 We're at the London Naval History Unit at the Department of War Studies. And we are actually functioning as part of the Center for the History of War. So those three are your hosts this evening as those King scholars. So the four hosts for this evening's is another from the British Commission of the Maritime History of Kings Maritime History Seminars, organized by VCNH and with the Society for Naval Research and the help of the way to register up and knowing that all that institution will back and be kind to you. I am very pleased to introduce tonight's speaker, it's Marisa Edwards, who is doing a PhD jointly from the University of São Paulo, Brazil and here and just an expert on Brazil, Brazil, defense, balancing and funds in the South Atlantic. And in addition to an academic career experience, multinational corporations and things, which we always like to point out, academic expertise is not the only expertise that helps to inform some of the view of the world. Well, it is about the subject of the PhD that we're talking about tonight, which is Brazil and the evolution of Brazilian defense relations in the South Atlantic. And so it is with genuine gratitude that I welcome you to the seminar and turn over to you to thank you. Thank you. OK, good evening, everybody, both in person and online. I hope you can hear me. As I said, my name is Marisa Edwards. I'm a final year joint international relations PhD candidate at the University of São Paulo and Queen's College London. I'm in my final year, which is very exciting. So I'll be submitting this year after all the challenges that came with the PhD during the pandemic, but it's been wonderful. I really enjoyed my research. I hope that I gave you guys a good insight as to my research and all the wonderful things that are to be learned about Brazil and the South Atlantic. So without further ado, yes, my research is on Brazil and the Zopacos. Now, Zopacos is an acronym that some people have gathered. It stands for the Zone, Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic. And my focus of my research is to combine the analysis of the evolution of Brazilian diplomatic and defense relations in the South Atlantic for a period of 1986 to 2013. My thesis does also provide present and future considerations, but the main portion of my research is within that 27 year time frame. So with regard to my presentation, I have a structure here to help guide us on this adventure. I'll firstly go through an overview of the key points on the Zopacos, some sort of key takeaways I feel everybody should know before I start getting more technical with my research. And then I'll move on to my thesis concept of research passion, followed by a thesis outline structure, and then a walkthrough of my seven chapters of my thesis. And then also provide a little teaser of my action plan for the upcoming months. And then, of course, open up for questions and queries at the end. So in terms of key points with regards to the Zopacos, first of all, it was established in 1986 by the UN General Assembly. Its founding declaration is ARES 4111. And when it was established at the United Nations General Assembly, I included here the little voting record. 124 countries voted in favour of the resolution, eight abstained, and one voted no. Can anyone guess which was the sole country that voted against the creation of the USA? Very good. Very good. The USA was the only country that voted against the establishment of the Zopacos. The UK voted in favour, the USSR voted in favour, but alas, the USA did not vote in favour of creating this. When the declaration came about, it has seven parametry and seven operative causes, predominantly focusing on the maintenance of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation. It also has as a focus the removal of the effects of the Cold War, such as the threat posed by nuclear weapons and also the possible militarisation of the South Atlantic. And in terms of some other cause that potentially people don't expect when you think about a zone of peace in the South Atlantic, it also has some kind of humanitarian causes. For example, it states unequivocally that it is against the apartheid regime in South Africa, it views it as a threat to the security of the South Atlantic region. So in terms of principle commitments, the key takeaways are that it is zone, that aims to be a nuclear weapons free zone. It seeks to maintain peace in the region. It seeks to further cooperation between the member states of which when the Zopacos was established, there were twenty two. There is now twenty four. So when the Zopacos was first established in terms of current cohort, two countries that were missing were Namibia and South Africa. As we know, in 1986, South Africa was ruled by the apartheid regime and Namibia was simply occupied by South African forces. So with the membership of the Zopacos on establishment, there were twenty two member states and currently there are now twenty four upon the inclusion of Namibia after the country's independence and South Africa since the end of the apartheid regime and also the country's disbandment of its nuclear weapons program. As that is a very important component of the member of Zopacos, it is, as I said, a zone that aims to be a nuclear weapons free zone. Therefore, none of the member states will possess nuclear weapons. In terms of ministerial meetings, there have been seven thus far. The first two years after the inception of the peace in Virginia in Brazil in 1988, that was followed by Abuja in 1990. As you can see, the ministerial meetings, they oscillate between being in South America and Africa. All the member states, I'll show you a little map as well, are located in South America and Africa. So you can see that there is that switch over. Brasilia in 1994, Brazil hosted once again as a ministerial meeting, some set West in South Africa in 1996. Buenos Aires in 1998. Luanda 2007 and Montevideo in 2030. So as you can see, the most recent ministerial meeting of the Zopacos occurred quite a little while ago, and that is where my species is seeking to ask if now, with all the changes, especially the astute and the Brazilian Navy towards potentially revitalizing the zone, if that is something that may happen. So that gives you a little overview of some key points of the Zopacos view to bear in mind as I walk you through my PhD research. So this is a map, as you can see, these are the current 24 member states. You have three in South America, so Brazil, Uruguayan, Argentina, and then 21 states in Africa ranging from Cape Verde down to Southern. I hope that helps, especially when I start delving into all the fun empirical things that I learned from my research that you can see who are the players in this research. So as to my thesis concept, well, to give you some background, I kind of got to the idea of researching the sample antique from my master's research. I'm very lucky in the audience to have one of my supervisors here, Professor Anthony Ferreira. Thank you for being here. I did my masters here at King's in the Brazil Institute, where I still am. And my master's research was on Anglo-Brazilian, diplomatic and defence relations during and after the Fortress War. So that was my sort of gateway into looking at the South Atlantic and also trying to understand what are the other kind of big players, not only in the South Atlantic, but also what are the big players doing and talking about in the South Atlantic? And this is where Brazil, with the highly developed maybe that it has, the region, you know, is a major player. So in terms of developing my ideas, I can confidently say that this fascination that I have South Atlantic began far earlier than 2018. When I started my PhD, it very likely. Well, certainly began back in 2016 when I started my masters. In terms of my kind of driver, I have my research fashion, which is my research, which looks at how does Brazil use its membership of the Zopacus in its diplomatic and defence relations in South Atlantic? And this is where it's something that I tell my students, I teach in international further and more studies. I say to them, it's very important when you're choosing your research question to think about how you're going to phrase it, a how question is different from a why question, just different from a what question. So with my question being, how does Brazil use its membership? That involves looking at not only Brazil's relationship with the Zopacus, but also the way in which it uses the fact that it is a member state in its diplomatic and defence relations in the South Atlantic region. And as we know, there are 24 member states, but there are also very important extra regional actors in the South Atlantic. The US is there, China is there, you know, it's all part of the puzzle as such. So this is the research driver of my research. And this kind of came about because as I began to do my preliminary readings and research into my topic, I realised that as much as there are consensus is about Brazil being a leading member, that it, you know, has all sorts of interests in the South Atlantic. When it came to developing my research question, I decided that in terms of looking at this idea of membership and how Brazil uses its membership, there was far more to be explored. And this is something that I truly hope that my research will be able to fill to not only provide an insight as to how Brazil acts in the Zoparcos, but how it uses its connection to these other countries within the Zoparcos framework in its diplomatic and defence relations in the South Atlantic region. So now to my thesis. When it came to developing my piece of structure, this has gone through many twists and turns, as I'm sure we all of these issues know in the room and online, it is something of a process. So with my thesis structure, this is a structure that I believe showcases the best of what my research is going to be able to offer. So it begins with, obviously, my introduction and methodological considerations followed by a theoretical framework, which involves dissecting and analysing theories of zones of peace, as well as aspects of securitisation theory and essentially the first chapter focuses around building a conceptual and theoretical framework, which will be used for my analysis as I progress. Chapter two is on Brazil and South Atlantic region. So this is a literature review, a predominantly literature review examining the literature produced on Brazil and South Atlantic. I'll speak a little bit more about that particular chapter as well later. But in terms of understanding the progression of this thesis, it's important to see these two first chapters as a strong introduction, both theoretically and in terms of the literature that's been produced to follow into my four core triangulation and research chapters. So in terms of my first chapter with my introduction, so in terms of introducing this concept as a practice, as I'm sure many of you may think, is something that it's it's not super research. You know, people, when you think of you think, well, an international organisation, you think the U.S., you think NATO, an institution, you know, there are so many that we could choose from. However, the Zopax is a zone of peace, and this is where when it comes to my research, I really try and shine a light on that. And in terms of introducing my work, I made the point, of course, of acknowledging the works that have been done before me, including a thesis that came out of Thanks College London back in 1997 by Jennifer Kaviala. She came from all studies and she analysed the Zopax. So I'm hoping that now myself, you know, what, 20 years later, picking up this fascinating topic. And I obviously provide a deep dive of my research question, what it represents, and then go into my methodological considerations. And in terms of my methodology, my research, it relies on three empirical data sets, which I'll be dissecting in a moment. But it's qualitative, it's an analysis of documents from the Brazilian known as Brazilian Embassy Archives. So it's like the Brazilian Foreign Industry Archives, which are called Vita Barachi. So I have three data sets, the first being these telegrams dispatches from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Archives, also documents from the UN Digital Library Archives, and also the empirical data that I gathered from semi-structured elite interviews that I conducted with senior Brazilian and South African former and current diplomatic and defence personnel. And then I include the thesis chapters overview, which as you have seen, there are seven chapters. So now to the I find extra fun part. When it came to gathering my research and doing gathering my empirical data, it, let's just say it went very well, I think overall, however, when you consider pandemics and COVID and having all sorts of issues with collecting data, it wasn't necessarily the most straightforward process, but I think in terms of gathering my research, I was able to do that well. And I spent six and a half months in Brazil as part of my fieldwork and also as part of my joint PhD commitments at the University of Sao Paulo. So I went to Brasilia to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Tamarachi Archives and looked at both the paper and introduction archives, the introduction archives are those that are from 2000 onwards. The paper archives are in many, many boxes, which involves going through the boxes and finding the appropriate information. And I also, through doing this, have been building a key as well, if Tamarachi terms and identifying key actors and participants. And this is going to be a bilingual Portuguese and English term space as such, which I can have in my research, but also hopefully aid any future scholars that want to delve into the Tamarachi archives. With regard to the UN Digital Library Archives, this involves decorations, resolutions, speeches, letters, voting records and reports. And they are focused just as those documents from the Tamarachi archives on Brazil and the Sao Paulo and the South Atlantic. And so in terms of looking at these UN Digital Library Archives involved going through their online database, which thankfully because of COVID is still very much accessible, so I was able to find all the information that I needed. I also conducted six semi-structured and neat interviews with current and former diplomatic and defence personnel. In terms of my interviewees, they were all, you know, selected incredibly carefully with regard to their roles. Chiefly, as I said, in Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations and in the one case, South African defence relations. So Antonio Patriota, he is a former Brazilian foreign minister. He's currently ambassador in Egypt, Brazilian ambassador in Egypt, and I interviewed him in person in Rome back in 2019 when he served as ambassador, Brazilian ambassador to Italy and San Marino. The Nelson Jobim is a former Brazilian defence minister, so he served also prior to being a defence minister as a justice minister, but I was interested, of course, in his exceptions and views as a defence minister. Gelsson Fosso Cajunior and Luís Desigimoada, both former Brazilian parent representatives of the United Nations, and Robert Higgs is a former South African red admiral, who interestingly enough was also a pallbearer at Nelson Mandela's funeral. Celso Amorim has served previously as a Brazilian foreign minister, a defence minister and a representative to the United Nations, and all six of mine to be very able to give me wonderful insights, not only on the establishment of Soapacas, but also its evolution. So essentially, these are the three empirical data sets which I use in my analysis chapters, and the data which I gathered from these data sets is triangulated in the chapters that follow. So in terms of providing my theoretical framework, as I mentioned, I'll be using theories of zones of peace, but also aspects of securitisation theory, and in terms of dividing up my research, I am obviously having a little introduction, followed by a deep dive on understanding zones of peace. I'm sure that you've hopefully heard of the Treaty of Tatloko, Treaty of Pandaba, these are all examples of land zones of peace, but also nuclear weapons of free zones. And this is where I argue that the Soapacas is quite unique in that it not only is in a maritime zone of peace, but it also aims to be and works as a nuclear weapons of free zone. And in terms of understanding what the Soapacas is, once I have been able now to dissect and pull out the different strands of understanding zones of peace, I am able to provide a better understanding framework of what is sense of purpose to progress to doing my triage. So the aspects of securitisation theory are focused primarily on securitisation and diplomacy and also on regional security. So with zones of peace, I primarily look at the works of Kacovitz and with securitisation with Buzza. And that's my chat to you. With my chapter two, as I said, this will be a chapter primarily focused on the existing literature and subdivided into looking at Brazil and the South Antique, but also Brazilian maritime security priorities such as its interests in its territorial waters and also the blue Amazon security nexus. There is also an analysis of the Brazilian defence documents which have been produced since the establishment of the Soapacas in 1986. So, for example, there are there's the Policicotas de Fiesa Nacional from 1996, the different Heverbloodas de Fiesa, which are the white books of defence and also the upcoming new Policicotas de Fiesa on maritime issues and also the new white book of defence. So in terms of providing a sort of framework for both literature and theory, these are the two kind of introductory chapters that lead into the triangulation chapters. So in terms of chapter three, this is when the triangulation gets fun. When it comes to providing this overview of the establishment of Soapacas, although it was established in 1986 by the U.N. General Assembly, it's very important to understand that there are heavy influences from the legacy of the Falklands-Marvelia School. And this is where having done the masters research, which I did on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations during and after the wars in understanding this legacy of the war in terms of shaping the way in which we view the South Atlantic, these are important tools to see how it formed in terms of the importance for Brazil, but also the future member states to create a zone of peace. You know, when you've had a recent war, as they have had, you know, as well as military partnerships in countries in South America, when it comes to setting up a zone of peace, these are all aspects that need to be considered. So when it came into the establishment process of the Soapacas, I went through all the empirical data which I collected at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Archives, the U.N. Digital Library Archives, as well as my interviews and have triangulated and produced an overview of the establishment process. And this is where I argue strongly that, you know, Brazil was a very important country, not only the establishment Soapacas, but in the drafting of the resolution itself. I've also seen reasons as to why the U.S., for example, voted against the establishment Soapacas. Remember, that was the only country they voted against. So I have found documents in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Archives that detail how the U.S. refused to accept the admission, for example, of Angola as a security threat. Only South Africa is mentioned as a security threat in the declaration of Soapacas. The Angola isn't. Well, as we know, they were, you know, it was a socialist country, you know, it was something that the Americans viewed negatively, especially in the Cold War period. So in terms of finding out this establishment process, it has been truly fascinating to see how different countries also work together to both draft the ultimate Ares 4111 declaration that established the Soap Peace, but also learn how Brazil negotiated and spoke to the U.S., also had meetings with the UK, also spoke to Argentina. Argentina was very keen to make sure that the Soapacas decorations, you know, was very much kind of steered towards, you know, protecting the interests of the countries of the South Atlantic, you know, as much as we all know, the UK has Marvinas, it has, you know, South South Wales, South Georgia, it has Ascension Islands, Lina, Tristan de Cunha, so it has as much as the British have a presence in the South Atlantic, the UK is not a member of Soapacas, and it's obviously a nuclear weapons power as well. So when it comes to understanding the establishment Soapacas, I've thus framed this chapter in this way. And then I provide a deep dive into the seven preamble tree and seven operative clauses of the Soapacas declaration. I then move into an analysis of the Soapacas and the Cold War. So this period is from 1987 to 1990. And it begins with the evaluation of the first Soapacas ministerial meeting in Rio in 1988, followed by an analysis as well of the outcomes of this meeting. Considering this is the first meeting, it's very interesting to see how the clauses of the declaration are put into practice. So for Brazil as the first host nation, it was there to really kind of set a precedent as to how the Soapacas might look like. It then fall over the Búja as a second meeting in 1990. And then it looks at the outcomes of the Búja. And in terms of planning my subsequent chapters, that kind of set a framework in terms of looking at the meeting itself, the outcomes of the meeting. And in terms of using my documentation, I was able to show the internal Brazilian perspective of the meetings, but also the way in which the UN had the Soapacas reported to it. Because what's interesting with the Soapacas and one of the reasons why I contend that it is the zone of peace and not obviously an organisation or anything like that is it doesn't have any of that framework. You know, the Soapacas does not have the headquarters. It does not have a secretary general. You know, it doesn't have a budget. It is essentially quite an abstract format. And that's something that I grapple with a lot, especially my first, second year of my PhD, until I realised that it was essentially what it was designed to be, a zone of peace. So when it came to doing this mapping, I then move into the post-cult war period. And as you can see, the frequency of the ministerial meetings increased. We had a second hosting for Brazil in Brasilia in 1994. And this is where the insights of Celso Amorinho were particularly important as he was chair of this event in Brasilia. So he was able to give lots of really interesting perspectives of what the meeting was like on the ground per se, in terms of Somerset West. As you know, that's in South Africa. So this is where things got particularly interesting. And I know I'm using that a lot, but I do truly really enjoy my research. I think I hope that is coming up. When it came to the expanding of the Zopacus membership, this is the decade where shifts started to occur. The membership increased from 22 to 24. And South Africa, once it had disbanded, its nuclear weapons program was therefore, and had, you know, the party which he then did when Nelson Mandela was elected. So the fourth ministerial meeting took place in Somerset West. And this is where similarly, you know, the agenda started developing, it started adjusting, because the post global period, without the two hegemon of the US, the SSR, it was starting to kind of find itself. So the South Atlantic was very much kind of progressing in not only its view by the internal players, but also the extra regional players. Then I look at the outcomes of Somerset West meeting progressing into the last meeting of the 20th century, so Buenos Aires in 1998. And this is where with Buenos Aires, considering Argentine interests in the South Atlantic and as well its interests, the Fort Cosmarvinas, it also gets curious because the way in which Argentina still views purpose is often as another tool in which it can argue to the UN that it wants its eyelids back, that's such. So that is my charge of five. My Zavakis and the new Millennium. This is my last, my fourth and final of my triangulation chapters. So as you can see, there is another meeting and this is a planned meeting and this was an addition that I made following my empirical research, because I found evidence in my empirical research and this is something that I hadn't found in any literature that had been produced that there had been a planned ministerial meeting in Benin in Contano in 2003. And this is very interesting because when it came to the gaps between the meetings, as you can see here, you know, we have two year increments, we then have the beginning of a period of larger gaps. So the 2003 ministerial meeting, had it occurred, would have been quite an interesting moment in time, not only with the new considerations that would have happened post 9 11, but also the different considerations that would have been made in terms of security priorities. So this is a plan ministerial meeting, which this segment, you know, came out of the research is something that I learned from doing my empirical research that there had been this plan ministerial meeting. But then there were the two meetings that occurred most recently in the 21st century, Luanda in 2007 and Montevideo in 2013. And in terms of Montevideo, I got lucky with both my interviewees because the Montevideo 2013 meeting was the first in which representatives from both foreign ministry and the defence ministry were both required to attend. So two of my interviewees were present in Montevideo in 2013. So South somebody was there in his capacity as defence minister and then finally put me off in his capacity as foreign minister. So this is, I hope, an overview then of my fourth translation chapters. My final chapter, my chapter seven is my chapter with my portfolio marks and as well some insights on the Zopakis future considerations. I divided this closing chapter thematically because it will allow not only to answer my research question of how does Brazil use its membership with Zopakis, but it also will allow me to provide insights theoretical kind of I can do theoretical refinement in terms of Zopakis' zone of peace, but also provide new insights on Brazil and Zopakis, the Zopakis ministerial meetings, Brazil and its relations with the Zopakis member states, and also Brazilian maritime security considerations. And this section with the security considerations also encompasses Brazil's relations, not only with other member states, of course, and how it, you know, you have examples of Brazil's cooperation with Namibia in terms of the Brazilian Navy, but also with extra regional actors, you know, in terms of a central argument in my research is that, you know, as much as Brazil is a leading actor in Zopakis, it still is interested in furthering its own agenda and furthering its own interests in the South Atlantic. And that involves building these post-relations with Zopakis member states, but also with extra regional actors, you know, to work well with the US, work well with the UK, it's all in Brazil's interests. And I kind of closed that chapter with questioning, you know, are we seeing at the moment a new revitalization of the Zopakis? And I will cover this in a minute, but in terms of this question of a new revitalization, well, there was a planned ministerial meeting as well in 2015 in Cape Verde, which didn't occur. It's still kind of on the cards as such. Back in July last year, we had a new resolution on Zopakis back in the UN in 2020 in September at the UN General Assembly. Our president, Bolsonaro, he spoke about Zopakis that was mentioned. I didn't like a lot of other things that Bolsonaro said at his UN General Assembly speech. However, when I heard that he mentioned Zopakis, I was quietly delighted. I'm not entirely sure who told him about Zopakis. I don't think he knows what Zopakis may be is, but I'm sure that his defence advisers do and especially his naval advisers. So in terms of this idea of a new revitalization and also the new security concerns, of course, you know, there's an increased in piracy in the Gulf Guinea. You know, there's all sorts of other concerns in terms of drug trafficking, overfishing. Very recently as well, there was training exercise between the Brazilian Navy and the Caperulean Navy. And in terms of this idea of a new revitalization, well, Cape Verde is still on the cards. So if Cape Verde hosts an eighth ministerial meeting, that could be within the umbrella of the next couple of years potentially, you know, because if the Brazilian Navy continues at the rate that it is in terms of taking active interest in the Zopakis, well, it's possible. So in terms of my breakdown, that is what my thesis is looking like. In terms of an action plan for the upcoming months, I'll be submitting this summer. So if August plan I'll be submitting August, September this year. Viva who knows maybe November. And at the moment, I'm in the stage of thinking about possible applications for lectureships, postdocs or consulting roles. And that's all I have to say for now. So thank you so much. And also if you want to learn more about the Zopakis, I have two published works, one in tandem with my supervisor, Dr. Enise Marientra Carvalho, which is on Brazil, the Zopakis and NATO. This was written back in 2020, not long after the whole Trump saying Brazil could be a NATO member. We're like, no, NATO, hello. So that kind of looks at that. And then also published by for my own on this idea of the Zopakis return to promise for ideology through practice. So here's my email. And yeah, thank you very much. Behind my name and my choreography and this sort of thing. But hopefully we can do that, find out a little bit more now, if we could. So if there are any questions, I'll see if there are some in that chat and we will and we will also entertain some from from outside, as it were. But there's one here. Yeah. Well, yeah, thank you. I wonder if you could expand on the foundation and particularly and particularly to know to what extent it might have been brought about on account of the foreign war. Was that a motive, a particular motivation for the player to not? Yeah. Is there a corner? Well, you know, I wonder if you want to solve with them. Yeah, of course. So in terms of the legacy of the war, one of the things I have especially in my team, the Brazilian Prime Minister archives is that there was quite a strong concern, especially on the part of Brazil for when the British started building the base at Mount Pleasant in Poland and also when the Chileans still see under detection started building their plant air base in East Ireland, the US would have access to. So that was an easy concern because we have these extraditional actors potentially coming in and risking heightening and militarisation of the. Sorry, Chile and East Ireland. So around 85, 86, so just prior to the establishment of purpose, the British were based as you know, we have the but they were starting to increase the construction for an air base in Mount Pleasant. And that was weird with a lot of concern by both Brazil and Argentina, Argentina for these reasons. But for Brazil, it was seen as steps by, you know, another power to essentially militarise the region. I included the aspect with the base on East Ireland and Chile because it was getting concerned this idea that both sides of South America might face militarisation on both sides. So in terms of the impact of the Court of International War, I think it's definitely an important moment. And it's said, even in interviews that all the interviews are conducted, that it was viewed as a watershed moment not only to change the way which South Atlantic is perceived in the region, but also by other players because, you know, the South South Atlantic unlike the North, you know, the North is the province of NATO, it's the province of the US, it's the province of the UK. Whereas the South Atlantic has multiple players. You know, you don't just have Brazil that has Germany, you also have South Africa. Nigeria has started to grow into NATO and Goa. So in terms of the legacy of the war in shaping the ideas behind the establishment of others, I think it was definitely there and in something that I argue might be sis. But there was also this aspect of wanting to have greater regional cooperation. This is where Harald has fantastic work as well in terms of what he posed as a say to like the South Atlantic Treaty of Humanisation, which would include South Africa. However, again, in my empirical research, I realised and learnt that that was something that was not going to be acceptable to Brazil and also Argentina because when it came to developing this idea of peace, having a country that had a rule that they didn't agree with, especially considering, you know, Brazil, Argentina, Europe, I had just left behind years of military dictatorship, you know, including South Africa, which I hope that answers. So to say, the South Atlantic was, you know, apart from the Europeans who were fighting down there, they didn't agree. Peaceful part of the world's oceans, one factor, and we're talking to a rather changed section. Absolutely, and considering, you know, when you think of 100 years prior, you obviously had slave trade, you had all sorts of kind of active movement in the South Atlantic, but, you know, it's absolutely true that the fault was all changed the perception that was only in 1982. And also in the documents that I found in where, you know, in 1982, I think it was in November and reserves, they started projecting this idea of having an international year of peace. And that was in 1986, which can't be the coincidence that the stone of peace was established in 1986. So it's all part of a large initiative to have an international peace, especially considering that Cold War was starting to thaw and that the environment started to become a bit more a friendly OK, we've got one, one from online, but let's take one more from the room and then we'll go online and then we'll go to you. So we'll start here. So you mentioned about the local treaty. So I was wondering, some of the African countries not sure, but also that I'm to the African internal weapons reason Brazilian agency without so I like what you meant to be started. So I was wondering how the there's some sort of cooperation on nuclear weapons, meaning they advocate with this framework for design for instance, or if there's some sort of a policy or they leave it for other proteins. So so what's the relationship between the best you said there's no institutional framework more budget. So I'm assuming, of course, they don't have yeah, but they don't have sort of no time to overset things as the fact that what's really starting to do to them is so how is the the new dimension future needs to look at? Yeah, absolutely. This is where, you know, as I said, turns out to be a member of the so please, you can't possess nuclear weapons. And you also in case of South Africa, they just spanned the weapons program. Brazil, as we know, is still is in the process of having nuclear submarines. They're not going to be used for any sort of military purposes as far as I've seen or read. So in terms of nuclear understanding technology, I think as long as long as it remains in peaceful kind of peaceful use, as as you mentioned, the agreement between Brazil and Argentina, it's still a factor that is very much it's those facts aims to be the weapons free zone. In terms of legally, well, if let's say the UK or the West went through the Southern take with nuclear warheads, it becomes a bit difficult because you'll see have the law of the high seas. You have all sorts of other things to factor in beyond and get through past territorial waters, you can see, et cetera. But in terms of the nuclear aspect, that's something that I look at in terms of nuclear weapons free zones and looking at understanding how this works functions. So yes, all the member states are on non nuclear states. But in terms of adapting to threats, the perceived threats from nuclear power, such as the US and the UK, that's when it becomes tricky because you have the law of the high seas. So if you go through a central corridor and especially British are going to port and guns to trade their bases in ascension, it becomes a bit more difficult, especially to deeply impose something. And unfortunately, this is where the big powers will still talk about it. Right. I hope that. Let's let's involve our online crowd. And there's a question. I don't know. You might might prefer to read it yourself. But it's about, you know, the maritime security collaboration and other aspects. Oh, OK. OK, so Roger's asking a question on maritime security collaboration with extra regional powers. And I mentioned quite rightly piracy and regulated fishing, such as training, capacity building, what's the nature, what states involved. So it's very interesting that I'm being asked this question because in at the end of March, there's going to be the International Studies Association conference in Nashville. I'm fortunate not going to go, but I am collaborating with the search of Camila Braga, who's a PhD at Orspey. And she and I are writing an article together about this exact topic looking at extra regional actors in South Atlantic. So if it's OK, can you ask me in a couple of months if that's all right? Because I'm still in the process of putting together and writing this this article. And in terms of my own research, yes, there is that aspect of looking at extra regional actors in the US and China. But that is still very much in terms of the current and future considerations. And as I'm very much deep in the writing up phase of my historical chapters, I think at the moment I just have those a bit fresher in my mind. So forgive me for that. We can go on to that. We'll follow you with that question later. In the meantime, we'll go on to the back. All right, so, well, what would you, again, the topic I was hoping to speak about? I have one question about the security, the security problem of the South Atlantic. Do you think, in which way do you think the human use is actually affected? Has it been affected to address, you know, security problems within the South Atlantic? Yeah, I asked that, because as you mentioned, there's no new security framework, there's no budget, so it's a port. And at the same time, it seems to me at once, so I guess this was created. It was sort of like a reaction to great power into humans in the area to say, OK, this is an area that we are not going to accept great powers to act. However, what are the material capabilities that into the South Atlantic, the member states actually increase the security of the country and to tackle these great issues? Yeah, so in terms of your question, which is, I guess, my two questions. Yes, sorry. But let's say it. In terms of how it works, well, you look at other examples of cooperation between countries that you have as a sort of example, for example, you've got Brazil, you've got South Africa, you've also got all sorts of other you know, naval exercises in southern India as well. So there are many other ways as well, Brazil, especially because it works with other member states. But in terms of within the framework of the powers itself, Brazil, you know, is very invested in having its other member states on board. You know, you only need to look at the multi-video meeting and see how much Brazil is invested in getting African representatives over by, you know, essentially bringing the mobile, sending Brazilian planes to bring them over to have them participate in what they do. So in terms of addressing the security concerns, well, when it comes to looking at the parts of the practice, it's essentially a method that the countries might incorporate to protect themselves, but also to further initiatives in their own projects. You know, in terms of Brazil, Brazilian Navy training with the Navy, that is a method of cooperation. And especially, you know, we have our own articles that we're writing for our project. But when it comes to looking at these current and future considerations, I'm sure there's going to be more coming up with Brazil's interest in protecting its interests, not only in its Blue Amazon security nexus, but also in increasing cooperation with Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. I'm sure I've missed some things in my terror about the tech technology and so on. But I wonder, I mean, I wonder about the different countries' agendas. And you're talking about, you know, how Argentina, for example, has a particular interest and it's related to the tensions with the UK and so forth. But what is, I mean, what are this cooperation and there's peace and there's those things? But what are Brazil's selfish interests and Brazil, if there are, I mean, assuming that there are, how does Brazil leave rich an organization like this? Which is very loose and not very, you know, able to do much. How does it leave rich a take for it down to selfish interests? And what are they? Yeah, that's that's really a question. I really, I think I just fell out of it because the used word organization. I'm sorry, I wasn't just saying it's OK. But in terms of how it advances its own agenda, I have found examples, for example, I have found examples in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry archives of showing, you know, Brazil, the Brazilian embassy in Cameroon is speaking back to you, if you're like, hey, Cameroon, if you go to this, this, this, we'll support your interests in this, this, this, if you went, for example. So there are some interests that are being further known for Brazil's cooperation within the South Atlantic. I mean, we think of the Brazil, we think of all sorts of sorry, I mean, it's in Portuguese terms, the non-Portuguese. But in terms of, like, other consideration to the oil with the content and shelf, you know, Brazil wants to protect its environment, but it also is interested in collaborating and cooperating with the other countries. And as much as Argentina, you know, has these huge concerns, especially with the British presence in South Atlantic, it's still in a position where it's still trying to, I think especially in recent times, still trying to work out where it stands with that. I just talked to Colleen recently. Do you think the importance could have been abated again? It's like, well, no, I don't. So in terms of Brazil's interests, they are multiple in South Atlantic, not only for strengthening cooperation with other member states, increasing the reach of its navy, but also building its better relations with its extradition powers, such as the US. And in China's, the presence has grown as well around Argentina, so. Good. Okay. Yeah, that's fine. Okay, then. Yeah, I guess my question is a little bit of a bit of a bit of a question about the lack of institutional framework, also the interests of Brazil, specifically with each country. And I was thinking more recently about the difference of the statute of the open debates and the US in that whole process. So Brazil, as a member of the office, but also recently, it's inside of this discourse, is sovereignty. How has the country's position in terms of still nourishing the separatists as a part of the policy and being due to its interests and at the same time doing things that might generate the actions because it directly affects the level of militarisation of the army? That's a very nice impression. I think I'll have to get back to that one just because I think it requires more thought than I can just come up with at the moment. So if that's OK, I'll definitely discuss that with you later. This is just something about this energy speed. Yeah. I mean, in terms of the maintenance of peace and the maintenance of the zone of peace, Brazil is the leading player in this process, but it's a zone of peace and cooperation. I think that needs to be remembered that as much as I talk a lot about zones of peace and I use series of zones of peace, that a lot of cooperation is very important, especially when you look at the different agendas of the other states, you know, in the Angola, you know, Angola has all the issues that it faces in terms of protecting its interests in Africa, what with its own oil on Nigeria rising. So in terms of understanding the dichotomy between the different factors of the member states, you need to remember that as much as Brazil is seeking to position itself to position of strength. And I guess it's the worst way. It still is seeking cooperation. And this is where, you know, I spoke at length with Samsung Lee about the increase in presence of Brazilian embassies in Africa, you know, we can credit the PT government, the Brazilian government and the border for the amount of Brazilian embassies that sprang up in West Africa. You know, you think of the CPLP, you think of all sorts of other ways in which Brazil has sought to increase its cooperation with other countries, not only in Africa, but in other parts of the world. So I think as much as Brazil seeks to project itself as a rising power, as part of BRICS, it still is a country that seeks to cooperate. I know, obviously, we have also our own power, so these things are all kind of, you know, the last kind of four years have been different. But traditionally, Brazil is a country that has worked hard to maintain good friendly relations with its neighbors, but also to promote, especially since all the good relations with it. Trudy Matisor, do you think there has been a sense of disengagement? Disengagement, you know, with Africa. I think Brazil has been concerned with other things, often enough, especially in the last 10 years, especially with the Amazon initiatives, it's had a lot of other concerns. But I do argue that there has been a revitalization. I think the fact that the Cape Verde meeting did not occur in 2015 was a blow to, you know, revitalization steps. However, considering the resolution that came out last year and saying, you know, Cape Verde was still very much on the table, that is something to be seen as a positive. And if you look at the new Brazilian defense documents that came out in the last year and a half, the suffocates are still there from the centre as being part of the strategy for Brazil's interests in the South Atlantic. So it is still being talked about, but it's where this peaks of troughs, peaks and troughs, as a purpose, has very much kind of gone like this, like a swing. And I guess that's what's been the challenge, but also the rewarding experience of this PhD research is to see that there have been these oscillations between periods of great interests, not only the part of Brazil, but of other member states to have, you know, be saw in the 1990s, the frequency of meaties every two or three years, you know, the media post-propable period. But then also now, yes, there is this decrease, but when you think of the other initiatives that have come out of Brazil, but also about countries, there have been a lot of things going on. OK, and talk is considering some of the economic 20 plus years, 20 more countries who are in nearly the same level, including Brazil. We have 90 points, 21 points to military new touch during your period. Brazil, again, deeply racist society over half the population who are mostly from Peru, some, I would say, 27 million people in Brazil living in Algae and Orbital, where some 40 or 50 or so months. Then the nation of the Amazon, coming of indigenous people, one bit corruption and nepotism. And I can go on. So what does help any model authority wants to meet that sort of thing, which is far as I'm concerned, it's all a coalition. OK, thank you for your question. I also want to point out that it's not an organization which is a sort of peace, sorry to keep repeating that, but it's it's it's very important to know the difference and also especially with the way in which it functions. You know, it does not have the legal framework or the institutional framework to function by the organization. I shall. I'm just trying to. Excuse me, I think as the as the present, I have the right to prepare my house the way I said when it comes to the idea of Brazil having an authority, well, considering it was an important fact of the establishment of the zone and also the promotion of the ministerial meetings. I think when it comes to looking at the establishment and the progression and the evolution of the zone, Brazil absolutely has a right to speak and it absolutely has a right to be present at the table because without Brazil, there will be two parts and without Brazil's steps towards having ministerial meetings and including the agenda's full cooperation, the naval cooperation for all sorts of other initiatives, you know, the zone of peace cooperation in South Atlantic would not occur. So in terms of, you know, your comments on Brazil's current government or on the other governments as well during this period. Yeah, I think they are very difficult countries to research and I'm sure anybody else who researches West Africa and South America, you know, there are many challenges to be faced. But in terms of the position of Brazil, I think unequivocally Brazil has the right to speak at that table, just as Argentina does, just as any of the other the member states do. It's a zone of peace and cooperation. So in terms of Brazil having this leading role, it does, but it relies on the cooperation with the other member states. I hope that at least gets you. And it's the biggest as well. And it's the biggest, right? So it gives it a profile. So yes, there's one more there. Yes, Jaime. Yeah, my question will be drawn to the zone of peace and when you went through the research and obviously went through the zone of peace theories. Did you find any particular feature that would differentiate the Bacchus with all the zones of peace, the non-war, for example, is there like an authentic feature problem as a Bacchus? So when you can you consider, you know, you've got a zone that functions like a nuclear weapons free zone. None of the member states have nuclear weapons. You know, South Africa, as I said, only became a member once it disbanded the nuclear weapons program. You know, it's a zone that is exclusively made up of non nuclear weapons states. And it's a maritime zone of peace. If you look at the literature that looks, for example, like the Indian Ocean and the Indian Seabed Zone of Peace and the Indian Ocean, you know, you do have nuclear weapons states, you know, India, Pakistan. So the dynamics are very different. So in terms of understanding the way in which does a Bacchus function, because it doesn't have any sort of institutional framework, it doesn't have a budget, it doesn't have so general, it's essentially a declaration which has spawned these material meetings and sorts of other agendas. It is set up to be present in South Atlantic, but also to stand as a different kind of differentiating marker for the promotion of peace and cooperation in the way that that one of the Indian Ocean, for example, does not fit. OK, then, I think unless somebody from online raises a hand or something, it might well be the time and it is in fact the time to thank Mausa properly. And we can do it normally now, which is wonderful. So if you'd all join me, thank you again. Everybody here, thanks to everybody online. And thanks to you as I'm just going to stop recording.