 Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council. Based on our regular economic and monetary analysis, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, we confirm that we will continue to make purchases under the asset purchase program at the current monthly pace of 80 billion euros until the end of this month. And that, from April 2017, our net asset purchases are intended to continue at a monthly pace of 60 billion euros until the end of December 2017, or beyond if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. The net purchases will be made alongside reinvestments of the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP. Our monetary measures and monetary policy measures have continued to preserve the very favorable financing conditions that are necessary to secure a sustained convergence of inflation rates towards level below but close to 2% over the medium term. They are ongoing pass-through to the borrowing conditions for firms and households, benefits credit creation, and supports the steadily firming recovery of the euro area economy. Sentiment indicators suggest that the cyclical recovery may be gaining momentum. Headline inflation has again increased, largely on account of rising energy and food price inflation. However, underlying inflation pressures continue to remain subdued. The Governing Council will continue to look through changes in HICP inflation if judged to be transient and to have no implication for the medium term outlook for price stability. A very substantial degree of monetary accommodation is still needed for underlying inflation pressures to build up and support headline inflation in the medium term. If the outlook becomes less favorable or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, we stand ready to increase our asset purchase program in terms of size and or duration. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Euro area real GDP increased by 0.4% quarter on quarter in the fourth quarter of 2016, following a similar pace of growth in the third quarter. Incoming data, notably survey results, increase our confidence that the ongoing economic expansion will continue to firm and broaden. The pass-through of our monetary policy measures is supporting domestic demand and facilitates the ongoing deleveraging process. The recovering investment continues to be promoted by very favorable financing conditions and improvements in corporate profitability. Moreover, rising employment, which is also benefiting from past structural reforms, is having a positive impact on households' real disposable income, thereby providing support for private consumption. Also, there are signs of somewhat stronger global recovery and increasing global trade. However, economic growth in the Euro area is expected to be dampened by a sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms and remaining balance sheet adjustment needs in a number of sectors. This assessment is broadly reflected in the March 2017 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the Euro area, which foresee annual real GDP increasing by 1.8% in 2017 by 1.7% in 2018 and by 1.6% in 2019. Compared with the December 2016 Euro system staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for real GDP growth has been revised upwards slightly in 2017 and 2018. The risks around in the Euro-era growth outlook have become less pronounced, but remain tilted to the downside and relate predominantly to global factors. According to EuroSTATS flash estimate, Euro area annual HICP inflation increased further to 2% in February up from 1.8% in January 2017 and 1.1% in December 2016. This reflected mainly a strong increase in annual energy and unprocessed food price inflation, with no signs yet of a convincing upward trend in underlying inflation. Headline inflation is likely to remain at levels close to 2% in the coming months, largely reflecting movements in the annual rate of change of energy prices. Centers of underlying inflation, however, have remained low and are expected to rise only gradually over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the expected continuing economic recovery, and the corresponding gradual absorption of slack. This pattern is also reflected in the March 2017 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the Euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation at 1.7% in 2017, 1.6% in 2018, and 1.7% in 2019. By comparison with the December 2016 Euro system staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for headline HICP inflation has been revised upwards significantly for 2017 and slightly for 2018, while remaining unchanged for 2019. The staff projections are conditional on the full implementation of all our policy measures. According to the monetary analysis, broad money M3 continues to expand at a robust pace with an annual rate of growth of 4.9% in January 2017 after 5% in December 2016. As in previous months, annual growth in M3 was mainly supported by its most liquid components, with a narrow monetary aggregate M1 expanding at an annual rate of 8.4% in January this year after 8.8% in December 2016. Loan dynamics followed the path of gradual recovery observed since the beginning of 2014. The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations was 2.3% in January 2017 as in the previous month. The annual growth rate of loans to households was 2.2% in January 2017 after 2% in December 2016. Although developments in bank credit continue to reflect the lack that relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets, the monetary policy measures put in place since June 2014 are significantly supporting borrowing conditions for firms and households, and thereby credit flows across the Euro area. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need for a continued, very substantial degree of monetary accommodation to secure a sustained return of inflation rates towards levels that are below but close to 2% without undue delay. In order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute much more decisively to strengthening economic growth. The implementation of structural reforms needs to be substantially stepped up to increase resilience, reduce structural unemployment, and boost potential output growth. Against the background of overall limited implementation of country-specific recommendations in 2016, greater reform effort is necessary in all Euro area countries in 2017. Regarding fiscal policies, all countries should intensify efforts towards achieving a more growth-friendly composition of public finances. A full and consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Act and of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure over time and across countries remains crucial to ensure confidence in the EU's governance framework. We are now at your disposal for questions. Mr. President, in January you outlined four criteria to describe the sustained adjustment part of inflation. Could you give us a progress report on how far you feel you are in fulfilling each one of those? And that has also been a debate about introducing a small change to the forward guidance that is removing a clause that says that you are still ready to lower rates if needed. And if I'm not mistaken, this clause is still in place, so could you explain to us why and if there has been a debate on this passage? Thank you. Thank you. Well, let me give you the substance of the discussion we had at this governing council. And in so doing I'll also answer your points. The first, it's actually been built, if one wants to summarize it, it's been built on three blocks. The first one is the acknowledgement of success, namely our monetary policy has been successful. And let me give you just a few numbers of why we say that and how we measure this success. Since 2015, real GDP growth has been steady at between 0.3 and 0.6% quarter on quarter. The economic sentiment index in February this year is the highest since 2011. The PMI composite output index this again February 2017 is the highest since April 2011. The unemployment rate in January was 9.6, it's the lowest since May 2009. Employment wise, well, I said last time that in the last three years 4 million jobs are being created, now in fact it's more than 4 million jobs because there has been a revision in the number of employment figures in Germany of recent, so it's even more than 4 million. And by the way, incidentally, in just giving you these numbers about employment, let me add that those who had doubts about the equity of our asset purchase program are being answered because the most equitable measure of all is to create employment and to decrease unemployment. The recovery broadened further in the last quarter last year across sectors and across countries. An interesting thing, which is continuing, I think I remarked about that last time, is that the dispersion of value added growth across countries reached an all-time low. In other words, countries seem to grow more together, an all-time low since 1997. If we move to inflation, I would say that risks of deflation have largely disappeared. Market-based inflation expectations have increased noticeably. Also those are longer-term horizons, even though they are still below the level that is considered to be adequate for pronouncing victory on the inflation front. The financing conditions and credit demand have continued to improve. Lending rates for households and companies have declined significantly, more by more than our key interest rates. The cross-country heterogeneity, you remember the time when we had fragmentation, we had countries where our lower interest rates were not passed to or through lower lending rates, and now this heterogeneity is materially decreased. For example, loan rates in Italy and Spain have declined more than in Germany and France. The borrowing conditions for SMEs have improved, and the firm's demand for loans has increased considerably, and also very important, the NFC, the non-financial company's leverage, has gone down quite significantly. Finally, let me give you a final estimate of the impact of our monetary policy measures in the three years between 2016 and 2019. The accumulated impact of our policy measures is 1.7% on inflation, additional being created by our policy measures, and 1.7% on growth. So that's basically the assessment that inspired the interventions of the governing council member, namely, acknowledge the success of our policy. The second block was the one that you just heard me saying in the introductory statement, namely, the appropriateness of the present monetary policy stance upon which these projections are based. So based on current information, the monetary policy stance that I've just read in the introductory statement is considered appropriate by the governing council. And the third block was a discussion about risks, about the economic situation, how it has evolved. And again, there was a general recognition that the balance of risk has improved as far, certainly as far as growth is concerned. So following from this, it's quite clear that the assessment of certain scenarios that were considered very likely before is now telling us that these scenarios are going to become less likely. And that had some consequences in our language, namely, there was a sentence which has been removed from my introductory statement that used to say, if warranted to achieve its objective, the governing council will act by using all the instruments available within its mandate. You remember from the previous introductory statement, that's being removed. That's being removed because basically to signal that there is no longer that sense of urgency in taking further actions while maintaining the accommodative monetary policy stance, including the forward guidance. But that urgency that was prompted by the risks of deflation isn't there. That was the judgment, the assessment of the governing council. The second issue on which I would like to draw your attention is that, as you know, the last telltale, the telltale's list is going to expire. And there was no discussion about having another telltale, not at all. I think we had not an intense but just a cursory discussion about whether to remove the word lower from the forward guidance. Now let me also, before I get to that, let me tell you what I said in this press conference in March 2016. I said, from today's perspective and taking into account the support of our measures to growth and inflation, we don't anticipate that it will be necessary to reduce rates further. Of course, new facts can change the situation and the outlook. Since then, we frankly never discussed. So we had an exchange on that. Now I'm saying this because just to emphasize it's not a dramatic choice whether to keep or to remove it, but in the end, the governing council, given the fact that we can't yet say that we are there with a self-sustained inflation rate, prefer to keep this option in the language. So we will continue to look through changes in HICP inflation to the extent that they're transient and without implication for medium-term outlook for price stability. Thank you. Mr. Franke? Thank you very much, Andreas Franke from Reuters in Frankfurt. Two questions if I may, one follow up on the TLTO. You mentioned, you said there was no discussion about the new TLTO. Can you elaborate a little bit more on this because there was so much noise about it before this meeting that there could be a new one. Is this tool now completely off the table or is it just you put it back and see what's going on and perhaps in the next few months it could happen or if you start tapering or exiting from the QE, could be a good option to safeguard liquidity in the future? The first question and the second one a little bit more broader if I may. If you look at the CDS markets the spreads are rising again so that tells me and more and more market participants and analysts that markets start betting again on a potential breakup of the eurozone. How do you want to deal with this situation especially given the fact that we have many, many important political aspects on the way forward this year? Thank you. Thank you. Now on the fact on the first question I only remarked it was not discussed at all as a sign of the improved climate. And so there was no member of the governing council felt the need to even sort of mention this. Having said that we as very much in the spirit of our foreign guidance it's there and it's potentially an instrument could be used if the economic situation will warrant that. In other words there is no ideological or institutional or legal obstacle to that. On the second point frankly I don't see that. I mean there are tensions but not anything that is that serious. In any event I've said it on and on we are ready. The euro is revocable and more than my words it should be we can discuss it further if you want but it should be the commitment first of all it should be the experience we had by the euro incidentally in the last full euro barometer. More than 70% of the people in the euro area are in favor of maintaining the euro. And this percentage is increasing. In the midst of the crisis three countries joined the euro. The euro is being perceived as being the prerequisite of the single market. If there is no single market there is no European Union and countries no matter what the views are have greatly benefited from the single market. So all this speaks in favor of and especially also after the experience of 2012 of looking at these developments with great attention but no anxiety. Mr. Jones. Mr. Draghi you've noted a lot of reasons why to be upbeat and yet my impression is that you're not convinced. So what would we need to see before you'd have this sort of high class problem in which you would be willing to drop the commitment to further easing. Is it a case that we'd need to see a more neutral balance of risks or should we be looking more specifically at the four criteria you've listed for inflation. And my second question there seems to be a lot of speculation out there that you could raise rates before the end of QE which clearly contradicts your opening statement and yet the speculation seems to persist. So would it be possible for you to clarify whether you can see any circumstances under which you would raise rates before ending bomb buying. Thank you. Thank you. No I simply reported on the discussion it's not a matter of being convinced or not. One thing that one has to understand is that this is a gradual process and the governing council members who want to be convinced that they actually see a self sustained adjustment in inflation rate and we don't see it yet. I said it in the introductory statement. There are no convincing signs yet that underlying inflation is in any event and the projections show this. So we see progress on the recovery here. This reflected mainly this higher headline inflation, strong increase in annual energy and unprocessed food price inflation with no signs yet of convincing upward trend in underlying inflation. So that is and so at the same time the projections are conditional on the full implementation of the monetary policy measures that I have just read about. And it's a gradual process. I was saying we have acknowledged the progress on the growth front, on the recovery front and we are pretty confident that as this will proceed this lack will close, the labor market conditions will improve and we'll start seeing that wages growth which is the linchpin of a self sustained growth in increase in inflation. That is the key variable that we should look at. It's not the only one but it's certainly key. And so it's not that one is convinced or unconvinced all of a sudden. We have to, we are progressing towards that objective, we are confident that we are progressing and we see we can actually assess the success of our decisions through the numbers that I've just given you on growth, on employment, on credit markets, on financing, on inflation expectations. Thank you. Now on the other point I don't want to speculate. Now the forward guidance now it's this one and current and based on current information that's what it is. It says that until the governing council the interest rates will, net asset purchase will continue to continue a monthly pace of 60 billion or beyond if necessary and the interest rates, the beginning says based on our regular economic and monetary analysis we decided to keep the key CB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. So it's, I remark here, it's an expectation. We expect them to remain at present or lower levels. Now as I said the expectation, the probability of an expectation that will actually materialize into lower level has gone down given what I just said about the rest, about the progress we've made. But the forward guidance, the governing council has decided to keep this forward guidance exactly as it stood before. Thank you. Mr. Ferless. Thank you. Tom Ferless from the Wall Street Journal. I had a question about the level of agreement within the governing council. Would you say that there's more consensus today going out or continuing with the stimulus than there was a couple of years ago when you were going into the QE program? Because some, you know, some governing council members expressed doubts about whether the current level of stimulus is too strong. My second question is on trade surpluses. The new US administration has expressed concern about surpluses in Germany. There's also a large surplus for the Eurozone as a whole. Do you think there's any merit in such criticism? Do you think Germany's and the Eurozone trade surplus reflect some kind of imbalance that could have a negative effect globally or for the Eurozone? Thanks. Let me respond to the second question first. I don't think there is any merit in attacking Germany. First, let me say that, by the way, I have discussed this, I've answered the same question in the European Parliament, when was that, two, three weeks ago. The currency of Germany is the Euro and the Euro-era's monetary policy is conducted by the ECB. ECB is independent as laid down in the European treaties and it's touch it. The exchange rate of the Euro is determined by market forces, which is consistent with the long-standing commitment of the international community to market-determined exchange rates as rated both the G7 and the G20 forum. In its latest report to Congress released on October 14, 2016, the US Treasury itself stressed that Germany does not manipulate the currency. Treasury, let me give you the quotes, Treasury has found in his report that no economy satisfies the criteria, including Germany, for being called a currency manipulator. Second quote, Germany has both a significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States and a current account surplus well above the material threshold. But the European Central Bank has not intervened in foreign currency since 2011. And when we did it, we did it as part of a concerted intervention to, in order to stabilize the yen following Japan's earthquake and the tsunami. So that is the, I think, the answer to your point. I can continue. I mean, if we look at, by the way, if we look at where the effective exchange rate stands today with respect to historical average, we don't see especially that the euro is off of the historical average, but the effective exchange rate of the dollar is off the historical average. And so it means that it's not the euro, the culprit for this situation. Now on your first question, you're asking me how the consensus changes from time to time and meeting to meeting. I actually don't have a meter to measure that. I would say the discussion today was pretty consensual. Each position was stated by and large. I think I gave you a fair account of what was discussed. New answers might have been different, but I don't think that, and in any event I am not able to compare the degree of consensus today with the degree of consensus last time. But you asked me even more difficult question. You're asking me to remember what the consensus was two or three years ago. That is, the bar is too high for me. Mr. Danes? Thank you. Harry Daniels from Life School News. It's a dual question, really. Firstly, the course from European leaders. How is the ECB handle a multi-speed Europe, as we've heard from Oland and Chancellor Merkel of late? And secondly, just the trade-off between the deposit rates and capital keys, we've seen some distortions specifically in the German market over the last three weeks at the short end. And I just wondered how the ECB would react to that. Well, on the first point, I really don't have much to say. It's an entirely wholly political judgment here. There is clearly the need to work more together, because the nature of the problems that have presented to the European countries are, all of them, I would say, supranational problems. So they can be successfully coped only together. Now, given that the political situations in different countries are different, it may well happen the countries are not equally ready to move together towards working together. And so I guess that's where the reference to multi-speed Europe comes from. The acknowledgement that certain group of countries, either because they perceive that their problems are more closer to their own entity, or because they are more willing to work together, are readyer than others to do this. And so my understanding of this is that whatever arrangement could be found, it's not clear yet which specific area would be addressed by this arrangement. But whatever arrangement could be found is going to be an open arrangement, namely ready to welcome any other country that would like to join. But I don't know enough about the specificities of this statement to elaborate more than that. Perhaps I would know more tonight. On the other point, it's about the distortions in the German market. Yes, we've observed and we are monitoring them quite closely. And we asked ourselves what could be the reasons, the causes for these interest rate movements. We are in a quite preliminary stage of our analysis. So what I'm going to tell today is just very provisional. There are several causes. One is that certainly the German short-term bonds are in more generally all the German bond market is viewed as a safe haven. And so have been flows towards this market and has been what we call flight to quality phenomenon as well. But if we limit our attention to the short-term segment, on top of that we see that the German short-term bonds are equivalent to putting money in the deposit facility. And so the share of those who don't have access to the deposit facility invest into German bonds, short-term bonds. And this share of people has gone up. And that's why we have low yields in the cash bond market on the short term. But not in the repo market because investors are different. And the other cause, of course, is our purchase program. But to assess the relative weight is still too early. I think the second cause, the first two causes seem to be pretty relevant, pretty significant, perhaps more significant than our purchase program. But just perhaps we want to come back on this next time to have a definite view on that. Mr. Akagawa? I'm Shogawa Kagawa, Japanese Nikkei. And I have two questions. One question is about economic outlook. I mean, growth and inflation, both are levered upwards today. What was today's risk assessment about fragile transatlantic relationship or the coming election in the Eurozone? And the second question is again about the currency manipulations discussion. And because the G20 meeting will be held next week in Baden-Baden in Germany, what kind of discussion are you expecting? Are you expecting any changes of G20 commitments or consensus in terms of exchange rate or banking regulations? Thank you. Well, thank you. In our introductory statement, there is a reference to geopolitical risks, of geopolitical risks. But I'm saying this because that's certainly a relevant risk source that we've taken into account in our discussion. If one wants to sort of assess the balance of risk as it has been evolving over, say, the five, six months, we would say that the domestic sources of risk have been more contained. The importance of domestic risk has decreased. And the geopolitical global risk share of importance, if anything, has gone up. That is a fair assessment. Although we've got to be very, very careful about this assessment because our experience over the last year and a half has been that we were expecting some significant economic impact from the various risks that have been materializing. You remember the Brexit, you remember the Italian referendum, you remember the new US administration, now we have the elections in Europe. Now, these risks have, some of them have materialized, but we haven't seen yet a significant economic impact. So we are all asking ourselves when, there are certain risks that are unambiguously negative. We know that certain of these events, and I don't want to point out which one, will produce in the medium term a negative consequence. But so far, we've been sort of almost a year and a half has passed from the British referendum, and we, perhaps I'm not sure I'm right, but about eight months? Nine months, yes, and we haven't seen yet a consequence. So we have to be sort of, we know that these are risky events. We don't know yet how these risky events will reverberate on the economic situation. On the second question, well, I think it's important to reiterate the commitments that were undertaken by our leaders and by our finance ministers. Let me just read the one of the last one, was on July 24th, 2016, by the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in Shandu. We reiterate that excessive volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates can have adverse implications for economic and financial stability. We will consult closely on exchange markets. We reaffirm our previous exchange rate commitments, including that we will refrain from competitive devaluations, and we will not target our exchange rates for competitive purposes. Now a statement like this, or statements to this extent, had been the pillar of the stability that has accompanied world growth in the last 20 years and longer. So it's very important that these commitments of this type are being reaffirmed. Mr Boindemann. Thank you. Mark Boindemann for Dutch newspaper NRC. Anders Blot. Mr Draghi, can I ask, has the governing council today discussed an exit from the QE programme? And in line with that, has the governing council discussed the language in the statement saying we stand ready to increase our asset purchase programme in terms of size and or duration? Thank you. No, no, we haven't discussed either point, but especially, I mean, but by and large, if I can repeat what I said before, the original formulation of the forward guidance maintained a certain amount of flexibility, just in case certain very negative scenarios were to materialize. From today's perspective, based on the information we have today, these scenarios have become more unlikely to materialize. Thank you. Mr Ewing. Jack Ewing, New York Times. Mr Draghi, there was some discussion of the political situation a few minutes ago. I wonder if I could come back to that. There's a number of elections coming up this year. A number of the, in most of the countries, there's a candidate who is anti-euro or deuro skeptic. It sounded a minute ago like you were pretty relaxed about that. Am I reading you right? Or is this something that you're worried about and does it play any role in your discussions? And secondly, on the G20, I just wonder, am I correct this will be your first meeting with any members of the new presidential, the new U.S. administration? And I'm just wondering if you have any agenda or message for them. Thank you. You are correct. You are correct. And no, not really. I mean, just our mandate is relatively narrow if compared to the broadness of the issues that are going to be discussed by the finance ministers. We operate, we work, and we craft our international position based on pursuing our mandate of price stability. So even in international fora, we look at what conditions internationally are supportive of price stability. So I don't have any message at this point in time. I'm certainly confident the discussion will be fruitful. Now, on your first point, let me be clear, if we go back to when the euro was created, there always been people who said, oh, it's wrong, it's a mistake, cannot be done. And there have been, they still were saying the same during the life of the euro, and they are saying the same today. Now, I find this position and that will tell you in which way I'm concerned. In other words, not so much by the market developments, which I said before, we look and monitor with attention but without anxiety. But in a different way, the euro, I was saying before, has been the cornerstone, the pillar upon which the single market could survive and could prosper and could increase prosperity of the member countries. So without single market, there is no European Union. So that's why it's unrealistic to think anything different from the euro. And now, especially now, that we face all European countries face geopolitical challenges, terrorism, migration, security challenges. The euro is a channel for solidarity across some of its members. And the leaders have expressed their clear intention to work together. I recall before that even in the midst of a crisis, three countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania joined the euro. And that was of course, because of the direct benefits that such membership could bring, but also because a sense of solidarity that such membership would entail. So to cut it short, the euro is here to stay so the question is not so much if it's irrevocable, it is. But then a more productive line of thinking would be how do we make sure that we can increase prosperity, make it function better, this monetary union. And in the course of its history, you can see that many things have been done. Now we tend to, always facing critical moments, we tend to underplay our achievements in the past. But in fact, if you look at the stability and growth pact, if you look at the ESSM, if you look at the ESM, if you look at the extraordinary shows of solidarity that countries have shown towards its members that were crossing, were having, were being in a state of crisis. Then on the other side, you can also recall the extraordinary efforts of the countries that were in a program. So all this tells us that the commitment of the European and Euro member countries leaders to the Euro is very, very strong. And so we should ask ourselves, what can we do better to make the Euro more resilient, stronger in facing a crisis? And of course, we've been, you know, you know the way the ECB thinks about that, but there are many other routes. And I think that today, more than ever, the situation is open to further progress. It's quite clear. It has to be made more resilient. I think everybody would agree with that. Thank you, Stryk. Johanna Tryk, Politico. Thank you very much. I've got two questions. You pointed out yourself earlier that the Central Bank has quite a narrow mandate, but it seems to me that the statement, the statement to say that the Euro is irrevocable is quite a political statement. Or do you consider it as part of your mandate to keep the currency union or the Euro alive? That's the one question. My second question is, it sounded like you're more optimistic on the economic outlook. And I wonder why that is not reflected in your inflation forecast for 2019. Thank you very much. Responding to the second question, we are more, as you say, to use your words, more optimistic about the growth forecast. We have to see how these improved prospects as far as growth is concerned and recovery and strengthening and broadening of the recoveries I've said before, translate into higher headline inflation into an inflation that satisfies the four features that were mentioned at the beginning, namely convergence through to our objective of an inflation rate which is close but below 2%. That is a durable convergence, namely in the medium term, so not transient. That is self-sustained, in other words, a convergence that can stay there without this extraordinary monetary accommodation that's in place. And of course, an inflation rate that is such for this objective for all countries and not one country only. So we haven't seen yet how this better prospects have translated. And the reason why we haven't seen, I mentioned it before, it's that we haven't seen yet any significant development on the wages front. That is the key point. I think as I said, it's not the only point, but it's one important element of our assessment. Now, on the other point, you may imagine this question was asked to me, it was asked at the time of the OMT, at the time of the London speech in 2012. No, I mean, the mandate of the ECB stays what it is, namely, pursue price stability and making sure that conditions in which our work to pursue price stability is gonna be successful. Not more than that. Thank you. Ms Weisbach. And Mr Weisbach, CMBC, may I bring you back to the G20? How important is that for you that there will be a bold statement against protectionist measures? Because there are reports that this might actually be dropped from the communique. And also, the point which you made earlier, there might be a dropping of the point of the competitive devaluation point in the communique. How important is that to you that we are going to see that for the world community? Another question is a bit more technical on, there are also concerns that already by now there's not enough bonds to buy for small countries like Portugal, for example. How are you going to address that problem going forward during the course of this year, given we keep on having the asset purchase program around at the current speed? Thank you. Well, answering your second question. Our bond purchase program is on track. It's on track both time-wise and quantity-wise. So we have no reason to be worried about this at this point in time. Now, on the other point is, well, it's actually quite important. It's for, I was commenting before on the commitments that were concerning the exchange rates, but I think I can say the same about the commitments on keeping an open trade. There have been the pillars of world prosperity for many, many years, many decades. And so it's quite important that G20 reaffirmed this commitment. And frankly, I mean, I don't know about these rumors. I know of the rumors, but I don't know what to say about that, where they come from, whether it's true or not. Thank you. And with this, we'll close the press conference. Thank you very much. Thank you.