 Well good morning everyone welcome to the New America Foundation. I'm Jonathan Geyer here with the Middle East Task Force and the Middle East Channel at foreignpolicy.com which is a publication we co-edit with Mark Lynch at GW. So I just want to welcome you on behalf of my colleagues Daniel Levy and Layla Hilal who co-direct our Task Force. We try to bring new perspectives, new ideas to long-standing conflicts, chief among them Israel, Palestine, Israel Arab issues. So we're really glad you made it out on this rainy morning. We have a really distinguished and smart panel, some new ideas hopefully about Israel, Palestine because we're ripe for new ideas on this issue after the UN. I think all of us know that the United Nations General Assembly convened about two, three weeks ago. Palestine applying for membership at the Security Council. Many criticisms in Washington for not going to the General Assembly for not getting an easy win. At the moment the membership is stalled in sort of technical committees with experts at the Security Council. Mahmoud Abbas is in Latin America lobbying for states on the Security Council to back statehood. So we're at another impasse. Things have been changing but it looks more the same than ever. So I'm excited to hear what our panel has to say about this. So we have Yossi Alfer, who is the co-editor of the Bitter Lemons Family of Publications, which I'm a big fan of. I've been reading Bitter Lemons basically since I've been hooked on this conflict. He's formerly Director of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. He's served as an advisor to the Prime Minister's office in Israel. And he's Director of Political Security Domain in Independent NGO. We also have Rob Malley, who directs the Middle East North Africa Program at International Crisis Group. Formerly a Clinton Administration official for Arab-Israeli Affairs and served on National Security Council. And I always love his articles in the New York Review of Books and it's been a while since he's written on Israel-Arab issues, so I'm excited for his take today. And we also have Nadia Bilbasi from NBC. She's a Senior U.S. Correspondent who's her claim to fame is having interviewed George W. Bush four times, the most of any Arab journalist. She's been with Al Arabiya for the last eight years. She's reported extensively from Africa, from various conflict zones. And she was recently in New York for the General Assembly. So as I say, a lot has been changing, but it looks more the same than ever. I think the conflict's very ripe for a new paradigm, a new approach. And Yossi Alfer has argued that the United Nations, the application for statehood at the United Nations actually presents a big opportunity to Israel. And a new way to manage the conflict, a new paradigm and an opportunity to see this as a state-to-state issue rather than a conflict which obviously we've been grappling with an Oslo paradigm for 20 years of direct negotiations that have gone basically nowhere. So with that, I'll turn to Yossi for a presentation of how a new paradigm might look and then we'll continue taking stock of what has been happening since the General Assembly. Thank you, Jonathan, and good morning, everybody. A new paradigm. Let me submit to you four propositions. First, that we're looking at a very difficult year ahead because no matter what happens at the UN, they're not going to be productive negotiations. The Obama administration is not going to play any kind of active role in encouraging negotiations. And we could say, given the surrounding, the atmosphere in the surrounding Arab world, we could see some serious disruptions, violence. We really cannot predict what's going to happen in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere, but I think it is fair to predict that nothing particularly positive is going to happen. So we're looking at a problematic and a dangerous year. Secondly, 18, you said 20 years. I'll give it 18 for Oslo. 18 years after the Oslo process began. And in particular, having experienced two opportunities at the summit in July 2000, Camp David, and in the course of 2008, the Olmer Abumaz negotiations, two opportunities at the summit to deal seriously with the final status issues. It's time to reassess whether there is any point in pursuing the same Oslo paradigm that we've become accustomed to. I wouldn't argue that Oslo has done nothing. Oslo has created the autonomous authority. The Oslo interim steps got us somewhere. But it's my sense that on the Palestinian side there is exactly this kind of reassessment. And the sense that Oslo has ground to a halt and that after two attempts to deal with the Oslo menu for final status issues, we need to take another look. And I would submit, and this is my third insight, that the Palestinian decision to go to the UN represents exactly such an attempt to change the paradigm of the way the conflict is dealt with, and in particular to change the focus from Israel sitting down with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which under Oslo is its partner, and which represents not just the Palestinian authority, but the Palestinian diaspora as well, to change it to a state-to-state model of negotiations. And finally, I would submit that this move by Abu Mazin constitutes, if left as is, could indeed have some very problematic consequences for Palestinians, for Israelis, for the conflict. But it offers us an opportunity, and by us, I mean in particular Israel and the United States, to leverage this initiative into a kind of a win-win proposition for the two sides based on state-to-state negotiations. Let me go back now and talk for a minute about why we are at an impasse with Oslo. First of all, because Israel is negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization, it is negotiating with a group which to a large extent represents the Palestinian diaspora and places huge emphasis on the issue of right of return and of return. Secondly, in those two opportunities at the summit to engage all of the final status issues, what we have seen is that the 1967 issues, that is to say borders, Palestinian capital and security, have proven far more negotiable than the pre-67 issues, what I would call the narrative issues. The holy places, which in some ways from an Israeli standpoint is a 3,000-year-old issue, and the refugee issue, which is an 1948 issue. You can look at where the parties have ended up when Abu Mazen and Olmer parted in September 2008. You can see a bridgeable gap on the territorial issue and on the security issue, and on the geographic Jerusalem issue. But it was Abu Mazen who walked away from those talks and said, outlined what Olmer had offered him, which from the Israeli standpoint was the most far-reaching offer, I believe Palestinians, certainly that they've ever heard, and that they're likely to hear in the foreseeable future. It was Abu Mazen who walked away and said, I turned him down, the gaps were too wide. Why were the gaps too wide? When you look at the narrative issues, the question of the right of return, and I want to make the distinction, I'm not talking about return. I think the question of how many thousands of Palestinian refugees might or might not return to Israel has proven negotiable, but there is the issue of the right of return. And on this issue, the narratives of the two sides clash completely. From the Israeli standpoint, the 1948 war of independence was a war of independence and was a just war. And if it created refugee problems, it did so on both sides, and both sides have to solve them. From the Palestinian standpoint, in my understanding, they need a formula to close this file in which they understand that the State of Israel acknowledges that it was born in sin in 1948, and that it was wrong and the Palestinians were right. On the holy places issue, in effect, I can only quote here Abu Mazen and Yasser Arafat at Camp David 2000, Temple Mount, there never was a temple. If you want confirmation of this just a few weeks ago at the UN, here is Abu Mazen saying to the world, I come to you from the holy land, the land of the prophets Jesus and Muhammad, no prophets before Jesus. What does this reflect? It reflects a point of view which is shared not just by Palestinians, but by most of the Arab world and maybe much of the Muslim world. That there is no Jewish people, that it doesn't have legitimate historic and legal roots in the holy land. That the Jews are a bunch of co-religionists, usurpers who came and took Palestinian land with the help of colonialism and imperialism. I think I've learned the Palestinian narrative. I know I'm never going to change it. I'm never going to persuade Palestinians to change it. But what I believe here, and of course that's reflected in the notion that there never was a temple and that the State of Israel was born in sin, but what I think Abu Mazen has understood implicitly or explicitly, what I'm learning from his appeal to the UN, is that he's saying we're going to have to put these narrative issues aside for a while and reconfigure this conflict on a state to state basis. When he goes to the UN, he doesn't ask the UN to determine that the State of Israel was born in sin. He is not asking the UN to determine who owns the Temple Mount. He's asking the UN for three things. Sovereignty, borders, capital injures, and he wants to come out of the UN experience negotiating, not as chairman of the PLO, with its huge refugee constituency, but as president of the State of Palestine. And my interpretation of what he's doing is strengthened when I look at the reaction in Arab circles where the refugee issue is a sensitive one. Hamas' chief criticism of the UN initiative is that it's abandoning the refugees. You hear this in the camps in Lebanon. King Abdullah II of Jordan is against the initiative because he's afraid that by abandoning the refugee issue he's going to be stuck with his demographic problem with his Palestinian population. So this merely confirms the very, the daring nature of what Abu Mazen is doing. He can send Hanan Ashrawi to tell the refugees it's okay, we won't forget you. And he can even mention 194 in one of the documents he submits to the UN. But it's perfectly clear to refugees where this is going. Now, obviously if you're an Israeli government that has a huge settler influence and right-wing influence, if you want to hold on to the territories and build settlements, this isn't going to interest you. If you reject the 1967 lines even with swaps as the basis for a deal and you reject the notion of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem, you'll find every reason to reject this UN initiative. But the fact is that a majority of Israelis are prepared to listen to the proposition of 67 lines in land swaps and that two Israeli prime ministers, both Barak and Olmer, have offered the Palestinians a capital in Jerusalem. So there's some basis in Israeli public opinion to deal with this positively even if that's not represented in the current government. What am I suggesting? I'm suggesting that the Palestinian initiative, one because it's a Palestinian initiative, the first time in many, many years that the initiative is in Palestinian hands and not in Israeli hands, one because it's a Palestinian initiative, two because it is prioritizing the issues, territory, capital sovereignty, before the pre-67 narrative issues, that this offers an opportunity, an opportunity to leverage this initiative into what I would call a win-win proposition. Now, I'm not deluding myself that anybody is going to submit this win-win proposition to the Security Council or the General Assembly tomorrow. I don't know what's going to come out of there, probably non-observe, probably observer state status from the General Assembly, and it's impossible to predict what this will or will not change. But I'm suggesting that if we want to move forward, we're going to have to start addressing the advantages embodied in the Palestinian initiative and try to remodel them into a win-win state-to-state paradigm. What should it include? The Palestinians are asking for a state. The UN on November 29, 1947 created two states or recommended the creation of two states, Arab and Jewish states in mandatory Palestine, Resolution 181. Netanyahu has been insisting that everybody recognizes Israel as a Jewish state. This, by the way, is his response to the sense of delegitimization embodied in the Palestinian positions on Temple Mount, on the right of return, and who's a prophet and who's not a prophet. The UN created Israel as a Jewish state. Go back to 181. You're going to create a Palestinian state? Re-confirm that Israel was created way back then as a Jewish state. Abu Mazen wants the 67 lines. But in negotiations, Palestinians have already agreed to land swaps. Put the land swaps into the resolution or into the formula. It doesn't have to be a UN formula. It can be a quartet formula or an American formula more than a year from now in the next administration. Put the land swaps in there to make it more palatable and acceptable and appealing to Israelis. The Palestinians want a capital in Jerusalem. Well, Israel has a capital in Jerusalem which is not recognized by a single country in the world. Recognize two capitals in Jerusalem. This is the opportunity to do it if you're recognizing one, recognize the other. Palestinians have already agreed to a variety of Israeli demands for security provisions. A demilitarized state, a non-militarized state. There are various formulations. Write this in as well. It's something they've agreed to in any case in negotiations. And reassure Israelis that their security interests are going to be recognized. Reassure Israelis that this new formula will insist that all issues be negotiated between the two sides. You may recall Abu Mazen wrote an op-ed in the New York Times a few months ago in which he suggested that once he gets a UN recognition, he's going to in effect transfer the nexus of the conflict away from the negotiating table and to groups like the International Court of Justice. Make sure that where I don't think anything positive for a solution to the conflict is going to come out. Make sure that both sides accept that they're going to have to negotiate. Beginning with the obvious issues of where the border is, where the capital is, what the security issues are, and leaving for later those pre-67 narrative issues which Abu Mazen is already suggesting he's prepared to leave for later because he's turning this into a state-to-state conflict. And as a state-to-state conflict, they will look very different. Put in a provision regarding minority rights to reassure the Arab world that if Israel is reconfirmed as a Jewish state, this is not going to prejudice the rights of non-Jewish Israelis, but also to reassure Israelis that if they choose to stay in a Palestinian state, that they'll have rights as well. Not that I think many will do so, but to achieve balance. And finally, the Arab Peace Initiative, which we've kind of forgotten in recent months in the shadow of the Arab revolutions, but the Arab Peace Initiative does offer Israel certain incentives for moving ahead toward peace with the Palestinians, aspects of normalization and security. If the UN is going to create a Palestinian state, this is the time for the UN to turn or for the quartet or any other international mediator to turn to the Arab states and say, we're taking a step forward and if the Israelis agree to this, there should be an Arab quid pro quo to persuade Israelis that there is a reward for making peace with their neighbors and for taking chances for peace. So what have I suggested here? One, time is important, the situation could deteriorate. There is nothing on the agenda. Two, the repeated attempts by the international community to return the parties to the negotiating table based on Oslo, and if you just sit down and negotiate everything will be all right, are looking increasingly pathetic. And I would suggest that a lot of the people who mouth these words themselves understand that this is increasingly pathetic because Oslo as we know it and the Oslo menu for final status issues negotiated between Israel and the PLO has run its course and we need a new paradigm. Three, the Palestinian appeal to the UN with all of the problems and dangers involved also presents us with an opportunity to reconfigure the conflict based on a state-to-state paradigm that deals first and foremost with state-to-state issues that is to say borders, security, capital, geography and so forth. And finally that there, it is possible to come up with a variety of formula and I've offered you one, but a variety of formula for making this kind of reconfiguration and what's important is to get the international community and particularly the United States as the prime or only likely mediator between the two sides to get it involved in leveraging the Palestinian initiative into a win-win proposition that could enable us to manage the conflict on a far more rational basis even if we don't determine who owns the Temple Mount in the next 10 or 20 or 100 years or we don't determine who was right and who was wrong in 1948 for the next 10 or 20 or 100 years with a state-to-state model based on this kind of international intervention the conflict becomes far more manageable, some of the issues can be solved immediately those that aren't no longer hold the rest of the process hostage and this would be a huge step forward for everyone. Thank you. Thank you so much. I think that's obviously a very compelling and strategic approach to the Palestinian statehood bid unfortunately what we've seen from the Obama administration has been almost exactly the opposite they've been running so much resistance to anything involving United Nations application it's all been phrased in the negative how do we avoid this not how do we use this to our advantage there's not been a jujitsu move from the State Department it's all been sort of how do we avoid this issue I want to turn to Rob to sort of see where the players are at what are the prospects of a new win-win approach either coming from the White House coming from Europe maybe the players in the region in light of the Arab awakening might step up where do you see things going? We live in a strange world and I'm not referring only to the allegations of this strange plot because here you have the Palestinian leader who's been most committed to negotiations, diplomacy, engagements with Israel and I have some quibble you'll see where characterization of us but we could come back to that I think he's somebody who actually has always been committed and on some of the issues that you mentioned probably has a more forward-looking perspective than you described but here you have somebody who's always been committed and now is the Palestinian who is the most who's turned the most forcefully to the UN international arena something he's never really done in the past so that's one puzzle and somebody why would he be the person to do that you have in Prime Minister Netanyahu somebody whose positions I suspect when he puts them on the table and if he were to negotiate and if you had the US or the quartet or anyone in the room his positions would be deemed less acceptable than the Palestinians position and yet he's the one who seems to be clamoring for direct talks all the time and you have the Obama administration which came into office truly promising a much more vigorous, fair-minded, effective approach to the peace process started on day one and ended up a little over two years later having succeeded in alienating not just the Israelis but also the Palestinians which is a feat and it's not all of their own making but it's a fact today that there's less trust in the US administration from both sides and as Yossi accurately said very little hope that the administration is going to do anything in the next year until the election now what's the reason for this and what is it symptomatic of and I think as Yossi says it's symptomatic of something pretty deep at a surface level I think it's symptomatic of the fact that right now from a purely political standpoint the what is effective, what is productive, what is what makes sense for the three political actors whether it's Netanyahu, Abbas, or Obama are to take positions that in fact are going to make a return to effective negotiations more difficult when I speak to some officials who tell me well why didn't Abbas seize his victory of his speech at the UN and all the credit he got to then pivot and go back to negotiations the answer is simple, the credit he got was because he took a position that showed that he was not prepared to go back to negotiations as business as usual in other words the currency he got would be immediately deflated if tomorrow he said okay now I'm prepared to go to negotiations without a settlement freeze without terms of reference so you can't expect him to use the capital to take a step that would immediately dilapidate it Prime Minister Netanyahu yes he says he wants to go to negotiations but what does he say that resonates deeply with the Israeli people it's what Yossi said it's when he calls for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state something that makes it very difficult for the negotiations to commence let alone to succeed but which enhances his position back home and President Obama's speech at the UN which to some extent I guess you could argue helps him domestically although I would question that I'm not sure how many people would give him credit for giving a speech a year before an election if they had any doubts about his commitment to Israel the day before so politically I questioned the wisdom of the strategy but definitely it was a speech that was intended in large part to satisfy domestic opinion but which also makes it harder to get back to negotiations because it discredits the US in Palestinian eyes so yes I think that we are now in a moment where domestic politics and the need of leaders to respond to what they feel either to build or to respond to what they feel are the aspirations of their people are pulling all sides apart but of course again as Yossi said I think the crisis is much deeper the crisis is of whether we want to call it the Oslo paradigm or whatever paradigm has been governing for the last two decades every single one of its pillars has been eroded if not collapsed the belief that you had on both sides coherent effective leaderships that spoke for and then could deliver for their people I don't need to get into details but certainly on the Palestinian side with the division and with the fragmentation of the political of the polity that's no longer the case on the Israeli side with the growing power of settler constituencies religious constituencies it's also more difficult and the fragmentation of the political scene to have a leader that's capable if he were willing to make the kind of historic compromise that a peace deal would entail so that's number one that was one of the assumptions that was guiding it the second was that both sides despite the skepticism had faith that a peace deal could be achieved through negotiations now again I don't need to go into detail but that has completely disappeared again what gave President Abbas such a positive reception back home and it really was I mean it surprised me how positively and enthusiastically Palestinians reacted to his stance at the UN is in part because he was breaking with the notion that we're going to go back to negotiations and perpetually and eternally hope that through in a room you're going to reach a deal with Israelis so the faith that you could get something through negotiations on the Palestinian side has evaporated but that's true on the Israeli side as well I don't think you'd find many Israelis again for the reasons Josie put forth who believe that negotiations with Palestinians is the way to reach a deal the third pillar was that the US could play an effective mediating role that may come back someday but it is no longer the case today and I don't think you have many who I mean just go through the list of things that the US has asked for extension of the moratorium settlement freeze extension of the moratorium direct talks without preconditions no security council resolution on settlements no security council resolution on statehood on all of those the US made demands that both parties felt free to ignore the notion that the US has today and again this is not criticism of the Obama administration I think goes beyond Obama I think it's sort of a more historic pattern but the notion that the US has aware with all today to get the parties to do what it wants them to do is for me a thing of the past and finally the role of the Arab world which in the Oslo Madrid post conception was to support the moderates quote-unquote on the Palestinian side help them make compromises, reach out to Israel again that's been eroding for some time the loss of credibility of pro-American regimes Saudi, Jordan, Egypt that had been in decline for some time with the Arab Spring it's become all the more difficult with given the again the weight of domestic politics and the fact that these regimes first have to care about reestablishing some degree of legitimacy or not losing whatever legitimacy that they have doesn't really put them in a position to be pressing about to do anything or to be reaching out to Israel and you add to that the new Turkey's new weight the fact is you don't have any of the building blocks of what was supposed to lead us to a peace agreement so I agree that the paradigm has collapsed is there new paradigm and is the one that you'll see is put forward a possibility very easy for me I mean the easiest position now is to say the paradigm has collapsed and I don't see a very effective one but it is a position that I have to take I don't see an alternative emerging and I question again I think Yossi is pointing in an interesting direction but I would question it on two levels first then if there's a Palestinian in the room he or she could correct me I didn't read Abbas's move at the UN quite the way you did I don't think and if he intended it he certainly won't get away with it but I don't think he intended it as an attempt to substitute the Palestinian state for the PLO the attacks he came under were attacks by people who suspected that and very quickly he and others had to counterattacks that was not the point he made very clear in his speech at the UN that this was not intended to in any way downplay the role of the PLO or to ignore the refugees and much of his speech was about the refugees which again was one of the reasons why Palestinians back home and elsewhere were so enthusiastic about it members of the diaspora who have been critical of Abu Mazen now for years told me they discovered a new Abu Mazen precisely because he put on the table a narrative that went back to 1948 and that spoke about the refugees so I don't know that politically again if one assumes that his goal was to go to state to state relations and put on the back burner other issues and say that the state is going to now negotiate with Israel and not the PLO if that was his intent which again I don't believe it was I don't think that it's one that is politically palatable right now for this leadership interested since you just met him what you make of it so first of all I don't think that's what he had in mind I think what he had in mind was symptomatic of what and the first paradox I mentioned here you have somebody who always believed in negotiations always believed in diplomacy always believed in reaching out to the US and to Israel who's taking a step that is contradicting all of those precepts he was the first Palestinian to believe in negotiations he's the last one who give them up but he too has to respond to what he sees the public mood his own conviction after having met with Netanyahu several times he just doesn't believe right now that he could simply go back to negotiations as usual and that's what the UN was symptomatic of it's a statement that things simply are not working we need something else I don't think the Palestinians have that something else I don't think they have that strategy tiptoeing right now with a break from the past but without really knowing where they're going to go so that's the first reason why I'm somewhat skeptical that this opens up the avenue now the other reason which is one that I'm happy to be convinced otherwise I'm not, and frankly I think you know you said how could we convince the US I think the US has bought onto the model that it should be borders and security first that's what the president said so certainly that's become the new article of faith maybe it works I have a hard time imagining that President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu even if they were only negotiating borders and security it could reach an agreement they're very far apart on those issues as well I mean that's what they discussed they discussed security in the three meetings they had and they got nowhere so the notion that this is what is holding it up I think raises a lot of doubts I also am not sure how you cabin them off and you'll see, you said in your presentation that whatever resolution comes out could say there's a Jewish state because that's in 181 which is accurate but that does open up the issues of 48 that does force the Palestinians to put other issues on the table I'm not so sure and I doubt that you'd have a palace an Israeli leader would be prepared to withdraw from 95, 96, 97% of the West Bank without having in return recognition of Israel as a Jewish state which the Palestinians either won't give or will only give if they get something on refugees and on Jerusalem so I'm not sure that you could truly untie this knot now as I said I'm going to take the easy way out compared to Yossi because I don't have right now an answer what I think we need to find is a way to use the next year which I think is going to be a dead year unfortunately but I don't see and I agree entirely with Yossi that people sort of when they don't know what to do they go to negotiations so the quartet is desperate it doesn't know what to do and now you ask members of the court do you think negotiations could succeed? no if they fail are we going to be in a worse position than we are today? maybe then why are you going there? because there's nothing else which is really probably the most unwise reason to go to something because you can't think of anything better but it is reflexively anyone you talk to in the quartet we have to have negotiations I don't think you have to have negotiations I think negotiations right now are a recipe for further polarizing the situation for further convincing the parties that there's no way out and how do you deal with the collapse of the talks? I think this is a very short term approach which the US, the UN, the Europeans to some extent the Russians are taking and I would hope that they would reconsider it now what could you do during that year and I'm going to stop now I think there are things that you could work on which probably are not that popular but I think the Palestinians they get their domestic house in order I think that's absolutely critical I think the Shelley deal may open up new avenues for reconciliation I think we need to deal with the issue of Gaza so that that doesn't become yet again a powder keg I think you have to find ways and you could do it perhaps to improve the life of Palestinians although that's obviously not a long-term solution and you have to take this time this year to rethink all the issues that Yossi and I put on the table and to think of a different paradigm which frankly at this point I don't have I think there are elements in what Yossi said that might point in the right direction but I think the crisis is deep enough that we need to take the time to think about how you address all these issues the issues of Palestinian leadership the issue of Israeli leadership the issue of complete loss of faith in the possibility of a solution the declining role of the US and the changes in the Arab world which I think make it a requirement for us to do what some of us hope the Obama administration would have done from day one which is to reset press the reset button on this conflict as well and think of a different way forward Well thank you Rob So it's interesting to see a little bit of pessimism in terms of not having a solution but in light of Prime Minister Fayyad's you know from the ground up peacemaking approach whether that's going to work or not is to be seen but I'm really interested Nadia in your perspective on Chairman Abbas you met with him in New York what are the strategic implications when he went home to Palestine in terms of the UN is there enough forward momentum to keep him afloat for now I know that he told Newsweek after the February vote on settlements at the United Nations that Obama told him to go up a tree Obama had a ladder to go down the tree took the ladder away and Abbas had to jump so is Abbas still in that tree or is he out of it at this stage I think he's still on the tree thank you so much for inviting me and thank you for coming on a rainy day really brave of you to come the conventional wisdom I think always that in terms of negotiation is madness is trying the same thing twice and expecting different results and I think really this applies very much to the negotiation concept and if you look at it through what both you say and Rob said for the last 20 years negotiation has not brought anything tangible for the Palestinians what they did is they created an authority that manages the occupation for them and if you go to the West Bank and you see Ramallah that always been held as a great model of success you know Prime Minister Fayyad is doing a great job and I'm not diminishing from his achievement but the fact that once you step out of Ramallah and you wanted to go to a city like Nablus or Genine you will see a checkpoint an Israeli checkpoint could be created overnight it will stop even the president from moving from one place to another so the reality on the ground contradict very much of the concept that the Palestinian gained something tangible from Oslo so I agree with you second is about negotiations if you look at all the final status issues border, security Jerusalem with exception of refugees and I'll talk about it now everything is dictated from an Israeli point of view the Palestinians have nothing in return to give because it is the Israelis they're going to sit with the strongest part and that's the Israelis and they are the weaker part and they have to negotiate accordingly the refugees being outside and they have to agree on some kind of settlement so I think from this point of view the negotiation has not brought anything Abbas's popularity and the PA in the West Bank in particular was very low and therefore they looked at the options around them and basically for the lack of any options they decided to go to an international forum where they got support and that was the driving force behind Abbas's decision to go to the UN and I'll give you probably read the report that actually the final point that pushed him to go to the Security Council as opposed to go to the General Assembly was basically the proposal that was given by the Americans with Dennis Ross and David Hale that it was nothing it was even described by Palestinian officials as insulting so he decided that the best way to change the dynamics on the ground is to create something considering what's happening in the Arab Spring now and the Palestinians leading the concept of nonviolent resistance in the first Intifada so he wanted to bring the attention back to him and to give him a card that will strengthen him in the negotiation I don't think it was a substitute for the negotiation but as you said now the court is talking about returning back to negotiation on October 23rd in Jordan but there is nothing absolutely to change to make these two parties coming together and the administration seems to be adamant that the two parties actually will meet in Jordan on what basis on what the preparations how the conditions on the ground has changed or the conditions rather the Palestinian spot which is a freeze on the settlements number one and having a terms of reference number two to make or accepting 67 as the basis for negotiation these things has not been acceptable to the Israelis or they have not accept them so far so why would you go back to negotiate so the court concept has to be reconstructed all together and I think the fact that also the Palestinians have deep mistrust in the representative of the court Tony Blair has a play in the bigger picture of whether to come to the negotiation or not and also having the U.S. being I mean the Palestinians knew from the beginning that the U.S. is not a partial player in the negotiation but the reason they need them is because it's the only power in the world that can exert pressure on Israel and that's I think the important point here it's not because they think they are going to be an honest broker I mean the official stated policy that Israel is a strategic ally of the United States and they always side with Israel no matter what and we have seen how the United States take the neck out in the UN Security Council it's not just they said that they're going to veto the decision but they actually lobbying actively every single country and if they're not lobbying I'll use the word bully in them to say do not vote for them and they take it even one step further which is really ridiculous see even lobbying countries to vote against Palestinian membership in UNESCO which is an organization and science but despite everything else I think from an American point of view they have to show they're the only true friends that stays with Israel no matter what and from the Palestinian point of view they need the Americans because they're the one who can pressure Israel there's nobody else who can tell them if you accept this deal you have to do this or you have to do that and saying that I agree that American impact in the Middle East is receding considering what's happening in Arab and now maybe there's a new proposal I don't know if it's going to be accepted or not by the French there is new actors coming but I still believe for the time being the United States will be the major player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict I agree with you that maybe this is not the time for negotiation because you're not going to achieve anything I don't even believe that the parties can get together to start with because it's not just the gaps are so big but the principle and the conditions that President Abbas put and he cannot be less Palestinians than the Americans when it comes to say free settlements and the Israelis said no and he said okay I'll forgive you let's start from nothing and the Israeli government is very clever always of saying to people who don't know the conflict very well well we willing to negotiate with that peak conditions as if they're the one who you know the party who's just compromising which is completely the opposite picture now I actually tend to be a little bit more optimistic than Rob when it comes to describing the situation as it stands now because I think the dynamics in the ground are changing so rapidly that nobody can predict what's going to happen now I'll give you an example a few days ago the news broke that Israel and Hamas decided to release Gilad Shalit was an Israeli soldier who was held kidnapped by Hamas for five years in return for 1027 Palestinian prisoners this deal has been on going on for a long time and probably in 2009 they came closer to do it and they didn't etc and if you read the analysis everybody trying to wonder what's important of the timing now why Prime Minister Netanyahu and Hamas, whether it's Khalid Mishal in Damascus or the leadership in Gaza decided to close this deal I will say the window is closing up, they don't know what's going to happen Prime Minister Netanyahu has been held as the leadership in negotiating with an organization that's strangely enough the United States put it on as a terrorist organization and somehow its closest ally is allowed to negotiate with the terrorist organization that's fine so the fact that Hamas and Israel decided to do this deal I think it's very significant and if you remember when Abbas decided to go to the UN the Israelis were the first against it using the word that they're going to delegitimize Israel which is in Palestinian perspective it's the opposite actually they're asking to legitimize the Palestinian state alongside Israel the Americans who were very active in lobbying everybody against it was Hamas they didn't want Abbas to go to the UN and they have been given statements and taken publicly and denouncing the move etc last night actually I was reading an interesting report that the chief negotiator of Fatih in Cairo has met with Khalid Mishal who's visiting Cairo now and probably will be there until the finalization of the deal with the release of Galat Shalit and the Palestinian prisoners and he expressed to Abbas what a great move that he did at the UN that he supports him for everything that he did and Hamas has added that whatever means that the U.S. diplomatic or military or whatever that basically this is a very important step in the long run of achieving a Palestinian independent Palestinian state and they expressed this love towards each other both Abbas thanking Mishal for releasing the prisoners and Mishal thanking Abbas for going to the UN which is a really interesting development and I think is dictated by what's happening around him and most of you obviously very nuanced when it comes to the Arab Spring and Hamas losing base in Damascus and most likely migrating towards Cairo Iran role as well in terms of supporting Hamas and this competition always I think for the last 20 years you have seen on the ground the disappearance almost of other factions within the PLO which is the leftist factions and now what you have on the ground is a defect to two parties which is Fatih and Hamas I mean you can talk about other small parties like Mubadara or like the third party but they don't really have support the support is basically between these two parties and at one stage I felt that I cannot see any kind of reconciliation between them regardless if the Egyptians were during Mubarak were playing the role that the good guys bring them together and using it as a leverage with the US but I think the party themselves felt that they cancel each other if they decided to unify because for the first time Hamas had the chance in a place and they are not going to give up this easily because everybody knows if there is an election today in Gaza or maybe before the release of Shalit because now the popularity has went up they will lose so it's not really their interest to have a unity government because ultimately the next step will be to have election and if they have election they will lose while they do that but now because the dynamics are shifting so quickly and because Hamas unlike the Islamic jihad is a political party and very pragmatic and the reason they are in power now because they decided to benefit from Oslo although they didn't recognize the previous agreements and to compete in an election and they won in that transparent election but we can argue whether they are able to make that transition from being a movement into a party or a government that accountable to people or whether the blockade or the international community fought them from day one whatever reason that they failed they did not really deliver so basically they were not really popular along the everything else that they introduced when curtailing civil liberties and rights of women and lots of things that make life miserable for people in Gaza in particular but I actually for the first time I believe now of what's happening in the Middle East and the decision now between these two parties Hamas and Israel to get together and to really show it maybe I'm reading too much to it but I think it will open a new kind of thinking that ultimately maybe we will see some kind of reconciliation because we all know there is not one single liberation movement in history achieved anything being divided and the division is so huge I mean you go to the West Bank and you go to Ramallah and you go to Gaza as if you go into two different world completely they don't relate to each other so maybe the reconciliation is on the horizon and maybe something will happen I'm not 100% sure the second thing I wanted to talk about the Arab peace initiative that you mentioned and many times when you come through Washington and people talk about this is the last opportunity for I heard Amr Moussa saying millions of times this is the last opportunity for the Israelis to accept it because basically if they accept it they will have recognition not just immediate normalization of relationship not just from 22 Arab countries but with 55 Muslim countries and if you look now at this Arab initiatives I mean the Arab League is not recognizable anymore you look at the countries there they are no longer there so the leadership is changing very fast and although of course Saudi Arabia is going to be there for a while and I mean Jordan but I think even that is not guaranteed in the long run this might change very quickly because the initiative that proposed by Arab regimes the Arab regimes are no longer there you have a huge movement in the Middle East whether it's going to succeed or not whether it's going to change for the better or for the worse but what we can guarantee is it's no longer the status quo that has been in the Middle East for the last 20 years so I will say that the change in the dynamic now might actually bring a new opportunity and if Netanyahu I will give him the benefit of the doubt some will say that actually he did the Shalit deal so he doesn't have to compromise more so he can say after all this pressure on him and not just the Americans decided to veto it but even when they were going to veto it the Israelis poked them in the eye and said you know what we're going to build 1,300 new housing units in Jerusalem and you know what we are pointing this new task force to legalize even the outpost settlements so he's given too much to the right wing constituents in the settlers community and in his own cabinet as well so it could be both ways I mean I cannot read him very well but I think what we have seen is you can for sure you cannot wait for another year because another year is always things gets worse not better I want to tie into that what you're saying about Netanyahu because I think it's interesting that he is sort of co-suring you might say the outpost sort of retroactively there is a lot of moves to appease his right wing coalition Yossi is there the political will to pursue the kind of approach that you want to take could Netanyahu actually do that with this current coalition would they be willing to do something you know bolder as you're saying or is Rob's critique that this isn't going to work out at the moment maybe bring true in this context you know one of the interesting things we've spent a few weeks in the United States and talking about these issues is picking up on theories about Netanyahu that are apparently stronger here than back home for example he's like a character in a novel yeah for example as long as his father is alive for example as long as Sarah is his wife look three almost three years ago Netanyahu benefited from a wave of hawkish sentiment in Israel generated not a little by the failure of peace processes the failures of where unilateral withdrawals and set up a very right wing coalition even with labor and now it's no longer even labor if you take his fundamental views together with the nature of his coalition to my mind it should have been clear to the quartet and to the Israeli peace camp for that matter two and a half years ago that it's pointless to lobby for a peace process that this government even if it deans to enter a peace process is not going to go very far so that I mean that's my answer to it the answer is no now Netanyahu is clever he's figured out Obama he's figured out a lot of American public opinion he's won congress he's got pretty solid his support in Israel it goes up and down the social justice movement brought it down there's no price to his coalition and when he pokes his finger in the eyes of the administration after Obama's very pro-Israel speech he's basically saying I can do whatever I want certainly in this year in this coming year I can do whatever I want I want sorry if you didn't hear me and get away with it so these are the facts of life but I have to add Rob I would argue that Abou Mazen not only understands or that we should all not understand Netanyahu is not a candidate to give up 96% of the West Bank in return for anything or nothing but I would argue that Abou Mazen now understands that after all of this especially he's not going to find an Israeli partner who can compromise to the extent necessary from the Palestinian standpoint not just on territory but on those narrative issues and this is why he's going to the U.N. and that even if he yes he paid a lot of lip service to the PLO and the refugees in his U.N. speech and so on and so forth but there are facts here if they come out as state and Israel can legitimately argue that this is the end of Aslo and that it has a new negotiating partner the State of Palestine and if Netanyahu has any sense at all or any future prime minister they will say we no longer negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization with its refugee constituency we negotiate with our neighbor the State of Palestine they want to put the refugee issue on the table fine we'll say to them you're a sovereign state any Palestinian you want anywhere you can resettle them any time you want inside of Palestine the issue's over whoever heard of one state asking another state to absorb its own citizens or its potential citizens I can't read Abu Mazen's mind and by the way when I asked him about this a few months ago in Ramallah he said something which I liked very much it's what politicians do but they never admit it he said I'm going to answer you in deliberately vague sentences because he's not showing his cards the one who is showing his cards is Fayyad in Fayyad's statements you can see a clear understanding a much clearer understanding that this is the approach but again none of this is going to produce any kind of process whatsoever in the coming year and beyond that I don't know none of us knows but we have to begin to change the paradigm and to recognize the failures of the past Rob I want to hear your take on that before we turn to the audience and also forgot to mention we have people live streaming this online so hello to you and people on Twitter maybe but Rob Sarkozy came out at the UN with the speech a bit of a surprise Europe is seemingly taking a more enhanced role maybe carrying the torch from the US now Europe hasn't really done much in the quartet context and I think we've seen high representative Kathy Ashton really follow Washington's lead and not really do anything bold or creative but are we entering a period where France the European three the European Union might do something different and creative or we should curb our enthusiasm for a new ICG report is titled they're going to try to be more active but as they see the US less so they'll try to be more active I'm not sure that we should hold our breath for a more bold, creative or successful policy I'm afraid that I don't I don't quite see that on the horizon and again the sort of reflex which is to say we got to go back to negotiation from Europeans and which they can't back up with a logical argument that's what I find most perplexing in terms of what Josie said I don't have any disagreement I don't again I don't think I think we shouldn't ascribe too much of a strategic motivation to what Abou Mazen did I'd like to argue that there is a alternative Palestinian strategy out there that's in search of a leadership there are things that Palestinians could do that are quite different they could truly try to I'm not saying that I would support it I just say those are ideas that you hear if you speak to the intellectual political class in Palestine truly trying to internationalize the conflict not so simply by going to the UN popular resistance reconciliation, other forms that is a different strategy which would for some time mean no negotiations, in fact a crisis with Israel and probably a real crisis with the US Palestinian leadership I don't think President Abbas at this point is going, I don't think that's where he wants to go I think he still views the UN move as a move to strengthen his hand in negotiations whether with Netanyahu or with someone else I don't see it on his part as a gambit to completely upend the paradigm of the past but as I said it's out there and it may happen almost unwittingly because the Palestinians may be going down a path from which they can't they can't go back let's turn to our audience we have my colleague Tom who's also with the Middle East channel here helping us out we can go to Steve here we can just give you a name and affiliation please I'm Steve Barr I'm the editorial assistant of the General Palestine Studies my brief question or possible point for discussion has to do with the Yoshi's characterization of the PLO to me the PLO is not so much represents in a strong way the refugee constituency as it has in the past since Oslo to me that that relationship has been gradually severed and has come to be much more a body under the control of or under the influence of Israel and the United States and their ability to influence the make up of that body including keeping Hamas off of it for example has enabled them to maintain this post Oslo equilibrium the paradigm shift that you suggested under which Israel begins negotiating with the PLO with the state of Palestine instead of the PLO would mean not only forfeiting the PLO status which was specifically designed as part of the Oslo agreements as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians but would also mean Israel implicitly recognizing the existence of the state of Palestine which has been here to for totally anathema to Israel's policy positions so what would be the implications from that end of that sort of paradigm shift how would it benefit Israel why would Israel see it in its favor to be favorable to its interests to recognize the existence of the state of Palestine and forfeit in other words negotiating with a partner that it has been able to select and carefully groom to make sure that the person sitting on the cross from it on the table on the other end of the table doesn't go too far beyond certain limits shall we say okay sorry do you want to start on that? maybe you'll see first you're certainly right to point out that the image of the PLO has changed since Oslo and as co-editor of Bitter Lemons I'm constantly encounter experts who confuse the PA and the PLO in their writing they assert that the PA is Israel's negotiating partner and they seem to make no distinction whatsoever between them but nevertheless the PLO is Israel's negotiating partner and not the PA the only thing the PA can talk about is with Barak let's say to discuss other security issues and the like and the distinction is maintained quite closely whether the PLO has become a lackey of Israel in the US as you're implying is something I have not perceived but you're free to comment on it now why recognize the state of Palestine and forfeit the PLO as a partner look if you believe that occupation of all or parts of the West Bank is far more a burden on Israel than it is an asset if you believe that the occupation is eating up Israel from inside if you believe that we can withdraw from the West Bank including the Jordan Valley and find and get Palestinians to agree to viable security provisions that compensate us for giving up strategic depth as I do as I believe all of this and if you believe that we're not going to be able to bridge the gaps on the narrative issues anytime soon and yet we all have to get on with life Palestinians have to go on with building their state and Israelis have to get on with being with really becoming a Jewish and a Democratic state that doesn't occupy its neighbors then you see a deal here then you see a deal here because then it makes sense for Israel to recognize the state of Palestine on borders on agreed borders and to withdraw even if we don't end the issues that only the PLO is appointed and qualified to negotiate now the PLO is our partner under Aslo but it's fair to say that if indeed the PLO which represents the Palestinians in the UN not the PA the PLO goes to the UN and says recognize the state then it's fair for Israel to say okay this is the end of Aslo as we know it because we were because the state is not mentioned in the Aslo agreement only final status is mentioned this has now been made a FETA complete we are free to address the state of Palestine now again state of Palestine accredited by the UN even as an observer state based on the 67 borders is not something that Netanyahu is likely to recognize but there are plenty of people in Israel who think that's not a bad idea to change the paradigm in this way but again I don't see the current Israeli government as a candidate for doing any of this frankly I don't think Netanyahu knows how he will respond to observer state status in the UN what he's going to do about it there are all kinds of options on the table annex the Jordan Valley annex the settlement blocks cut off all relations do absolutely nothing and frankly I I think Netanyahu is more the consummate politician who gets up in the morning and just tries to figure out how he's going to spin through the day and he hasn't decided this yet but again we're living in a very changing Middle East and this is some you don't look just at the Palestinian issue you look at what's going on in a much bigger circle around us and it's very difficult to decide today what you're going to do if and when to follow up on that sure and I think the one interesting thing is just in the context of the Arab Spring is whether the Palestine Liberation Organization and the PA are any more sustainable than Mubarak or any of the other regimes but Rob please not going to address that but on your question you know we could talk for a long time about the status of the PLO certainly it's not been an effective body certainly it's not been representative for many years and I think Palestinians would be many Palestinians would be the first to admit it but it has a symbolic symbolic weight and I think that's why there was such criticism at first among some particularly in the diaspora about the Palestinians move seeking to have recognition of the Palestinian state I think Palestinians will not I don't think president Abbas can afford to and again I don't think he wants to substitute the Palestinian state as a negotiating part of Israel may say you do it but I think the Palestinians still have the right to decide who's going to negotiate on their behalf and my assumption is that they'll insist that it be the PLO I just met a few days ago with people from Hamas who are not even in the PLO and yet they were adamant that the PLO had to remain the absolute representative and it couldn't be you couldn't replace it with the Palestinian state of course they harbor the hope of entering the PLO but beyond it they see the symbolic value and it would be I think a very risky move for the current leadership to say well we're accepting the Palestinian state mind you Palestinian state already existed was proclaimed in 1988 many countries recognize it that didn't change the fact that the PLO still is the one and of course if the UN recognize it it changes its status but the PLO in my view will still remain the one that would negotiate on the Israeli part I always I felt now as Yossi said it's not something perhaps that Netanyahu would or could have done I felt the smartest move that the Israelis could have taken months ago was to say not only do we not mind that the Palestinians are doing at the UN we're going to be the first country to recognize the state of Palestine but of course now let's sit down and negotiate border security etc but you want to call yourself a state fine you're a state you know now deal with and I think it could have even been smart to say now now you should deal with building your state the existential issues refugees and everything we could deal with once you've established yourself as a genuine state so build up and now let's negotiate like two states you know border let's have a border negotiation over where the border will be and sort of diffuse the emotional aspects of the crisis I think that would have been a clever move on the Israeli party would have completely pulled the rug from underneath I mean what what benefit would the Palestinians have had to have recognition of a state if Israel accepted it to do something that Israel would find antagonistic so it would have taken you know completely burst the bubble deflated it but I think I mean there are many reasons why Israel didn't do it but I could see very strong benefit for them to try to turn this into what Yossi just described as a state-to-state negotiation where issues like refugees you know as Yossi said how many states are calling for their citizens to be settled elsewhere so that would have given I think Israel a stronger hand that shows not to do it for other reasons Do you want to add anything Nadia or next? No I mean just like one thing which is basically they were worried about being members of the ICG and other things that if ICG I don't know I don't know that we'd admit them I CC I mean what an ICG too with the ICC and others so they will be tried as war criminals so they were worried about that too great my name is Seidar I have a quick question for Rob you said that the next year will be dead what about the year after assuming that Obama finds reelection well it's not just Obama it's also what happens in Israel and Palestine I think I mean dead as both of my colleagues here have said you can't predict what's going to happen and to say that we're giving up on a year is a pretty tall order I think things need to be done they just simply the things that need to be done don't until having the two parties negotiate I think there's much more productive things that can be done again in terms of getting the palace in house on order changing our policy towards Palestinian unity changing the policy towards towards Gaza trying to see whether things could be done on the ground that would actually begin to lessen Israel's footprint even more I mean some of the issues that Nadia mentioned you could see that and at the same time use the time to think of a different approach to what's going to be done you know I say a year because of Obama's because of the reelection but you know it's a little bit arbitrary but just use this time to do things to try to avoid the worst which is renewal of violence collapse of institutions whether it's Gaza in the West Bank renewed violence and use the time to prevent the worst things to try to shore up what you can to change the approach on some core issues as I said on the Palestinian unification side and think about what you're going to do next and you know if Obama is re-elected then we'll have to see what happens in Israel unfortunately I don't want to be more pessimistic than I was but if I listen to Yossi not only does he say nothing could happen to Netanyahu but there's no reason to believe Netanyahu wouldn't be re-elected so we're going to have to learn to live with perhaps a new Netanyahu coalition and try to figure out a way with him to move forward how are we difficult people may think it will be I don't know Obama we don't do speculations I don't think he's given much thought to that I think his first thought is to get re-elected so I think we'll take three questions just so we can get everyone we start with Khaled in the back oh Khaled and Gindi the Brookings Institution your point about why Israel didn't sort of try to preempt the Palestinian UN bid by simply accepting and pull the work out from underneath them I'd like to hear actually the reactions from all three panelists could one reason be simply that Abbas has called everyone's bluff and that at the end of the day both Israel and the United States were not as supportive of a two state solution as they claimed that they in fact were what I mean by that is here they were presented with an opportunity to enshrine you know to register the two state solution with the UN officially as it's being sort of eroded on the ground and when push came to shove Obama who has said that a two state solution is a vital national security interest of the United States he chose instead of the outcome he chose the process and he even mentioned that in his speech that it's not the goal that matters it's how you get there and so by sort of prioritizing the process over the substance process over the outcome and now we see Congress is cutting funding we see you know Israel sort of also I think ambivalent on the funding issue or at least not weighing in strongly doesn't that suggest that at the end of the day they're somewhat ambivalent about a two state solution and that Abbas is effectively called their bluff let's just we'll take two questions so you guys can all answer that let's take this gentleman second round I'm Abandara Tunisi I'm an intern at the National Democratic Institute a lot of the discussion today has been based on the assumption that there's going to be a successful outcome from this Palestinian bid for statehood my question is how does that paradigm shift that we talked about today materialize with the likely failure of the UN bid and how would we see that in the short term in the next five and ten years or ten years from now okay and then first row here I'm Tom Getman a former NGO executive in the Middle East and was part of the observer team in South Africa during the sanctions legislation period and I still spend four months a year there Ambassador Oren this morning wrote a very deflecting article op-ed about Tom Friedman and Kristoff and other authors saying that Israel is on a very down dangerous downward slope sorry MacDeecy, Professor MacDeecy said there's a huge change on college campuses with progressive Jews not towing the party line anymore is there a possibility that restiveness on the campuses in the synagogues and in the churches the United States will have a role to play like happened during the South Africa period where there really were surprises so we have three easy questions whether has Obama chosen process over outcome has he prioritized the moribund peace process over the actual stated policy the U.S. of a two state solution I think the implicit question about the failure of the U.N. bid is if these expectations are built up so high and nothing comes of it what's going to actually happen and then Israel is increasingly isolated where is the American community going to stand so Nadia do you want to talk first about Khalid's question very quickly I think I actually believe that both administration and the Israelis believe in the two state solution whether they don't have the vision of how to reach it and they believe it strongly because they hate the alternative which is the disappearance of a two state solution and having one state where everybody is equal and one man one vote so they don't want that because it's no longer Jewish or democratic and you know that and also the fact again I stress that America has to stand up to stand with Israel no matter what and you hear this from administration officials that they have to be seen as the friend that will stick up with Israel in the sea of states that against them and the isolation losing allies like Turkey and Egypt now so no matter what even if whatever even if you don't know the details of the resolution they will still vote with Israel on this particular issue second is the Palestinians know it is a symbolic move I don't think there is high expectation there everybody know but again out of frustration out of lack of belief that the negotiation will materialize into anything tangible they decided to go to the UN and I think to have the whole world community behind you it gives you some kind of momentum and it gives you just a card to strengthen your hand in the negotiation and this is what I'm saying I'm going there it's not the end of the process but if the Israelis agree to our term which is freezing settlement 67 border it will be willing to negotiate tomorrow so the fact that they wanted to go to the UN it wasn't just because they realized that actually when Abbas goes back that they're going to have something and the Palestinians will say well we got a state now they know even probably the Israelis can stop Abbas from crossing the from Jordan to Ramallah because they in charge of everything so I think the fact that they do it just to create some kind of dynamic on the ground I think was the motive behind it and I agree probably the Palestinians didn't think of a bigger strategy what's going to happen when it fails who's going to be with them who's going to be against them what's the long term strategy five years from now I don't think they actually reached that stage yet I think they still on this take it one step further and if we get the General Assembly and we get acceptance to the ICC maybe that will be something that they can use luckily we haven't seen a five year strategy from Washington either so it's not the Palestinians that are the only ones without a strategy that's true sorry what was the third question oh yeah no I don't really see this changing the narrative is very pro-Israel no matter what in America it's going to take a long time I will say decades maybe 50 years maybe I don't know I'm completely pessimistic when it comes to that it's not going to be pro-Palestinians it's not even going to be pro-Israel peace as such that is the interest of the survival of the Jewish state dependent fundamentally on the fact that they have a Palestinian state they don't see that there is a movement and it's growing it's not as strong as in Europe but the Israelis use it to the maximum to show that this is and they link it to anti-Israel anti this government and it becomes even now that in Washington you cannot speak anti-Likud let alone anti-Israel it's really been framed from a right-wing point of view I suppose even to the general interest of the Jewish state so I don't really see this gathering any momentum anytime soon Yossi do you want to comment on process versus outcome or yes I do why not call Abu Mazen's block at the UN by welcoming to the states well one substantive one one substantive opposition or doubt that is legitimate from the standpoint of an Israeli who backs away from this is that you once you start internationalizing this conflict it's a slippery slope and you don't know where it's going to end but that Israel is certainly has far less support internationally than the Palestinians do whether it's the UN or other bodies and leaving aside American public opinion I agree with you on what you said and that so that therefore we have to keep this as a direct bilateral negotiations with American involvement in which as you said earlier in the correct Palestinian view Israel has the upper hand so I mean this is an understandable hesitance source of hesitation secondly Netanyahu understands perfectly well that if the UN does approve something it will be generally understood to be even if not specifically mentioned to be along the 67 lines and he doesn't accept the 67 lines he simply doesn't so this is another reason why he's going to pose it as for Obama someone who has championed the international arena and engagement and so on and so forth well obviously there are electoral considerations in his opposition even going back to February in the settlement resolution but beyond that this administration has made just about every possible mistake regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict and one could list this as another one do you want me to look at the other let me just deal with the gentleman from the National Democratic Institute how do you bring about a paradigm shift in the next five years look the very fact that you asked the question pleases me because that's really what I want to leave you with is the notion that we need a paradigm shift and we have then even if you don't agree with my paradigm and there's plenty of meat there not to agree with I understand but at least we have to start looking and stop being so hypocritically hypocritical advocates of pointless negotiations from the Israeli stand to the extent that there is international and or Arab support for a new state to state paradigm but a win-win one not a one-sided one a win-win one I would suggest that you will be giving the moderate Israeli public something to campaign on as matters stand that the peace camp in Israel has been totally delegitimized because it's advocating what we all agree is totally hypocritical and pointless okay whether it's coming from Ashton or from a Shelly-Yakhimovich or Yasisari it's a shrinking peace camp you can't even find the leaders but no but there is such a camp there are plenty of rational and moderate people they're also represented by Kadima which Cipri Livni also is just again advocating you know I almost reached an agreement with Abou Allah we could just sit down again we could do it give us something new give us something to point to and say okay here's a new idea there's support for it out there and this is a much better way to address and attack the position of the existing government do you want to add to that? I got nothing to add alright let's take two more questions gentlemen right here hello my name is Mina I'm from Egypt Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth and I'm coming from the New Egypt my reading for New Egypt actually I'm not seeing any positive in the New Egypt right now we have like three major topics on the public debate which is the first one, the sectarian problem right now and the economic and the Arab-Israeli conflict two months ago there was an interview for two of the presidency candidate in Egypt which is the first one, Haizem Salah Abou Suma'il the Islamic candidate and the second one is Hamdeen Sabahi and the question was when we should declare the war against Israel the debate now is more far from any rational or can I ask you to phrase it as a question though? can I ask you to get towards your question? yeah yeah yeah well okay the thing is I have a lot to share but my question is what kind of strategy that we are going to deal with the New Egypt and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict okay thanks and we'll take Mark in the back Yossi we've seen in the West Bank recently a series of incidents they've been going on for a while between settlers and Palestinians and most recently a series of follow-on incidents between settlers in the Israeli army is it your assessment that these will escalate how important are they how closely is the Netanyahu government looking at it is it a cause for maybe moving the Netanyahu government in a way that they might not go before so Rob do you want to talk about Egypt for a moment and then we can turn to the and I think even in President the question was the other question is it really a New Egypt the one area where I think I think it was pretty obvious from the outset was once you have public opinion you're taking a bigger role in the making of public policy then by definition attitudes towards Israel and Egypt's policy towards the Israeli process towards Gaza will have to change to some extent and over time I think it's going to change in a more pronounced way I think Egypt will be more like Turkey than more like Erdogan to Turkey than like Mubarak's Egypt and that's a factor that I think everyone has taken into account I don't think Egypt has an interest certainly not the current leadership in breaking ties with Israel going toward and even questioning the Camp David Accords but on issues that are going to resonate with their public they're going to have to be careful not to be viewed as at odds with overwhelming sentiments I think that's something that but it's not just true of Egypt I think it's going to be true and already is true of most of the countries in the region and that's one could argue is this going to be detrimental because it means that it's going to be harder to make a deal or more positive and ultimately regimes are going to be more representative of their people I tend towards the latter view great and Yossi can you address sort of where do things stand right now between settlers IDF in the West Bank and just to address the Egypt issue for the Israeli standpoint if I may with all of my admiration for the new region we don't know how this is going to end we don't know how this is going to end in a single Arab country that is undergoing revolution and so it's extreme and nor can we have any influence on it so it's extremely difficult to devise strategies other than what Rob said that you clearly public the street has a totally new significance but it's extremely difficult to devise strategies for dealing from the Israeli standpoint for dealing with this when we don't know how it's going to end and when it hasn't ended what most concerns Israelis today is Sinai Sinai Gaza negative complex but these are tactical issues these are not so much strategic issues now Mark you talk about the price tag settlers or the hill youth the price tag settlers look I'm constantly fascinated by the capacity of the old guard settler leadership to roll their eyes and say we don't know where these people came from and we condemn what they do and so on and so forth but we don't know who they are this is the natural outcome of the settler movement second or third generation fourth generation could be worse now the Israeli security establishment is gradually taking this more seriously to the extent that it's already labeled this an underground and labeled some of it terrorism but they really they really haven't been able to put their hands on these guys because the settler infrastructure in the west bank is feels far more at home there than the IDF does and of course there are clear rules of the game whereby Palestinian security organizations don't touch this issue and don't deal with them I would suggest that if and if and when what are we seeing here we're seeing the extreme end of the ideological settler movement which is is setting trying to set limits on what the Israeli government can do and in effect establish itself almost as a separate political or a separate functioning entity in the west bank and taking steps aimed at making life increasingly unpleasant for Palestinians in the hopes that they will go away where this is going to lead I don't know if there is any agreement if and when there is an agreement on removing settlements what we see here is a clear indication that there will be bloodshed between Israelis this is a clear indication and it's frightening enough that I can even imagine a situation in which again in this hypothetical situation where we've actually reached some sort of agreement and we're evacuating settlements I can see an imaginary situation in which Israel says either to these guys in these hilltop settlements we're not going to mess with you we'll leave you for the Palestinians to deal with which is extremely dangerous and volatile or I can imagine when I talk to my fellow security officials and mention this they're horrified but I can imagine a situation that welcomes an international force to help it get rid of these people and thereby reduce the dangers of not civil war but of strife between Israelis that's how far this has come and as matters stand with this government and with the total lack of a peace process or prospects for a peace process this is going to get worse well there you have it that's what to keep your eyes on I want to thank everyone so much for coming on this rainy morning I want to thank our distinguished panelists Yossi Alfer, Rob Malley and Nadia Bilbasi and to New America, to my colleagues Tom Cutch and Stephanie Gunther so thank you, we'll see you next time