 Oké, we hebben twee ondernemers in de panel. Rita Sjidovski, assistente professor van de Wilschafs University in Vienna en Peter Coles, judge at the Supreme Court in The Hague. Rita, raise first, would you like to comment? Invitation also to be part of this distinguished panel and be able to reflect on these very challenging thoughts. I will try to make an overview of what we learned from Raymond and Eric's presentation and also including Daniels presentation about the status of anti-use rules under the stated, EU-stated rules and the sovereignty of the member states is to introduce or not to introduce anti-use rules and adding some of my personal comments on this summary. I think what we learned is basically we can distinguish two situations where the issue of state is can arise and that's the lack of anti-use rules in a domestic system either a general, a gar or the lack of specific anti-use rules and the other situation is the selective application of existing anti-use rules. As regards the first question, the lack of a gar or lack of certain specific anti-use rules in a domestic system I recall the case of Tri-Emitaria where the Court of Justice had that there is no general EU law principle according to which the member states would be obliged to prevent the abuse of their domestic law or the circumvention of their domestic taxes. Now if you think about that, there is no such general principle under EU law is it completely reconcilable with the commission's reasoning in the tax rulings investigation cases because what the commission argues is that there is a principle of equality embedded in the EU-stated rules which basically requires that the member states do not treat group companies more favorably than standard companies. So this inherent embedded principle of equality what is basically inferred to oblige the member states to have the Amsterdam principle and to apply the Amsterdam principle. If that's the case, then could not we say that the same principle also requires a member state that it does not treat tax avoiders or tax cheaters in the same way as honest taxpayers. That is something also following for me at least from the principle of equality. So if the principle of equality requires the application of an Amsterdam principle under domestic law even if it's not specifically laid down in that domestic law could we say that the same principle from which you can derive the principle of prevention of abuse also requires a member state to put in place anti-abuse in either regard or a certain specific anti-abuse rule. I come to the second situation the selective application of an existing domestic anti-abuse rule where I would say I think Daniel also mentioned that here you can also have two situations when the selectivity comes from the domestic legislation itself so there is an anti-abuse rule under domestic law for example the UKCFC rule but it's drafted in a way or provided in a way under domestic law which imporves some differential treatment for certain taxpayers and that would be the case with the UKCFC rules for group financing income you do not apply the CFC rules in the same way as other income. And the other situation is when the tax authorities apply an otherwise equal or neutral anti-abuse rule in a selective way and that would be the case of the tax ruling investigations or even if there is no written proof of that selective application you would say that a certain tax assessment is not in line with the general rules and deviates from the general normal interpretation of the general law and that's why it's selective and I think in this group of cases what we are facing with the most essential question that we are facing with is the choice of the reference system as we heard and this is the crux of the matter in most of the cases how to choose the right reference system this is what we saw in the case of Haidkamp so the German law scary forward case and we saw the solution by the commission we saw the solution by the general court and now by the advocate general this was also this very very difficult conceptual question how to choose the reference system was also read by Mr. Leventhal en what I get from his presentation that probably in his view the solution would be not to have this step in the selectivity analysis at all the derogation test the so-called derogation test where you have to identify the reference system but just to do a pure discrimination test and then I think it could be a way out only superficially because I think unfortunately the discrimination test involves the same conceptual difficulty and that would mean the selection of comparables I think that is actually the same problem as the identification of the reference system under a discrimination test we still have to decide what to compare with what so you have to choose what is the general system that you compare with the derogation so I think that the bad news is that we cannot really escape from this very difficult conceptual question under any type of analysis and what Mr. Leventhal also said and Eric also criticised that in his view you have to take the lowest level of generality and that's the reference system to which you decide that there is derogation however in the text ruling the investigation cases the reference system is always the general corporate income tax system which is the highest or the most general reference system possible so I think there is some kind of discrepancy in this reasoning now the other change is the picture because now we have EU secondary law which obliges the member states to introduce certain anti-abuse laws if they do not do so as Raymond says the commission actually can initiate an inflection procedure so I think that brings higher uncertainty in the system so we do not have to rely anymore we do not have to question anymore whether on the basis of some very general and vague principles like the principle of equality or on the basis of the stated rules the member states would be somehow obliged to have this or that anti-abuse rule now we have secondary law in this what are the compulsory anti-abuse rules which have to be introduced to a certain tax system we had in sense of it is still not the ideal picture because we can also question whether the ACA itself contains some differentiations some distinctions which could be questionable under the stated rules and we saw that on some of the slides like the exceptions to the interest limitation rule exceptions to the CFC rule whether these distinctions which are provided in the directive itself in EU secondary law can be challenged under the stated rules well as Raymond mentioned under the stated rules probably not because the stated is granted by the member states and this is a directive which is an EU instrument so that cannot be stated however we can still ask the question and now we are coming back again my favorite principle principle of equality whether that could be something on the basis of which these distinctions differentiations within the ACA could be challenged