 Question 162 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 162 of Pride in Eight Articles. We must now consider Pride and, one, Pride in general. Two, the first man's sin, which we hold to have been Pride. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether Pride is a sin. Second, whether it is a special vice. Third, wherein does it reside as in its subject? Fourth, of its species. Fifth, whether it is a mortal sin. Sixth, whether it is the most grievous of all sins. Seventh, of its relation to other sins. Eighth, whether it should be reckoned a capital vice. First article, whether Pride is a sin. Objection one, it would seem that Pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what he will do, and he is not the author of sin. Now Pride is numbered among the divine promises, for it is written in Isaiah 60 verse 15, I will make thee to be an everlasting Pride, a joy unto generation and generation. Therefore Pride is not a sin. Objection two further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God, for every creature has a natural desire for this, and especially does this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's book on sentences that Pride is love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent. Hence Augustine says in the Confessions 2.6, Pride imitates exaltedness, whereas thou alone art God exalted over all. Therefore Pride is not a sin. Objection three. Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue, but also to a contrary vice as the philosopher states in Ethics 2.8. But no vice is found to be opposed to Pride? Therefore Pride is not a sin. On the contrary, it is written in Tobit 4.14, Never suffer Pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words. I answer that Pride superbia is so called because a man thereby aims higher supra than he is. Wherefore Isidor says in his etymologies 10, A man is said to be proud because he wishes to appear above, super what he really is, for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is is proud. Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that Pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4.4, the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason. Therefore it is evident that Pride is a sin. Reply to Objection 1. Pride, superbia, may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing, supergreditur the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate superabundance, in which sense any superabundant thing may be called Pride, and it is thus that God promises Pride as significant of superabundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage of Isaiah 61.6 says that there is a good and an evil Pride, or a sinful Pride which God resists, and a Pride that denotes the glory which he bestows. It may also be replied that Pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take Pride. Reply to Objection 2. Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite, so that if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now Pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason, wherefore Augustine says on the City of God 1413 that Pride is the desire for inordinate exultation, and hence it is that as he asserts Pride imitates God inordinately, for it hath equality of fellowship under him, and wishes to usurp his dominion over our fellow creatures. Reply to Objection 3. Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which in a way is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity as stated above in Question 161, Article 1, Third Reply. Hence the vice opposed to Pride by default is akin to the vice of Pusil animity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to grape things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of grape things against presumption. Now Pusil animity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default. But if we take it for the mind's attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default, since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, Pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility from different points of view, to humility in as much as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity in as much as it tends to grape things inordinately. Since, however, Pride implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as Pusil animity, which denotes littleness of soul intending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity. Second article, whether Pride is a special sin. Objection 1. You would seem that Pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says in On Nature and Grace, 24, that you will find no sin that is not labeled Pride. And Prosper says in his On the Contemplate of Life, 3, 2, that without Pride no sin is or was or ever will be possible. Therefore Pride is a general sin. Objection 2. A glass on Job 3317, that he may withdraw man from wickedness, says that a man prides himself when he transgresses his commandments by sin. Now according to Ambrose in On Paradise 8, every sin is a transgression of the Divine Law and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments. Therefore every sin is Pride. Objection 3 further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But Pride is opposed to all the virtues for Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3423, Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue. It raises itself up against all the powers of the soul like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body. And Isidore says in his etymologies that it is the downfall of all virtues. Therefore Pride is not a special sin. Objection 4 further, every special sin has a special matter. Now Pride has a general matter. For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3423 that one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence. One is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues. Therefore Pride is not a special but a general sin. On the contrary, Augustine says in On Nature and Grace 29, If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law, Pride is a very different sin from other vices. Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore Pride is not a general but a special sin. I answer that the sin of Pride may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way Pride is a special sin because it has a special object. For it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as stated in Article 1, 2nd reply. Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic character, in as much as all sins may arise from Pride in two ways. First, directly through other sins being directed to the end of Pride, which is one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were. That is by removing an obstacle, since Pride makes a man despise the Divine Law, which hinders him from sinning, according to Jeremiah 2.20. It must, however, be observed that this generic character of Pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from Pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from Pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin through contempt, which pertains to Pride, yet one does not always break the Divine Commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance and sometimes through weakness. And for this reason Augustine says in Our Nature and Grace 29 that many things are done amiss which are not done through Pride. Reply to Objection 1. These words are introduced by Augustine into his book On Nature and Grace, not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion and shows that not all sins are committed through Pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of Pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of Pride, namely contempt of the Commandment. For sin is committed not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively. Thus he who in ignorance slays his father is a parasite effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly, he who breaks God's Commandment is said to Pride himself against God effectively always, but not always affectively. Reply to Objection 3. A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways, in one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus Pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility, even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it by acting counter there too. In another way, a sin destroys a virtue by making ill use of that virtue, and thus Pride destroys every virtue insofar as it finds an occasion of Pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin. Reply to Objection 4. Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters. For it is inordinate love of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things. Third Article Whether the subject of Pride is the irascible faculty Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of Pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 2317, A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light. Now the knowledge of sin pertains not to the irascible, but to the rational faculty. Therefore Pride is not in the irascible. Objection 2. Further Gregory says in his commentary on Job 248 that The proud observe other people's conduct, not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride. Therefore it would seem that Pride originates in undue observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible, but to the rational faculty. Objection 3. Further Pride seeks preeminence, not only insensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things. While it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclesiasticus 1014, the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God. Now the irascible, since it is part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore Pride cannot be in the irascible. Objection 4. Further, as stated in Prosper's book of sentences, sentence 294, Pride is love of one's own excellence. But love is not in the irascible, but in the concubus possible. Therefore Pride is not in the irascible. On the contrary, Gregory, in his commentary on Job 249, opposes Pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore Pride is in the irascible. I answer that the subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object. For the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of Pride is something difficult. For Pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above in Articles 1 and 2. Therefore Pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger strictly speaking is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellect of appetite to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless, the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupisable power, as stated above in the first part, Question 59, Article 4, as well as in the Parsprima Secundae, Question 82, Article 5, 1 and 2 replies. Consequently, if the difficult thing, which is the object of Pride, were merely some sensible object, where to the sensitive appetite might tend, Pride would have to be in the irascible, which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which Pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of Pride is the irascible, not only strictly so-called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellect of appetite. Wherefore Pride is ascribed also to the demons. Reply to Objection 1. Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and Pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God that he may receive the knowledge of truth from him, according to Matthew 1125, thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent, that is, from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, and hast revealed them to little ones, that is, to the humble. Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written in Ecclesiasticus 634, If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction. The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by Pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth. Thus Gregory says in his commentary on Job 2317 that, The proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness. And if they know of them, they cannot relish them. Hence it is written in Proverbs 112, where humility is, there is also wisdom. Reply to Objection 2, as stated above in Question 161, Articles 2 and 6, Humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now Pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is, and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence. Since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is born towards things higher than what become him. Consequently, whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem, lead him to Pride. And one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as on the other hand, in the words of Gregory, again in his commentary on Job 2317, Holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others above themselves. Accordingly, the conclusion is not that Pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason. Reply to Objection 3, Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, as stated above. Reply to Objection 4, According to Augustine and on the City of God 14.7 and 9, Love precedes all other emotions of the soul and is their cause, wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that Pride is said to be love of one's own excellence, inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to Pride. Fourth Article Whether the four species of Pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory? Objection 1. It seems that the four species of Pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says in his commentary on Job 236, There are four marks by which every kind of Pride of the arrogant betrays itself. Either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits. Or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have, for Pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deems that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned as species of Pride. Objection 2 further The same thing should not be reckoned as species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned as species of lying, as stated above in Question 110 Article 2 as well as Question 112. Therefore it should not be accounted as species of Pride. Objection 3 further Some other things apparently pertain to Pride which are not mentioned here. For Jerome says that Nothing is so indicative of Pride as to show oneself ungrateful. And Augustine says on the city of God 1414 that It belongs to Pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed. Again presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one would seem to have much to do with Pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of Pride. Objection 4 further We find other divisions of Pride. For Anselm divides the uplifting of Pride saying that there is Pride of will, Pride of speech, and Pride of deed. Bernard also reckons 12 degrees of Pride namely Curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, Singularity, arrogance, presumption, defence of one's sins, Deceitful confession, rebelliousness, licence, sinful habit. Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly. On the contrary the authority of Gregory suffices. I answer that as stated above in articles one two and three. Pride denotes immoderate desire of one's own excellence. A desire to wit that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency. And thus we have the third species of Pride namely boasting of having what one has not. Secondly it may be considered with regard to its cause insofar as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is born towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously. And thus we have the first two species of Pride namely when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God or when he believes that that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits. Thirdly it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it insofar as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men. The result again being that his appetite is born inordinately towards his own excellence. And thus we have the fourth species of Pride which is when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous. Reply to Objection 1. A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First universally and thus in matters of faith a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Secondly in some particular matter of choice and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication. Yet he is not an unbeliever as he would be were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God or that grace is given to men for their merits whereas properly speaking it belongs to pride and not to unbelief through inordinate desire of one's own excellence to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself or of one's own merits. Reply to Objection 2. Boasting is reckoned a species of lying as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not. But as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride. Reply to Objection 3. The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed belongs to the third species since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species which consists in wishing to be preferred to others. Reply to Objection 4. The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin for it begins by being conceived in thought then it is the uttered in word and thirdly is accomplished in deed. The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility of which we have spoken above in question 161 article 6. For the first degree of humility is to be humble in heart and to show it in one's very person one's eyes fixed on the ground and to this is opposed curiosity which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is to speak few and sensible words and not to be loud a voice. To this is opposed frivolity of mind by which a man is proud of a speech. The third degree of humility is not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter to which is opposed senseless mirth. The fourth degree of humility is to maintain silence until one is asked to which is opposed boasting. The fifth degree of humility is to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery to which is opposed singularity whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is to believe and acknowledge oneself vile than all to which is opposed arrogance whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes to which is opposed presumption whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is to confess one's sins to which is opposed defense of one's sins. The ninth degree is to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances to which is opposed deceitful confession whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is obedience to which is opposed rebelliousness. The eleventh degree of humility is not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires to this is opposed license whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is fear of God to this is opposed the habit of sinning which implies contempt of God. In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated but also certain things that precede and follow them as we have stated above with regard to humility. In question 161 article 6 Fifth article whether pride is a mortal sin Objection one you would seem that pride is not a mortal sin for a gloss on Psalm 7 verse 4 O Lord my God if I have done this thing says namely the universal sin which is pride therefore if pride were a mortal sin so would every sin be objection to further every mortal sin is contrary to charity but pride is apparently not contrary to charity neither as to the love of God nor as to the love of one's neighbor because the excellence by which pride desires inordinately is not always opposed to God's honor or our neighbor's good therefore pride is not a mortal sin objection three further every mortal sin is opposed to virtue but pride is not opposed to virtue on the contrary it arises therefrom for as Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3423 sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues therefore pride is not a mortal sin on the contrary Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3423 that pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate and contrary wise humility of the elect but men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin I answer that pride is opposed to humility now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God as stated above in question 161 article 1 fifth reply hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection insofar as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the divine rule or measure against the saying of the apostle in 2 Corinthians 1013 but we will not glory beyond our measure but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us therefore it is written in Ecclesiasticus 1014 the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God because to which the root of pride is found to consist in man not being in some way subject to God and his rule now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin for this consists in turning away from God and consequently pride is of its genus a mortal sin nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus for instance fornication and adultery there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection through forestalling the judgment of reason and being without its consent so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins when reason does not consent to them reply to objection one as stated above in article 2 pride is a general sin not by its essence but by a kind of influence in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal but only such as arise from perfect pride which we have stated to be a mortal sin reply to objection two pride is always contrary to the love of God in as much as the proud man does not subject himself to the divine rule as he ought sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor when namely a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor and this again is a transgression of the divine rule which has established order among men so that one ought to be subject to another reply to objection three pride arises from virtue not as from its direct cause but as from an accidental cause in so far as a man makes of virtue an occasion for pride and nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another as stated in physics 8.1 hence some are even proud of their humility sixth article whether pride is the most grievous of sins objection one it would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins for the more difficult a sin is to avoid the less grievous it would seem to be now pride is the most difficult to avoid for Augustine says in his rule other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins objection two further the greater evil is opposed to the greater good as the philosopher asserts in ethics 8.10 now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues as stated above in question 61 article 5 therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder and so forth are more grievous sins than pride objection three further the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil but pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Romans 128 where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart men of science were delivered to a reparate sense to do those things which are not convenient therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins on the contrary a gloss on Psalm 118 verse 51 the proud did iniquitously says the greatest sin in man is pride I answer that two things are to be observed in sin conversion to a mutable good and this is the material part of sin and a version from the immutable good and this gives sin its formal aspect and compliment now on the part of the conversion there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins because uplifting which pride covets inordinately is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue but on the part of the aversion pride has extreme gravity because in other sins man turns away from God either through ignorance or through weakness or through desire for any other good whatever whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule hence Boethiah says that while all vices flee from God pride alone withstands God for which reason it especially stated in James 4.6 that God resisteth the proud wherefore aversion from God and His commandments which is a consequence as it were in other sins belongs to pride by its very nature for its act is the contempt of God and since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal compliment of sin replied to objection one a sin is difficult to avoid in two ways first on account of the violence of its onslaught thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity and still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence on account of its con-naturality as stated in ethics 2, 3 and 9 a difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin because a man sins the more grievously according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation as Augustine says and on the city of God 14, 12 and 15 secondly it is difficult to avoid a sin on account of its being hidden in this way it is difficult to avoid pride since it takes occasion even from good deeds as stated in article 5, 3 reply hence Augustine says pointedly that it lies in weight for good deeds and it is written in Psalm 141 verse 4 in the way wherein I walked the proud have hidden as snare for me hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason but once discovered by reason it is easily avoided both by considering one's own infirmity according to Ecclesiasticist 10, 9 why is earth and ashes proud and by considering God's greatness according to Job 15, 13 why dot thy spirits well against God as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself according to Isaiah 40 verse 6 all flesh is grass and the glory thereof as the flower of the field further on in Isaiah 64 verse 6 all our justices are become like the rag of a monstrous woman reply to objection 2 opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object which is considered on the part of conversion in this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues but it is the greatest on the part of aversion since it brings greatness upon other sins for unbelief by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness the same applies to despair and the like reply to objection 3 just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity so too in order to overcome their pride God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful hence Isidor says in On the Supreme Good 238 that pride is the worst of all vices whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds so that its guilt is less perceptible on the other hand carnal lust is apparent to all because from the outset it is of a shameful nature and yet under God's dispensation it is less grievous than pride for he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not falls into the lusts of the flesh that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement from this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest for just as a wise physician in order to cure a worse disease allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that as a remedy God allows men to fall into other sins seventh article whether pride is the first sin of all objection one it would seem that pride is not the first sin of all for the first is maintained in all that follows now pride does not accompany all sins nor is it the origin of all for Augustine says in Our Nature in Grace 20 that many things are done amiss which are not done with pride therefore pride is not the first sin of all objection two further it is written in Ecclesiasticus 1014 that the beginning of pride is to fall off from God therefore falling away from God precedes pride objection three further the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues now not humility but faith is the first of all virtues therefore pride is not the first sin of all objection four further it is written in 2 Timothy 313 evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse so that apparently man's beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins but pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the forgoing article therefore pride is not the first sin objection five further resemblance and pretense come after the reality now the philosopher says in Ethics 3 7 that pride apes fortitude and daring therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride on the contrary it is written in Ecclesiasticus 1015 pride is the beginning of all sin I answer that the first thing in every genus is that which is essential now it has been stated above in article 6 that a version from God which is the formal complement of sin belongs to pride essentially and to other sins consequently hence it is that pride fulfills the conditions of a first thing and is the beginning of all sins as stated above in the Parse Prima Secunde question 84 article 2 when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin reply to objection one pride is said to be the beginning of all sin not as though every sin originated from pride but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride reply to objection two to fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride not as though it were a distinct sin from pride but as being the first part of pride for it has been said above in article 5 that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake reply to objection three there is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices for vice is corruptive of virtue now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted where for as faith is the first of virtues so unbelief is the last of sins to which sometimes man is led by other sins hence a gloss on psalm 136 verse 7 raise it raise it even to the foundation thereof says that by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief and the apostle says in first Timothy 119 that some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith reply to objection four pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness but among the grievous sins the first is pride as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous and as that which is first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin a gloss on psalm 18 verse 13 I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin says namely from the sin of pride which is the last in those who return to God and the first in those who withdraw from God reply to objection five the philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude not that it consists precisely in this but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men if he seemed to be daring or brave eighth article whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice objection one you would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice since isidore and cassian number pride among the capital vices objection two further pride is apparently the same as vain glory since both covet excellence now vain glory is reckoned a capital vice therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice objection three further Augustine says in on virginity thirty one that pride begets envy nor as it ever without this companion now envy is reckoned a capital vice is stated above in question thirty six article four much more therefore is pride a capital vice on the contrary Gregory in his commentary on Job thirty one forty five does not include pride among the capital vices I answer that as stated above in articles two and five first reply pride may be considered in two ways first in itself as being a special sin secondly as having a general influence towards all sins now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise where for some considering pride in the light of a special sin numbered it together with the other capital vices but Gregory taking into consideration its general influence towards all vices as explained above in article two objection three did not place it among the capital vices but held it to be the queen and mother of all the vices hence he says in his commentary on Job thirty one forty five pride the queen of vices when it has vanquished and captured the heart forwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds this suffices for the reply to the first objection reply to objection two pride is not the same as Vainglory but is the cause thereof for pride covets excellence inordinately while Vainglory covets the outward show of excellence reply to objection three the fact that envy which is a capital vice arises from pride does not prove that pride is a capital vice but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves end of question one hundred and sixty two read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question one hundred and sixty three Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question one hundred and sixty three of the first man's sin in four articles we must now consider the first man's sin which was pride and one his sin two its punishment three the temptation whereby he was led to sin under the first head there are four points of inquiry first whether pride was the first man's first sin second what the first man coveted by sinning third whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins fourth which sinned more grievously the man or the woman first article whether pride was the first man's first sin objection one it would seem that pride was not the first man's first sin for the apostle says in Romans 519 that by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners now the first man's first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin therefore disobedience and not pride was the first man's sin objection two further Ambrose says commenting on Luke 4.3 and the devil said to him that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man now Christ was first tempted to gluttony as appears from Matthew 4.3 where it was said to him if thou be the son of God command that these stones be made bread therefore the first man's sin was not pride but gluttony objection three further man sinned at the devil's suggestion now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge according to Genesis 3.5 therefore in ordinance in man was through the desire of knowledge which pertains to curiosity therefore curiosity and not pride was the first sin objection four further a glass on 1 Timothy 2.14 the woman being seduced was in the transgression says the apostle rightly calls this seduction for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because he knew that if they touched it they would be like God's as though he who made them men begrudged them the Godhead now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride on the contrary it is written in Ecclesiasticus 10.15 pride is the beginning of all sin now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin according to Romans 5.12 by one man sin entered into this world therefore man's first sin was pride I answer that many movements may concur towards one sin and the character of sin attaches to that one in which in ordinance is first frowned and it is evident that in ordinance is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body since as Augustine says in On the City of God 118 the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains also among the inward movements the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end now man was so appointed in the state of innocence that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit therefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason it remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good now he would have not coveted it inordinately by desiring it according to his measure as established by the divine rule hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure and this pertains to pride therefore it is evident that man's first sin was pride reply to objection one man's disobedience to the divine command was not willed by man for his own sake for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will it remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride this agrees with the statement of Augustine who says that man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting and scorned God's command reply to objection two gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents for it is written in Genesis 3.6 the woman saw that the tree was good to eat and fair to the eyes and delightful to behold and she took of the fruit thereof and did eat yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning but the persuasive words of the serpent who said your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as God's and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride reply to objection three the desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence hence the serpent began by saying you shall be as God's and added knowing good and evil reply to objection four according to Augustine the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were depart by God from a good and useful thing were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power and a certain proud self-presumption this does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion her mind was puffed up the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly second article whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness objection one it would seem that the first man's pride did not consist in his coveting the divine likeness for no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature now God's likeness is competent to man according to his nature for it is written in Genesis 1 26 let us make man to our image and likeness therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness objection two further it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil for this was the serpent's suggestion you shall be as God's knowing good and evil now the desire of knowledge is natural to man according to the saying of the philosopher at the beginning of his metaphysics 1 1 all men naturally desire knowledge therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness objection three further no wise man chooses the impossible now the first man was in doubt with wisdom according to Ecclesiasticus 17 5 he filled them with the knowledge of understanding since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite namely choice it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible but it is impossible for man to be like God according to the saying of Exodus 15 11 who is like to the among the strong oh Lord therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness on the contrary Augustine commenting on Psalm 68 verse 5 then did I restore that which I took not away says Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness I answer that likeness is twofold one is a likeness of absolute equality and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind especially of a wise man the other is a likeness of imitation such as is possible for a creature in reference to God so far as the creature participates somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure for Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 9 the same things are like and unlike to God like according as they imitate him as far as he can be imitated unlike according as an effect falls short of its cause now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good where for from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure as stated in the foregoing article it follows that he coveted God's likeness inordinately it must however be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed now spiritual good in so far as the rational creature participates in the divine likeness may be considered in reference to three things first as to natural being and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation both on man of whom it is written in Genesis 126 that God made man to his image and likeness and on the angel of whom it is written in Ezekiel 2812 thou wasst the seal of resemblance secondly as to knowledge and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation where for immediately after the words just quoted thou wasst the seal of resemblance we read full of wisdom the first man at his creation had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality thirdly as to the power of operation and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness accordingly while both namely the devil and the first man coveted God's likeness inordinately neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature but the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's likeness as regards knowledge of good and evil according to the serpent's instigation namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good and what was evil for him to do or again that he should of himself for know what good and what evil would befall him secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power of operation namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness hence Augustine says that the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power on the other hand the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards power where for Augustine says in On True Religion 13 that he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God insofar as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the divine rule reply to Objection 1 this argument considers the likeness of nature and man did not sin by coveting this as stated reply to Objection 2 it is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge absolutely but to covet this likeness inordinately that is above one's measure this is a sin hence Augustine commenting on Psalm 70 verse 18 oh God who is like thee says he who desires to be of himself even as God is of no one wishes wickedly to be like God thus did the devil who was unwilling to be subject to him and man who refused to be as a servant bound by his command reply to Objection 3 this argument considers the likeness of equality third article whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins Objection 1 it would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins for Augustine says in On the City of God 1415 great was the wickedness in sinning when it was so easy to avoid sin now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin because they had nothing within them urging them to sin therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins Objection 2 further punishment is proportionate to guilt now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished since by it death entered into this world as the apostle says in Romans 512 therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins Objection 3 further the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest according to Metaphysics 2.4 now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men therefore it was the greatest on the contrary Origen says in Peri Archon 13 I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly this can happen only by degrees and little by little now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins I answer that there is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin one results from the very species of the sin thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication the other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person or time the former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than all other sins of men as regards the species of the sin for though pride of its genus as a certain preeminence over other sins yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately such as the pride of our first parents as stated in article 2 but if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state we must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply reply to objection 1 this argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner reply to objection 2 the severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin because it destroyed the innocence of our original state and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature reply to objection 3 where things are directly subordinate the first must needs be the greatest such as not the order among sins for one follows from another accidentally and thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest fourth article whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's objection 1 it would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's for it is written in 1 Timothy 2.14 Adam was not seduced but the woman being seduced was in the transgression and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance but the man threw a surred knowledge now the latter is the graver sin according to Luke 12 verses 47 48 that servant who knew the will of his Lord and did not according to his will shall be beaten with many stripes but he that knew not and did things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with a few stripes therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's objection 2 further Augustine says if man is the head he should live better and give an example of good deeds to his wife that she may imitate him now he who ought to do better sins more grievously if he commit a sin therefore Adam sin more grievously than Eve's objection 3 further the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous now Adam apparently sinned against the Holy Ghost because while sinning he relied on God's mercy and this pertains to the sin of presumption therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve's on the contrary punishment corresponds to guilt now the woman was more grievously punished than the man as appears from Genesis 3 therefore she sinned more grievously than the man I answer that as stated in article 3 the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin accordingly we must assert that if we consider the condition attaching to these persons the man's sin is the more grievous because he was more perfect than the woman as regards the genus itself of the sin the sin of each is considered to be equal for each sinned by pride hence Augustine says in his commentary on Genesis Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex through parity of pride but as regards the species of pride the woman sinned more grievously for three reasons first because she was more puffed up than the man for the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree lest they should be like to him so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God's will on the other hand the man did not believe this to be true therefore he did not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will but his pride consisted in wishing to attain there too by his own power secondly not only herself sinned but suggested sin to the man therefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor thirdly the man's sin was diminished by the fact that as Augustine says he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good will on account of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend that he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the divine sentence it is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the man's reply to Objection 1 the woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride wherefore her ignorance did not excuse but aggravated her sin insofar as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride reply to Objection 2 this argument considers the circumstance of personal condition on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than the woman's reply to Objection 3 the man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to contempt of God's justice wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost but as Augustine says again in his commentary on Genesis it was due to the fact that having had no experience of God's severity he thought the sin to be venial that is easily forgiven