 yesterday. And our sympathies, of course, go out to those Afghans who suffered, as well as to the Afghan people who have been struggling with the problems of insurgency and terrorism now for many decades. All the same, I think it only brings the conversation that we're going to have this morning into sharper focus because the absence of the problem in the national debate does not signify any diminution of its significance, both for the Afghan people and for U.S. policy going forward. I want to, on your behalf and mine, extend a special welcome to our panelists this morning. We have a great panel, three U.S. ambassadors, Salmi Khalidzad, who was our ambassador of Afghanistan to Iraq to the United Nations and is now the president of Griffin Partners, a public policy firm in Washington. A special welcome to Dan Feldman, who was the special representative of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the State Department and is now a partner at Aiken Gump, a law firm in Washington. Welcome, Dan. And of course, a special welcome to my old colleague and co-conspirator Carnegie, Ambassador Hussain Kani, who was formerly Pakistan's ambassador to the United States and is now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institution. Hussain and I actually have the pleasure of publishing the very first Carnegie product many, many years ago when I came to this institution. And last but of course not the least, I want to welcome Jeff Eggers, who worked with me on this paper and was the co-author in every sense of the word, both for the paper and for the project that led up to it. So a very special thanks to Jeff and I hope this will be the first of many things we could do together at Carnegie in elsewhere. In a few minutes, I will yield the floor to Jeff so that he can begin the conversation with our guests. But before I do that, I want to just spend a few minutes walking over some of the key themes of the paper. I'm not going to regurgitate in any detail the minutiae and the manuscript, but I want to reprise some of the key themes for the benefit of those of you who haven't had the chance to look at it before this morning's conversation. I think it's commonplace now to state that Afghanistan is the longest war in America's history. Very often that proposition comes laced with a sense of burden. And those burdens obscure the fact that after 17 years of war, much has actually been achieved in Afghanistan. The state has been reconstituted. The Afghan armed forces have become a national institution and the Afghan economy has begun to enjoy slow but nonetheless positive growth. And that's a testament to both American and foreign contributions over the last decade and a half. Having said that, however, there's still much that is at risk in Afghanistan. Political weaknesses are pervasive both at the apex of government and throughout the country. The economy is struggling, and especially so after the international withdrawals in the last few years. And the Taliban insurgency continues undimaged. So evidence of what the insurgents could do in Kabul yesterday. In this context, a critical issue is what will US policy towards Afghanistan be going forward. Much of the debate has really been about the numbers of troops that are present in country, the numbers of troops we ought to send to Afghanistan, and of course the cost of the campaign. But unfortunately, there's been very little discussion about what our objectives ought to be in Afghanistan going forward. The report that we have done is really intended to bring the issue of objectives back to center stage. And in the report, the key argument that we make is that US objectives going forward must really focus on protecting the gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan so far. And toward that end, we ought to consciously redouble our energies towards seeking a political settlement. This might seem counterintuitive and outside the pale of the times, but let me just spend a few minutes telling you why we argued towards that conclusion. It was a core presumption that underlay the work in this report. And that presumption was that both the Trump administration and the international community are unlikely to make the contributions necessary to secure either a decisive military victory in Afghanistan or pursue an open-ended conflict for as far as the eye can see. We also presumed that a complete disengagement of Afghanistan would be disastrous. If these were the two bookends within which policy has to be made, the unlikely hood of a military victory, the unsustainability of an open-ended conflict, as well as the perils of complete disengagement, then one was left with no alternative but to start thinking about some kind of a political settlement. With the only issues remaining to be resolved pertaining to the circumstances of the settlement and the terms of the settlement. We also thought that the present moment was potentially favorable for exploring this possibility because of the likelihood that U.S. troops' strength would be increased, however, marginally, that the administration was likely to provide enhanced authorities for combat support to the Afghan national security forces. And that the international community could be convinced to sustain its support for Afghanistan so long as there was a strategy that looked seriously at the possibility of ending the conflict. Of course, if any of these variables were to change, the likelihood of the possibility of reaching a settlement, especially a settlement in favorable terms, becomes either harder or impossible. But we thought that this was a moment where one at least ought to try. Now having said that, just because a settlement has attracted us and might even be the virtuous evolution of this conflict doesn't imply that a settlement is possible. If the Taliban come to the belief that the United States is exiting Afghanistan irrevocably, or that a military victory remains within their reach, that incentives to engage in a settlement obviously decrees. Consequently, the paper emphasizes a two track policy for the administration and the two tracks are strong continued support for the Afghan state, coupled with a revitalized effort at seeking or exploring some kind of reconciliation. The objective of sustaining support for the Afghan state is really in order to build a viable Afghan national security force that, at least in the near term, can help arrest the loss of territorial control and give the government some of the bargaining chips acquired should a settlement become possible. And the objective of revitalizing our efforts at reconciliation are aimed at making a settlement the targeted objective of policy rather than simply the incidental effect of other policies that we pursue in Afghanistan. To make this happen, we flag six specific things that the United States ought to consider in concert with the subcontractments. First, we do need a unified civil military strategy that we argue ought to be centered on an empowered US ambassador and couple because a policy of this complexity and magnitude cannot be managed remotely from Washington. Second, the United States ought to consider becoming a direct participant in the conversation with the Taliban. We cannot maintain the fiction that this is not our war. It's purely an Afghan war with the Taliban. The third is we ought to encourage our Afghan partners to engage in a national dialogue with all constituencies in Afghanistan to explore what the terms of a possible settlement could be. It's not a settlement of course the United States can impose on Afghanistan. It's a settlement that has to grow organically from the preferences of the country. Fourth, we ought to take seriously the possibility of targeting the Taliban shooter in Pakistan because as long as the Taliban leadership believe that they essentially have an unimpaired sanctuary, the incentives to engage in a conversation with the Taliban or the United States are really money. Further, we have to press Pakistan on the sanctuary itself because Pakistan certainly in its own self-interest ought to find a solution to the Afghan problem that mitigates its security challenges, not exacerbates them. And the best way forward is really to think of a partnership with Afghanistan rather than the proxies that challenge the Afghanistan. And finally, we have to revisit regional cooperation towards Afghanistan. But regional cooperation is really a lagging variable, not a leading variable. You will not get a solution in Afghanistan through regional cooperation. But if the United States has a sensible and understandable policy towards Afghanistan, it is possible to bring together the region to support some kind of settlement. Having said all this, I want to end with the word of caution. This report is not the last word on U.S. policy towards Afghanistan. This is a report that is intended to shape the debate at this moment. We have to come back based on what the administration chooses going forward and based on what happens in Afghanistan if these policies are implemented to reexamine where the premises on which these recommendations are based are sensible enough. But that's a book for the future. For the moment, we believe we've at least laid out a framework for thinking about the problem and some ideas that hopefully will help us exit the log jam that we currently find ourselves in. So with those words, I want to yield the floor to Jeff to carry this conversation with the distinguished panel here. Thank you, Jeff. Thank you, Ashley. And good morning, everyone. Welcome to Carnegie. It's good to see a full room here, and it's particularly nice to have such an exceptional panel. I look forward to a great conversation. I don't think the next 50 minutes of hearing from them and then another half an hour or so of hearing your questions is going to go slowly. I think this is going to go very quickly. It's going to be very interesting. Obviously, Afghanistan's making news in Kabul today, as Ashley mentioned, news of a bombing. But Afghanistan hasn't made a lot of news in Washington. There was some expectation that the president's visit to Europe and the NATO summit last week might culminate in some sort of policy announcement and yet it was more about trade and Article 5 and so forth. And we're led to believe through our sources in the media that the administration continues this debate. So I want to put it to our panel, many of whom know this issue quite intimately. If you were sitting not here with us at Carnegie but in perhaps the Oval Office or the Situation Room, given that this administration is debating the policy now, what would you advise President Trump at this point in time? Who would like to start? We'll just give them five or so minutes to kind of give this policy council and then we'll go into some questions. Zal, please. Well, first I want to thank Ashley and you and Carnegie for doing the report for the meetings you had before the report was published and for convening this meeting. I think Afghanistan deserves more public attention and debate here than it has received or has been receiving in recent time. And so therefore this is in itself a contribution. Second, on the sad day for Afghanistan and for all of us concerned about the issue of terrorism, I want to offer my condolences to the Afghan people and to all who have been affected by this terrorist barbaric bombing that took place. Estimates are that as many as maybe over 300 may have been injured and perhaps as 80 or so people may have been killed, mostly civilians by all accounts so far. But there is a fog of war and so on the aftermath reports may be different. Now with regard to the Oval Office, I think when we have a new administration it's on an issue as important as the way Ashley described it, which I agree you have to look at both objectives and strategy. The objective that you inherited, do they remain valid? Do you revalidate it? Or do you change the objective? Or if you validate the objective, the strategy in need of adjustment or change or if you embrace new objective then what is the implication for the strategy? And I believe that we haven't had, I don't know about the inside administration although I'm aware of the kind of debate that there is, but about the whole set of both objectives and strategy. It seems that the focus both publicly and maybe inside is on troop numbers or the troops, the answer and I believe that that is the wrong way to think about it. Troops are important and I would say a word or two about the logic of having some additional forces being sent to Afghanistan. But I believe that precluding the objective that we have had, Afghanistan being a sanctuary for terrorists with reach to the United States that would target the United States, that's the objective that we had embraced after 9-11 and that remained valid. I think it should remain valid and the way to do it is either through a military victory or enough of a progress that leads to a negotiated settlement that Ashley has described. And I believe that we have always said that ultimately there has to be an end to this war and the war could end with a negotiated settlement. In fact President Karzai often mentioned that he was told by President Obama that we don't regard the Taliban as such an enemy and therefore a negotiated settlement with the Taliban is an option that we would like to see pursue. President Trump has spoken much more negatively about the Taliban publicly as he did on Memorial Day, where he described them as the enemy of all of civilization. But that doesn't mean that the goal of seeking a negotiated settlement is abandoned. So the question is given where we are, where perhaps with the too rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces to a lower number, the balance that shifted on the ground in Afghanistan in the last couple of years, let's remember that the Afghans have taken responsibility for the fight. Our role is in support of them. That's a big change for some of us like myself who was involved in Afghanistan right after 9-11 in the current period. There was no Afghan institution called an Afghan National Army. So the fact that now Afghans are taking on the fight, paying a very high price for taking responsibility for the fight, I do believe that the deterioration in the balance needs to be addressed with additional support both in terms of numbers and in terms of the authorities that the commander has. I'm actually surprised that already some of the authorities that should have been delegated to the commander may not have been delegated yet. That should happen and should happen very quickly in my view and the issue with regard to numbers that need to be resolved and I for one would not question the commander's recommendation who has said that in order to prevent deterioration and shift the balance against the insurgents, he needs three to five thousand additional forces. But that's not in my judgment inconsistent with the desire for a political settlement because the three to five thousand plus more authorities plus enablers including the air power I think can, I mean looked at it in great detail but I do believe that it can arrest the deterioration in the balance against the government. And that provides the context, the environment in which you can more seriously pursue negotiations, two things in addition before I stop. One is that as long as the Taliban believe or the other groups and the situation is complex it's not only the Taliban now we have the ISIS problem that the time is on their side that they are winning that the balance is continuously shifting in their favor their interest in negotiation diminishes especially any kind of negotiations that actually said preserve the successes that has been achieved against it. So the stalemate has to be one that doesn't deteriorate against the government if it's a stalemate that perhaps deteriorates against the other side would be even better that's one it might be mixed negotiations more likely than if they thought they're winning. Second issue is the issue of sanctuary that and I believe this is one of the most important issues as to why the war has dragged on I mean there are issues internal to Afghanistan perhaps we will get to that to the government to the political elite the divisions the kind of limitations in terms of progress on rule of law I mean corruption we could we can talk about all of that and those are important issues but my judgment the key factor for why this war has gone on for as long as it has is the issue of sanctuary when insurgents have a base outside when the leadership can live in safety when they can get trained when they can recover when they can go to hospitals when they get injured when they can get resources financial it it's much harder to and it takes a lot longer to defeat such an insurgency if that wasn't the case so the if I was advising the administration I would say that not only after review the afghan circumstances what the issues are not only the military issue with regard to how you make sure things do not deteriorate but how do you resolve or deal with the with the sanctuary issue and I for one believe that we need to put both a lot negative such as the steps that Ashley recommended we do not accept that the sanctuary is a sanctuary as far as we are concerned if we and our Afghan allies get attacked from a base or by groups that have bases on the other side that we do not regard that to be a safe haven that we should treat as safe haven and therefore not to go after them and we even and their friends Obama we went after one of the leader Mullah Mansour so but I would put I would take additional steps and we will get to that to on the negative side but I would also put a lot more positive things on the table with Pakistan should it cooperate I think Pakistan has legitimate interests and concerns in Afghanistan they need to be addressed they need to be talked about I've always said to my friends to the left he should be on the right actually but you know he knows more than anyone else because Pakistan is communicating a couple of papers to the US government it's concerns about Afghanistan those papers need to be made public so that one can see with their concerns and sort of those papers contain their real concern so we can we can we should and the Afghans should engage on legitimate Pakistani concern and Pakistan is an important country and we it's in our interest to have a reasonable good relationship with it how do we incentivize Pakistan to do so so as a president a noble office do you accept the goal of precluding a return to terrorists in Afghanistan we can reach the United States and those are we can name them which groups they are we have we got the Akhani network as a terrorist group the Akhani are a deadly element in the combination that the attack targets Afghanistan they are based in Pakistan Taliban or extremist group based headquarters in Pakistan ISIS is more complex the more space we that has been created by the too rapid withdrawal and by having an adequate number of forces based on what the commanders say the problem has gotten worse now one last point and I'm sorry I've taken too long the question is that some say this has taken too long how long are we going to do this for if you do not abandon the objective which we could debate should what should we embrace some other sort of objective but if you do not what options do we have is there a better alternative to strengthening the Afghan state I know that administration and during the campaign like it happens all the time I've been a part of a couple of campaigns where this was an issue that we don't do state building we do the nation building but in some circumstances that's the best option unfortunately because if a piece of territory is strategically important for solving a problem that is important you really have either you coexist with a problem in that strategic space or you solve it you occupy it preclude prevent what you think is undesirable or you help locals do it and I think through the two administrations I think Bush and President Obama we have managed to build some institutions that they have taken the fight on our casualties I wish they would be zero but they are very small the costs are much lower financially than they were at times perhaps they can be made lower through more effective burden sharing we haven't talked about that what allies can do where I would put more emphasis than perhaps have been put at times in the past given that I all that I have said is a really sharp look at the issue of how do we engage with Pakistan how do we influence shape Pakistan's trajectory what does it take because if we don't Pakistan continues on the path with regard to sanctuaries that it is it's going to be it's going to be very hard to resolve this issue in any meaningful way in the immediate future it will take a long time to harden the Afghan state to the degree that it can protect all of its territory and can withstand efforts at kind of people coming who are based in Pakistan to create a peace here so it's a it's a it's a big challenge I'd like the administration to make a deliberate decision not to make a review that it isn't really confident in that it would have to review it again in a year as it has happened at times in the past so I'm not sooner maybe better but a good deliberated strategy will be even better than and then it being sooner but but the administration does face big questions so that's that's what I conduct okay thank you Ambassador Khalilzad's prescription revalidate the foundational objectives additional troops to reinforce a deteriorating security situation and a bit of carrots and sticks approach to address the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan a lot more carrot and sticks okay not a bit more and we'll get we will get more into that let's go to the audiences right and give Ambassador Hakane your chance. Thank you very much first of all let me just say that Jeff and Ashley both of you I'm very grateful for you bringing me back to Carnegie where I first arrived in 2002 and and started my life here in Washington DC in my first exile and I wasn't being rude when I was looking at my iPhone I was actually searching for a piece I recalled I did while I was here at Carnegie and I found it and it was published by the center for American Progress because the New York Times turned it down the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post turned it down they all thought it was too pessimistic and this was published on the 12th of December 2003 and it was titled a forgotten war and it began with the words two years after the U.S. dropped its first bombs over Afghanistan in President Bush's global war against terrorism the Taliban are reportedly regrouping in the lawless tribal region straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border then I went on to explain how the Taliban will become a problem etc etc nobody believed me at that time obviously which is why it was on the on a website of the Center for American Progress and not in the major newspapers I wish people had read it and taken it more seriously that was just a blurb so that you know that what I say comes with some understanding of the region which is not always understood in Washington DC at that time even Zalmi Khalilzad was not on the same side as me in terms of understanding the situation and I hope that it won't take me 14 years to persuade Dan Feldman of the same of the same hard facts that I am talking about so here's what I'm going to say to President Trump if I if I get a chance to walk into the whole office and talk to him I understand that it has to be shot and here's how I will begin I will say I will begin by saying Mr. President you more than anybody else in this room knows that it is sometimes not possible to get a divorce unless you are married you have to say you have to say that to tell death do a spot to be able to get to the point where you can actually say now I'm invoking the prenup and that is how Afghanistan works the only way the US will be able to get out of Afghanistan is by saying we have no intention of getting out of Afghanistan the more you have these timelines and by the way Dan might recall in my last days in the ambassador there was this talk was going on that was 2011 talk was already going on about you know how we can have a timeline for withdrawal and I said whatever else you do don't give a timeline and the reason is because Mullah Umar's famous words we have the time and the Americans have the watches so I said all you are doing is by giving a deadline you are making them use the stopwatch feature of their watches of your watches and they understand that so all they know is they're going to wait you out and you're just telling them how long they have to wait you out the more you commit the more likely it is that you will be able to get out so that's one thing that you have to understand second you can't build a future without understanding the past you have to understand what has happened in Afghanistan over the decades perhaps over the centuries Afghanistan may have mineral resources but those mineral resources are going to be extracted by multinational corporations only once that country has peace right now every protagonist in Afghanistan is going to end up being subsidized by somebody or the other the Taliban are subsidized they are armed trained equipped funded by someone you know how that someone is I don't have to identify for you so you have to understand that whoever is going to fight the Taliban will also have to be subsidized and whether you want to do it or not you have to understand it will have to happen otherwise the Taliban win all wars end in a political settlement so Afghanistan is not going to be different however the Taliban are not normal actors the Taliban have a different world view in their world view time is not of importance worldly goods are not of importance they have been ideologically indoctrinated a certain way they are willing to give up a lot more anybody who is willing to blow himself up is not does not think the same way as those who fight to protect the lives of their children and their family it's a different world view so understand that negotiating them is not going to be like negotiating with other groups insurgent groups and other nations that you have engaged with the Soviet Union with the communists they at least were as materialistic as you might have been and so incentives could have worked these people have a different world view so yes there should be negotiations but bear that in mind the way to get them to negotiation is when they feel that the consequences of not negotiating are going to be even worse than the fight that they are fighting the same goes for their sponsors and supporters there is a presumption in Washington DC which we might hear again today that you know Pakistan does not yield well to pressure and by the way an aside here I think that this panel would have been better served if an official representative of the Pakistani position was also here because I mean I am on the outs on that one it's very difficult for me to say Taliban what Taliban you know which is what Pakistan's early response was sanctuary what sanctuary and I'm not in that camp so therefore I'm the wrong person at least for that perspective the fact remains that Pakistan does have a view on Afghanistan and I agree with Ambassador Khalid Pakistan's legitimate concerns about Afghanistan must be addressed Afghanistan should not be allowed to become a safe haven for negative operations against Pakistan Pakistan has had this fear for a long time that the Pashtuns of Pakistan and the Baloch of Pakistan can be instigated from Afghanistan but the fact of the matter is that history also shows that Afghanistan refused to play that role even in the 1965 and 1971 wars when Afghanistan was very close to India Afghanistan ended up siding with Pakistan in the wars it did not create the pincer so to my Pakistani friends I've been saying it for a long time haven't had any effect that maybe it's an imaginary fear that India will come and create a base but to protect Pakistan maybe there can be an agreement guaranteed by international powers that Afghanistan will not be home to Indian troops that's understandable that Afghanistan will not have any huge intelligence base but that's not what Pakistan has now ended up making its policy around because there are no Indian military bases in Afghanistan there are four consulates but Pakistanis have said many times that there are 44 consulates so if anybody exaggerates the threat by a factor of 11 then they really need to be dealt with by subtracting that factor of 11 and telling them hey guys we understand you have genuine concerns but imaginary concerns we can't deal with and lastly if Afghanistan is to have a so so yes you can talk about reassuring Pakistan but no one can reassure someone who exaggerates the threat by many factors by multiple factors there is no proxy war in Afghanistan going on right now in which Pakistan has to defend itself against an Indian proxy who is the Indian proxy this is not the civil war of the late 1990s in which there were allegations that the Indians and the Russians supported the Northern Alliance that the only other power other than the United States and NATO which are militarily openly present in Pakistan the only country that has a covert operation in Afghanistan of any magnitude is Pakistan and now Iran is interfering etc but all of that can be shut down only by being realistic about the threats not by acknowledging and accepting just because somebody says I'm threatened exaggerate those threats that said we have to come to the issue of the military posture look the military is Mr. President take many years you have General McMaster here you have other people here in this room these people took many years to become generals you don't become a second lieutenant one day and then in 10 years get promoted to general so you will have to wait for Afghanistan's military to have that 20-30 year period when there will be an SPD Corps and when the Afghan units will be sufficiently strong to be able to take on a rival that has the best military planners helping an insurgent army which is expendable to them it's a very easy thing you know usually military men when they are planning they think about how many people really lose but when you have a rag-tag bunch of radically ideologically motivated people then you don't have to worry about losses so it's a no loss war from the point of view of Pakistan's GHQ that's why it has dragged on for so long and so you have to help the Afghan military come to that level where it can sustain itself and be strong enough and then comes the question of what do you do with Pakistan my humble submission there is start by understanding what Pakistan wants stop indulging fantasies like Pakistan will help broker a peace with the Taliban because if it wanted to it could have done it in all these many years all it has to do is round up all the people when the current leader of the Taliban was elected he was elected in Peshawar all the Taliban leaders showed up to elect him well they can do the same exercise round them all up instead of electing a leader for electing a team of negotiators the fact that that hasn't happened means that it's not going to happen so in this report one of the best suggestions is try to talk directly to the Taliban however there will be problems there and in the end you may end up having to talk to individual commanders killing them away from the main body of Taliban and be prepared for new splinters to emerge what is ISIS in Afghanistan they call themselves ISIS in Khurasan ISIS in Khurasan is essentially a splinter of the Taliban what is the Haqqani network which has stolen my family name to my great dismay they are basically the Zadranis as you know Jalaluddin Haqqani is from the Zadran tribe he adopted the name Haqqani because it literally means the righteous and that's why his sons now have the name it's not his family name that's an important aside for people to know of course nowadays the ISI always talks about destroying the Haqqani network but they usually mean me and my friends rather than the network run by Siraj Haqqani so I think those will be the crucial elements of American policy towards Afghanistan number one help the Afghans get a strong military and stay there as long as it needs to be done of course one understands not waste your money but do it methodically and with the support of Europeans and others second stop giving deadlines and stop showing anxiety to leave you will not be able to leave the more anxiety you show and you will get less cooperation from the Taliban potential Taliban negotiators and groups that might be locked from the Taliban and also from the Pakistanis third have a frank conversation with Pakistan but understand that conversations in Islamabad are not the same thing as pressure many times Americans say we've pressured them enough no pressure means something that makes the other change their behavior just because some American diplomat went and got a little testy and said you guys aren't doing this and the other side said no no no what it's not even happening that is not pressure with all due respect so you have to figure out how to do that and I agree it has to be both incentives and pressure but you have to understand what do they really want and the longer you believe mythological fears the more you prolong them and finally you have to have a political settlement in Afghanistan but to do that you have to be much more aware of the political actors and what they are really doing don't let them act as school children who come in and complain about each other to the teacher but at the same time so don't get too meddlesome in Afghan domestic politics but at the same time don't just keep throwing money as the solution lastly nation building state building look one of the reasons why Afghanistan has become so complicated is because everybody who was trying to help Afghanistan was trying to do it from a very America centric perspective I once remember talking to a school teacher in Afghanistan who said I can't understand why they come to us with plans for elaborate schools with basketball courts and this and that etc we would be very happy with a roof, a blackboard, some chalk, a teacher and some books and so if we can get the beltway bandits I don't know if there are some present here my apologies and the various consultants and everybody who takes the money we can actually bring down the cost and get help Afghanistan build itself up and be a practical ally that can bring the Taliban to the point where they feel compelled to negotiate Gulbadeed Hikmatiyaar who rocketed Afghanistan, who destroyed Kabul in his effort to seize power first he got peeled off from Pakistan which was useful Pakistan stopped supporting him because they thought he was no longer useful they switched their support to the Taliban and then when he realized I'm getting too old I'm never going to have any power I'm not going to have absolute power in Kabul ever that's when he negotiated that can be the template for understanding how you will get the Taliban to negotiate instead of just having negotiations with anybody who says I am a Taliban representative Thank you So from Ambassador Hikani a prescription of prescience, a metaphor of matrimony and a desire for a more open-ended commitment and lastly a disclaimer that there's a drawn tribe has stolen his family name Dan can you do better? I don't know if I can do better but it is heartening first of all to see so many people turn out for an event that was forgotten 14 years ago and remains or seems even more forgotten at this point certainly given the very very few comments that were made about Afghanistan over the course of this presidential campaign cycle the few public comments that have been made by the White House to date you would never guess that it was America's longest running war one where we continue to invest in enormous amount of resources one where we have already spent $800 billion or more where 2400 Americans have been killed plus countless international forces and most importantly tens of thousands of Afghan people as we saw so tragically today and especially I think today given the reaffirmation of the sanctity of civilian life and the belief in Afghan government and in the international community that supports all of whom were targeted today in this just unconscionable act so thanks for being here thanks very much to Ashley and Jeff for putting together I think a very timely and important and cogent analysis of what the options are and it's heartening to me that I agree in at least some part with much of what's been said already certainly I think there's a degree of overlap between Zal and I in terms of the overarching approach to Afghanistan and even elements of what Ambassador Hakani had said I think are important where I think we certainly diverge is that this with Ambassador Hakani is that what I said what I heard as advice the president sounds like not only an open-ended commitment but a potentially endless commitment without a clear idea of as Zal said the strategy and what are a distillation of what the U.S. national security interests are in being there and then how we achieve them and to think at this point that what we couldn't achieve in terms of leverage by force in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table at a height of 140,000 troops and close to 100,000 Americans there that we could do with a few thousand more the numbers that are in the public domain if there are roughly 12,000 international forces there now even if we get up to 5,000 to 8,000 to 20,000 even if it's 25,000 as a fraction of what it was at its height and if that didn't succeed in creating leverage for the Taliban I don't see why this is still relatively minimal increase even though it's a 50-60% increase of U.S. troops but overall in terms of the numbers there would do much to change the underlying dynamic and as they both have alluded to and where I certainly agree we have long said across the military and civilian leadership over the last 16 years that this cannot be resolved on the military battlefield that it is not the nature of this conflict given the nature of the insurgency and that there has to be a political settlement and a political resolution to this and that to me is where we all must stay supremely focused how do we get there so to go back to the advice of the president I think picking up Zal's very good frame it's first of all what is that distillation of the U.S. national security interests why do we remain in Afghanistan at this point and there is a fundamental tension there between are we doing it for solely counter terrorist purposes or are we doing it to stabilize the Afghan state or to do a little bit of both and if it's on counter terrorism is the enemy just Al Qaeda and its affiliates as was defined in the Obama years is it now broader in terms of ISIL and Daesh and those that we think could actually pose a threat to the homeland or is it the Taliban which for legitimate reasons we opted not to define in that way in part because it didn't seem to represent the threat to the homeland so I think there does have to be I hear the concern on just continuing to produce reports but there does have to be I think a very clear eyed assessment of what the threats emanating from Afghanistan actually are and then defining a strategy that addresses them and I have not heard that over the course of the last several months what I'm most concerned about Mr. President is that from all that we have heard from public sources and private ones this continues to seem like a very narrow decision on troop levels and it cannot be that way for an ultimate resolution to the conflict this has to be a fully integrated synergistic coordinated approach that brings to bear all levers of American power so that is in part a military footprint but it's absolutely a diplomatic engagement one it's in part an economic one whether that's nation building or just helping to stabilize the state however that's defined it's in part an intel one it's in part a regional strategy all of that has to be combined in a very comprehensive and functional process and I have seen no indication of that happening thus far from from the outside and I'm quite concerned if those other equities are not being represented at the same time that there's a fundamental threshold issue of whether we increase troops and by how much in terms of a troop level increase I think it would be hard for anyone as all of us have been involved in this issue for so many years to suggest that we wouldn't support what generals in the field would advocate for and I've worked closely with General Nicholson, General McMaster when he was there and would certainly want to be very differential to what they believe they need but again I think it's to what end and what are we going to achieve with 20,000 international troops that we couldn't ultimately with 140,000 I concur in terms of I think the greatest weakness of the strategy which we helped implement which was the deadlines on it I would hope that in whatever decision is made that we continue to try to exert leverage by not having an automatic deadline set at least at the outset and that it is conditioned space but they also understand the reasons for wanting to ensure that it wasn't seen as an endless commitment of US resources so if we then all agree that there has to be a political settlement then your paper does particularly well is to lay out and then dispense with some of the potential strategies so I concur that on the unilateral approaches if you take either extreme on an enormous surge, troop surge like we had back in the beginning of the Obama administration or leaving altogether that doesn't ultimately meet our strategic interests on the regional approach I think that though you identify key problems with it that doesn't mean that we can't continue to engage there and in fact I think we must continue to help lead that process in a way that we did over the course of the Obama administration in terms of numerous bilateral and multilateral meetings with key regional interests and just as it looks to me as if the US is abdicating leadership in any number of areas I think we're also abdicating leadership in that process and we should be at the center of it and so how do we generate a and so you ultimately the two options that Ashley briefed on the kind of status quo plus and then the political settlement I concur that the default seems to be to the status quo plus but I think we all have to do everything we can to energize that political settlement what I don't think you got into as much in that paper is that there are a broad spectrum of ideas on what a political settlement actually looks like the ones that Hussain has talked about are having such leverage and such military might that the Taliban would be operating from a position of weakness I'm not sure how that happens over the course of the next few years at a minimum and so I do think that we should be looking to incentivize any number of options that we can we should be casting a very very broad net in terms of whom we can speak with and how we do this whether that is as we sought to do for many years having a formal Taliban office that we have an official address whether in Doha or elsewhere laying out what preconditions would be having the Afghan government lay out its strategy and plan because this does have to be an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process but I think that they need to articulate as well what that starts to look like which other countries or other parties are at the table including if there's a role for multilateral agencies like the UN or others and then ultimately what a sustainable future for Afghanistan can actually look like I think that has to be the prison that we look through all this what is the end goal how do we achieve some degree of sustainability and stability in Afghanistan the last few things I'd say is that core to that will be a very very robust regional effort certainly with regard to Pakistan and as one of those State Department diplomats that issued hard messages to Pakistan I would take issue with some of Hussein's characterization of that because I do think that this was tried in a very comprehensive manner over a long period of time and at a point when at various times during the course of the Obama administration the relationship really sink to real lows because of the differences of opinion and what was being asked of Pakistan and but I think it also has to ensure as Zal laid out that there are both carrots and sticks that though it may be emotionally satisfying to cast Pakistan as the sole undermining force of this that there are any number of issues that we also have to continue to engage Pakistan on whether on regional stability issues that don't include Afghanistan on growing extremism and fundamentalism and issues that could well cause a threat to our homeland if left unaddressed in Pakistan on nuclear proliferation issues and so like all else that this is that there's a spectrum and that we have to have a fully comprehensive strategy in able to be most effective and I don't think that after many years of efforts that there has been any indication as we long talked about changing Pakistan's strategic calculus that that will ultimately be changed by anything other than the Pakistani decision that it's in their interest to change their calculus and so that's what we need to continue to drive at and then lastly in terms of leading the international community as I think America should and must in Afghanistan and elsewhere is that means that there's a critical role for key partners and certainly on a day that certainly members of the German embassy were targeted in Afghanistan when they have taken such a leadership position in Mazar when they have always continued to be among the foremost of allies in this international coalition that getting into a Twitter war with them is not in our interest and doesn't necessarily suggest American strength and same with the Australians and same with the Brits and same with any number of others that we have counted on and have stood with us steadfastly the only time that we have ever invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter at our interest and those allies have been steadfast and so engaging and continuing to lead that international coalition will be key to long-term sustainability. Thank you. Thanks, Dan. So I want to go to you but before I do let me just imagine that the president or his advisors had a follow-up question and they were to say I was taken by Ambassador Hikani and close at point about Pakistan and I certainly agree with that sentiment but I was also taken by Dan your point that it's hard to imagine what 20,000 troops would do that 140,000 couldn't presumably we're at this point of indecision because there's a debate and let me represent the other side of the debate here by asking you let's take what some of my advisors are recommending as a more prudent course of saving this investment and reinvesting it at home something that I ran on in the campaign the threat has changed Bin Laden is dead and I want to put the question to you differently what is the threat to the United States if we were to disengage and let things run their course given that we've made a reasonable investment and given Afghanistan a reasonable chance to consolidate it so what's the real threat to the United States if we take that course? Ambassador Hikani. Three quick points. The real threat to the United States is that Islamist extremist terrorism will continue to have a home even outside the Middle East as a result of failure or withdrawal from Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan together become one theater and because of its geographic location it continues to play havoc with Central Asia with South Asia and potentially East Asia and America has interests in all those places plus given the large number of people that moved from that region into the United States it could also be a threat to the American homeland two subsidiary points it's easy to say what will 20,000 accomplish what 140,000 didn't here's the difference 140,000 went with a very clear deadline and I'm not saying that there can't be an internal deadline of course there's no point in having an endless commitment but announcing a deadline has a very different effect on an enemy like the Taliban in fact I know for a fact that on the Pakistani side the knowledge that the Americans will come out look Musharraf in his book writes that when the Americans went in after 9-11 I thought they will be leaving in two to three years that's what his calculus was based on so it's as important to understand the others calculus as it is your own and I believe that the real threat will be that that region will again become a terrorism center and that threat is not worth allowing and if you were still unconvinced well of course you could always do that to withdraw President Obama for example you did that in Iraq and I think you regretted it later on but you did that I think Iraq is a good lesson for President Trump to think about we're back there at a bigger number than perhaps could have precluded the situation getting where it is if we continue to stay at a much lower number so Afghanistan in my judgment is the beneficiary of Obama's mistake in Iraq it's much harder to do that than Afghanistan because that has happened that happened if it had been reversed maybe Iraq would have been the beneficiary so new face I would say the President very difficult choices there's no doubt about that now it's true that al-Qaida has been weakened Afghanistan there's no question about that what we did under both administration Bush and Obama their leadership was decimated but some of the things that we did was because we were in Afghanistan and we couldn't have done them easily if we weren't there and if you remove that these people are looking ISIS and others are looking where Iran governs places where they can go to if I give the example of Iran so the problem that has been reduced can decrease if we abandon Afghanistan now I think the question that I think that Diana's raised what you can do with 20,000 or 10,000 you couldn't do with 100,000 besides the mistake of putting timetables on them like the Obama administration is that is a different reality now than Afghanistan the reality is that forces that didn't exist when we did some of those local forces now they do exist the effort to break them has not succeeded they're losing ground slowly but they haven't been broken imagine if you allow the force to break by this engaging what option will we face then do we go back to the 100,000 if there is no Afghan force or do we live with the sanctuary I think the key part is that Diana's point about the political settlement I think is very valid the question is what are the conditions that can be more favorable to a political settlement and less favorable to a political settlement that's where the space for discussion might be conditions that are more favorable than my view and I think I should correctly say we can be 100% sure about these things because the other guy as a vote and their beliefs, their calculus all are important that we must understand and I appreciate your point that we have to understand the others that are in this game not be fooled by our own wishful thinking about what they might or might not be but is that I think it's more likely a political settlement if the adversary believe we cannot win that's one important and two it's for not believing that not only the military and the support for Afghanistan a little more is important coming to this understanding with Pakistan I think that would help we talk about regional and all that that's very important and I support that but let's be clear not all regional players are of equal importance and for this issue the regional power that really matters is Pakistan and I do think that in this report that's interesting which we haven't highlighted is that we also change something else which is that we engage all of ourselves we have so far have done it occasionally but it has been not for some and it has been we have had issues with the Afghan government about only Afghan own and Afghan led I think what has been proposed is slightly different and that sort of some adjustment that could be beneficial in my view it's worth but it can be only beneficial in the context of showing up as the military leaders are doing that the balance doesn't shift as the balance is beginning to shift has become more complex Iran is seeking to engage the Taliban, the Russians, the others because they see that the Taliban are becoming a bigger factor that they must deal with and that is the issue of ISIL so the limited increase prevent victory or change in the balance against the Taliban with pressure more in positive and negative incentive with Pakistan engaged with Pakistan with opening also with the Taliban I think it's a package that puts us in a better place then if we disengage or if we stay where we are staying where we are in my view is not an option it's going to deteriorate so either you go to increasing somewhat or getting out and getting out is extremely dangerous in my view for U.S. national security interests so that's the prudent option I think what this report and what at least my judgment about so let's imagine he's not convinced gives him a final word he says 140 characters or less I can give you a hand bumper sticker 140 characters or less would be everyone counts in this decision making but I have not heard yet any kind of compelling narrative on what the additional troop strength whether it's 10,000 or even more than that does other than arrest the deterioration at the end of the day General Nicholson described this as a stalemate and what we hope we get back to with increased troop strength is back to a stalemate and the question is for how long and to what end and what is ultimately sustainable from that in terms of I don't think that the Iraq analogy is an apt one here primarily because it was the Iraqis that chose to enter into the status forces I know I'm not sure I want to take you on that one but but to the point of having continued but to the point of investing in Afghanistan what we do have in Afghanistan is a very credible engaged pro-international community government that would like us there and so do we continue to execute on that for some of the reasons that we've laid out again over the last year or two we continue to hear about threats like ISIL or Daesh and I think it's notable that this the ordinance the enormous ordinance that was dropped in the web a few months ago was specifically targeted on ISIL does that mean that we think that there's an increased threat there that we are redefining our interest there we've not heard anything to necessarily state that and does that present a threat a national security interest or threat to our homeland in a way that the others didn't we'd have to see I think the failed state argument is always a compelling one that gets you back into the same discussion that we've had in many years in many different theaters on is that also is a remedy of that more effectively nation-building and then again how do you utilize economic interests and a range of others I would just add in terms of the counterpoint to this which we have not heard floated here is that increased troops also brings increased threats to us solely by the fact that they are there and so if some of these groups do not pose a threat to us in a homeland or even more regionally but only pose a threat to us as we continue to increase forces are we not just continuing this cycle of violence by continuing to invest more there and then lastly what I would say is that we continue to talk about the right conditions for a political settlement I think that at any time and again we're even on the basis of military assessments with an increase no one is talking about breaking much out of a stalemate for the foreseeable future I think any time could be the appropriate time for a political settlement but it has to be a very energized one an effective one and that means difficult conversations it's going to be an ugly process it has to mean not just actually one of your recommendations not just an empowered ambassador in Kabul but an empowered state department in a functional interagency process that instructs that ambassador and helps to ensure that they deal with all those in the region and the region is a critical piece of this yes Pakistan and the policy will be particularly important but given the increase in Russian engagement with the Taliban of Iranian engagement with the Taliban all of these are not clear dichotomies we can't decide that Iran may have an interest in Afghanistan that would be helpful for them to speak with them but refuse to speak with them about a whole range of other issues and it's a tough neighborhood I mean it's Iran it's Russia it's China it's India and Pakistan and for those reasons alone there has to be a very very robust and empowered diplomatic I agree with that let me do this ambassador because we've got a number of questions back here so I want to get our audience engaged here I just have an open-ended question for everybody including the audience please why hasn't there been a political settlement I mean eight years that was Richard Holbrooke's intention political settlement let's go over it learn from it learn from it and I think that's important to think about it look I want a political settlement as much as anybody else I just know the history and I know how it is I'm the only one in this room who has actually spoken about this at the very beginning well sorry and so the Taliban leaders you know they have a particular view and a way of engaging and it's not going to be an easy process but it should be continued but we should learn from why it didn't happen let's not pretend there's a political settlement waiting and we are not seizing on it let's do this let's go to the audience who's been patient please wait for the microphone either your question or are you convinced in the white jacket here in the front thanks Rachel thank you so much my name is Nazira Azim I'm correspondent for Ariana TV network from Afghanistan as you guys mentioned today was very sad unfortunately this is the only man which is Ramadan more than 200 people have been killed I got so many messages from Afghanistan from the social media like Facebook, Twitter and people was crying and they knew that Ambassador Khalilzad will have a speech today and they asked me specifically for how long Afghan people should suffer although experts said Afghan war will be one of the longest war around the world thank you very much thank you the gentleman right next to you Rachel in the India Globe in Asia today my question is that Osama bin Laden is dead but violence and bombings and killings of the innocent Afghans and international community still going on and I'm sure President Trump is asking the same question who is behind and how we can end my question is that many high level Afghan officials were here and they all blamed that Pakistan is fueling the fire I don't know how much you can answer and where can we go from here and what role you think India should play, thank you a few we've got, let's capture the gentlemen and the glasses in the fifth row there Rachel and then this gentleman in the front and then we'll turn to the panel for all three of those questions thank you Marvin Weinbaum Middle East Institute you know I still have trouble with the idea of what is a political settlement and I think that this is something we haven't we talk about it as the as the goal here for example and I think Hussain alluded to this are we really sure that they have the same end state vision, it's very important do we think that that process would be anything other than years in accomplishing do we have years do we think that there is a credible interlocutor it's much more complex now than it was 10 years ago in that regard so is there another option that was not rather than having on one hand defeat defeating them or negotiating with them and that is the idea here that we should not be looking for a grand bargain that that's not attainable so it's not reconciliation but it is reintegration and that's the best hope we have and I think Hussain alluded to that too that what we're really doing and I think we do have a strategy and I think that strategy may be a long shot but that strategy is buying time buying time for the Afghan government to be able to in terms of security economics and the political to be able to put its act together so what the additional troops who is maintain what is our maintenance strategy it's simply to keep that going that our generals have said we can't do that job of maintenance without a few more thousand troops again I say it's a long shot but given the complexity that I think I've said here isn't that the only shot we have thank you and let's Rachel if we could turn to this gentleman take all three questions to our panel first I want to congratulate the panel this has been a really tour de force in 2008 the Atlantic Council issued a report signed out by Jim Jones who was then chairman as a former NATO commander that began make no mistake NATO is losing in Afghanistan subsequently we had to soften that a bit but there were three reasons that we were losing first government in Kabul second an economy based on drugs and corruption with no means to sustain it and third as Sassan said a failure to understand Pashtunwala and the culture of Afghanistan I would argue those same three flaws persist today and perhaps even maybe bigger despite our attraction for Ashraf Ghani it seems to me that you've got two choices one a permanent commitment to Afghanistan that's going to take 30 years possibly or longer which comes at a time when the US military is retooling to fight a big war against a so-called peer competitor and wants to shed itself of these responsibilities and is not getting sufficient funding to be able to keep up with its current needs or withdrawal you're stuck with those two choices how then do you make the decision so three questions India the utility of reintegration in buying some time and then third how do we get past our cultural amnesty in the strategic sense who wants to take India well I favor increase cooperation between us India with regard to Afghanistan we're moving toward the world of dealing with bigger challenges in Asia we need a balance of power approach to Asia and in that balance of power grand strategy I think close US India relationship is very important and I think we should support and one area where this cooperation can manifest and there can be can manifest itself can add real momentum besides military cooperation in the Indian ocean or balancing rise of China I think is in Afghanistan where it can be materially manifested and there can be burden sharing if you like because if part of the cost the reason some have got the heartburn about doing what we're doing where can how can the cost be reduced without abandoning our objectives and we need to look at at the game sort of the chess board broadly and India I think is a target of opportunity in that we have very compatible interests with them now I think one of the perhaps incentives with regards to Pakistan this complicated thing we need to be be conscious of that and maybe in our discussion with Pakistan this can be also effective what the consequences of persisting in this way if they don't recalibrate could be so that I want to say a word on Marvin's for your permission I agree with you Marvin that we need to look at negotiating a deal with the Taliban headquarters sort of speak but that doesn't preclude reaching out to kind of elements inside the two are not compatible in fact I think we may not since I'm not in government I've seized the opportunity on that front fully in the aftermath of the death of announcement of the death of Malama because I think usually an Islamic movement succession is very problematic the choice of who replaces a big leader can create factions and I think it in fact did and I thought there was a lot of opportunity at that time I think there may be opportunity so a robust effort covert and overt with Afghans and our people and others because there are a lot of others also connections and still I will really support other views little our integration have it sure on the India point I would just say certainly was a mainstay of my time almost seven years in the State Department to engage very actively that they were part of our 6 plus 1 discussions but we also had not only direct bilateral discussions frequently on Afghanistan but in Afghan, US, India and we always we always commended India for the amount of assistance and engagement they provided on economic issues in particular and I have I was always impressed with India's restraint and recognition that moving beyond economic assistance to the potential for military assistance could make an already fragile regional situation that much more fragile so I hope that they continue the strong investments on the economic front in particular and refrain from and refrain from the others. I think Marvin's question is a really interesting and important one because there has been a lot of focus on reintegration over the years and to Hussein's point on knowing the history unfortunately today that's been one that just hasn't been successful there were the British and the Japanese funded reintegration efforts there were many kind of DDR related efforts and these were fairly of de minimis impact it doesn't mean that we shouldn't continue them and I agree if there are others like Het Mark Dr and that there can be outreach too and that can ultimately be brought in we should continue that but I don't ultimately see a process of very very low level reintegration bottom up that results in any sort of comprehensive or sustainable resolution for that I think we still do need to really try to intensify a broader reconciliation process and to your question on you know is there is there an interlocutor for that I would say our experience was that we think that there was I think that the experience of Sergeant Bergdahl's release and in other instances we had the effort to set up an office in Doha so there was an address when we came knocking or others and that we had a channel that was valid was an important one but there absolutely has to be a discussion and a very hard discussion on what this actually means what is Afghanistan going to put on the table what is the US prepared to put on the table how are we going to guarantee that continues in a manner and I would say that the three fundamental you know red lines of the US laid down for the end process for reconciliation back in 2010 are still the same ones and those should be that the Taliban renounced violence that it break from Al-Qaeda to our question on use of failed states and how it can be a direct threat to the homeland and that it embrace the Afghan constitution including rights of women and that the protections that and significant benefits that have resulted in Afghanistan over the course of the last 16 17 years can seek to be safeguarded quick response to Dr. Ollman's comment look I think that the Afghanistan Pakistan theater is actually part of the peer competitor concerns of the US military or reorientation of the military because if the peer competitor is China then China's heavy investments in Pakistan and acceptance of Pakistan's desire to have Afghanistan as its sphere of influence would definitely play into that as well so I don't think that the US military's desire to reorient itself will apply to the Afghanistan Pakistan theater although it may apply to other places where it thinks that it's being stressed unnecessarily. Two finger on this one. I think it would be a strategic error on the part of our military that if it abandons the lessons learned the capabilities to do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and just focus on a big war with the peer competitor because the rivalries before we get to the big war would happen at these lower levels and we've paid a high price over many years to learn lessons to acquire capabilities and if we swing away and from those I think we would pay a high price for it so I hope that they will learn to do both peer competitor and to be able to do counterinsurgency and counterterror. Those are the real world issues I don't believe that they can they can just do major wars as a planning tool and I used to be the head of planning and the defense department and I think the civilian needs to instruct that they need to do both major regional contingencies which would be peer competitor focus and counterterrorism you know the numbers one can argue with but it would be I think it would be a failure of leadership or learning the wrong lessons if they are instructed only to prepare to do two major regional contingencies it's nearly simultaneously and force plan for that purpose alone. Thank you Zhao. Unfortunately we're out of time but if you've been convinced of anything perhaps it is that this is indeed a very complex issue and there are no easy answers so please join me in thanking Carnegie and ambassadors Hekhani, Khalil Azad and Kelvin. Excellent job. That's excellent. My office is about two doors down right in Dupont. The home is right by your home. Chevy Chase DC. I know. I would love to. I've never been invited. Happily. I agree. I agree. I agree. Yeah. Yes, yes. Yeah, you did. All right, good. Are you a viewer? Should you email me yesterday about an interview, but I don't think it was you at VOA. I don't remember. I was out of town yesterday, so I didn't get back to it yet. But, um...