 CHAPTER 1 OF BOOK 2 OF RETRICK Such therefore are the particulars from which it is requisite to exhort and dissuade, to blame and praise, to accuse and defend, and such likewise are the opinions and propositions which are useful in procuring credibility in these. For concerning these, and from these, enthamemes about each genus of orations are peculiarly derived. This however, the rhetorical art is for the sake of judgment, bracket. For the auditors of orations, judge of consultations, and justice is judgment, close bracket. It is necessary that the orator should not only direct his attention to the oration, so as to consider how it may be demonstrative and credible. But he should also show himself to be worthy of belief, and dispose his auditor to become a judge. For it is of great consequence in procuring belief, especially indeed in councils, and afterwards in judgments, that the speaker should appear to be properly qualified, and that he should be well affected towards the auditors. And besides this, if the auditors also are properly disposed, that the speaker therefore should appear to be properly qualified is more useful in councils than in judgments. But for the hearer to be well disposed is more useful in judgments. For the same things do not appear to those that love and hate, nor to those that are irascible, and those that are mild. But either they appear entirely different, or different in magnitude. For to the friend, he concerning whom he forms the judgment, will not appear to have acted unjustly, or will appear to have acted so in a small degree. But to him who hates, the contrary will take place. And to him who desires, and is in good hope of possessing what he desires, if that which is to come is pleasant, it also appears that it will be, and that it will be good. But to him who has no desire, and no expectation of a thing, the contrary will take place. There are three causes, therefore, through which men become worthy of belief. For so many are the things through which we believe, besides demonstrations, and these are prudence, virtue, and benevolence. For men are false in what they say, or in the councils they give, either on account of all these, or on account of some one of these. For either they do not think rightly through imprudence, or they do not speak what appears to be true in consequence of their depravity. Or they are prudent and worthy, but not benevolent. Hence it happens that those do not give the best councils who know how to give them, and these are the only things through which they fail. It is necessary, therefore, that he who appears to possess all these should be considered by his auditors as worthy of belief. And hence, therefore, men may appear to be prudent and worthy, must be derived from the divisions of the virtues. For from the same things through which a man renders himself prudent and worthy, he may also cause another to become so. Concerning benevolence, however, in friendship, we must now speak in discussing what pertains to the passions. But the passions are those things on account of which men being changed differ in their judgments, and to which pleasure and pain are consequent. The passions, therefore, are such as anger, pity, fear, and other things of this kind, and the contraries to these. It is necessary, however, to give a three-fold division to the particulars about each. I say, for instance, about anger, we should consider how men are disposed when they are angry, what the things are at which they are accustomed to be angry, and what the quality is of the things which are the subjects of their anger. For, if we only possess a knowledge of one or two, but not of all these, it will be impossible to excite anger in the auditors, and in a similar manner in the other passions. As therefore, in what has been before said, we have delivered appropriate propositions. We shall likewise do the same in considering the passions, and divide them after the same manner. Chapter 2. Let anger, therefore, be the appetite in man of apparent revenge, in conjunction with pain, in consequence of a seeming neglect, or contempt of himself, or of someone belonging to him. If, therefore, anger is this, it is necessary that he who is angry should always be angry with some particular person, as, for instance, with Cleon, but not with man, and that he is angry because Cleon has done, or intended to do something to himself, or to someone belonging to him. It is also necessary that a certain pleasure arising from the hope of revenge should be consequent to all anger, for it is pleasant for a man to fancy that he shall obtain the object of his desire. But no one aspires after those things which appear to him to be impossible. He who is angry, however, aspires after things which it is possible for him to obtain. Hence it is well said by Achilles concerning anger that, quote, Anger increases in the mortal breast, sweeter than trickling honey to the taste. Close quote. For a certain pleasure is consequent to anger both on this account and because the thoughts of those who are angry are entirely employed on revenge. The fantasy, therefore, or imagination, which is then engenerated in the soul, produces pleasure in the same manner as the imagination which is engenerated in dreams. Since, however, neglect is the energy of opinion about that which appears to deserve no regard. Bracket, for we conceive that both good and evil, and what contributes to these, are worthy of attention, but such things as are nothing, or very trifling, we conceive to be of no worth whatever. Close bracket. Hence, there are three species of neglect, viz, contempt, insolence, and contumally, for that which men despise, they neglect, since they despise that which they conceive to be of no worth, and those things which are of no worth, they neglect. He also who insults another person appears to despise him. For insult is an impediment to the will of another person. Not that he who offers the insult may derive a certain advantage himself, but that he may prevent the person insulted from deriving it. Since, therefore, he does not expect to derive any advantage himself, he neglects the other person, for it is evident that he does not apprehend any injury will accrue to himself from the insult, since if he did, he would be afraid and would not neglect the person he insults, nor any advantage to the person insulted, which deserves to be mentioned, for if he did, he would be anxious to make him his friend. He also who acts contumally towards another neglects him, for contumally is to injure and pain another person in those things in which shame befalls the sufferer, and this not that anything else may be done to him than what is done, but that he may receive pleasure from the act. For those who return an injury do not act contumally, but take revenge. The cause, however, of pleasure to those that culminate is this, that they fancy they excel in a greater degree by acting ill, hence young men and those that are rich are contumelious, for they fancy that they thus acquire a superiority to others. But ignomini pertains to contumally, and he who disgraces another neglects him, for that which is of no worth has no honor either of evil or good. Hence Achilles, when angry says, quote, the affront my honor stains, while he my valour's girdon thus detains, close quote, and quote, disgraced, dishonored, like the vilest slave, close quote. As being enraged on account of these things, men also think it fit that they should be greatly honored by those who are inferior to them in birth, in power, in virtue, and in short, in that in which they very much excel another person. As for instance, the rich man excels the poor man in money, the rhetorician excels in speaking, him who is unable to speak, the governor, him who is governed, and he who fancies himself worthy to command, him who deserves to be commanded. Hence it is said, quote, great is the wrath of jove descended kings, close quote, and quote, for though we deem the short-lived fury past, tis sure the mighty will revenge at last, close quote. For men are indignant on account of their transcendency, men likewise think that they ought to be greatly honored by those by whom anyone should think they ought to be benefited, but these are such as they have benefited, or do benefit, either they themselves, or someone belonging to them, or such as they do wish, or have wished to benefit. It is now therefore manifest from these things how men are disposed, when they are angry, and with whom, and from what causes they are angry, for they are angry indeed when they are aggrieved. For he who is aggrieved desires something, whether he is aggrieved by any opposition directly made against him, as when a man is prevented from drinking that is thirsty, or if an opposition is not directly made against him, yet it appears to be made indirectly, or if anyone acts contrary to him, or does not cooperate with him, or if anything else disturbs him, thus disposed from all these circumstances he is angry. Hence, the sick, the poor, those that are in love, those that are thirsty, and in short those that desire anything, and do not act rightly, are disposed to be angry, and are easily provoked, and especially with those that neglect their present condition. Thus for instance, the sick are angry with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their disease, the poor with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their poverty, warriors with those that neglect them in warlike affairs, and lovers with those that neglect them in amatory concerns, and in a similar manner in other things. For each is prepared to exercise his anger against those that neglect them, by the inherent passion. Further still, men are likewise disposed to be angry when things happen contrary to their expectation, for that which is very much contrary to opinion is more grievous, just as what is very much contrary to opinion produces delight, if that which is wished for is accomplished. Hence also, seasons and times, and dispositions and ages render it apparent what kind of persons are easily disposed to anger, and when and where, and that when they are most in these circumstances they are most easily excited to anger. Men likewise are angry with those that laugh at, deride, and mock them, for by so acting they insult them. They are also angry with those that offend them in such things as are indications of contumely. But it is necessary that these should be things of such a kind, as are not directed to any other end, and are of no advantage to those that do them, for they appear to be done solely through contumely. Men also are angry with those that defame and despise things to which they are most devoted. Thus for instance, those that are ambitious of excelling in philosophy are angry with those who speak contemptuously of philosophy. Those who pay great attention to the form and beauty of the body are angry with those that despise it, and in a similar manner in other things. This also is much more the case if they suspect that they either do not at all possess these things, or do not firmly possess them, or do not appear to do so. But when they fancy they very much excel in those things for which they are reviled, they pay no attention to the scoffs of others. Men are likewise angry with their friends, more than with those that are not their friends, for they think it is more proper that they should be benefited by them than not. They are also angry with those who have been accustomed to honour, or pay attention to them, if they no longer associate with them as formerly, for they fancy that by so acting they are despised by them. They are likewise angry with those that do not return the kindness which they have received, nor make an equal recompense, and also with those who act contrary to them, if they are their inferiors, for all such things appear to be attended with contempt, the one indeed as of inferiors, but the other as by inferiors. They are also angry in a greater degree if they are despised by men of no account, for anger was supposed by us to arise from undeserved neglect or contempt, but it is fit that inferiors should not despise their superiors. Men likewise are angry with their friends if they do not speak or act well, and still more so if they do the contraries of these. Also, if they are not sensible of their wants, as was the case with the Plexipus of Antipho when he was angry with Milly-Ager, for it is a sign of neglect not to be sensible of the wants of a friend, since those things are not concealed from us to which we pay attention. They are likewise angry with those that rejoice in their misfortunes, and in short with those who are not at all concerned when they are in adversity. For this is an indication either of hostility or neglect. Also, with those who pay no attention to them when they are aggrieved, on which account they are angry with those who are the messengers of evil, and likewise with those who willingly hear or see their maladies. For in this case such persons resemble either those who neglect them or their enemies. For friends condole with their friends in their afflictions, and all men grieve on surveying their own maladies. They are likewise angry with five kinds of persons by whom they are neglected, with those with whom they stand in competition for honor, with those they admire, with those by whom they wish to be admired, with those whom they reverence, and with those by whom they are reverenced. For if they are neglected by any of these, they are in a greater degree angry. They are also angry with those who despise them by injuring their parents, children, wives, and such as are in subjection to them, and whom it would be disgraceful in them not to assist. Likewise with those that are ungrateful, for neglect or contempt from these is unbecoming. They are also angry with such as employ irony and dissimulation towards those who are seriously employed, for irony pertains to contempt. Likewise with those that benefit others, but not themselves. For this also indicates contempt, not to think a man deserving of that which all other persons are thought to deserve. Forgetfulness also is productive of anger, as for instance of names, though it is but a trifling thing. For forgetfulness seems to be an indication of neglect, since oblivion is produced from negligence, and negligence is inattention. And thus we have shown who the persons are by whom anger is excited, how they are disposed, and from what causes others are angry with them. It is likewise evident that an orator ought to frame his auditors to such a temper as they are in when they are angry, and show that the opponents are guilty of those things which excite anger, and that they are such persons as men are accustomed to be angry with. Chapter 3 Since, however, the being angry is contrary to the being placable, and anger is contrary to placability, the disposition of those that are placable must be considered, who those persons are to whom they conduct themselves with placability, and through what causes they become so. Let placability then be our omission and suppression of anger. If, therefore, men are angry with those that neglect them, but neglect is a voluntary thing, it is evident that they will be placable to those who do none of these things, or do them unwillingly, or appear not to have done them voluntarily. They will, likewise, be placable to those who wish to have done the contrary to what they have done, and also to those who are such towards themselves as they are towards others, for no one appears to neglect himself, likewise to those who acknowledge their faults and repent of them, for, considering the pain which they feel as a punishment for what they have done, they cease to be angry. But this is evident from what takes place in punishing servants, for we punish in a greater degree such of them as deny the fault, and contradict us, but we cease to be angry with such of them as acknowledge they are punished justly. The cause, however, of this is that it is impudence to deny what is manifest, and impudence is neglect and contempt. We feel no shame, therefore, towards those whom we very much despise. Men are placable, likewise, to those who humble themselves towards them, and do not contradict them, for thus they appear to acknowledge that they are inferior to them, but those that are inferior are afraid, and no one who is afraid is negligent, but that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves is evident from dogs who do not bite those that prostrate themselves. Men also are placable to those that act seriously when they are acting seriously themselves, for thus they appear to be thought by them worthy of attention, and not to be despised. Likewise to those who, if they have injured them in any respect, are afterwards more grateful to them, also to those that beg and entreat, for such persons are more humble. And to those that are neither contumilius nor scoffers nor neglectful either of any person, or at least not of the worthy, or of such as they themselves are. And in short, men become placable from causes contrary to those which excite to anger. They are likewise placable to those whom they fear and reverence, for so long as they are thus disposed towards them, they are not angry with them, for it is impossible at one and the same time to be angry with and afraid of a man. With those also who have done anything through anger, they are either not angry or they are angry in a less degree, for such persons do not appear to have acted from neglect, since no one who is angry is neglectful. For neglect is unattended with pain, but anger is accompanied with pain. They are likewise placable to those that revere them, because reverence is contrary to contempt. It is also evident that men are placable when they are in a disposition contrary to anger, as when they are in sport, when they are laughing, when they are at a festival, when they are successful, when they perform any business happily, when they are full. And in short, when they are without pain, experience a pleasure unattended with indolence, and are in good hope. They are likewise placable to those by whom they have not been molested for a long time, and through whom they have not been excited to recent anger, for time appeases anger. Vengeance also, formerly inflicted on another person, has the power of appeasing a greater anger conceived against someone. Hence, philocrities answered well when a certain person said, the people being enraged, why do you not defend yourself? He replied, not yet. But when will you? When I see another person condemned, for men become placable when they have consumed their anger upon another person, as it happened to Ergophilus, whom the people absolved, though they were more enraged against him than against Callisthenes, whom the day before they had condemned to death. Men also are placable towards those whom they have convicted, and likewise when they see those that are angry suffering a greater evil from their anger than the occasion to others, for they conceive that such a one is punished for his anger. Also, if they think that they themselves have acted unjustly and suffered justly, for anger is not excited against that which is just, since in this case they do not any longer fancy that they suffer undeservedly. But anger was said by us to be this, viz, to arise from a conception of unmerited contempt. Hence, it is necessary that offenders should first be punished by words, for slaves also, when thus punished, are less indignant. Those likewise are placable, who conceive that persons on whom they inflict punishment will not perceive that they are punished by them. For anger is excited against individuals, as is evident from its definition. Hence, Ulysses, in his speech to Polyphemus, rightly calls himself Ulysses the subverter of cities, as if he could not have avenged the injuries of Polyphemus, unless he made him sensible, who it was that inflicted the vengeance, and for what it was inflicted. It follows therefore that we are not angry with those that are not sensible, nor any longer with those that are dead, because we fancy they have suffered the extremity of evils, and will not be pained by, or sensible of a revenge, which is the object of desire of those that are angry. Hence, it is well said, by the poet respecting Hector, who wished that the anger of Achilles towards him might cease when he was dead, quote, on the deaf earth his rage was spent in vain, close quote. It is evident therefore that those who wish to render others placable must derive their arguments from these places, for those whose anger is to be appeased must be rendered such persons as we have described. But those persons with whom others are angry must be shown by the orator to be such as are to be feared, or that they are worthy of reverence, or that they have deserved well of them, or that they injured them unwillingly, or that they are very much grieved for what they have done. Chapter 4 Let us now show who those persons are that are the objects of love and hatred, and why they are so, defining for this purpose what friendship is, and friendly love. Let therefore friendly love be defined to be the wish that such things, as are conceived to be good, may fall to the lot of someone for his own sake, and not for the sake of him who forms the wish, and also the endeavor of him who forms the wish to procure such goods to the utmost of his power. But he is a friend who loves and is reciprocally beloved, and those persons conceive themselves to be friends who think they are thus disposed towards each other. These things therefore, being supposed, it is necessary that a friend should be one who reciprocally rejoices in the good which befalls another person, and is naturally pained when that person is aggrieved, and this not on account of anything else, but on account of the person himself, for all men rejoice when they obtain the object of their wishes, but are aggrieved if the contrary takes place, so that pains and pleasures are an indication of good and bad wishes. Those likewise are friends to each other to whom the same things are good and evil, and also those who are friends and enemies to the same persons and things, for these must necessarily wish the same things, so that he who wishes the same things to another as to himself appears to be a friend to that person. Men also love those that have either benefited them, or those that are under their care, or if their kindness to them has been great, or has been cheerfully exerted, or seasonably, and for their own sake, and also such as they think are willing to benefit others. They likewise love the friends of their friends, and those that love the same person that they love, and who are beloved by those who are beloved by them, who are likewise enemies to those to whom they are enemies, and who hate those whom they hate, and are hated by those who are hated by them. For the same thing appears to be good to all these and to themselves, so that they wish the same good to them as to themselves, which was the definition of a friend. Further still, men love those who are beneficent to them in pecuniary affairs, and in those things which regard their safety. Hence, they honour liberal, brave, and just men, and they consider those to be such who do not live on the property of others. But men of this description are those that live by their own labour, and among these are those that live by agriculture, and of others, especially manual artificers. They also love those that are temperate, because they are not unjust, and for the same reason they love those that lead a quiet life, unmolested by business. We likewise love those to whom we wish to be friends, if they appear to wish to be our friends. But men of this description are such as are good according to virtue and are celebrated, either by all men or by the best of men, or by those who are admired by us, or by those who admire us. Further still, men love those who are agreeable companions, and with whom they can pass the day pleasantly. But men of this description are such as are ingenuous, who do not reprove the faults of others, and are not studious of contention nor morose, for all such persons are pugnacious, and those that are pugnacious appear to wish things contrary to the wishes of friends. They likewise love those that have elegant manners, and who can give and take a jest, for in both these men strive to be facetious, as well those that are able to bear railery, as those that are able to rail elegantly themselves. They also love those who praise the good things which they enjoy, and especially such among these as they are fearful, should not be present to themselves. Likewise, those who are neat in their appearance, in their dress, and in everything pertaining to the whole of their life, and those who neither reprobate the faults committed by others, nor benefits conferred on them. For both are attended with defamation. They likewise love those that neither remember injuries, nor are observers of the faults of others, but are easily reconciled. For such as they think they are towards others, they also think they will be towards themselves. They likewise love those that are not addicted to slander, and who know no evil, but only good, either of their neighbors or them, for a good man acts in this manner. Also, those that do not resist them when they are angry or seriously employed, for such like persons are pugnacious. Likewise, those that are seriously disposed towards them, as for instance, such as admire them, consider them to be worthy, are delighted with them, and are especially thus affected in things in which they themselves particularly wish to be admired, or to appear to be worthy, or pleasant persons. Men also love those that resemble themselves, and are engaged in the same pursuits, provided they are no impediment to them, and their subsistence is not derived from the same profession. For thus, what Hesiod says will take place, viz that the potter envies the potter. They likewise love those who desire things of which it is, at the same time possible for them to be partakers. For if not, the same thing which we have just noticed will thus happen. They also love those towards whom they are so disposed, as not to be ashamed of things which are base only according to opinion, and towards whom they are ashamed of things which are in reality base. And likewise, those by whom they are ambitious to be honored, or by whom they wish to be emulated, and not to be envied. For these they either love or wish to be their friends. They likewise love those with whom they cooperate in the acquisition of some good, lest greater evil should hear after befall themselves. And also those who similarly love their friends when absent and present, on which account all men love those who are thus disposed towards the dead. And in short, they love those who very much love their friends, and do not forsake them. For among the number of good men, they especially love those who are good in what relates to friendship. They likewise love those who do not act with dissimulation towards them. But men of this description are such as are not ashamed to speak of their own defects. For we have already observed that towards friends, we should be ashamed of things which relate to opinion, i.e., which are base in opinion only, and not in reality. If, therefore, he who is ashamed has not friendly love, he who is not ashamed will resemble one who has friendly love. Men likewise love those who are not the objects of fear, and in whom they can confide, for no one loves him of whom he is afraid. But the species of friendship are fellowship, familiarity, alliance, and things of the like kind. Beneficence also exerted towards another person is productive of friendship, as also are acting beneficently when it is not required, and not divulging favours when they are bestowed. For thus, beneficence will appear to have been exerted for the sake of the friend, and not on any other account. Chapter 5 With respect to enmity, however, and hatred, it is evident that they must necessarily be surveyed from contraries. But the things which produce enmity are anger, injury either in word or deed, and calumny. Anger, therefore, arises from what pertains to ourselves. But enmity may exist independent of what has reference to ourselves. For, if we conceive a man to be a person of a certain description, we hate him. And anger, indeed, is always exerted towards particular persons, as, for instance, towards callous or socrates. But hatred is also exerted towards genera themselves, for every man hates a thief and a sycophant. And anger, indeed, may be cured by time. But hatred is incurable. The former also desires to give pain, but the latter is more desirous to do harm. For, he who is angry wishes that he with whom he is angry may be sensible of pain. But, with him who hates, this is of no consequence. All painful things, however, are objects of sensation. But those things which are especially evils, vis, injustice, and folly, are, in the smallest degree, objects of sensation. For the presence of vice is attended with no pain. And anger, indeed, is accompanied with pain. But hatred is not. For he who is angry is pained. But he who hates, feels no pain. And the angry man, indeed, pities the subject of his anger, if many evils befall him. But he who hates, feels no commissuration for the object of his hatred. For, the former wishes that he with whom he is angry may reciprocally suffer what he feels. But the latter wishes that the object of his hatred may no longer exist. From these things, therefore, it is evident that it is possible for an orator to show who those are that are really enemies and friends, and to make those to be such who are not so. He may also dissolve the arguments by which his opponents endeavor to show that some persons are mutually friends or enemies, and that when it is dubious whether a thing was done from anger or from enmity, he may persuade the adoption of that part which someone may have deliberately chosen. Chapter 6. What kind of things are the objects of fear, and how those that are terrified are affected will be evident from what follows? Let fear, therefore, be a certain pain or perturbation arising from the imagination of some future evil, which is either of a destructive nature or attended with molestation. For, not all evils are the objects of fear. Such, for instance, as injustice or slowness, but such as are capable of producing great molestation or destruction, and these, when they are not remote, but seem to be near, so as to be imminent. For, things which are very remote are not the objects of fear, since all men know that they shall die. Yet, because death is not near, they pay no attention to it. If, however, fear is this, it is necessary that such things should be terrible as appear to possess a great power of destroying, or are productive of such harm as is attended with great molestation. Hence also, the indications of things of this kind are terrible, for the object of fear seems to be near. For danger is this, viz, the approximation of that which is terrible. Things of this kind, however, are the enmity and anger of those who are able to affect something, for it is evident that they are both willing and able, so that they are near to acting what their enmity and anger may suggest. Injustice also, when it possesses power, is the object of fear. For the unjust man is unjust from deliberate choice. Virtue likewise, when insulted, in possessing power, is to be feared. For it is evident that vengeance, when it is insulted, is always the object of its deliberate choice, but now it possesses power. The fear also of those who are able to affect something is the object of terror, for such a one must necessarily be in preparation for that which he dreads. Since, however, the multitude are depraved, are vanquished by gain, and are timid in dangers, to be in the power of another person is a thing for the most part to be feared. Hence, those who have been eyewitnesses of any dreadful deed that has been perpetrated are to be feared, lest they should divulge it, or desert him by whom it was committed. Those likewise who are able to do an injury are always to be feared by those who are capable of being injured. For men, for the most part, act unjustly when they are able. Those also are to be feared, who either have suffered an injury, or think that they have, for they always watch for an opportunity of retaliating. Those two are to be dreaded, who would do an injury if they had the power, for they are afraid of retaliation, and it was supposed that a thing of this kind is the object of dread. Those likewise are to be feared, who are competitors for the same things, and which both cannot at one and the same time possess. For, between men of this description, there is always hostility. Those also who are objects of dread to more powerful men are to be feared by us, for they are more able to injure us than they are to injure the more powerful. For the same reason, those persons are to be feared, who are dreaded by men more powerful than themselves, and also those who have destroyed men superior to themselves in power, and those who have attacked men inferior to themselves, for either they are now to be dreaded, or when their power is increased. Among those that have been injured likewise, and among enemies and opponents, such as are to be dreaded, are not those that are hasty and caloric, and who speak their mind freely, but those that are mild, who dissemble and are crafty. For, what they are machinating is obscure, or nearly so, and hence their designs are never manifest because they are remote from observation. With respect however to everything that is dreadful, such things are more to be feared, the errors pertaining to which cannot be corrected, but it is either wholly impossible to correct them, or they cannot be corrected by those that have committed them, but by their adversaries. Those things also are to be feared for which there is no help, or in which assistance cannot easily be obtained, and in short, those things are to be feared, which, when they do, or shall happen to others, are lamentable in their consequences. With respect to things which are to be feared, and which are dreaded by men, these, as I may say, are nearly the greatest. Let us now show the manner in which men are affected when they are afraid. If, therefore, fear is attended with the expectation of suffering some destructive evil, it is evident that no one is afraid who thinks that he shall not suffer any evil, and that no one dreads those things which he does not think he shall suffer, or those persons through whom he does not imagine he shall suffer, nor, then, when he does not suspect any evil to be imminent. Hence, it is necessary that those persons should be afraid who imagine they shall suffer some evil, and from such persons, and in such things, and at such a time. Neither, however, those who are in very prosperous circumstances, and appear to be so to themselves, imagine they shall suffer any evil. Bracket, on which account such men are insolent, neglectful, and audacious, and riches, strength, a multitude of friends, and power produce such men, close bracket, nor those who think that they have now suffered dreadfully, and whose hopes with respect to futurity are extinct, as is the case with those who are led to capital punishment. But it is necessary, where there is fear, that there should be some hope of safety, and of escaping the evils, which occasion their anxiety, of which this is an indication that fear makes men disposed to receive counsel, though no one consults about things that are hopeless. Hence, when it is necessary that the orator should excite fear in his auditors, he must show them that they are such persons as may suffer many evils, because others greater than them have suffered them. He must also show that men similar to themselves suffer or have suffered many evils, from those through whom they did not expect to suffer, and that they have suffered these evils, and then when they did not imagine they should. Chapter 7 Since, however, with respect to fear, it is evident what it is, and it is also evident what the objects of terror are, and how men are affected when they are afraid. It is likewise manifest from these things what confidence is, what the kind of things are in which men confide, and how confident men are disposed. For confidence is contrary to fear, and that which is the object of confidence to that which is the object of dread. Hence, confidence is a hope attended with imagination, that those things which may be salutary to us are near at hand, but that those things which are the objects of our dread either do not exist or are remote. But the things which are effective of confidence are events of a dreadful nature if they are remote, and such as may be confided in if they are near. Evils also which are imminent if they may be corrected produce confidence, and this is likewise the case when many or great auxiliaries or both these against evils are present. Confidence also is produced when there are neither any persons who have been injured by us nor who have injured us, and when either, in short, we have no antagonists or they have no power, or if they have power they are our friends, or have received benefits from, or have conferred benefits on us. Confidence likewise is produced when those to whom the same things are advantageous as are beneficial to us are many, or superior to us, or both these. Those however that are confident in dangers are such as think they can accomplish with rectitude many things without suffering any evil, or who if they frequently fall into great dangers escape from them, for men become void of perturbation in dangers in a twofold respect, either because they have not experienced them before, or because they have auxiliaries through which they may escape from them. For thus in dangers at sea, those who are unexperienced in its storms are confident they shall escape them, and also those who have assistance in themselves from their experience. Confidence likewise is produced when there is nothing to be feared from either our equals or inferiors, and those to whom we imagine ourselves to be superior, but we imagine ourselves to be superior to those whom we have either themselves vanquished, or those that are superior to or resemble them. Men also are confident if they think those things are present with them in a greater number, and in a greater degree, for which those who excel others are the objects of dread, and these are an abundance of riches, strength of body, of friends, of country, of warlike apparatus, and either of all, or of the greatest of these. They are likewise confident if they have injured, either no one, or not many, or not such as are the objects of fear, and in short, if they are well disposed with reference to what pertains to the gods, both as to other things, and to what is indicated by signs and oracles. For anger is attended with confidence, and not to injure, but to be injured is effective of anger, but divinity is conceived to give assistance to those that are injured. Men also are confident when either having first attacked others, they neither do nor are likely to suffer any evil, or think that in so doing they have acted rightly, and thus much concerning things which are the objects of fear and confidence. Chapter 8. What kinds of things, however, those are which are the objects of shame, and also those for which men are not ashamed, and towards what persons they are ashamed, and how they are disposed when under the influence of this passion will be evident from what follows. But let shame be a certain pain and perturbation with respect to evils, either present or past or future, which apparently lead to infamy. And, let want of shame or impudence be a certain contempt and impassivity with respect to these very same things. If, therefore, shame is that which we have defined it to be, a man must necessarily be ashamed of evils of such a kind as appear to him to be base, or to those whom he regards. But things of this kind are such deeds as proceed from vice. Such, for instance, as for a soldier to throw away his shield in battle or fly, for this proceeds from timidity. It is likewise base to deny a deposit, for this is the effect of injustice, and also to lie with women with whom it is not lawful to lie, or where it is not proper, or when it is not proper, for this proceeds from intemperance. It is likewise base to seek after gain from minute or disgraceful or impossible things, as from the poor or the dead, whence also the proverb to take away from the dead, for this proceeds from a desire of base gain, and from illiberality. It is also base for a man not to assist others with money when he is able, or to assist in a less degree than he is able. Likewise, for a man to receive pecuniary assistance from one less rich than himself, is base, and for him to take up money at interest, and yet seem to beg, to beg, and yet seem to demand, to demand, and yet seem to beg, to praise a thing, so as that he may appear to beg it, and the repulsed to persist no less in begging it, for all these are indications of illiberality. It is likewise base to praise a man to his face, for this is a sign of flattery, also to praise above measure what is good, but extenuate what is evil, to condole immoderately with one who is afflicted, and everything else of a similar kind. For these are indications of flattery. It is also base not to endure labours which more elderly, or delicate men, or those that have greater authority, or in short, those that are more imbecile endure, for all these are indications of effeminacy. To be benefited likewise by another, and that frequently is base, and also to reprobate the benefits conferred on another, for all these are indications of pusillanimity and an abject mind. It is also base for a man to speak of himself, and to promise great things of himself, and likewise to attribute to himself the deeds of others, for this is a sign of arrogance. In a similar manner, in each of the other ethical vices, works and indications, the like may be found, for they are base and shameful. In addition to these things also, it is shameful not to participate of those beautiful things of which all men, or all those that resemble each other, or most men participate. But by men that resemble each other I mean those of the same nation, city, and age, and who are allied to each other, and in short, those that are of an equal condition, for it is now base not to partake of these things, as for instance, of such a portion of erudition, and of other things in a similar manner. But all these are more shameful when they are seen to happen to anyone from himself, for thus they proceed in a greater degree from vice, when a man is the cause to himself of past, present, or future evils. Men likewise are ashamed of such things as lead to infamy, and disgrace, if they suffer, or have suffered, or are to suffer them. And these are such things as pertain to the ministering services, either of the body, or of base works, among the numbers of which is having the body abused. Things also are shameful, which pertain to intemperance, whether voluntary or involuntary. But things which pertain to violence are involuntary, for the endurance of such things unattended with revenge proceeds from sloth and timidity. These therefore, and the like, are the things of which men are ashamed. Since, however, shame is an imagination, with respect to ignominy and shame, on account of ignominy itself, and not on account of the evils which attend it. But no one pays any attention to opinion, except on account of those who form the opinion. Men must necessarily feel shame in the presence of those whom they regard when they have acted wrong. But they regard those who admire them, and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, and with whom they contend for honors, and whose opinion they do not despise. They wish, therefore, to be admired by, and they admire those who are in possession of some good which is honorable, or from whom they very much wish to obtain something, which it is in their power to give them. As, for instance, is the case with lovers. Men, however, contend for honors with those that resemble themselves. But they pay attention to prudent men, as to persons of veracity, and men of this kind are such as are more elderly, and the erudite. Men also are ashamed of what is before their eyes, and is done openly, whence the proverb, the shame is in the eyes. On this account, they are more ashamed before those that are always present with them, and who pay attention to them, because both these are before their eyes. They are likewise ashamed before those who are not obnoxious to the same crimes as themselves. For it is evident that the opinion of the latter are contrary to those of the former. Before those also they are ashamed, who are not disposed to pardon such as appear to act wrong. For that which a man does himself, he is said not to be indignant with in his neighbors, so that it is evident he will be indignant with crimes which he does not commit himself. They are likewise ashamed before those who divulge to many persons anything they have done amiss, for there is no difference between the not appearing to have done wrong, and the not divulging it. But those divulge the faults of others who have been injured by them, because they observe their conduct, and also those who are given to defamation. Bracket, for if they defame those who have not acted wrong, much more will they defame those that have. Close bracket. Those also divulge what they see or hear, who are attentive to the faults of others, such as those that deride, and comic poets, for in a certain respect they are given to defamation, and are babblers. Men likewise are ashamed before those by whom they have never been repulsed, but have obtained what they wished, for they are disposed towards them, as towards persons whom they admire. Hence also, they feel shame before those who have for the first time asked anything of them, as not having yet done anything by which they might lose their good opinion. Of this kind likewise, are such as recently wished to be friends, for they have perceived qualities of the most excellent nature in us. Hence the answer of Euripides to the Syracutions was well, when they desired his friendship. Among those likewise, who were formerly known to us, we feel shame before such of them as are not conscious of any crime we may have committed. Men also are not only ashamed of disgraceful things, but of the indications of such things. Thus for instance, they are not only ashamed of the act of venery, but likewise of the indications of it, and not only when they do base things, but when they speak of them. In a similar manner also, they are not only ashamed before the above mentioned persons, but before those who may divulge their actions to them, such as the servants and friends of these. In short, men are not ashamed before those whose opinion with respect to veracity is despised by many persons, for no one is ashamed before children and brutes. Nor are men ashamed of the same things before persons that they know, and those who are unknown to them, but before those whom they know they are ashamed of such things as are base in reality, and before those that are unknown of such things as are legally base. Men likewise, when they are ashamed, are affected in the following manner. In the first place, when they are present with persons of such a description, as we have shown, those to be before whom they are ashamed. But these were such, as are either admired by them, or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they are in want of something advantageous, which they will not obtain if they are without renown. Men also are ashamed when they are seen by such persons as these. As Sidious, the orator said respecting the division of the lands in Samos, for he desired the Athenians to suppose that they were surrounded by the Greeks in a circle, not only as hearers, but as spectators of their decrees. And they are likewise ashamed if such persons are near them, or are likely to be spectators of their actions. Hence, those that are unfortunate are unwilling to be seen by those that emulate them, for emulators are admirers. Men also are ashamed when they have anything which disgraces the actions and affairs either of themselves or their ancestors, or of certain other persons with whom they have any alliance, and in short, they are ashamed before those of whom they are themselves ashamed. But these are such persons, as the above mentioned, and those who are referred to them, of whom they have been the preceptors or counselors. They are likewise ashamed if there are other persons resembling themselves with whom they contend for honorary distinctions, for from shame they both do and admit to do things on account of men of this description. Men also feel more ashamed when they are about to be seen, and converse openly with those who are conscious of their actions. Hence, Antipho the poet, when he was led to punishment, by the command of Dionysius, on seeing those who were to be executed with him, having their faces covered as they passed through the gates of the prison, said, why do you cover your faces? Will any one of these see you tomorrow? And thus much concerning shame. But with respect to imprudence, it is evident that we shall abound with what is to be said about it from contraries. Chapter 9 Those, however, to whom men are grateful, and in what they are grateful, or how they are affected when they are so, will be evident when we have to find what a favor or kindness is. Let a favor, therefore, be that according to which he who possesses a thing is said to confer a favor on him who is in want of it. Not that he may receive anything from him, nor that any advantage may accrue to the giver, but that he who is in want may be benefited. But a favor is great when it is conferred, either on one who is very much in want of it, or the favor itself consists of things which are great and difficult to obtain, or is bestowed opportunely, or when he who bestows it is the only one, or the first that bestows it, or who especially bestows it. Wants, however, are appetites, or desires, and of these particularly, such as are accompanied with pain when the desired object is not obtained. But of this kind are such desires as love, and also those which take place in the maladies of the body, and in dangers, for he who is in danger desires, and likewise, he who is in pain. Hence, those who relieve men that are in poverty or in exile, though the relief be but small, yet on account of the magnitude of the want, and the seasonableness of the relief, they confer a favor, as was the case with him who gave a mat to a poor exile in the lyceum. It is necessary, therefore, that he who confers a favor must especially confer it in the above mentioned circumstances, but if not in these, in such as are equal or greater. Hence, since it is evident when, and in what things a favor is to be conferred, and how those are affected that bestow a favor, it is likewise manifest that from hence, arguments must be derived for the purpose of showing that others are, or have been, in such like pain and want, and that those who relieved them in such want relieve them by supplying what was mentioned. It is likewise manifest whence it may be shown that a favor has not been conferred, and that no gratitude is due, either by evincing that it is, or has been conferred, for the sake of those that bestowed it. And that is not a favor, or it may be shown that it was conferred casually, or by compulsion, or that a kindness was returned, but not conferred, whether knowingly or not, for in both ways one thing is given for another, so that neither in this way will it be a favor. What we have said likewise must be considered in all the categories, for it is a favor, either because this particular thing is given, or so much, or a thing of such equality, or at such a time, or in such a place, but the signs that a favor has not been conferred are if less has been done than at another time, and if the same, or equal, or greater things have been conferred on enemies, for it is evident in this case that these things have not been bestowed for our sakes, or if things of a vile nature have been bestowed knowingly, for no one will acknowledge that he is in want of vile things, and thus much concerning conferring, and not conferring a favor. End of Chapter 9 of Book 1, Recording in Memory of Mitchell Edwards