 Part 1, Chapter 6 of Canada's Hundred Days with the Canadian Corps from Amiens to Moun, August 8th through November 11th, 1918. This is LibriVox Recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey. Part 1, Chapter 6. Operations. August 8th continued. In years to come, the Canadian historian will be amply repaid for a patient and minute exploration of the Canadian battalion narratives. Written on the field, expressed in the terse and concise language of the soldier, these, when collected together, must form an invaluable body of information. And from that storehouse of tactical movements and isolated acts of gallantry, a complete and detailed picture of every battle in which Canadian troops have taken part can be correctly portrayed. But, even where the materials immediately available, such a work must fill many volumes. And yet, all the life and color, the spirit and the essence of battle is contained superlatively in these annals of the battalion, of the company, and of the platoon, the true infantry fighting unit. And therefore it is proposed within circumscribed limits of the present volume to incorporate so far as may be practicable occasional accounts of the performances of individual units as being typical of them all. As has been seen above, the 3rd Canadian Division had a particularly hard task on our right flank, where the ground was not only extraordinarily difficult, but the plan of the battle imposed that the French attack on our right should be on echelon to our success if the term may be used rather than parallel to our advance. At the kickoff, the 9th Brigade, Brigadier General D. M. Ormond was on our extreme right along the Roy Road with the 8th Brigade on the left of the divisional area, in contact with the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Canadian Division, the 7th Brigade being in support. The 9th Brigade had very hard fighting from the start, having to make good along the narrow causeway from Domar. After crossing the loose, the ground rose up steeply to the edge of the plateau, here intersected by many gullies, swept by heavy machine gun fire from Dodo wood on the opposing slope. Owing to the fog, many of the tanks lost direction, and the infantry were left to their own resources. Both the 43rd Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg, and the 116th Central Ontario, had stiff fighting through the woods, being for a time held up by machine gun posts. When the mist lifted, however, the tanks put in very effectual work, reducing these strongholds while our intensive barrage prevented the enemy sending up reinforcements. The Brigade captured many prisoners and guns of all calibers. This advance was pushed on down the Roy Road through Hammond Wood, where heavy opposition was again encountered, but the troops engaged were not to be denied and secured their objectives on the red line on schedule. On the Brigade left, the 58th Battalion, Western Ontario, had very heavy fighting, being confronted by many machine gun nests. In reducing these, gallant deeds were accomplished. Thus, Corporal Harry Garnet Bedford Minor of Richetown, Ontario rushed an enemy machine gun single-handed, killing the entire crew and turning the gun on the enemy. Later, with two others, he attacked another enemy machine gun post and succeeded in putting the gun out of action. Although wounded, Corporal Minor refused to withdraw and rushed single-handed an enemy bombing post, bayonetting two of the garrison and putting the remainder to flight. He was mortally wounded in the performance of this deed. On the left of the 9th Brigade, the objectives of the 8th Brigade lay through the village of Angare across the Luce River at Des Moines. This Brigade, Brigadier General D. C. Draper, had been formed in December 1915 from the first and second Canadian-mounted rifle brigades, when the exigencies of Trentch warfare demanded the service of every available infantryman. And, unlike the Canadian cavalry brigade, continued as infantry throughout the war. It consisted of the first, second, fourth and fifth Canadian-mounted rifle battalions, and with it will always be associated the terrific fighting of sanctuary wood in June 1916. On the morning of August 8th, the first Canadian-mounted rifles, recruited from the Canadian prairie west, left off the attack, capturing their objective of Angare village. The artillery barrage moved at the rate of 100 yards every three minutes, thus allowing the infantry to deal with any enemy encountered. Stubborn resistance was offered in places, but for the most part, enemy machine guns and trench mortars had been done in via artillery fire. Owing to the heavy mist, the tanks assigned in support failed to reach the assembly positions in time to jump off with the infantry, but the barrage had destroyed the wire and the assault was pushed home with relatively slight loss. Indeed, the battalions suffered only 63 casualties, though they captured 375 prisoners besides inflicting heavy casualties. Angare village being gained, the second Canadian-mounted rifles, a British Columbia unit, leapfrogged over and proceeded to attack Des Moines, which laid just south of the loose river in a very strong position, flanked by a high range of hill to the east and south. Canadian engineers under heavy fire built a footbridge over the river and the village was carried after hard fighting. Here the attack was taken up by the 7th Brigade, Brigadier General H.M. Dyer, that had come up in support, and so fast was the assault pushed ahead that each of the two battalions in the line, the 42nd Royal Highlanders of Canada from Montreal, and the 49th from Edmonton, captured an entire enemy battery. Tanks now took part in the advance over the open rolling land eastward, and all objectives were gained on time. The 4th Canadian Division followed the 3rd Canadian Division down the Roy Road, crossing the loose at Domar, and attacked through the 3rd Division, after the latter had gained its objective of the Mezier-Cailloux Road. The advance was continued with the 11th Brigade, Brigadier General V.W. Odeum on the right, the 12th Brigade, Brigadier General J.H. McBrien on the left, and the 10th Brigade, Brigadier General R.J.F. Hader in reserve in the center. Before the infantry jumped off at 12.10 p.m., the cavalry and some tanks had gone through towards the old AMIA defense system. The guns had shot themselves out over the 3rd Canadian Division's advance, and therefore the only artillery support for the troops was that of a few batteries, which had followed them along, coming into action when the advance was held up. The first real opposition came from Bokor Village, but this was overcome, and our men pushed forward to Bokor Wood, held by the enemy in force, his very heavy machine gunfire holding up both our advancing brigades. Here a very gallant infantry attack finally cleared up the situation, and the line went forward once more. Considerable opposition was met and overcome by the 12th Brigade, before they finally reached the blue line. On the right the enemy was making a stout stand at La Cainelle, and the fact that here the French were not abreast of us made the situation more difficult, and that evening this village remained in the hands of the enemy. The first Canadian Division, the Old Red Patch, occupied the center of the core line of attack, and in describing its operations, free use will be made of the very interesting narrative of the operations of the division in the battles of 1918, prepared and published by its staff, though considerable condensation is necessary to keep within available space limits. The Valley of the Loose, after bisecting the 3rd Division front, ran in a generally easterly direction for 2,500 yards, made a sharp bend to the northeast for 1,000 yards, and then east again to its source, approximately 14,000 yards from the front line of the 1st Division, or practically the final objective of the first day. For 1,000 yards in breadth, in front of our line, lay Ungar Wood, strongly fortified by the enemy. To reach the first objective, the green line, 6,000 yards distant, the troops must attack down a slope through Ungar Wood and the enemy front and support trenches, across a wooded valley known as Morge Mall Wood, then capturing the high ground on which was situated the German main line of resistance, then through a sharp valley known as Pantaloon Ravine, in which were many machine gun positions, and finally on to the forward slope of the north bank of the Loose. On the extreme right of the divisional area, 1,000 yards short of the green line, northeast of Des Mois, with the little village of Oberkuhl. Between the green and red lines on this sector was the Valley of Loose, heavily wooded and throwing off deep ravines, with the village of Inyaku, on the river, 1,000 yards beyond the green line, and 2,000 yards short of the red line. The blue line throughout our front followed the old Amiens defense line, a single trench line, disused and shallow for the most part. On the 1st Division front, between the red and blue lines, the frontage narrowed 1,200 yards and offered a depth of 5,000 yards. For the first 3,000 yards was the river, then the considerable town of Kei, and 1,000 yards east, the old Amiens defense line, the final objective. The 1st Canadian Division attacked on a one brigade front, the tasks allotted being the capture of the green line by the third brigade, Brigadier General G. S. Tuxford, the red line by the 1st Brigade, Brigadier General W. H. Griesbach, and the blue line by the 2nd Brigade, Brigadier General F. O. W. Loomis. Thus the attack was to take the form of 3 separate, distinct blows. The 3rd Brigade attacked with the 16th, 13th and 14th battalions in line, and the 15th and 5th battalions in support. The latter being detached from the 2nd Brigade, detailed to take the final objective if absolutely necessary. 22 tanks supported the brigade in its attack. 3 batteries from the machine gun battalion advanced with the infantry, and at 5.20 am, the 2nd Brigade of Canadian Field Artillery followed in support. Little serious fighting took place until the main resistance line was reached. Here in his trenches the enemy put up a stiff fight, casualties being heavy on both sides, but the Highlanders were not to be denied and the green line was reached well on time. The character of this fighting is illustrated by the heroic deed of Private John Bernard Croke of the 13th Battalion, a native of Glace Bay, Cape Breton. Having become separated from his section, he encountered a machine gun nest, which he bombed and silenced, taking the gun and crew prisoners. Shortly afterwards he was severely wounded, but refused to desist. Having rejoined his platoon, a very strong point was encountered, containing several machine guns. Private Croke, however, seeing an opportunity, dashed forward alone and was almost immediately followed by the remainder of the platoon in a brilliant charge. He was the first to arrive at the trench line, into which he led his men, capturing three machine guns and bayonetting or capturing the entire garrison. He was again severely wounded, this time mortally. When his company was held up by heavy fire from three machine guns, which were seriously delaying the advance, Corporal James Herman Goode of the same battalion, a native of Bathurst and Bee, realizing the gravity of the situation, dashed forward alone, killing several of the garrison and capturing the remainder. Later on, Corporal Goode, while alone, encountered a battery of 5.9 inch guns, which were in action at the time. Collecting three men of his section, he charged the battery under point blank fire and captured the entire crews of three guns. The 13th Battalion, Montreal Highlanders, was recruited in part from the Maritime provinces. Equally stiff fighting was encountered by the 16th Battalion, Canadian-Scottish of Western Canada, and the 14th Battalion, Royal Montreal Regiment. The battalions supporting the successful attack of the Third Brigade, the 15th, recruited from the 48th Highlanders of Toronto, and the 5th Saskatchewan, had sharp work mobbing up the wood being full of enemy dugouts. The 1st Brigade began to move forward at 5.10 a.m. and at 8.20, crossed the green line and carried the attack forward. This brigade also attacked with three battalions in line, the 2nd from Ottawa, the 3rd recruited from Toronto District, and 4th Central Ontario, with the 1st Western Ontario in support. Its attack was carried out without artillery support, except for the bombardment of distant points by heavy guns. Six tanks were allotted to it, but 18 actually went in, as 12 of the 22 that attacked with the 3rd Brigade were still in action. The objective, the high ground east of Caillou and the crossings of Luce at this village and at Ignacour, was secured between 11 and 11.30 a.m. In the meantime, the 2nd Brigade had been marching forward and attacked with the 7th Battalion, British Columbia, and 10th Battalion of Alberta, on the right and left of the Luce River, with the 8th Battalion recruited from the province of Manitoba in support, and the 5th Battalion recruited from the province of Saskatchewan and reserve. 14 tanks advanced with the infantry, of which six reached the final objective. Except on the extreme left, little resistance was encountered by this Brigade, the enemy being demoralized. The 2nd Canadian Division, on the left of the Canadian line and in liaison with the Australians, launched its attack from a narrow front, but widened out from Marsilcave to the north of the Amiens-Chon Railway toward Le Motte-en-Santerre in order to obtain freedom of manoeuvre for its attack on the towns of Vincourt and Gyocourt on this railway. It adhered to follow high open ground over a plateau cut by deep valleys and resistance was very determined. The 2nd Canadian Division was on a single brigade front, the 4th Brigade in the line, the 5th Brigade behind, ready to pass through, and the 6th Brigade in reserve. The 4th Brigade, Brigadier General R. Rennie, was to capture Marsilcave and establish a line 500 yards east. With it were two companies of the 14th Battalion Tank Corps, one Army Brigade of Artillery, and two batteries of machine guns. There were also Canadian engineers for investigating and repairing dugouts. The troops moved forward in a mist, and instead of following the tanks, they found it necessary to lead the way. On the right was the 18th Battalion, Western Ontario, with the 19th Battalion, Central Ontario on the left, in close touch with the Australians. At 6.23 a.m., the barrage lifted from Marsilcave, and the troops rushed the village. Its capture was completed by 7.20 by the 19th and 21st Battalions, the latter being from Eastern Ontario. While leading his battalion into action, Lieutenant Colonel Elmer W. Jones was killed by machine gunfire, the command of the 21st Battalion devolving upon major A.G. Pence. Meantime, the 18th Battalion had done good work towards Morge-Malm Wood. All battalions in the brigade had hard fighting, the 20th Battalion of Toronto, though in support, suffering heavy casualties while mopping up. The 5th Brigade, Brigadier General J.M. Ross advanced in support of the 4th Brigade. Owing to the very heavy fog prevailing at the kick-off, units of the latter advanced rapidly without encountering opposition, passing in this way over wooded areas where the enemy lay hid until they had gone through. As a consequence, the 5th Brigade, following up at about 6.00 a.m., ran into heavy and quite unexpected machine gun and rifle-fire, progress being slow and its units losing heavily in both officers and men. The tanks were on ahead and the infantry had to fight it out alone. In this way, the 26th Battalion, New Brunswick, Lieutenant Colonel A.E.G. McKenzie, was badly cut up in Snipe Copes, south of Marshall Cove, losses of officers being very great. A Lieutenant, a junior sub-altern in his company, found himself in command of it before reaching his objective and was later recommended for the greatest bravery and skillful leadership inspiring his men to fresh exertions. So heavy were the casualties in the battalion that at one time it was seriously checked. The officer commanding, however, gathered together the battalion staff, including Cooks and Batman, and led them into the assault, thus saving the situation, and the battalion continued on to its objective. The 24th Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Montreal of the same brigade, was also in line and lost heavily in the early morning. The tanks suffered heavily as the open, level country made them fair targets once the mist had lifted. The 5th Brigade, in face of stiffening opposition, pushed on its attack and captured its objective of the red line, Vincourt and Guillocourt. All its units had hard-fighting, Lieutenant Colonel Weiss of the 25th Battalion, Nova Scotia, being wounded, while the 22nd French-Canadians, though in support, had a number of casualties. Towards evening, the 6th Brigade, Brigadier General A.H. Bell went through the 5th Brigade and captured its final objective, the old Amiens defense line, with the 31st Battalion, Southern Alberta, on the right, and the 29th Battalion, British Columbia, on the left. In close support were the 27th Battalion, Manitoba, and 28th Battalion, Saskatchewan. The fighting was stiff and the 28th was drawn into it before the blue line was won. Notwithstanding the very hard-going, the 2nd Canadian Division thus captured all its objectives on time. Although owing to its prolonged period in the line, it had not had the same months of training in open warfare as our other divisions, its troops proved themselves readily adaptable to the new conditions. The 2nd Australian Division, on our immediate left, made good progress, advancing beside us through Bayonne-Villet to east of Harbournier, but south of the Somme the 3rd Australian Division was held up a good deal by the failure of the 3rd British Corps to make any substantial progress north of that river. This Corps had been subjected to a heavy attack two days before and had only succeeded on August 7th in regaining ground lost and was in no condition to push with vigor a new offensive on the grand scale. Thus ended the first day of the battle, in which all four Canadian Divisions had been engaged. The greatest penetration east of Kay representing a depth of 16,000 yards from the jumping offline and thus constituting a record first days advance on the west front. Over 6,000 prisoners had been captured, exceeding our total casualties, with a vast quantity of guns and material of all kinds, including two complete enemy divisional headquarters, with valuable plans and documents. As had been done at Vimy, where captured batteries had been renamed the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Pandermanic batteries, we put to immediate use the captured guns, with their great store of ammunition. But in this case, every gun on our front being captured, two complete Pandermanic artillery brigades were formed, a kernel of artillery being sent up to take command. Captured documents confirmed what this massing of artillery in the front line indicated, namely that we had anticipated the enemy offensive against Amiens by two days only. Had it been otherwise, and the line been held lightly but in depth, our captures must have been far less and we should not have so overwhelmed the defence in our first rush. Tougher writing was ahead. Recording by Mike Vendetti, Canyon City, Colorado, mikevendetti.com Canada's Hundred Days by John Lively Part 1 Chapter 7 Operations August 9-11 We have seen how, on the opening day, all the objectives had been captured except the town of L'Iquasson. On our extreme right, a strong position the enemy was able to hold because the French were not up on our flank. Plans for the renewal of the attack next day depended on an early clearing up of this situation by the 4th Canadian Division and, accordingly, the 11th Brigade was entrusted with the task. The 75th Battalion, recruited from Central and Western Ontario, advanced by night to the assault, while the 87th Battalion, the Grenadier Guards of Montreal, was to make a flank march across the enemy front passing south of the Roy Road and thence falling on the enemy's flank. These battalions had to take up their positions for the attack in the dark by the stars and their maps and compasses, a difficult operation, but, starting off at 4.30am, they were on their appointed ground by six o'clock when, aided by an intensive barrage, the attack was successfully pushed home. A amusing incident was the wager made between the Brigadier and Lieutenant Colonel C.C. Harbottle of the 75th, as to which would first occupy the enemy divisional headquarters, known to be in L'Iquasson. The battalion commander won out by a short space and the brigade had to be content with less pretentious headquarters. To return to the narrative of the Corps Commander, quote, on the following day, August 9th, the advance was continued with the third, first and second Canadian divisions in the line, the fourth Canadian division being held in Corps Reserve. Substantial progress was made and by evening the average depth of our advance was about four miles, with a maximum of six and a half miles at some points. The following additional villages were captured, Quançolle, Royce, Beauchure, Beaufort, Wavelze, Roubaix, Verre, Monchon and Risselles. The infantry and tanks of the third Canadian division and the Canadian independent force cooperated with the French in the capture of Arvarez. During the day, the enemy's resistance stiffened considerably and whatever gains were made resulted from heavy infantry fighting against fresh troops, with only a few tanks available for support. This advance had brought our troops within the area of the trenches and defenses occupied prior to this only operations of 1916. These trenches, while not in a good state of repair, were nevertheless protected by a considerable amount of wire and lent themselves readily to a very stubborn machine gun defense, The battle had indeed assumed an entirely different character. Although an average of 6,000 yards was gained during the day, it was only at cost of very heavy ding dong fighting with the best will in the world. It took time to bring up the artillery. Canadian railway troops were engaged in pushing up the railhead from Amiens but progress was slow. In face of fresh enemy divisions, it was necessary to proceed with utmost caution and not expose our troops to needless losses unless the gain was positive but the spirit of the men continued wonderful. In fact, Sir Arthur Currie found in his visits to advance dressing stations many of our wounded anxious to get back into the line. The day's attack had been designed to open early in the morning, the glimmer of dawn being the favorite hour of the Canadian Corps. But until Lake Wasnell fell, this plan had to be postponed and changes were also necessary in the alignment of the divisions. Our second division extending its area further south, forcing the first division to sideslip south about 5,000 yards. All this took time and the kickoff did not therefore take place until well on in the day. The task assigned to Corps on August 9 was not so formidable to all seeming as that accomplished on the previous day. It meant an attack on a 5 mile front to a depth of about 3.5 miles. The objective was the bushfire, Rovroy, Maricote Road. The country was almost flat, very open, with only a few villages and small woods scattered over it. The attack was to be carried out by the third, first and second divisions, from right to left. The third division had to advance down the Roi Road and capture Folay and Bolshoir. The first division had the villages of Goufort, Wavelve and Rovroy on its front, while the second division was responsible for Folay, Rosiers and Maricote. On the right, as has been seen, the third division not only secured their objectives, but went out of the Corps area to assist the French in capturing our valoirs. In the center, on the first division front, the first brigade was sent in to capture Bufort and Rovroy, and the second brigade against Warbillers. The first brigade attacked with the first battalion, Western Ontario, and fourth battalion, Central Ontario, in the line, the second battalion, Ottawa, in support, and the third battalion recruited from Toronto District in reserve. The attack was supported by two batteries of machine guns and the first brigade of Field Artillery covered the advance. From the outset, the attacking troops came under heavy machine gun fire from the high ground on the right. In order to deal with it, the right flank troops of the first division were deflected south, the second battalion being pushed forward to fill the gap, thereafter fighting right through to the objective. The second brigade was able to make rapid progress in the early stage of the attack, outstripping the troops on its right by the time Warbillers was reached. This village and the woods immediately to the south of it were captured by the aid of tanks, but with little difficulty. But on the extreme right in the early stage of the attack, serious resistance was encountered, coming from Anesta machine guns in Hatchett Wood. The second brigade attacked with the fifth battalion Saskatchewan and the eighth battalion of Winnipeg, and there came up in support two battalions of the third brigade the fifteenth recruited from the forty-eighth Highlanders of Toronto and the fourteenth Royal Montreal Regiment. The intensive fighting on this front was fruitful of many individual deeds of gallantry. Thus, when his platoon came unexpectedly under fire of numerous machine guns, acting Sergeant George Frederick Coppens of the Eighth Battalion, a native of London, England, finding that it was not possible to advance nor retire, and when no cover being available, it was apparent that the platoon must be annihilated unless the machine guns were at once silenced. Called for four volunteers to follow him, and leapt forward in the face of intense machine gun fire. With his comrades, he rushed straight for the machine guns. The four men with him were killed and Corporal Coppens wounded. Despite his wounds, he reached the hospital machine guns alone, killed the operator of the first gun, and three of the crew, and made prisoners of four others. Bold initiative on the part of Sergeant D. Zingle, fifth battalion of Wolford, Alberta, saved the lives of many of his comrades. He was leading his platoon forward gallantly to the attack east of Warverelles, but had not gone far when he realized that a gap had occurred in his flank, and that an enemy machine gun was firing at close range into the advancing line. Grasping the situation, he rushed forward some two hundred yards ahead of the platoon, tackled the machine gun in placement, killed the officer and operator of the gun, and dispersed the crew. Later, when the battalion was held up by very heavy machine gun fire, he displayed much tactical skill and directed his fire with destructive results. Shortly afterwards, he was rendered unconscious by an enemy shell, but on recovering consciousness, he had once continued to direct harassing fire on the enemy. Twelve tanks supported the First Canadian Division this day, six with each brigade, and all did valuable service. In addition, the divisional commander secured some wippet tanks from the cavalry corps, and these were of assistance in clearing Buford Wood. Meanwhile, on our left, in touch with the Australians, the Second Canadian Division had exceedingly stiff fighting. At 11am, the Fifth Brigade attacked on the right, and the Sixth Brigade on the left, with the Fourth Brigade in reserve. The Fifth had in line the 25th Battalion Nova Scotia on the right, and the 22nd Battalion French-Canadians on the left, and advanced under very heavy fire on Mericourt. Earlier in the day, this town had been ridden over by the Eighth Housers, but it was again in the hands of the enemy. The position was studded with machine gun posts, the enemy being in great strength along the ravine from Verlet to Mericourt, and the men fought their way forward slowly, reducing these strong holds in succession. The two battalions worked their way forward, with the greatest gallantry and finally stormed Mericourt at 5pm clearing the village and establishing a line in front of it. They were here, however, exposed to the point blank fire of a battery at Mericourt. The 24th Battalion Victoria Rifles of Montreal and the 26th Battalion New Brunswick came up in support and the line was consolidated. Brigadier General J. M. Ross was severely wounded, being incapacitated for several months, command of the Fifth Brigade, developing upon Lieutenant Colonel T. L. Trembly of the 22nd Battalion. On our extreme left, the Sixth Brigade had before it the considerable town of Rochevres, supported by the railway embankment and here the enemy was in great force, having established numerous machine gun posts in the suburbs. Although the general attack of the Second Canadian Division was not to take place until 11am, the Battalion are left the 27th of Manitoba, attacked at 8am in conjunction with the Australians and not to hold up their advance. In its advance, the Battalion was exposed to inflate fire from both flanks and fought its way forward with the greatest difficulty but with grim determination. It was indeed one of the hardest fights of its history and it suffered heavy casualties before its troops entered the town at a quarter past one that afternoon. Here many prisoners and much booty was captured. On the brigade right, the 29th Battalion of Vancouver did not kick off until 11am, synchronizing its advance with that of the Fifth Brigade on its right. It was held up to by heavy flank fire from the direction of Rochevres and it had a hard battle all the way, suffering 250 casualties. In Rochevres, the Battalion captured an 11 inch naval gun mounted on a railway truck. In the afternoon, the Sixth Brigade proceeded to the capture of its final objective for the day. In the High Church Tower of Rochevres, one of our batteries established an old pip observation post and this elevation gave a fine view of the battle both north and south. About a mile east of Rochevres could be seen lying on the track an entire enemy train which laden with reinforcements had been captured by Imperial cavalry. This church tower was a conspicuous mark to the enemy batteries further east and not many hours past before they brought it down. On our left, Australian troops had stormed Leons, thus thrusting a sharp salient into the enemy defense and their line then fell back north-westerly through Rhinecourt and Pryart to Moercourt on the Somme. The enemy however attacked in great force and the Australians were obliged to fall back from both Leons and Pryart. Converting for the time being our position at Moercourt into a salient. Fighting of the same character continued next day, August 10th. The attack was continued on the morning of August 10th says Sir Arthur Curry with the Third Canadian Division on the right and the Fourth Canadian Division on the left. The First and Second Divisions being held in Corps Reserve. After the Third Canadian Division had taken the village of Les Quasnois, the 32nd British Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on the night of August 9th through the 10th, passed through it and advanced the line somewhat further from the old British trenches west of Parveras and Damri Bray. The Fourth Canadian Division during the day succeeded after very hard fighting in occupying Fort Quascourt, Moercourt, Chile and Halu. The capture of Fort Quascourt was particularly valuable in view of preparations and progress for an attack on the strong enemy positions between that village and the Roy Road. Desperate fighting took place on the Fourth Canadian Divisional Front where our left blank still presented a pronounced salient. On the divisional right, the 10th Brigade fought its way forward through a maze of enemy machine gun positions in face of intensive artillery fire. All its battalions were heavily engaged at one stage or another, these being the 44th New Brunswick but originally recruited in the west the 46th. South Saskatchewan, the 47th Western Ontario and the 50th Calgary. The 12th Brigade, Brigadier General J. H. McBrien carried on the attack on the left of our line from the neighborhood of Moercourt, Storming, Moercourt and Chile with the railway at Halu the objective. The going was extraordinarily difficult through a maze of trenches and wires studded with machine gun posts. The 78th Battalion of Winnipeg fought its way right through to Halu. The 38th Battalion Ottawa also saw very heavy fighting in this sector and in fact the whole brigade greatly distinguished itself, the other battalions being the 72nd British Columbia and the 85th Nova Scotia. The 11th Brigade came up in support and was also heavily engaged and here the 102nd Battalion British Columbia held a critical position in face of very heavy loss but the enemy was able to bring up more artillery and the salient was found untenable. During the night of August 10th to the 11th a strong enemy counterattack developed against a part of the front of the 4th Canadian Division east of Halu. Says the Corps Commander, this counterattack was beaten off but owing to general conditions the line at the point was slightly withdrawn to the railway embankment immediately to the west of Halu. Subsequent upon the slight withdrawal and with a view to reducing the existing salient forward to Chile the line was further withdrawn to the eastern outskirts of that village. On October 11th at 9.30 a.m. he goes on the 32nd Division launched an attack against Damary but was not successful the 4th Canadian Division improved their line by advancing it locally to reduce the Chile salient which was still very pronounced. During the night of August 11th to the 12th the 32nd Division and 4th Canadian Division were relieved by the 3rd and the 2nd Canadian Divisions respectively. On August 13th Sir Arthur Curry addressed a special order to his command as follows, quote, the first stage of this battle of a meaning is over and one of the most successful operations conducted by the Allied armies since the war began is now a matter of history. The Canadian Corps has every right to feel more than proud of the part it played. To move the Corps from the Arrars Front and in less than a week launch it in battle so many miles distant was in itself a splendid performance. Yet the splendor of that performance pales into insignificance when compared with what has been accomplished since zero hour on August 8th. On that date the Canadian Corps to which was attached the 3rd Cavalry Division, the 4th Tank Brigade, the 5th Squadron RAF attacked on a front of 7500 yards after a penetration of 22,000 yards the line tonight rests on a 10,000 yard frontage. 16 German divisions have been identified of which four have been completely routed. Nearly 150 guns have been captured while over 1000 machine guns have fallen into our hands. 10,000 prisoners have passed through our cages and casualty clearing stations, a number greatly in excess of our total casualties. 25 towns and villages have been rescued from the clutch of the invaders. The Paris Amines Railway has been freed from interference and the danger of dividing the French and British armies has been dissipated. Canada has always placed the most implicit confidence in her army. How nobly has that confidence been justified and with what pride has the story of your gallant success been read in the homeland? This magnificent victory has been won because your training was good, your discipline was good, your leadership was good. Given these three, success must always come. From the depths of a very full heart, I wish to thank all staffs and services, the infantry, the artillery, the cavalry, the engineers, the machine gunners, the independent forces consisting of the motor machine gun brigades, and the cyclists, the tank battalions, the RAF, the medical services, the army service corps, the ordnance corps, the veterinary corps, and the chaplain services for their splendid support and cooperation. And to congratulate you all on the wonderful success achieved. Let us remember our gallant dead, whose spirit shall ever be with us, inspiring us to noble or effort, and when the call again comes, be it soon or otherwise, I know the same measure of success will be yours." End of Part 1, Chapter 7, Recording by Mike Vendetti, Canyon City, Colorado. MikeVendetti.com Part 1, Chapter 8 of Canada's Hundred Days with the Canadian Corps, from Amiens to Mone, August 8 to November 11, 1918. This is a LibreBox recording. All LibreBox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibreBox.org. Canada's Hundred Days by John Lidesay. Part 1, Chapter 8. Operations, August 12 to 20. The heroic, though fruitless assault of the 32nd British Division upon the immensely strong enemy positions in front of Pauvier and Dammery is worth recording in more detail because it opened the way for a magnificent feat of arms on part of troops of the 3rd Canadian Division. Two-and-a-half miles northwest of Roy, right a thwart the Amin Roy Road, rises the 100-meter eminence known from the singular shape of the wood at its foot as the Bois-en-Zed, or Zed Wood. It formed an important feature of ancient defenses in this region, and to this day the galleries hewn from the living rock still exist in the base of the hill. The enemy went on the defensive prior to the battles of the Somme in 1916, was quick to seize its value and make of it the pivot of his defense in front of Roy, a considerable railway center. Linked up with the villages to the north, it formed a chief outwork of its Roy-Chanay line. Its importance was so generally recognized that in the early stage of the present battle a squadron of the Fort Gary Horse had made a reckless dash down the Roy Road in the hope of galloping the position, a fatal ride described in detail on a subsequent page. The enemy held in force andeshi, a village a mile southwest of Zed Wood, which for a few hours had been in the hands of our cavalry on August 10, Damary, three-quarters of a mile to the northeast of the wood, and Parvier, the same distance due north of Damary. His right flank, though somewhat compromised by the capture of Focus Court recorded above, a village a mile and three-quarters north and a little east of Parvier still rested firmly on the wood immediately north of Parvier with the little hamlet of Maison Bleu just beyond, and received additional support from the fortified village of La Chevette, a mile and a quarter northeast of Parvier, and therefore the same distance southeast of Focus Court. Running for a thousand yards south of Damary and so northeast of Zed Wood is Damary Wood. For military purposes of an earlier age this old Roman road had been led right over the crest of Zed Wood, and on each side for a mile or two west the enemy had lined it with trenches and wire with machine gun positions sweeping what was in effect a natural glassy. The same defense system with a double line of trench had been carried from the Roy Road west of Damary and thence west of Parvier. As is usual in this part of the country each of these villages is perched upon a slight elevation rising from 90 meters at Damary to 95 at Parvier, crowned with the dense foliage of the village park. Immediately east of this line the ground rises gently up to fall away in a little dip and then rise again to the villages of Goyancourt and Freynoy Le Roy, the former being about 1200 yards and the latter 2000 yards northeast of Damary, and these could not have been placed better to afford support to both Damary and Parvier either by infantry or artillery. Goyancourt is on a slightly higher level than Damary, but the ridge intervening prevents direct observation and was to form the key to the battle tactics of our troops who finally captured it. The weakness of the position is that immediately in front of it lies a wide plateau with a uniform elevation of 100 meters distant about 1000 yards from both Damary and Parvier and what is worse from the point of view of the defense thrusting in a tongue between them. On this higher ground is situated the old British front line of the Somme, but it is bare and open affording no natural cover. To make a frontal attack necessitated descending from the plateau and then advancing up the reverse slope against the villages everywhere exposed to artillery and machine gunfire. The only shelter was an old but still deep support trench running east and west and leading directly out of our defense system into Damary Village. It was against this immensely strong position that the 32nd division was sent into attack. This British division had been brought hastily down from the north covering part of the distance by marching and the troops were tired out when they took over from our third division on the night of August 9-10. During August 10 elements of the division improved the line with a view to securing a better jumping off ground. There was no sleep at night for the enemy kept up a deluge of artillery fire liberally besprinkled with gas shells. At half past nine in the morning of Sunday August 11 the division launched an attack extending over its whole front supported by a not very successful barrage. The troops attacked with the utmost gallantry but were met by a withering and crushing fire and at no point made an advance of more than a hundred yards beyond our trench system. The units engaged included Devon troops and Highland Light Infantry and our men who witnessed the slaughter said it was an inspiring sight to see these attempting to dig in under the hail and fury of fire. Finally the division fell back having suffered nearly two thousand casualties and the following night was relieved by the third Canadian division. The heavy loss was due primarily to the divisional artillery putting down their barrage too far ahead of the troops with the result that their men were not following the barrage sufficiently closely. No troops in the world could have shown greater fortitude or pertenacity the attack being persisted in long after its hopelessness was revealed. The third Canadian division took over again therefore on Sunday night August 11-12. The divisional commander, Major General L.J. Lipset had once said about his preparation for the attack. He decided that our left sector in front of Parvier offered best prospects for an initial success. Plans were carefully prepared for amassing of artillery and for this purpose the divisional artillery had the support of the fifth Canadian divisional artillery with some heavy batteries. Monday and Tuesday were devoted to fighting the way step by step through the old trench system up to the northern and western edge of Parvier and Damary. This was done under unremittant and intense enemy fire both day and night, our troops continually having to put on their gas masks. Nor was this all. On Monday the enemy made two determined counterattacks and on Tuesday night counterattacked three times but on each occasion was beaten off. Finally all was ready and it was decided to open the attack on Parvier on Wednesday night. The assault was assigned to the 7th Brigade and won battalion the 42nd Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Lieutenant Colonel R.L.H. Ewing, started in by making a detour north of Parvier bombing as they went. So soon as this movement was well under way the Princess Patricia's light infantry, Lieutenant Colonel C.J.T. Stewart initiated a similar attack south of Parvier, thrusting in along the high spur alluded to above. By dawn both battalions were established on the northern and southern outskirts of the village respectively. At a quarter past six our massed artillery laid down a hurricane barrage for fifteen minutes. The two battalions then rushed the village joining hands fifteen minutes later with combined casualties of but five men since the kickoff of the previous night. But the heavy fighting was yet to come. Leaving the 42nd to mop up the village the Princess Patricia's Canadian light infantry pushed on to the east and prepared to fight off a determined counterattack developing from La Chevette to the northeast. But they were immediately appraised of another attack coming at their rear from Dammery. Nothing daunted they formed front both ways and fought their way back to Parvier though the enemy was coming on four deep from two directions. The 42nd came up to their support and soon the other two battalions of the brigade the Royal Canadian Regiment and the 49th of Edmonton were on the ground helping to consolidate the position. During the course of the day the enemy attacked again and again but finally desisted the Princess Patricia's estimating five hundred dead on their front. The village was honeycombed with subterranean passages and in mopping up these three platoons of the 42nd about ninety men not only killed a hundred of the enemy as they strove to fight their way out but captured and sent to the rear four hundred two prisoners. These two battalions suffered heavy casualties but they were incurred after the village had been stormed. One officer remarked that there had been no harder infantry fighting since Moquay Farm. Many individual feats of valor characterized this fight for Parvier such as that of Private Thomas Dinnison of the 42nd Battalion a native of Denmark but who enlisted in Montreal. During ten hours of hand-to-hand fighting which resulted in the capture of over a mile of strongly garrisoned and stubbornly defended enemy trenches he displayed conspicuous and continuous bravery. Five times in succession he rushed forward alone and single-handed put hostile machine guns out of action accounting for twelve of the enemy with bomb and bayonet. His sustained valor and resourcefulness inspired his comrades at a very critical stage of the battle. At a critical period of the counter-attack when his platoon was isolated and almost surrounded Sergeant Robert Spall of the Princess Patricia's seized a Lewis gun and jumping upon the parapet of the trench his platoon was holding poured in a withering fire on the uncoming enemy ranks inflicting many casualties. He then led his men along the trench into a gap seventy-five yards from the enemy where picking up another Lewis gun this gallant NCO again climbed the parapet and by his fire at point-blank range checked the enemy advance. He was here fatally wounded but his courage and resourcefulness had saved his platoon. Born in Suffolk, England he was brought by his parents to Montreal when a child and at the outbreak of the war was engaged in business in Winnipeg. In the meantime another battle had developed almost unexpectedly at Dammery on the front of the 9th Brigade. The 52nd Battalion for the most part lumbermen and prospectors recruited at Fort William and Port Arthur held the line immediately opposite the village. On Wednesday night the enemy made a half-hearted attack and at nine o'clock next morning August 15 a platoon was sent up the support line described above bombing as they went to test out the enemy's resistance. They reported back all clear. The battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Foster made a personal reconnaissance with one runner and satisfied that the village could be carried ordered an attack at five minutes notice. One company on the right went forward south of the village, a second company followed up the support trench and a third skirted the village on the north with the remaining company in support. Very shortly Dammery was in our hands. A few of the enemy were found in dugouts and one of those lunged his bayonet through the sleeve of Colonel Foster's tunic before the latter shot him down. Suspecting a trap he led his battalion east of the village and formed up behind the ridge with one company pushed well out on either flank. In the meantime the 116th Battalion, Centre Ontario, was pushing forward on his left and the 43rd Battalion Winnipeg in close support of the 52nd. The movement was carried out fairly in time for their broke on the doomed village an intense enemy cannonade of heavy and light guns, but not a shell touched our men lying behind the ridge. Gas laid down in the village floated back on a west wind over their heads. Then after the preparation was considered complete, Dunn's ways of field grey converging on Dammery from both Goyancourt and Freynoy flooded in to an easy victory. They came in full marching equipment with their blankets evidently expecting to break through. Not less than four enemy battalions came against our little force. They came confidently on to one of the most terrible slaughters of the war for our magnificent artillery assisted by French batteries on our right laid down an intense barrage in the centre of their massed advance and right across its entire length extending as far back as the Goyancourt Freynoy Road. The front waves were caught between the barrage and the village and must either fight their way through or surrender. They fought with desperate courage. Our centre fell back a little to the edge of the village while both our flanks, somewhat advanced and wheeling in, poured a murderous rifle and machine gun fire into the penned enemy mass. He was doomed. A few fought through to the village and fell beneath our bayonets. Some 250 surrendered. The rest died. The dead, conservatively estimated at over 1,000, were piled up rampart high, for our range was never more than 200 yards. This was at one o'clock in the afternoon. At four o'clock the enemy again made a massed attack, so vital was the position to the defence of Roy. But by this time the Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg had come up in support with a company on either flank of the 52nd and secured Damary Wood. The enemy was driven back with further slaughter. Among our wounded was Lieutenant Colonel Uckerhart, who had so gallantly brought up his battalion the 43rd. Assistance too had been rendered from the direction of the Roy Road by the international company, half French and half Canadian, who formed the liaison between us. Our gallant French neighbours indeed, fired by our success, pitched in that evening and stormed Z Wood. By a singular chance the immediate neighbours of the 52nd Canadian Infantry Battalion were the 52nd French Chaussaires, and an interchange of compliment and congratulation took place on the very fine work of both sides. The remainder of the Battle of Am Yen, so far as the Canadian Corps is concerned, is thus described by the Corps Commander, quote, On the nights of August 15-16 and 16-17 the first Canadian Division relieved the 3rd Canadian Division, the latter being withdrawn to Corps Reserve. Progress was made during the night of August 16-17, the enemy being driven out of François by the 4th Brigade, Brigadier-General R. Rennie and out of La Chevette by the 1st Canadian Division, our line in the right being advanced in cooperation with the French. The relief of the 2nd Canadian Division by the 4th Canadian Division was carried out on the nights of August 15-16 and 16-17, the former being withdrawn to Corps Reserve on August 17. The operation which had been projected for August 16 had been postponed and it had been decided to transfer the Canadian Corps back to the 1st Army, the move to begin by strategical trains on August 19. August 18 was quiet along the front, but on August 19 the 4th Canadian Division carried out a minor operation near Chilet, which greatly improved our line in that neighborhood. Four hostile counterattacks to recover the newly won ground were beaten off during the night. On August 19, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions started their move to 1st Army and on the night of August 19-20, the relief of the 1st Canadian Division commenced. This relief was completed on August 22 and the 1st Canadian Division was placed in Corps Reserve. On August 22, I handed over command of the Canadian Corps front to the General Officer commanding, Australian Corps, and my headquarters moved north to Hodcloak, opening there at 10 a.m. on the same day. Between August 2 and 22, the Canadian Corps fought against 15 German Divisions. Of these, 10 were directly engaged and thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost every one of their battalions. The five other divisions fighting astride our flanks were only partially engaged by us. In the same period, the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190 guns of all calibers, and more than 1,000 machine guns and trench mortars. The greatest depth penetrated approximated to 14 miles and an area of over 67 square miles containing 27 towns and villages had been liberated. The casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps in the 14 days heavy fighting amounted to officers killed 126, missing 9, wounded 444, total 579. Other ranks killed 1,688, missing 436, wounded 8,659, total 10,783. Considering the number of German divisions engaged and the results achieved, the casualties were very light. The capture of François by the 2nd Canadian Division was a brilliant piece of work. On August 19, orders were issued to the 4th and 5th brigades to push forward and establish a line which should deny to the enemy the defences of the railway east of François, and also clear the village, thus enabling the 1st Canadian Division, which was attacking on the right in cooperation with the French, to obtain their objective of La Chevette. The 19th Battalion, Central Ontario, Lieutenant Colonel L.H. Millen, attacked at half-past 4 in the afternoon and successfully carried out the operation, establishing a line well forward of the village, capturing many prisoners and machine guns and much material. By half-past 7, the line had been consolidated. This battalion was assisted by two companies of the 18th Battalion, Western Ontario, on the right, who, after the attack, were used to protect and hold the extended right flank, caused by the division on the right not having been able to advance simultaneously. During these operations, since August 8, casualties among officers were very heavy. In addition to casualties among battalion commanders mentioned previously, Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Bent of the 15th Battalion of Toronto was severely wounded, the command devolving until his return some weeks later on Major J.D. Garvin. Lieutenant Colonel W.S. Lata of the 29th Battalion of Vancouver was also severely wounded. End of Part 1, Chapter 8 Part 1, Chapter 9 of Canada's Hundred Days with the Canadian Corps from Amiens to Mont, August 8 to November 11, 1918. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey. Part 1, Chapter 9. Operations. Canadian Cavalry Brigade. Reference has been made to the wonderful spectacle afforded by the British Cavalry Corps, when on the morning of August 8 it rode up to the plateau of Saint-Tair. This arm had done good service in the first battle of Cambrai, and had proved of vital value in the great retreat of the previous march, and now it looked as if they were to have the opportunity of breaking through the enemy line. That was not to be, but they nevertheless, by their dashing tactics, contributed very materially to the demoralization of the enemy, particularly on August 8 and 9. In making his brilliant acknowledgments, Field Marshal Haig, himself a brilliant cavalry leader, writes as follows. The fine performance of the cavalry throughout all stages of the operation deserves mention. Having completed their assembly behind the battle front by a series of night marches, on the first day of the attack they advance 23 miles from their points of concentration, and by the dash and vigor of their action, both on this and subsequent days, rendered most valuable and gallant service. And again, the cavalry were again able to demonstrate the great advantage their rapid power of concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in close contact with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed ahead of the latter, and by anticipating the arrival of the German reserves, assisted materially in our success. The Third Cavalry Division was placed in this operation at the disposition of the Canadian Corps Commander, but as the battle developed, with the opportunity for exploitation offering more and more in the Canadian sector, Corps boundaries were not strictly observed. Thus on August 9 the First Cavalry Division, led by the Eighth Hussars, came into the Corps area on our left flank, and took Mahari Corps at the Gallup, while a little to the east of Rosier, Imperial Cavalry captured a whole train of enemy reinforcements, some five or six hundred Saxons, that had been rushed up the line. The Third Cavalry Division was led into battle by the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier General R. W. Patterson, consisting of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lieutenant Colonel Van Straubensy, afterwards killed in action during the advance on Lakato, Lord Strathcona's horse, Royal Canadians, Lieutenant Colonel MacDonald, and the Fort Gary horse, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson. Both the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Strathconas form part of the Canadian Permanent Force, the former with Depot in Toronto and a distinguished fighting record going back to the North Rest Rebellion of 1885, and including South Africa, while the latter is the famous force recruited and maintained by Lord Strathcona during the South African War. Its depot originally being at Winnipeg, but more recently removed to Calgary. While in the militia list, the 34th Fort Gary horse of Winnipeg is only a junior organization, its war record entitles it to rank as a veteran force. One of its notable exploits was in the First Battle of Cambrai, November 1917, when one of its squadrons was the only cavalry unit to get across the Shelt Canal, its wonderful fight there being a matter of public record. A number of other mounted units sailed from Canada, including the various battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, later formed into the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and never remounted. But the three regiments named, while all demounted and taking their part as infantry in the early defensive days of trench warfare, were reorganized as the Canadian Cavalry Brigade when the prospect of our offensives on the west front opened the way for cavalry cooperation. The brigade formed a complete unit with its own Canadian Royal Horse Artillery, Machine Gun Squadron and Field Ambulance, and the intensive training and shock tactics it had received made it admirably fitted for the work ahead of it. The 3rd Cavalry Division, also including the 5th and 6th brigades, was billeted in the area of Hange Sursong, when on the night of August 6-7 it moved up to Amiens, reaching there at 3 in the morning and lying all next day in the city park. At 8 o'clock on the evening of August 7th, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade took the road through Longo, up to the woods west of Villars-Bretagneau, where it remained until after the battle opened. At a quarter to six on the morning of August 8th the advance began, passing south of Marsil Cove, across the Loose River at Iñacor, and taking up a battle-line west of Bokor and Kayao, the Royal Canadian Dragoons being on the right at the former point with the Strathconas on the left and the Fort Garries in reserve. Each regiment engaged, having two squadrons in line and its 3rd in support. The enemy occupied Bokor in force, holding up the advance of our infantry along the Roy Road. At noon the Royal Canadian Dragoons were lying in shelter behind the ridge about a thousand yards northwest of the village when the order came to attack. Picketing their horses, A and C squadrons advanced on foot and fought their way into the outskirts of the village. But enemy machine gunners, strongly fortified in the church tower, could not be dislodged. Word was passed back to a battery of the RCHA who galloped up into action, unlimbering their guns under a storm of machine gun fire, but quickly reducing the stronghold by shell fire at point-blank range. Many prisoners and much booty were captured with the village, which was held by the Royal Canadian Dragoons until relieved at 3 o'clock by our infantry. Meanwhile the Strathconas had not been idle. Riding down from Kayo and refusing Bokor on their right, they attacked the considerable village of LeCosnel, but the charge was stopped by the enemy's machine guns in a sunken road. The two squadrons swung left and right, and here the major leading the charge got in advance of his men and with one corporal defended himself in the scrub for eleven hours, finally rejoining his command under cover of night. The squadron that had swung off to the right crossed the Roy Road and galloped into Fresnoy en Chaucy, surprising the garrison in rear and rounding up a hundred and fifty prisoners. The enemy came back in force and the troop withdrew, rejoining the regiment with all its prisoners. In this village was presented the curious spectacle of a trooper leading a pack of ammunition mules, galloping with his reins over his arm and emptying his carbine into the enemy. All next day, August 9th, the brigade lay in support in the woods south of Kayo. On August 10th it was supposed the enemy was falling back on Roy, and at noon the brigade advanced to the high ground looking down over the battlefield on the east, the Fort Garry's and Royal Canadian Dragoons being in line and the Strathconas in support. They advanced through Le Caznel, where Villiers, Beaufort, Fallis, Beauchure and Le Caznoy, taking up a position across the Roy Road, lest of La Cambuse, a hamlet fifteen hundred yards southwest of Dommery. In front was the formidable Hundred-Meter Hill and Wood Node as Z Wood, an immensely strong position as has been described above. Aaronously, as it turned out, General Patterson was informed that our infantry had taken Dommery and the French were in possession of Andeshi, and on the supposition that the enemy was falling back on the Somme through Roy, when the capture of the position must be of immense importance, as enabling us to push on in his rear and thus secure a considerable tactical success, he was in his own mind quite justified in ordering that Z Wood be taken at all costs. A squadron of the Fort Garry's was detailed for the job and its commander went forward to reconnoitre. The terrific fire he thus drew only confirmed the hazard of the enterprise, but the attempt must be made. The squadrons swept down the road with the intention of galloping the wood, but it was to certain destruction. The enemy held strong trench lines, crowded with infantry and studded with machine guns, along each side of the highway, while from the encircling heights they poured in a withering shell fire. Owing to the trenches and wire it was impossible to get off the road. The men rode on. One trooper got within a hundred yards of the wood before he too fell. Some empty saddles returned, and at night half a dozen wounded men crawled back into our lines. Nothing like it has been seen in this war, said a veteran Canadian infantryman who was a spectator. Neither Regina Trench nor Passchendale was a patch on it. Those boys rode as if they were demented. Death's daredevil. The men rode on. Those boys rode as if they were demented. Death stared them in the face before they had gone a hundred yards, but they just kept going. Better fortune came to the other squadron of the Fort Garry's, Major Strachan, V.C., advancing along the fatal road. The squadron, while still west of La Caznoy, came under very heavy machine gun fire from the direction of Dommery. It swung off the road south crossing into the French infantry lines, and then, galloping over trench and wire, captured the village of Andeshi. And with it a very large enemy supply depot and a considerable number of prisoners. The squadron held the village in the face of repeated counterattacks until ordered to withdraw, bringing off all its prisoners. Mention may be made here of the brilliant exploit of a sergeant and five men of the Canadian Light Horse, recruited in the west, but which did not form part of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, being included in the Canadian Corps troops, and as such accompanied the Corps throughout these operations. On August 9th, while cooperating along the Roy Road with Lancers and Scots Grays, this little party dashed out, shot up, and stampeded an entire enemy convoy. Two of the men were killed, but the sergeant and the other three rejoined their troop. On the night of August 11th, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade went back to Am Yen, and two days later returned to its depot at Hange Sursong. This was to be the last occasion it was to fight on the same field with the Canadian Corps. Thereafter it vanished into the blue, though from time to time reports came through of gallant deeds, notably its capture of Lakato. The purpose of the cavalry was to push back on through the anticipated break in the enemy lines, and cut loose on his back areas, destroying dumps and communications. The opportunity never came. What was accomplished, gallant though it was, had little more than a localized effect, and after three days, when it was clear the line could not be broken, the cavalry was withdrawn. It had suffered heavily, but it had given proof of the greatest dash and initiative, tackling jobs that perhaps could have been accomplished at less cost by the slower-moving infantry. It has been said that the day of the cavalry is over, that in the execution of its chief functions it has either been superseded or neutralized, that whereas the work of reconnaissance is now carried out by aircraft, assisted by the telephone and wireless telegraphy, the opportunity for the cavalry to move to the enemy lines with the wireless telegraphy, the opportunity of using cavalry in shock tactics becomes less and less as modern weapons are perfected, together with the now universal system of defense by trench and wire systems, supported by concentrated machine gun fire. And finally, it is pointed out that if the battle fronts of the future are to be continuous as in this war, the scope of the cavalry must be confined to two periods, the preliminary, before the opposing lines are joined in battle, and the final, when one side is giving way and the cavalry can be used with advantage to hurry his retreat and raid his communications. In this war the value of the cavalry in the early stage in the retreat from Mons was fully demonstrated, but the armistice cut short its fast-developing opportunities which it was hoped would turn the retreat into a rout. Nothing developed in the battle of Amien to seriously impair the force of these criticisms. A few of the brilliant cavalry exploits and even the most hardy champion of the cavalry will not contend that the battle was won by the cavalry or that it would have been lost without them or that the general result of the first two days of fighting would even have been seriously compromised had they been absent altogether. Apply the same test to the claims of the infantry and the artillery and the answer is obvious and in a lesser degree the tanks also proved indispensable. Above all the tanks economized infantry losses. In the last analysis it was the man with the machine gun, the man with the rifle and the man with the bomb and bayonet that won our battles always predicting powerful artillery support. End of Part 1, Chapter 9 Part 1, Chapter 10 of Canada's Hundred Days with the Canadian Corps from Amien to Mons August 8th to November 11th, 1918 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey Part 1, Chapter 10 Sidelights of Battle The first fury of the battle being spent there comes a pause ten days have been continually on the move or in the firing and a rest for many of the tired troops who for a week to line. The battalions rest on the line they have reached troops relieving them operations whether has been perfect and for once in our favour there are no rains to ruin the operation as happened in the salient a year before reinforcements and supplies all gathered beforehand are brought up with automatic regularity but over everything is a sheet of white dust The men lie now in the shelter of woods many sleeping in enemy blankets and enemy dugouts but the majority bunk on the ground each man scooping for himself a shallow trench proof against flying shrapnel with night bombing going on and by day the enemies heavy artillery searching likely bits of cover safety lies in the open ground but human nature feels less exposed under shelter of trees and so the woods are populace bone weary they sleep off their fatigue but soon the battalion band strikes up animated groups gather talking over the battle and exhibiting their souvenirs iron crosses old fashioned key winding watches officer's swords regimental rings shoulder straps and buttons cut off protesting prisoners queer wooden tobacco pipes quaintly carved all manner of gear a knot of men are gambling with sheeps of boldly printed paper marks 10 marks to the frank is their rate of exchange not for seeing the time but a few months away when in Belgium each of those marks is to be worth one frank 30 centine the men are in the best of moods to talk about their exploits first we come across Brutinelle's independent force this consists of two Canadian motor machine gun brigades a six gun Newton mortar section and a wireless section all mounted in armored cars together with the Canadian corps cyclist battalion the force came straight up to the line and went into action with no rest for three days they were hard at it and Saturday night was their first sleep it was good fun said one of them to do any fighting in our proper capacity did you hear how one of our cyclists took a village down on the Roy road he was scouting and rode through the village full tilt steering with one hand and with the other emptying his automatic into flabbergasted fritzies he kept going right through and when one of our armored cars came up behind the whole garrison surrendered good sport it was along the Roy road that day some real hunting the Amien Roy road here traverses a difficult country with the means and bordered by woods offering excellent positions for machine gun nets here at times the armored cars were held up and lost heavily an enemy gun made a direct hit on one car killing three of the crew and cutting off the armor of the gunner removing the body of the driver this man corporal crews of Ottawa swung round the shattered car bringing it safely back into our lines then he died less tragic was the experience which in the twilight ran through our lines on the Roy road and only pulled up when challenged by an enemy sentry him they bayoneted but it was too good to last the bosh came back with bombs and put the lorry out of commission our men however though all wounded crawled back to our lines in the darkness faced with the loss of their rations the unit advanced and recaptured the lorry towing it back in triumph Padres are strictly noncombatant and unarmed they found their chaplain Captain Deesum already in possession with eight prisoners I went up there to help the boys through he said with cigarettes and things but I found I'd blundered in ahead of the battalion there was nothing else to do but put a bold face on it and these fellows here thought they were surrounded the Padres had a bullet wound in his cheek and four through his tunic a perfectly good coat ruined old front line they called him and told how at Passchendaele strictly against orders he was in the front line burying our dead when up comes the divisional senior chaplain a reprimand was due but have you another spade was all the colonels said here is another story of a Padre Father R. McGillivarae of antagonist Nova Scotia chaplain of the Fifth Brigade while ministering to the wounded where they fell on the field of battle south of Raleigh was forced to take shelter in a shell hole where he found the remnants of a company and an enemy field battery a few hundred yards away was firing over open sites grasping the situation Father McGillivarae called out boys we may as well die fighting he leaped up from the shell hole and rushed the battery followed by his brave boys the boys say he terrified the Huns as with a wild war whoop and brandishing his cane he landed in their midst the rest of the story is short the prisoners were numbered off and the guns were marked captured by the 26th battalion some wag remarked it should have been captured by Canadian chaplain service in the dense midst of the kickoff on Thursday a section of five men of the 13th battalion Montreal Highlanders got separated from their unit and groping their way about came suddenly upon an enemy trench fully manned the corporal one after another over a hundred Bosch came tumbling out of the trench hands up the five men safely delivered the batch of the divisional cage so great was the number of prisoners on the first day that we could not spare escorts they were told to go to the rear and for the most part went quietly two mounted men marshaled back over a thousand from the divisional to the core cage but they were not all like this three stout Vertenburgers seized a broken down tank they put up a stiff defense but presently out of the blue a bombing plane swooped down and dropped a bomb neatly on top of the tank nothing was more inspiring to our men than the fine cooperation of the tanks commanded by Imperial officers each ran his own show and although there was a good deal of confusion in the fog a gallant and resourceful lot they were many were our tried comrades for they had fought with us at Vimy we will go anywhere with the Canadians said one of them has never been seen in this war much the same thing was said on a later day by an officer of an Imperial heavy battery we would sooner be with you than with anyone for we know that your wounded infantry will exploit to the last yard the work of the gunners but the tank suffered heavily particularly in the wooded country this is what a staff officer of the 11th brigade witnessed a tank section of three was advancing in line ahead of our infantry when from the next field the first tank burst into flames its course was run the second stopped and the third also burst into flames then the second tank moved forward again stopped burst into flames out of the manhole crawled two men suffocating a third thrust his arm from a gunport waving back the infantry flames looked out to his hand in the early stage of the advance of the 54th battalion from the Kutenei with Bosch strongly entrenched in defences the tanks had overrun it was impossible to pass by without being moaned down by flank fire seeing that his three companies in line were closely engaged the battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Kerry of Nelson, British Columbia took personal command of the reserve company organized it for defense and then led it in attack on a corner of the wood in face of heavy machine gun fire the three companies were enabled to outflank it capturing the garrison and proceeding to their objectives these incidents selected at random might be multiplied and 100 fold and they leave untouched the record of public honors of VCs and the like they were garnered from these tired men gathered round their campfires stitching rents made by Barb Dreyer or drying out their sweaty shirts wonderful indeed their spirit for the most part of the night's and only their superb condition fine discipline and unquenchable order carried them through to go perhaps two or three days without sleep and but little food will try the stoutest heart it was precisely into such a state of mind that during a lull in the battle one's inquiries were directed crossing the channel but a few days before one had been struck by the fact that the nearer one got to the front line the clearer was the note of confidence in London as in Montreal that one had been at work one had met but a day or two before a highly placed Canadian officer who disbared a victory and as for the politicians with them it had become a question whether the Sammys were to be in time to save us whether we could keep going till the spring of 1919 but these fellows had taken the measure of the Bosch and they knew that he was beaten if not this year then surely the next but even here are discriminations hot blood youth doesn't care it is his great adventure to him it is a lovely war but fathers of families stayed citizens enlisted only from an imperative sense of duty these have a different angle shan't we have peace this fall asked a tough old blue nose one points out that we can have a peace at any time but such a peace as is only a truce never that he replies we'll find it out here and now I can't leave it to my boy we're all fed up with the war of the battalion none of us like it but we'll carry through to October 1919 if that's your date or 1920 if we must but the peace must be the real thing we must rub Fritz's nose in the dust good and plenty and then there is the company of adventurers old prospectors from the mountains trappers of the wild shanty men from the backwoods men whose whole life has been a gamble with death and for these war is the greatest game of all we must fight till we're in again says one and there is a private who fought with the 52nd battalion in front of Damary military medal and bar who works on survey parties out of Edmonton Alta the best fun I ever had he said I've had many a moose fight and have tussled with the grizzlies in the Rockies but this beat all I used up two of our rifles and then grabbed a Bosch rifle got so hot I had to work the bolt with my foot the longest range was 200 yards most of it 75 to 100 in every shot a bull one of our Lewis guns fired off 34 pans I'd never seen so much dead in my life it was like spraying a potato patch our Colonel is a real general or our number would have been up the men are wonderful so too are the battalion officers and one cannot withhold one's admiration from the juniors and the military casualties show and yet carry the added responsibility of leadership here is the story of a posthumous Victoria Cross Lieutenant brilliant of the 22nd battalion French Canadians for the most conspicuous gallantry and almost superhuman devotion to duty during the operations of August 8th and 9th the official record goes he was in charge of a company which he led during the two days with absolute fearlessness and extraordinary ability and initiative at about one o'clock in the afternoon of August 9th just after the day's attack had begun his company's left flank was held up by an enemy machine gun he rushed in and captured the gun personally killing two of the gun crew while doing this he was wounded in the thigh but he refused to be evacuated a little after three o'clock the same day his company was held up by heavy machine gun fire from a machine gun nest in a group of houses he personally reconnoitred the ground organized a party of two platoons and rushed straight for the machine gun nest here one hundred and fifty Germans and fifteen machine guns were captured the lieutenant personally killed five Germans and being wounded a second time now in the shoulder which he had immediately dressed again refused to be evacuated at about six in the evening of the same day he saw a field gun firing on his men with open sights from a neighboring wood he immediately organized and led a rushing party towards the gun after progressing about six hundred yards he was seriously wounded in the abdomen in spite of this third wound he continued to advance some two hundred yards when he fell unconscious from exhaustion and loss of blood his wonderful example throughout the day fired his men with an enthusiasm and fury which largely contributed towards the battalion's noble achievements this was in the attack of Maricourt he died that night another posthumous VC was Lieutenant James Edward Tate of the seventy-eighth battalion of Winnipeg for most conspicuous bravery and initiative in attack the advance on Halu having been checked by intense machine gun fire Lieutenant Tate rallied his company and led it forward with consummate skill and dash under a hail of bullets a concealed machine gun however continued to cause many casualties taking a rifle and bayonet Lieutenant Tate dashed forward alone and killed the enemy gunner crying come on boys the seventy-eighth don't mind machine guns inspired by his example his men rushed the position capturing twelve machine guns and twenty prisoners later when the enemy counter-attacked our positions under intense artillery bombardments this gallant officer displayed outstanding courage and leadership and though mortally wounded by a shell continued to direct and aid his men until his death owing to the exigencies of the British press censorship in France whose instructions from general headquarters during this period the participation in this great battle of the Canadian corps must not be published the people of Canada learned of the victory two or three days before they became aware of the conspicuous part taken in it by their sons and brothers it was indeed a Canadian corps battle planned by the corps and zero hour fixed by the corps what that part was is best summed up in the words of an impartial critic the special correspondent in France of the London Times reviewing the course of events in the first scene of our offensive which began August 8 the actors were chiefly overseas men from the British Isles took only a small part of the attack north of the Somme to protect the flank of the Australians south of the river below here on the main battle front the honour of the first advance was shared by the Australians and Canadians in structure it was chiefly a Canadian battle it was their advance on the loose that was the corps and crux of the operation and on their progress depended the advance of the Australians on their left and that of the successive French armies on their right each of which was thrown in only as the advance above it prospered the Canadians I think are right in claiming that the fighting of these first two days was the biggest thing Canada has done in the war not accepting the recapture of Vimy Ridge certainly nothing could have been better the Canadian corps flushed with victory was to go on to bigger things yet the impression won bore away that the Australians show was a kind of picnic there indeed the Vians were war rations and the skittle alleys, machine gun emplacements but where nevertheless there was after the dreary months of the trenches a sense of change and holiday sight of green fields and growing things a clatter of movement and good humour we were going back to quite a different thing to the long road stretching from Eris to Cambrai a field of bloody footsteps mire and death end of part one chapter 10 part one chapter 11 of Canada's hundred days with the Canadian corps from Amiens to Mone August 8th through November 11, 1918 this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesay part one chapter 11 lessons of the battle war is the last thing to go according to program said Thucydides and the maxim never had a more striking application than in this battle of Amiens the enemy were preparing to attack when upon them fell the avalanche it was all very disconcerting for the moment they were overwhelmed those of their front line troops who escaped capture had their wind up and spread consternation behind besides they had lost all their guns except stout machine gunners in strictly localized defenses we met very little organized opposition the first day and our great store of prisoners guns and material of all kinds was precisely due to the enemy having been massed forward for the assault set for a couple of days later but as we went forward conditions began to change it is another maxim of war that an attack weakens in its thrust as it progresses so at the end of the third day our blow having lost some of its first impetus being restricted in its full swing by the course of the battle on either flank and meeting more and more determined resistance from the enemy who had thrown in a number of fresh divisions and again gathered together a respectable body of artillery our advance perceptibly slowed down we were coming too to the country hitherto as we have seen the enemy's organized defense had been rudimentary he had paid little attention to his trench system and there was a minimum of wire but now we were to advance into the old Somme battlefield traversed by ancient trench lines festooned by rusted wire and passing off solid ground to marshlands while in our immediate front lay the strong defense line linking up Roy and Shoenay and the operations before him that Sir Arthur Curry made very strong representations to the high command to the effect that the Canadian Corps having successfully accomplished its allotted task as storm troops should be pulled out of that area before its bright temper became dull to be used in a similar operation on another front for which he suggested the Bapaum sector as most suitable however it was decided that the Corps should do more spade work until at least the French offensive had developed further in the direction of Roy there was a prospect too that the offensive on our left flank reduced north of the Somme to a static condition before Bray and thus in turn holding back our immediate neighbors the Australians might develop more favorably when the attacking front would broaden and the Canadian Corps be relieved from its salient offering new opportunities for further successful exploitation towards the Somme the Dissultery writing that followed Dissultery not that it was easy but because it led nowhere in particular proved very expensive for the Canadian Corps whose task subjected as it was to a galling and fallowed fire resolved itself into the storming of individual villages in fact there was the prospect that we were going to run into another blind alley after the fashion of the offensive of 1916 on to the Somme was the talk in the ranks but without a true appreciation of the difficulties when therefore the word reached us that we were to be relieved by French divisions there was a general satisfaction we understood of course that it meant we were to have a go in elsewhere it is worth noting here that Field Marshall Haig in his victory dispatch endorses the opinion submitted by the Canadian Corps commander of August 12 he writes our infantry had reached the old German Somme defenses of 1916 on the general line west of Dammery east of Lyon east of Croyar having repulsed with severe loss determined counterattacks in the neighborhood of Lyon north of the Somme we were on the western outskirts of Bracer Somme and crossed in all directions with tangled belts of wire the hole covered by the wild vegetation of two years presented unrivaled opportunities for stubborn machine gun defenses attacks carried out on August 13 proved the strength of these positions and showed that the enemy heavily reinforced was ready to give battle for them I therefore determined to break off the battle on this front and transferred the front of attack army to the sector north of the Somme where an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy my intention was for the third army to operate in the direction of Balpalm so as to turn the lines of the old Somme defenses from the north the French First Army now ceased to be under my command meanwhile south of the Somme our pressure was to be maintained so as to take advantage of any weakening on the part of the enemy and encourage in him the belief that we intended to persist in our operations on that front during the succeeding days local attacks gave us possession of Dammery, Parvier and Françard and made progress also at other points end quote in fact our whole conduct of the war had changed under the masterly direction of both our attacks henceforth were to be restricted in their objectives and only to be developed as their successful progress cost further fields for exploitation in effect the battle of Amiens was now broken off so far as the British forces went and there immediately opened the less ambitious but locally successful attack in the direction of Balpalm then in turn came the battle of Arras and the beginning of the Hindenburg line by the Canadian Corps thereafter the whole fabric of the enemy defense began to give way and it was the beginning of the end before leaving the battlefield some tactical considerations are worthy of note it cannot be said that in its broad aspects the battle presented any new tactical features it merely applied successfully the plans Sir Julian Bing had originated for his third army in the first battle of Cambrai of the preceding November he failed relatively at least to his hopes because he had not at his disposal sufficient forces to exploit his initial success nor even to properly defend the ground one but that did not invalidate his plan which consisted of a surprise attack unaccompanied by artillery preparation the free use of tanks being counted on to break the road for the infantry combined with an intensive barrage laid down on the enemy front and support lines and battery positions that plan changed the nature of the combat on the western front converting it from trench to trench fighting to open warfare the enemy was quick to adopt it in his march offensive and with perfect success his means being adequate to his purpose it was now for the first time successfully employed by the British arms the plan was developed to its highest extent by the employment of a tremendous barrage designed to carry the infantry deep into enemy territory by the presence of an unprecedented number of tanks including the newly perfected whippets by the bringing up of the Calvary Corps and last but not least by the cooperation of the independent force under General Brutinelle of Canadian motor machine gun brigades and cyclists Brutinelle's independent force as we have seen did valuable and particularly gallant work along the Roy Road where in the early stage of the battle it acted as the liaison between the French and our own third division and two was denied the chance of breaking through and because its operations were necessarily confined to meddled roads held everywhere in great strength by the enemy its offensive role was limited its first brigade was fighting over the same ground where it had one imperishable fame in the March retreat over 100 heavy tanks were assigned to the attack and of these two thirds had become casualties from one cause and another by the end of the third day some were walking wounded cases only but many were destroyed by direct hits without question the tanks played a great and formidable part in this battle and if the war had continued another year no doubt they would have become a still more effective arm but that they were not vital to success was proved by the Canadian Corps later on when its supply of tanks at first scanty rapidly was reduced to the vanishing point the tank indeed and its tactical management was still in process of evolution even up to the close of hostilities it was perhaps Britain's greatest material contribution to the war early tanks failed or achieved but a moiety of success because they were too slow and too vulnerable the enemy after his first shock of surprise affected to take them lightly but nevertheless captured documents proved that he was anxious commanders being warned to be prepared to pay special attention to anti-tank defense and to train men with the anti-tank guns a magnified rifle weighing 35 pounds of which several fell into our hands in the Amin show the great width and depth of the Hindenburg ditch was designed to stop tanks after the considerable French success with tanks south-west of Cisson in July and our own in the present battle the arms increased his own tanks were a failure because of poor design the flat under body preventing the climbing of obstacles and he never had enough to make them really formidable in the Amin show the tanks were masked and the wastage was so great that replacements on the same scale were difficult especially as the widening of the battle line made an effective tank concentration more and more out of the question in the ARA defensive battle line and in the battle of Khembray because of the impassable nature of canals and rivers encountered they were almost entirely absent very few in fact were left at all in the closing stages of the great offensive and a localized concentration to overcome machine gun resistance became impossible had it been otherwise our casualties would have been lighter for the tank is the ideal weapon for destroying machine gun nests in the Amin show tanks were driven right over these emplacements either killing or capturing their garrisons if war comes again in our time the tank has a great future the whippets have a special mission of their own the up-to-date cavalry but the heavy tank must also have sufficient speed to keep well ahead of infantry on necessity strong enough armor plating to resist all but direct hits strong fortified posts and such bulk and engine power as can traverse not only natural obstacles except canals and rivers but the protective ditches dug by the enemy above all they must have wider range of vision and be in direct communication not only with their own units but with other arms especially infantry for at present the tank once started is a law unto itself and too often becomes detached from the log of the early morning of August 8 they often lost their way overrunning their objectives or missing them altogether compasses were useless because of the mass of metal and shut in that fiery box a general survey is impossible one tank was observed coming back from the front line when its commander supposed he was working forward even in the last days of the war there appeared to be two schools of thought in regard to tank tactics one as exemplified in the Amiens show was that long lines of tanks should go in ahead of the infantry and over run the enemy in many cases they sailed right over dugouts and past machine gun posts they could not see in the merc so that our infantry following up had a hard time of it and the trouble was that when a tank was wanted to reduce such a fortified point the infantry had no means of making their need known the other was that tanks should be held in leash close up behind the infantry to be employed on individual work as required a quite possible development might be that each brigade or even each battalion would have its own tank section to work in tactical conjunction extraordinary gallant men these tank crews the suicide club our boys called them one of our officers a very brave man went forward in one of them to reconnoiter when finally he was let out he shook his fist at his hosts never again demon will I enter your scalding bowels tank crews indeed were under a terrible strain both physical and mental greater even than that of the stokers of a battleship in action in that confined space filled with poisonous gases the atmosphere was all but insupportable tank crews have been known to come out of their fortress and thrown themselves on the ground in utter exhaustion amid the full fury of an enemy barrage a full day's battle such as August 8 played them out and there was great difficulty in getting the tank crews back into shape for the battle of the following day that indeed was to some extent the cause of our delay in continuing the offensive on August 9 in such a case the strategist laying out his battle for the morrow is apt to overlook the purely physical element of his problem where the fighting is to be continuous over a period of days it is necessary to furnish relief crews for the tanks a good number of Canadians were scattered through the tank crews but it was an imperial service the great majority of officers and men being old country if the war had gone on a Canadian tank division would have been created and the significance existed between our infantry and the tanks as explained these were limited in their scope but that was the inherent defect of the machine and not the crew so important was the part of the tank in the battle that this rather lengthy digression may be permitted we have seen that there was nothing particularly novel about the tactics of the amiens show but the whole plan was brought to the highest perfection and the employment of a fresh such as the Canadian corps assured success in advance as it turned out the weight of the battle fell on the Canadian corps but that was not the original design the fourth army was to advance on its entire front with British troops on the left and Australians in the center and Canadians on the right the most difficult ground perhaps being assigned to the latter when this movement had well developed the French first army was to take up the battle on our right but this program was diverted by reason of the situation north of the Somme here the enemy had attacked the 3rd British corps in great strength two days before and was bringing up reserves for a further thrust in the development of his intended general offensive against amiens it turned out therefore that instead of making much progress troops in this sector had all they could do to hold their own but the battle had given up in march fell to the ground as a consequence the left of the Canadian corps was obliged to conform and though its center pushed well forward and its right kept pace with ourselves it was unable to attain tactical freedom of maneuver on the other hand our right the French battle went so well after it had gained momentum that it spread far to the south eventually including Mont-de-Dieu and the effect of this was to make the Canadian area the pivotal center of the entire battle front at all stages and until we gave over to the French our line was in greater or less degree a marked salient and this of course exposed our men to enfilade artillery fire now from one flank now from the other and sometimes from both it is necessary to have a clear picture of this in order to appreciate the sterling character of their work as the capture of Chile Halu, Parvier, Damary, Fronsart and Lechvette their success was not brought about by accident skilled and patient staff work perfect organization by both A and Q branches the devoted efforts of the Canadian engineers and Army Service Corps fine qualities of leadership from divisional commanders right down to the veteran NCOs all these contributed but the greatest factor of all themselves highly disciplined fresh from a period of intensive training and conspicuous in the qualities of initiative and resource that had stood the Canadian soldier in such good stead on many a hard fought field one need not speak of their courage the common heritage of the nations but they possessed in a peculiar degree the quality of the race that declines to envisage defeat and will not be denied victory the moral effect of this great victory was far reaching for the first time in many a long day troops of the British armies had taken the offensive on the grand scale and had demonstrated that man for man in leadership and technical equipment they were the superior of the enemy that was the great contribution that the Canadian corps and with them the Australians made to the cause of the allies on August 8 they restored confidence in the British arms weakened in morale and repute in the sight of both our allies and the enemy since the sad days of March not only to the rank and file of the armies themselves but to the world at large looking back over but a few months yet this nevertheless a gulf fast obliterating memory and almost impassable to the imagination from the sure vantage ground of British victories in every theatre of the war it seems all but incredible that the British army and notwithstanding the demonstration of the French on the Marne doubts actually existed in the ability of the British armies to carry out a successful offensive yet so it was these doubts totally without justification as the event proved were finally dispelled on August 8 thus ended LC operation as it was named by the Canadian corps staff for the battle cry on the morning of August 8 was the castle land Avery castle the hospital ship sunk in the Irish sea just before with Canadian medical officers and nurses on board and what did the enemy think of it Van Houtier who commanded in this front was brother-in-law of Ludendorff and the best face must be put on it we were up against the elite of the French army and the celebrated Canadian corps said the German higher staff it is not generally known that the battle of Amiens was intended to be the last British offensive on the west front in 1918 and it was only because of the unexpected success attained that our offensives were everywhere continued the original program granted a reasonable measure of success such as should free the Amiens Paris railway was that thereafter the troops should settle down into winter quarters and await the coming of the American armies to renew the offensive this bold stroke in which the Canadian corps had so striking a part not only opened the floodgates of victory but saved for us the long weary months of trench warfare and the heavy casualties they entail with Ludendorff August 8 is obviously an obsession we have seen above something of his opinion the 8th of August he says in another place marked the downfall of our writing strength destroyed our hopes of strategic amelioration to continue the war was to start a gamble the war had to be ended end quote he returns again and again to the fatal day quote the 8th of August 1918 is the black day of the German army in the history of the war I have experienced none worse except during the events beginning with September 15 which took place on the Bulgarian front and sealed the fate of the central powers the English Colonials and the French broke deep into our line between the some and the loose where our divisions were completely overrun 6 or 7 German divisions which could be described as thoroughly fit for battle had been defeated 2 or 3 divisions and the remnants of the defeated forces were ready to close the wide gap between Bray and Roy end quote and he concludes by speaking of the contemplated retirement in this section of the line quote this movement he says was decided upon the night of August 9 to 10 if it did not succeed a great allied victory was possible end quote end of part 1 chapter 11