a clan based society where everything is based on the six primary clans. And they had found a way that they were the only institution of government that operated clan neutral. They could send an ISAC policeman to a derude neighborhood and he could work. And how did they do that? Well, they've had their own police hospital. They had their own police school. They had their own police orphanage. They built their whole infrastructure so that they could remain neutral. And by the way, they had a reputation for no corruption and no brutality. Now, obviously, that has changed over time. But when you think about the effort, the U.S. effort in 1994 to rebuild them, that was actually pretty easy. They wanted to come back to work and they wanted to be what they once were. We have to be very mindful of the realities of the countries that we're operating in and the police forces we're operating in and the various cultural aspects of them. And Somalia to me is a great example. It's where I truly learned about values. When I think about policing and obstacles to international policing, I'm not sure that the issues in Africa are that much different from anywhere else. In every place you confront issues of corruption, they depend. They can differ by degree. They differ by format. They differ by how they're manifested. They can be high level corruption where people at the top of the organization are taking big kickbacks and contracts, etc. Or they can be relatively low level where the police officers are extorting a couple of dollars on the corner. And we could have an interesting discussion about what is more corrosive on the public trust and the ability of the police force to operate. The incompetence of the police, and I'll talk more about that in a second. But critical to all of this is the willingness of the host nation. What does the host country want to do? You know, we can go in and say we want to do this and we want to help you do ABCD. If the host country is not really interested in that, then you're not going to get very far. And efforts of police reform are not going to be terribly successful. One of the things that I was very pleased with in Somalia is we were running the police program. State department was very clear that they had broader political objectives. And there were a number of times where they said, you know, we're going to stop the police program if ABC doesn't happen. And I think that's a critical recognition of our power versus the host country and how you work together and what are you trying to accomplish. I think one of the things that happens in Africa is there are political structures and power structures in Africa that we've really never penetrated. And we have to recognize the reality that reforming the police is frankly a threat to those political structures. And though that reality makes it very difficult to do police reform and police development, I always hear about political will. And sometimes, you know, political will is is not not really there in the host country in any meaningful way. I think what we try and do is on the bottom. We've done an awful lot of police assistance that focuses on improving skills and knowledge. But does that take and hold? Do we really have knowledge transfer? And I've seen a lot of dysfunction in a lot of these police departments. And the dysfunction in some places is so great in the in the agency that it becomes almost impossible to engage in the the skill transfer and the knowledge transfer until you address some of those broader issues. I will, this is a slide actually that I use in training in the U.S. Because the way you get a police department to do something, you start with a written policy. What do I want you to do? You know, if you read the Google clips today, you'll see the Milwaukee police change their pursuit policy. Ed Flynn wrote a new policy and said, here's how I want you to do pursuits. Well, once you do that, then you train everybody on what you want them to do and how you want them to do it. We have a tendency to do the training part and skip the policy part. And once you put in place that training in the policy, then you've got to have a supervision system to make sure that people are actually doing it. And finally, there's got to be some kind of a disciplinary system to make sure that it actually happens. And I don't care if you're talking about the LAPD, the Samantha Metro Police Department. My first police department was Coachella, California, 29 cops. You've got to have a set of systems in place to drive behavior. And I think that applies whether we're talking about Africa or the United States or any place else. Finally, one of the things that I found very interesting in Africa, I've seen this elsewhere, but more pronounced in Africa, in my experience, is people hold on to their old doctrine. And I don't know why this is, but I ran into a lot of people there who were trained in North Korea or had North Korean police training and a lot of Russian police training in parts of Africa. And we tend to forget that. In Afghanistan, I met the general who's in charge of police training for the entire Afghan police. Well, you know, 20 years ago, this guy went for a four-year police training tour in Moscow. That's where he got his substantive training. So we sometimes have leaders that are hanging on to their old doctrine. And by the way, this is unique to Africa. That's why I'm saying, I'm not sure the problems in Africa are any different than they are anywhere else. I could make the same discussion about some chiefs I've worked for in the United States. They're holding on to the doctrine that they might have learned in the early 70s and haven't really changed. So these are just some points that I would make. I don't think Africa is unique in some ways. It certainly is unique in other ways. You have to apply specific experience, knowledge, and respect for the history and customs and culture of the host country. And those have to be embedded throughout this. A real sense of the reality about those host nations. I'll tell one story and then I'm done. When I was in Haiti, we had a big food fight in Haiti. I was in Haiti and I got a call from the State Department and they said, what kind of trucks do you want for the police? You know, Fords or Chevy's. And if you go behind a police station in Haiti, you can tell what year a country was giving aid to Haiti by the fleet of wrecked vehicles. So the Renault from the 40s, the Canadian Ford Fair Lane from the 50s. We had a real discussion. What is the capacity to maintain that kind of assistance? And really, how do we build that capacity into the police force? And I think that kind of discussion is absolutely critical as we move forward and now really move into something and it's probably a good segue. We're all talking about security sector reform, which acknowledges the complexity of what we're talking about. And with that. Thank you so much. Yes, why don't we turn directly to you? Okay, it's on. What I'm going to do today in a few minutes, about 20 minutes, is to talk about the substance of what I think reform should look like in Africa. I'm not going to talk contrary to what either Jennifer or Mike said. I'm not going to talk about the bureaucratic obstacles in the U.S. government to getting it done. If I do that, we will all be in tears. And I've been down that road too often. We're not going to do that. What I'm going to give you is eight points, which I think must be born in mind. If you're framing a reform program, not only for Africa, I'll comment on Africa specifically, but in general. My first point is you have to decide first what your reform objective is. Capacity building, by the way, is not an objective. It is a means to an end. And what we've got to stop talking about is we're going to do reform or we're going to do capacity building. We've got to say, what's the end state of that police force that we want to achieve? And I will suggest to you that there are three objectives that you can have in reforming or supporting a police force. First, do you want to enhance its ability to protect the regime, its ability to protect the population, or its ability to help us with our international security problems? These are fundamental choices. Now, they interrelate to some extent, but there is enormous tension. You can put together a very different program for enhancing the capacity of the police to defend the regime from its internal enemies, as opposed to protecting the population from the things that matter to them in terms of security. And what we often do in all of these countries is what we're really interested in doing is creating international partners in the war on drugs, terrorism, international property rights, trafficking in people, and so forth. Now, look, these are all worthy goals. I don't mean to say you can ignore any of these, but you better get your priorities straight, or you don't know what you're doing there, and even worse than that, it's so open-ended that everybody will treat it kind of like a Rorschach test, and they'll just feed in the stuff that they already do without any sense of connection to where you want to go. That's my first point. Secondly, my own, and here I'm going to go in to talk about what I think our priorities ought to be in Africa, as well as in elsewhere, we ought to choose the second. We ought to prioritize developing the police to provide a service that is valued in terms of public safety to the population. Why do I say that? I say that for two reasons. First of all, being protected, an individual being protected in their life and property, is fundamental to any kind of development that you're going to do in Africa. If you ignore this, you're just going to waste money. That's first. But the second has to do with America's political objectives in the long term abroad, and surely that is to create stable governments that are based on legitimacy and not on force. This is our democratic aspiration for countries, but it also means, and also is based on the insight that a country, that a regime, a government, will protect itself better if the public believes that it is valuable and on their side, rather than if it relies on force. So I go for the second. Now let me say something about that, however. It's unrealistic. Let's be sensible for a moment. The host government is going to demand something, and they may not be so keen on creating a population serving police force as we might be. You're going to have to give them something, and you're probably going to, and that's a negotiation, that you better get up front and better be prepared for. If you're not, you're up a creek without a paddle. Second thing is, I do think, and here, people from the State Department won't particularly appreciate this, I think we ought to ignore America's security agenda. I think, look, international crime in the dimensions that I suggested, drugs, people, terrorism and so forth, those are serious problems. But I think what we should be privileging, prioritizing in these countries, is not how they help us, but what we do to create, in the long-term, stable legitimate governments there. And I think we are often too preoccupied with our own short-term problems rather than long-term problems. But this is me, this is Bailey speaking, number two, in point number two. At the same time, let me say this, this is a problem that all of our, I think, that all of our assistance program where the police have, let me put it this way, we have to have negotiations within the American government with respect to getting our priorities right. And the problem at the moment is, as I say it, that the Hill is very interested in developing foreign police sources for our sake. And that's a huge problem, in other words, the money. In other words, we're going to have to pay something to please our political masters in the United States in all of these programs. And so there's a negotiation that has to take place in the host government with respect to that objective and our government with respect to why we're there. And getting these on the table earlier rather than later, I think is fundamental. People come to this debate with different agendas and you have to recognize that and you have to get it kind of worked out in advance. All right, third point. If you, if you want to go with any agenda, but particularly the one that I think should be prioritized, which is creating a police force which is perceived to be legitimate through service to its own population, then, then you can do your assessment of your country program. I am suggesting that you've got to get your policy and your political priority straight first, then you do the assessment on a country by country basis. This is just what Mike said. Africa is a huge place and it has different police traditions, different cultures, etc. At that point, you send your team into the country and say for our particular objectives, what needs to be done and what are the obstacles in each country that needs to be overcome. There is not a generic police reform program for Africa. Forget it. And yet, there is the way people talk here in the United States and it's just terribly naive. The implication of that, by the way, is that there really is, we have to avoid a cookie cutter approach, which means that we have a lot of programs that we call reform and we just trot them out. We take them off the shelf and we send them every place the same damn program in country after country after country. We've got to stop that and we have to assess first and then we have to tailor what we can do to what we need to do and unfortunately we don't do that. We send what we do rather than what is needed. The fourth program, if we're going to prioritize the creation of a population-serving police that is legitimate in the eyes of its people, provides public safety, how do we do that? What are the keys to doing that particular, achieving that particular objective? In my view, what you need to do is to change the orientation of the police with respect to whom they serve and how they go about it. It is a matter of changing the attitudes of the police. I think three attitudes are absolutely fundamental if you're going to create a population-serving police and Bob Perito and I have recently been writing about this. We call it core policing. We think it has three aspects. The police need to be available to all the citizens. They need to be responsive when called to respond in terms that reflect the needs that they've been told about. And thirdly, they need to do this policing in a fair equitable way across all the divisions of society. These are attitudes. Please note, let me put this first. I think America very often in its foreign assistance programs forgets what made Western and American and Canadian and British and Australian policing really good and was the big transformation. It wasn't technology. It wasn't really a kind of technical knowledge, it wasn't machines. It was in fact what Peele said originally that the police are the people and the people are the police. That was, that's something that goes on in your head. It's not something, it's not a machine. It isn't entirely logistics, which isn't to say logistics aren't important, Mike, they are. They can't be crucially important. But you've got to look at what you're trying to do and what you're trying to do is to change what the police think they're there for. And what I'm saying is should be fundamental to our assistance program is to teaching them how to be available. So many police, just as you know, stay in there, you know, stay in their police stations, they don't go out, they stay on street corners, et cetera, et cetera. They're not available. And the last thing police are going to do is, people are going to do is come to them. Thirdly, they don't know what to do when they get there either. They don't know how to listen. They don't know how to interact. They don't know how to refer people to other people that can help them. They don't know how to say no in a diplomatic way, et cetera. And lastly, being fair. In other words, this is a public good I'm talking about, and it should be provided equally to everybody, regardless of cast, language, gender, religion, and so forth. That's another thing that happens up here. So what I, and so, well, an implication of this, wherever I go in the police advising business, I find that there is a tension in police, professional police circles between those people to say we need, we need to be authoritative and tough to make them respect us. And then what America keeps talking about in terms of human rights and rule of law and all of that soft stuff. And it seems to be a trade-off. And what I want to tell you is I don't think it is a trade-off. And Mike is shaking his head in agreement. And the point is this. I think one of the things that we've learned in the recent examination of counterinsurgency doctrine, encounter terrorism doctrine, and something we've known all the way along in crime prevention. Get the public on your side and the police, and the police can be effective. If the police are not on your side, it's pretty hopeless. Don't we know that fundamentally? So what I'm suggesting is that what you must do is to do those things that show the police in a way which is respected, provides a service that people will say, this isn't our benefit. If you do that, if you do that, the effectiveness of the police is multiplied. And I'll put it, my implication is this, that the greatest, if you want to improve the effectiveness of the police, whether it's in crime prevention or in other preventing these other sorts of things that I've mentioned, the greatest effectiveness multiplier is getting the public to cooperate with you. More important than anything else that you can do. And that's why I stress this business of attitudes. Fifth, the next thing that I would ask of a police besides working on these attitudes, if your priorities are my priorities, is to develop the institutional ability of the police to get value for money. And what I mean here is that most police forces, and sadly this is somewhat true in the United States, Mike, they don't know what they're doing. They don't know how they're, put it this way, they don't know how their money is being spent. They don't know what their people are doing. They don't know how many people are doing one thing as opposed to other things. And they have absolutely no idea what all these people are achieving. What I'm talking about is something which in police circles now is called evidence-based policing. Getting them the ability to collect information about what their organization is doing and more than that what it's achieving. And what it's achieving in terms of the objectives, the priorities that I already said. In other words, I think we need to develop, and I don't care where you are in the world, you need to develop a kind of problem-solving mentality in the police. So the police are used to saying, this is our problem and we will now begin to think and strategize about how to do this. Most police forces, again, in developed as underdeveloped countries, in a sense, they police in a generic way. And they police in the same way everywhere and all through the week and so forth. They do not tailor the use of their resources to their particular problems. And what I'm suggesting is that this is a capacity that we can develop in foreign police forces as we are learning to develop in our own. And it is fundamental because if you don't do it, resources are being wasted. They are being sent out there by recipe and not because anybody really knows that doing this kind of thing will produce the thing that you want. Six, select and train the donors and project managers that you send out in the field in the skills of being change agents. I'm now looking at how you implement. One of the problems that, in other words, I'm saying that the people you send out to do this good work can't just be cops or academics or anybody else. They need to be people who have actually had some experience in changing organizations, in mentoring people in organizations to do differently, who have trained people in the past. And when we do constantly in the United States and other places too, I must say, we keep sending out people who have a certain status in law enforcement, but they don't know anything about teaching, managing, mentoring, overseeing, and so forth. And we have to begin to select the people that we deploy abroad for these skills and not simply because of the fact that they don't have to write a constitution or they know how to organize a traffic police. They've got to be people who can interrelate with the people that they are trying to change in a way which is accepted. This is a unique skill and we have in the United States done nothing virtually. Sorry it'd be so dramatic here, but I get irritated from time to time. We have done nothing to work on figuring out what those skills are and selecting for them and when they don't exist, putting people into a training program for goodness sakes on how you interact in that particular culture to achieve the objectives you want. The military DOD is beginning to get ahead of us in this in big ways. They're doing much more effective things, I think, in terms of teaching people about the culture they're going into, the languages they're going to need, and they're beginning to feedback some of the skills or some of the problems that people in the field have encountered and what you've got to do so you don't encounter them again. The DOD is ahead of us, I think, on the civilian side. Seventh, Mike's point, we're going to focus on the police but do understand that being successful and what you want to do when the police requires a larger context of change, having to do with the ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, whatever you want to call it, and the rest of the criminal justice system. You can't just change the police and hope that that is going to achieve the good things that you want. And so what I say here, the implication of this is beware of stovepipes in development and we do that all the time. And we have one stovepipe that works in the cops and we have another one that works on the prosecutor, we have another one that works on this and that and they don't communicate. And it's going to be a whole of government coordination. I think we're beginning to learn that but bringing it off is hugely difficult. All right, now eight. Two, notice I haven't talked to anything about this particular problems of Africa because I think these other ones come first, actually, before you get to the problems of Africa. There are two problems, overarching imperatives, I think, in creating in Africa the kind of police forces, the kind of police services, as the British like to say, that I'm talking about. One that serves the public with the end of becoming legitimate in the eyes of the public and therefore legitimating the government and the rule of law. Two big problems. One is to buffer political intrusion into policing. Politicians will always try to get the police to do things. Always. It's true. Look, I'm from New York State, for God's sake, and we've just gone through three superintendents of police in about eight weeks for this very reason. So I do know something about this. And so what I'm saying is we've got to, you've got to develop some walls between what the police, what the police can do with the police, sorry, what the politicians can do with the police and what they can't do with the police. This is long term, it has its own problems and we could spend a lot of time on it, but especially in hiring, promoting, assigning, and disciplining. The police have got to be on their own bottom on that one. We're talking about the kind of professionalization that came into American and British policing in the early part of the 20th century. It took us 50 years and we're still working on it plainly, as from what I've said, but that's crucial. And the second thing is, as Mike has mentioned, is eliminating corruption. If you want to, in a word, what's the biggest delegitimator of a police force is being corrupt anywhere in the world. You have to pay for the service and this is true throughout Africa. It's true in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and so forth. And by the way, the problem of political buffering and corruption are intimately related. If the police, for example, if the politicians sell posts, police posts, for example, and they do in many, many countries, especially in India, which I know quite well, then the police people have to raise the money to pay the politician. How do you do that? And you begin to get a system of corruption. It's not personal failings. It's a system that's rooted in the structure of political supervision. All right. So those are the two problems that you are going to have in any program that you launch in Africa. You're going to have to confront those right off the bat. So these are my eight points about how you go about putting together a program that may work. And I'll end by simply saying this. I'm going to give you my test for what a reformed population serving police looks like. In other words, how do you judge whether you have achieved what you want to achieve in terms of this population serving legitimate police force? My test is the following. We talk a lot about evaluating these programs. We never do, but here's my test. It's this. Do parents in the country which you are working in? Do parents teach their children that when they're away from home and need help of any sort, they look for a cop? If the answer to that is yes, fine. That's a wonderful police force. If the answer to that is no, and it is no in about 90 percent of the world's countries, you have something to do. And I've tried this, this one, you know, this one liner test on a lot of people in different countries, and I find that not only the civilians accept it, but so do the cops. The cops can't deny that this is a fair test of what they're doing. They may hate it because they don't really want to do it, but they can't deny it. And I find that this is a, you know, if I can get them nodding, that's a legitimate thing to require of us. I've turned a corner. A small one, but it's a corner. All right, thank you very much. Thank you both for really excellent thoughtful presentations on that. The question it raises for me in terms of getting kind of changing attitudes, changing culture, almost the policing culture and getting that kind of written policy right is who's going to do that and what will be the driver of that. You know, there's there's reasons probably that the police are so under resourced and kind of the poor, poor brother of the militaries. They probably don't pose the same kind of threat to the regime that a military might, so the military gets privileged in those ways. And I'm wondering if from your experiences where you might have seen that culture begin to change and what drove it because it seems it's going to require more than kind of engaging at the state to state level, but will probably come from movements within society more. I mean, I'm thinking of the Kenya case recently kind of in the performance of the police after the elections really drove, I think, I mean, it's I think Kenyans have always acknowledged that there's a problem there. But this really put a spotlight in in a certain way that I think a lot more groups are becoming focused on it. Nigeria, the recent Boko Haram incident, I think has kind of stirred up some opportunity, I'm not going to say opportunities for reform, but a debate on this. But have you seen it, have you seen that kind of shift happen? You say it happened here in the early 20th century in some ways, and it's still a work in progress. But and what drives that change ultimately is just a leadership question or is it a community question? First of all, just in terms of Nigeria, there is actually a lot of debate that's been going on for quite a while in Nigeria about policing. I mean, I was at a police account, I ran internal affairs at LAPD for about three years. And I was at a police civilian accountability meeting in The Hague. And, you know, there was a whole contingent from Nigeria, not from the police, but from civilian oversight bodies and people working on it. I mean, so there's a pretty robust discussion going on. Now, what that's ultimately coming to, I don't know. I think David's point, though, is exactly right. What does the host government want? And so the example I would use just in my experience is El Salvador. Me too. I think that El Salvador, following the war, there was a very firm agreement about what the police were going to be. 20% from the former government, 20% from the former guerrillas, 60% never been the police before. And all of the donor countries recognized that this was a long-term commitment. And we were there for years with the Spanish, with the Argentinians, with other countries, very agreed upon and a very structured way. And by the way, we did a brilliant AID project on demilitarizing the guys. When the military police got pulled out, we put the new police in in segments. They trained up a whole contingent of folks. They went to a part of the country. They pulled out the military police and put in the new police-civil national. And those people, as they came out, you want to be a farmer, here's some land, here's a seed, here's a chit, you want to be a truck driver, here's a chit, here's a, here's a, you want to be a computer guy, here's a chit to go to school. So in my opinion, when you look back at El Salvador in the early 90s, following the war, that would be my leading example where there was a conscious, complete change. Now we can have a whole different discussion about the effectiveness of the police or issues in the police. I'm not saying that they don't have those, but to answer your question which is change, that would be my example. I think there's one in Africa and that's South Africa now and that's ongoing. All of these are ongoing. Police departments can relapse and don't ever forget that. Absolutely. So it's always a work in progress, but I think South Africa has worked very hard on the attitudes of the of the whole new whole new group of people who have been recruited since Mandela basically. So that's a second one, I think. But no, Mike and I are struggling. Just like an example, you know, despite all the places where the UN has been, all the places where the, where America has been, all the training we've done, we're coming up with a couple and they haven't, you know, they haven't quite got there as one might wish. Let me say something else. For a long time, I took the notion that that you see the point is if the government won't let you do it, you can't do it. Forget it. Now, and so my view has been for a long time if the government won't let us do what we think is in their long run interests, which I've talked to you about and in the interests of the population, don't go. Don't go. Now, the problem with that is that we do have international security interests and there are bureaucracies, powerful ones in the U.S. government, supported by people on the hill for virtuous reasons that say that's nice Bailey, but we've got people coming in from, from, from from Southeast Europe, for example, people trafficking out of the former of the public to the Soviet Union, parts of the Soviet Union. We've got to work with these people, even if we're, even if they're not interested in what you might call democratic police. We may, excuse me, we've made packs like this with, with, with South American regimes in the past. And so this is going to be a, I'm back to what I said at the beginning, there are going to be some places where you simply can't do the agenda that you would most like to do and do you just simply say, okay, we're not going, or do you go in a, kind of a, in a gradual way and try to use that leverage to move them in the long run in the direction that you want to go. This is the art of doing foreign aid. Can I, can I, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, Jennifer. I'm sorry. Okay, Shelly's moved to speak. I'm sorry. I think the point that we just made is absolutely the right one because my observations say to me that politicians will always strive to accomplish their objectives. In Nigeria, which is the case that I know best, the police was deliberately downplayed in the 70s to shore up the military. And that situation continues to exist up until today. And the current politicians are trying very hard to continue to dominate the police. State governors are calling for state police so that they can continue that domination. Where I violently agree with you is the fact that it's going to be difficult for the US to get the objective of those governments changed. It's going to be very difficult. Therefore, you go in with the attitude, look there are international issues that we need to deal with. But because we need the police to be of service to the people to create a stable environment so that those international problems can be dealt with longer term. I think that's where you start from. One observation about what David said it's interesting we draw the US draws a very big distinction between military assistance and police assistance. And I remember when I was living in Kenya and commuting into Somalia for a while we weren't allowed to do any support for the Kenyan police or do the gradual change that you're describing. But there was a whole floor of the embassy that was US military assistance. And so we've not had that kind of discussion on the police side. And I will make one other point that we have to keep in mind and we all know this. We don't have a federal police force in the United States. We don't have a national police force. And so unlike Canada says okay we'll send the RCMP and the Guard of Shakanas Ireland sends them. We don't have one of those. And so that you know America's greatest strength in policing in some ways is the diversity of the police forces and the kind of experimentation that goes on. It's also our greatest weakness in a lot of ways. And it absolutely is a weakness in the broader international context. And may I just say one thing and we are going to start crying. Because we don't have a national police force we have several federal agencies and all of them have special they have special remits and they are not the kind of agencies which can do the kind of attitudinal transformation training that we want. It's Mike's police forces. It's the state and local police forces that know how to do the form that I'm talking about. But the ones that we can dispatch are the feds. Bless them. They know a lot of things and they're doing some good work. Don't get me wrong here. But their institutional charge is not the same as that Mike had in LA. I have questions on that but let's go to David too. It's a story rather than a question. May I use your mic if you could? Hello. Yes. It's a story rather than a question with some observations. I spent quite a lot of time in Sierra Leone and the British government has poured vast resources into rebuilding Sierra Leone since the end of the war in 2002. And one of the things they've done is to reconstruct the police force. So 2002 I could go to parts of Sierra Leone. I'd never been to before and every police station was more or less rebuilt and every police station had a shiny new land rover sat outside it. I had my computer stolen and so I went to report it to the local police. And it was a tremendously hierarchical structure because the chief police officer of the town of Bow wasn't actually there. It was a Sunday that I went. Nobody had the authority to do anything even take down a basic report that there was such a sense of hierarchical structure within the local police that even the senior detective didn't feel able to deal with this European who'd come in and that everything would have to wait until the boss was in place let alone the guy down at the bottom. And it strikes me that in a society which is so hierarchical it's going to be extraordinarily difficult even if they have the resources to actually instill the initiative and the sort of independence go-getting that in a sense is essential to any kind of police work. When they actually came to my hotel to take the details about five detectives came and they took down the report and the first thing they did immediately was to arrest all the hotel maids because they were people with key access to the rooms and so they were all immediately thrown into jail for a weekend just to see what was happening no evidence against them. Now by this time I was getting more and more alarmed about what I had instigated. Finally I wanted to get a signed piece of paper from the police so that I could present it to my insurance company when I came back home. It was again impossible for any of the junior officers in Bow Police Station and we're not talking about some secondary town we're talking about the second major city of Sierra Leone with population of more than a quarter million. Again nobody had the authority to do anything unless the chief of police signed it. And so we're talking about a society whose social assumptions are so different that even with all the changes that you've talked about it seems to me fundamentally virtually impossible to instill an American or European style sense of policing. It just doesn't work like that and how you actually create that I don't know. In Kenya by contrast you go into the police station you say I've been burgled everything is taken down everything is done the problem is the police don't have a land rover to do anything. So in Kenya you have the initiative you have the drive but you don't have the facility in Sierra Leone because of British money you did have the facility but you had no initiative and structure and sense of how to actually operate as a real police force. One quick comment we can start crying because of the inadequacies of the American government we can start crying because of the impediments that we'll face abroad they're all true and once we begin to list them we'll all go home and we'll say this is a failing enterprise if I were a betting man I would always bet nine to one against reform working in any of the places that we're working in. I think it's that difficult for the reasons that you begin to point to. Does that mean we should stay home? I don't think so I think we have to try and try again and we have to become more skilled and I think we have not been as skilled as we need to in the United States look it took the British and the Americans at least a century of reform before they institutionalized some of the things that we think characterize our police force it's going to take a long time so let's so let's just accept upfront that this is going to fail more times certainly in the short run than it succeeds I'll put an explanation point on that until 1993 police chiefs in America didn't talk about crime until 1993 we didn't talk about reducing crime that was never discussed by police chiefs it was only in 1993 when we started doing Comstat and we started taking ownership and accountability for crime that we started really driving down crime numbers and started to tailor responses and David's word to the realities that we were facing but that was 1993 1994 that's when it started but how do you dig down well I think you've got other everything you suggested is the sort of surface how do you get down to the bottom yeah I yeah Eric Beinhardt from SCTAP and AID actually what I think we're we really need to look at carefully when we talk about Sub-Saharan Africa is that the chasm between urban and rural you guys have brought it out some but I think a lot of times we're naive when we go in and we're talking about rule of law development and and if we're going to be honest with ourselves we're looking at the capital city what about the rest of the country I mean a lot of these countries in Africa the rural areas have never had a colonial a statutory colonial system so how are we going to create one the people don't read they don't read the colonial language there's thousands of languages in Africa you have all these issues which I think we're naive and not addressing and Dr. Bell you mentioned civic education basically I think is what you were we're getting at but I mean civic education how do you link the customary law with statutory law how do you build bridges between the two because honestly I think if if we talk about rule of law development in Africa we're talking about a very it depends on who's defining rule of law and in what context and I think a lot of what happens in Africa is you have an an urban elite which obviously has sort of our rule of law conception but the rest of the country does not have that so how do you start narrowing that gap yeah that's something that I wrestle a lot with working on Africa nice to see you Eric I think but I think it varies by country again like Somalia when we did the Isitap project in Somalia they had police stations in all the sub towns and where we worked the best actually was the sub towns Mogadishu we had the most trouble so I think again it's very situational I don't know the answer to your law question I mean I've wrestled with that over and over again I saw it in Afghanistan in December you know it's the Islamic government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan you know we got to figure out how to do that but I think that the rural urban question is very situational I'm not sure it's I'm not sure I would just say because I you know can you you've got yeah no I'm not I'm not trying to generalize that I just I think from a development perspective we don't analyze it enough and I think in my experience working on law enforcement criminal justice development in Africa is something that donor community does not look out enough I guess maybe that's a little and let me just throw out one other pet peeve of mine you've mentioned the some of the issues with host countries in terms of you know lack of political will the donor community needs to take a hard look at at itself and I don't mean to pick on the UN but I'm going to tell this little story in Nigeria in 2000 someone from the UN told President Abbas and Joe that the ideal ratio of police to citizens was one to 400 I don't know where they came up with that but they came up with it so President Abbas and Joe took that literally at the time Nigeria had between 100 and 150,000 police no one knew how many there were a lot of people ghost policemen et cetera but he decided to literally meet that ratio so over the next four years the Nigeria police force increased to 350,000 police which is what basically is today it's more corrupt it's more incompetent it's it's everything they still don't perform services that the police normally would they have vigilante groups who go out and and do patrols so I've seen this in various countries in the last year that I've gone to there's a document that says well the police force of X country is 15,000 in order to have an effective police force we need to double it to 30,000 to meet the ratio of one to 400 so I think we the donor community needs to take take a long look at what we're doing and and reassess I'm Tyler Thompson from the public international law and policy group my question goes back to the hierarchy of needs that you were talking about in the very beginning and just what type of essential minimal infrastructures are needed to even begin this reform process from what you were saying it seems like food stability communication transportation and prison structures at the very least are needed to even begin the reform process so you just say a few others yeah you're talking about I was talking about you've got to do something on employee welfare I mean if I'm going to ask police officers to go out and do certain jobs take certain risks serve the public I'll endorse everything that David said 100% serve the public that kind of focus then I've got to get to some basic level of employee welfare employee wellness I think that depending on the country you know the Latin American model which you see in a lot of Latin American countries where there's a barracks and there's housing provided and there's food provided for the police is a very very realistic way to go versus you know the US model or a western European model where it's live on the economy we're going to pay you a salary and you're going to live on the economy but that depends on the on the context you're in but you've got to at least get the police to some level where they can operate and part of what Eric's talking about when you get to this question of how many cops there's only so much money in the pie right and so one of my big arguments in Afghanistan is exactly why are we trying to build a force of 100,000 or 90,000 let's stop let's build a really good force of 30,000 that we can pay that we can equip that we can deploy let's build the sustainable operational force so I think when you have that discussion about employee welfare that you know people are going to make sure that it's like look look at the United States when you have natural disasters Hurricane Andrew Hurricane Katrina you know cops abandoned their posts if their families weren't safe why would we expect anybody anywhere else to act any differently so you've got to have a level of employee welfare wherever you are and that was the point that I was trying to make before you start talking about all the great things you want the police department to do taking the reports when somebody shows up says my computer was stolen not arresting the maids you know before you get there they've got to at least feel that they're they can live let's take two at one sir okay yeah thanks I both present I'm Eric Silla from Department of State to work as a policy advisor for our assistant secretary so I think about some of these bigger which which assistant secretary which for Africa okay great Eric Carson just and I'm a historian by by training graduate training so I appreciate both the your bowels to to the importance of understanding history and and I think the presentations are so excellent that I think there's a lot of parallels to other other sectors and so this is sort of a suggestion or an idea that put forth for Jennifer and you know as we roll forward I think we're going to need to step back and look at sort of our bigger kind of strategic engagement in Africa to figure out how this piece fits in because it you know what anytime we talk about some of our current policy priorities say promoting economic growth and development and investment it loses back rule of law and you know every day there's some some new case of you know a company investor dealing with a rule of law issue and and a given you know African country but it also gets to the heart of the the fabric of Africa you know power in African states in society and how do you remake that and then also our you know our military approach which is you know at the moment we tend to overemphasize I think as it was noted the the kind of the military approach and so there's this kind of formula for state building in Africa which is based on building capacity of the military peacekeeping training and all these different sectoral you know modules but the I think the bigger strategic challenges though that when you look at how the resources allocated you know we're we're well I wanted to ask earlier how much we spent on El Salvador you know 20 years ago and what that would represent in today's dollars and how you know how that compares to our overall you know money that we're devoting to Africa but also in terms of how that's balanced out where we're spending billions of dollars on the PEPFAR and malaria projects comparable amounts of money for supporting peacekeeping across Africa and then if we look at what we're spending on on specific you know police programs and so there's I think at some point and as we have these discussions we need to sit down and kind of figure out how these these pieces fit in and I'll just close with kind of a historical comment I mean I think that you know when I studied African history it was the police government institutions were built for the colonial powers and I think there's that legacy there where to this day these institutions whether they're judicial law enforcement are there for almost kind of alien political interests I mean they're not colonial today but I think in many ways the relationship between a lot of governments and the people is still very much kind of a colonial colonial one thanks Eric I think that is important and you know I hope that we we can do that and kind of where this fits into the biggest picture because we don't want to look at the issue policing in a vacuum and also what you said a kind of a petfire in that approach and I wonder in the sequencing of this because in in petfire it was it's very hard to get governments for example to start thinking about rebuilding their health systems if there's nothing passing through the health system I mean there was no there were no drugs or meds or and so forth and so to to kind of push for a cultural change before we begin to do kind of the nuts and bolts stuff and capacities I wonder if there is a balance there that you begin to do things that then can incentivize greater reform change I mean or in the maritime security if you know everybody will say yes it's important but you know we don't even have a coast guard cutter or a port or but if you start to perhaps say you know European command is being on the AIS systems you know the things that you stick on maps so that you know or a computer or a kind of basic technical capacities then says to the government okay there may be something here in it for us to start going down this route but otherwise it kind of goes against what you're saying get the culture change first but how do you do that if there's kind of nothing people are stuck in what the reality is no I don't I I I I I violently disagree no I don't violently disagree but I think you're putting two things together putting two things together that should not be put together and that is you you may have to bribe foreign governments to get access to do what you want you may have to give them some things that they're going to want that they may not use indeed in the way that you want to use them I you're going to you're going to have to do that bribe that's what that's what and and let me and let me say that's what you do you see ultimately whether you're doing political reform or police reform or broader in the United States it's ultimately it comes back to politics it is it is a high political matter and you have to understand that at the beginning not at the end so that's what I say that you're going to have to do this and you're and State Department it's going to have to be the ones that kind of balances those priorities okay on the other hand I don't like the thinking when you begin to talk about the police reform process itself as if there are I don't like the word balancing what we do too often in the United States is what we say is we'll stick in these things and presumptuously this will get us to where we want to go in terms of police reform and what I'm what I'm saying is once you get under the politics of this thing what your objectives are in that particular country you should then figure out how you should say to get to that's what we want to get to attitudinal change which I want to do what do you need to do to get there in other words always make sure that your inputs are contributing to the objectives that you've stated too often in the United States we we just deploy inputs with no theoretical empirical connection to where we want to go in the long run that's what I'm saying that's why I I quarrel with you about the balancing notion that you put certain things in first and then oh gosh now good things will happen uh-uh I wish it were that way and so what I'm saying is always make sure that in your strategic plan you keep your eye fixed on where you want to go and you justify every input in terms of that objective you know I I understand the I think your point is well taken the only thing I was thinking about when you were talking about I was thinking about Haiti when we first went into Haiti to create the first-ever civilian police force we were really started on how do we you know nobody went to the police station in Haiti it's it's sort of David's point you know if you went to the police station in Haiti you immediately got beat up and locked in a cell for a couple of days to teach you never to come there and bother them again and and so how do we change the population's view about the police that was you know the issue we were wrestling with in 94 and 95 and and it was interesting because there was a lot of pressure you know that we were trying to how do we make them responsive well at that point time in Haiti only 2% of the population had telephones so you can't have the U.S. model of you know dial 911 because there's no phones and we had to think about other ways and it was interesting the technology so so there was nothing passing through the system but then cell phones came along and we completely bypassed the need for that so so there there can be this interplay I guess between it I tend to agree with David though and I I think it's a difficult it's an easy position for us to say sitting here in a conference room talking about it in the abstract you know you must have the politics right it gets really messy and really hard when you're at the table and you're trying to get it done and you're dealing with all these other countries and all these other factors and Congress and so I I endorse his comment 100% but I I also having been the guy on the ground a lot I've seen how difficult that can be and if you address these transnations absolutely that's I mean that's but then the dilemma is what then do you do but the bottom line is that policing is not a front and center in the current discourse on policy you're absolutely right it's just not the truth about there and it and it needs to be yeah I completely agree we don't we don't really push for it you know my life it's just a come up there's no consistency for it but it's just not you know there's a you know look at the paper and then you get the day and it's you've got your humanitarian background and you're even great supreme of it the mill we don't have we don't have a federal police force who's the voice you know I think it could be should be wish it was is a tap but that's another that's a long discussion we have I'm going to run out a minute I'll stay for another minute or two and then you'll have to excuse me I'm sorry I must go okay well if you we'll go a little over but let's take two quick questions the gentleman here has been waiting the gentleman in the back very quick and then if you have to run you have to run you have to run you have to run Ed Alphabeau from African competition okay I would like to know how do you assess the if you go to a country like in Africa how do you assess the existing culture before you transfer your western country policing knowledge to the police department particular country how do you do that and second I would like to respond to my friend who have my colleagues that have experience in Sierra Leone it will depend on the year or the particular time because Sierra Leone have war and many many police officers has been gone and then replaced so it depend the time you went there but if I want as a former police officer and secretary service from Togo I have a little bit of experience about condition that you happen or things that happen to you why you see that difference first of all if you left your culture from where you are from you may not see any difference that's how they operate their police job in that particular country but it's because you comparing that behavior police behavior to your country police officers behavior then everything become wear for you and that's what both speakers talk about culture okay quick question from the back hi Eric Gutch is from Human Rights Watch I just had a quick question on police corruption if there's any cases like success stories on dealing with police corruption whether it be historically within U.S. for police forces or country national forces and any specific strategies that you found worked again dealing with high-level grand corruption or petty corruption extortion God there's huge there's a huge body of success stories I mean both in the U.S. and abroad you know I mean we can sort of you can talk about the LAPD and coming out of the Rampart case you can talk about New Orleans now New Orleans is a great example because it goes back to the point that Dr. Bailey made those issues were fixed there was a lot of fix going on in the early 2000s and now today a lot of problems have resurfaced so it goes to a central point in American policing anyway we're too leadership-centric we don't have a teaching hospital approach to policing but I think there are lots of there internationally there have also been lots of experiences again Peru for example has done some very interesting things with traffic corruption where for example the traffic police in Peru are all women the drive in the motorcycles because they decided that they would have less corruption with female traffic cops than with males so you know there's been a lot of stuff there's like that's a that's a very rich body of knowledge and there is a pretty well developed doctrine around what to do I will say and this is my opinion I'll be happy to debate this at long length I am not a fan of the current efforts on civilian oversight and accountability particularly the methodology the Brits have taken with the independent police complaints commission I will predict to you that because we haven't done what David Bailey said we needed to do which is what's the objective that in five to six years they're going to be trying to change that because they haven't defined what success is I'm a complete fan of transparency of oversight the police need to belong to the public and be accountable to the public but the mechanisms that I'm seeing develop around the world where somehow you substitute a civilian investigator for a police investigator or the idea that the police cannot investigate themselves is frankly repugnant to me and is and does not reflect the reality that I've found something about culture Mike take care thank you very much I want to say something about his his comment about culture I don't think you so much we're looking at changing cultures we need to adapt to cultures and when you send in your assessment team you don't just send in police officers and lawyers you send in some people who know something about the local country the local country and culture in other words you need area experts you need social scientists you need people who are sensitive to that so that at least they can then guide you into what you can use locally and what you need to change and often I think you don't need to change as much as you think that many of the things that we're talking about in local cultures let me put it another way I think most people around the world I don't care whether you're in rural areas or capital areas or whether in Africa or Asia most people want to have when they're threatened in some way physically they want to be able to go someplace that is reliable that will take them seriously and will not treat them on the basis of their skin color or their gender or what I think this is universal am I wrong and in fact in places like Africa there are all sorts of traditional auspices which people will go to when the state fails right and what and and you and you simply have to ask yourself the question what are these local what do these local bodies as long as they're not you know kind of exclusive bodies as they may be on the basis of religion whatever what is it that they give that the government isn't and I believe I bet you they're talking about what I'm talking about they're talking about people you can rely on to be effective and fair