 morning. And the 21st century heritage, seizing histories, lessons to tackle technology and leadership challenges in the new century. And thank you all for being here and outnumbering the panel. Laugh or I'll tell it again. Come on, folks. We'll get warmed up here. We want this to be a discussion. I'm gonna make some remarks and we're gonna have the panelists make some remarks in order. I'll kind of lay out thematically what it is we're trying to do here today. But what I'd really like to do that never really happened to some of these panels is you'll hear us talk for a little bit. We'd like to engage in a discussion. What's on your mind? Get up to the mics. Come ask us questions. Let's kind of delve into some of this stuff. And thinking about lessons learned in history, you're gonna hear some examples here shortly. I was reminded of a recent conversation I had with Tom Friedman, who is the op ed columnist for the New York Times. You may have read some of his books. The world is flat. The Lexus and the olive tree. He's writing a new book called the world is fast. And it's the convergent of what he calls the three m's. Excuse me. He's very pithy on how he writes, but the three m's that are converging in his mind are Moore's law, which is shorthand for the rapid acceleration of technology at a pace we haven't seen in this world before. Mother Nature, which is the increasing issues of climate change, sea level rise and the interaction of the built environment and the natural environment that's causing disasters of a greater frequency and consequence. The third is markets. That's a short term for globalization. We live in a connected society, the internet of things, digital economy, we're finding more and more threats and challenges that are agnostic to physically and geographically described borders, germs, weather, financial transactions, the internet, start to confound things like the UCP joint, joint operational areas. Sometimes the complexity of the convergence of all these things creates a level of difficulty or scale that makes us hard to handle problems. In my own personal history, I've written a couple of salient examples where because of the convergence of these things, complexity is something that has to be confronted as a risk aggravator. And I think one of the lessons that I take moving forward is that we've got to look very, very closely at the challenges that are facing us. Sometimes we can reach back and pull out successful examples from the past. Sometimes we have to use those examples as a way to challenge the existing doctrine and the procedures on how we actually going to respond to some of these things because complexity tends to challenge existing doctrine and policies and they seem to become very, very hard to apply. The recent Ebola outbreak would be an example of that where there doesn't seem to be a doctrine or a funding source to be able to respond to these challenges. Two quick examples of complexity from my world. The deep water rise and oil spill. We went to war, if you will, with the tools we created after the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, which was a tanker with a known amount of oil. What we had to deal with was a well uncontrolled wellhead 5000 feet below the surface with oil coming up to the surface for 85 days under different wind, sea and tide conditions that produced 100,000 spills rather than one monolithic spill. In Katrina, we thought we were responding to a hurricane. That wasn't really the problem the day after the storm passed. The real problem was we lost continuity of government in New Orleans. We didn't fix that for almost 10 days. So this notion of complexity, how you confront it, how you learn from the past is something that we really need to look at going forward. During the Haiti earthquake, we lost access to the Haiti airport for a while. It was only one landing strip that was unlit. We finally negotiated landing rights to the Haitian government to allow us to move from 12 landings at 8 to 160 landings and take off at the height of the airlift. But to do that, we had to negotiate taking control of the airspace of the Haitian government. Having watched that six week into the oil spill, I went to the president and I recommended that we take control of the airspace in the Gulf of Mexico. Our current ISR capability was not adequate to address those 100,000 patches of oil. We couldn't vector our resources adequately and we really needed to bring in the intelligence community overhead assets and modern command and control to over face over oil spill doctrine that had evolved for 20 years. So just some examples of how we need to think about these things going forward. I think another thing is the existing challenges of technology and leadership in crisis that we're facing today requires to co-produce outcomes. Very few agencies that are capable of actually executing the response and solving the entire problem within their authorities, jurisdictions, and appropriations. That means we have to learn how to partner, create trust, and unity of effort is the term I like to use because when you move outside title 10, you don't have unity of command anymore. You can't order folks around. You got to figure out some way to create that moving forward. So what I'd like to kind of do today to stimulate the conversation is take us through how the services view history, how leaders intend to think about that moving forward. And I used to say when I was coming on the Coast Guard, you know, we have to honor the past but operate in the future. That doesn't mean there's no link between them. But the question is how do you make that manifest? How do you make that a dynamic process where you're actually improving performance based on what you've learned? So we're going to start by talking about history and how we think about history, how the services are approaching that, and then we're going to take a couple of different slants on that. How we have looked at operations in the past, some that have been successful and not successful. How does this impact the world of safety as technology is evolving and we're getting into areas of operations? How do we do that safely and securely so we can conduct our missions and bring our people home? And finally, we're going to take a look at over the course of history how things like amphibious warfare have evolved and what we have learned going back to when we first tried to do this in the early part of the 20th century. And again, at the end, I'll make a few closing comments and I'd really like to hear from you all on what you'd like to get out of us. We're at your mercy at that point. So again, thank you all for being here and I appreciate your attendance. Our first presenter is going to be Sam Cox, we're Admiral US Navy retired. He is the director of Naval History and Heritage of the Naval History and Heritage Command and he is the curator of the Navy. He has a intelligence background, notable assignments are the J2 at Cybercom and the CO of St. Com's JIC. He's been involved in multiple operations involving crisis operations, contingency operation and combat operations. He is currently working with the CNO right now in the practical use of history and he's going to talk to us about that. Sam. Thank you, sir, very much and thank you all for attending today, taking time out from your schedule. History actually occupies a very prominent place within the CNO's new design for maintaining maritime superiority. In fact, if you even look at the one page summary, history is on there under the, you know, understand the lessons of history so as not to relearn them. So to me, that's a clear indication of the importance that the CNO places on this. The campaign design for those who may not be familiar, you know, why a design versus a strategy or a campaign plan is a recognition of what was just discussed with the rapidity of change in the world today. Your plan is obsolete before it's on the shelf and doesn't survive contact with the enemy. So the design is intended to be a living, breathing process that allows us to improve and these statements that are within there, like understand the lessons of history, are intended to be guideposts for how we move forward. I think there's a lot more to history than understanding the lessons learned, but I agree with the CNO on the primacy of it. When I would counsel junior officers, I would always say, hey, it's really great to learn from your own mistakes. It's even better to learn from the mistakes of others, particularly when you're in a line of work where mistakes cost lives and lose battles. So I think that is truly important. But some of the other things about history that are relevant to operations today and the future, and one I would characterize as the moral obligation that we have, you know, if you expect people to fight and die for our country, the least we can do as a Navy and the nation is to remember them. At every memorial service for a sailor who falls in battle or lost at sea, we make a promise to their family and to them that we will not forget. So at the core, each service history organization, what we are doing is keeping faith with those members who have served and continue to serve today. Because those who serve today, if they see that we forget those who came before, then they will know that we will forget them too. And this desire to be remembered is a part of a warrior ethos. You can see it trace its roots all the way about even in the Iliad, you see examples of this. And it's not something that the bean counters or the budget guys truly understand, but I think it's something that warriors do understand, this obligation we have to not forget their sacrifice. Other aspect, I come from an Italian's background, so I look at the world, to me it's increasingly dangerous place in ways that we have never experienced before. And there's an increasing role for a strong Navy in that future. In order to make sure we have a strong Navy that we need in order to deal with the threats of the future, we have to have the support of Congress. And you're not going to have the support of Congress if you don't have the support of the American people. And the public affairs folks have their surveys which show that the more people understand about the Navy, the more supportive they are of what the Navy does. And Navy history plays an important role in educating the American people. It's important that they understand what the Navy does, but it's also expected to understand what the Navy has done for them, and that way they can then gather what we might be required to do for them in the future. We reach through our museums and our history programs a pretty wide demographic of people, but excused towards older and more mature, which are exactly the people who vote, exactly the people who write Congress and write letters to the editor. So by telling an accurate story, warts and all of the Navy, which allows us to have the credibility with these folks when we tell what is in fact, even with the warts, an incredible story, that allows us to get the support of the American people, which is actually critical to our ability to have the technology we need in the future. Another aspect I would say is what I call unit combat cohesion. Others call it camaraderie, spriticor, band of brothers, whatever. The reality that when in the heat of battle, sailors or other warriors do not fight for lofty ideals or patriotism. They fight for the person who's standing next to them. And I don't like to trivialize combat by comparing it to sports analogies, but if you ask yourself, why are there teams that habitually win and teams habitually lose? There's a whole lot of factors that go into that obviously, but I would say that one of them for habitual winners is that they have internalized the legacy of what came before, of those people who were in those positions, the great deeds that they did, the sacrifices that they made, and whether they realize it or not, they've internalized that history and they don't want to let that legacy down. They want to live up to that legacy. And I think that's what creates winners and that's why they want to stand for the buddy who's next to them, which is the fundamental aspect of how you win in battle. I think history has an important role to play in that. And if we get into discussion later, I'd like to give you some great examples of how that worked. But I do want to focus on what the topic here today was lessons learned. This is actually an incredibly, a lot easier said than done. It's actually very dangerous how to do because there's all kinds of ways to go astray. One of the best books I read early on was the use and misuse of the lessons of history. And there's a variety of factor of that. One is that time and time again, you will see examples of militaries who are fighting the last war. They become fixated on what happened before. And I'm not normally known to quote Nietzsche, but one of his comments was, victory makes the victor stupid and the vanquished vengeful. And we as United States, we've been on a victory roll for a very long time, so there may be some cause for concern in that regard. But it also tends to be that the lessons of history frequently get reduced to bumper sticker kinds of approaches. Lesson in Munich, appeasement never works. Maybe if the allies weren't ready for war yet either, nor was Germany, the result might have been a stalemate that allowed the Germans a peaceful time or relatively to develop an atomic weapon before they began the war. In that case, Neville Chamberlain might look more like he chose a lesser two evils rather than a craven surrender. You don't really know. And one of the challenges of history is if you are a professional historian and you start diving into the primary sources, you very quickly go, are these two people from the same planet, let alone were in the same battle? So actually getting to the truth of what really happened, how it happened, why it happened, is actually extremely difficult, which is why history is actually a rigorous discipline, which my engineer buddies sometimes find to their dismay in the Plebe seapower class at the Neville Academy. Others would argue correctly is that every historical event is a unique combination of very complex demographic, social, economic, emotional factors that go into it such that you're never going to exactly replicate an event that happened before. I would say that's absolutely true. History does not repeat itself, but I think you can make a case that people frequently make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. And it's useful to make sure you study those and understand them. But the point of studying the history is not by itself. The objective is to gain a baseline understanding of what happened and why it happened. And then to analyze what has changed in the interim between now and then. So in the engineer's term, that you can place a velocity in a direction vector on the change, and that gives you a much better chance of understanding what's going to happen in our line of work, where it's all about being inside the enemy's oodaloop and being able to do it faster than they do. You know, if we don't understand where the enemy has been, where they are, then we're not going to know where they're going, and we're going to get caught by surprise. So how do you do this? You know, the first thing you have to do is preserve your history, you know, starting right now. And that's actually, in some respects, harder now than in the past, because the information technology we have, information and misinformation and disinformation travels even faster than the truth. And it's very difficult. The second aspect is you've got to be able to retrieve it rapidly in order to analyze it and put it to good use. You know, the days of, you know, the Naval Historical Center, you know, everyone's sitting around, you know, every 10 years you crank out a book, you know, those days are long gone. We are very much in the service, you know, rapid real-time support to senior Navy leadership forces in the field to provide historical context. An example would be, you know, recently the Navy's, you know, getting beat up head and shoulders about the littoral combat ship now frigate. So we were tasked to do a study on what's been the reaction to the first-in-class, you know, going back through history. And it turns out you go back to the previous frigate, the Perry class, that's a Helen Keller class, you know, deaf and blind, because of perceived sensor limitations. The frigate before that, the Knox. Well, that's the low end of the high-low mix, for sure. And you can go back and this is actually the norm for a new platform, whether it's a ship or an aircraft. The teething problems, the cost overruns, the those who think it's not going to work, those who would rather spend the money on something else. It just goes on and on. But if you go far enough back, you also start seeing more and more cases of technological dead ends, where we built ships and platforms and they didn't go anywhere. So you could make a good case that we're actually vastly improved in what we're able to do now than we were before, but you put it in a historic context and what we're experiencing right now in terms of the, you know, issues with LCS, you know, ops normal. I would wrap this up here by, you know, going back to some of the things the CNO talked to us about when he was laying out the campaign strategy at the last, you know, flag things. And he emphasized the importance of institutional integrity and he called that, you know, don't lie to ourselves. And I like to think that I support that by, you know, telling people that, you know, I'm not the Ministry of Propaganda. My role as Director of Naval History is to provide as accurate presentation of the history of the Navy as I possibly can, because in many cases, you'll learn more by the mistakes and the blunders and the things that went wrong. Even in defeat and tragedy, there are examples of valor and sacrifice that certainly deserve, you know, to be remembered. But you can't have institutional integrity if you don't have, you know, institutional memory. And that's fundamentally what we do. And I would just close by saying that, you know, every great Navy that has come before us has one thing in common and that's that they declined. And part of that is when they started to believe their own propaganda about how great they were and lost sight of the reality of where they'd been, where they're going, and weren't able to maintain the support of the government and the people. And as a result, they didn't get the funding. They didn't get the, you know, and they just, in some cases, were defeated in battle who weren't impressed by, you know, adversaries who weren't impressed by their information dominance or whatever. So, you know, wrapping up, C&O believes, you know, history is important. He said so. And I certainly do as a director of naval history. And I look forward to any questions afterwards. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Sam. Between our presenters, I'm going to throw out a couple of thoughts. You can maybe be thinking about them before we go to Q&A based on a couple of things that Sam said. First of all, he talked about interaction with the public. I think maybe when we're done here, it'd be good to have a little discussion about what do we do in the age of the connected society, the Internet of Things when people can aggregate to produce social behaviors and not be in each other's presence. And there's no barrier to entry to public participation in events, as we found out when CNN was sitting there when our troops came ashore on Mogadishu over a decade ago. The second issue is the horizon falls of navies. I used to lead the U.S. delegation to IMO as a commandant on the Coast Guard, and I was shocked on one of my first visits over there on my breakfast with the first sea lord to find out that our fleet and the number of people in the United States Coast Guard was bigger than the British Navy. Some sobering thoughts about the evolution of sea power and how countries evolve over time. The third thing, regarding LCS, Sam, I got to tell you I went back 10 years ago, multiple hearings on the Hill about the national security cutter and I was going to break in half and sink on sea trials and we're breaking all kinds of records with drug interdiction in the eastern Pacific right now and I could not be prouder of that cutter and sometimes you just have to stay the course, as you said. Our next speaker is Dick Gron. I give you his whole bio but after I did that you would think he should have a television show named after him somewhere between Boston Legal and The Good Wife. He's a managing partner at Lune and Grossman where he specializes in assisting large organizations and corporations in investigations, litigation and some hair-raising issues that I will get in here today. He's been admitted to the bar in both Georgia and Massachusetts, been named a super lawyer and a top lawyer in New England by local professional publications. He's got a JD from Emory University but his real qualification to speak to you all today about history, tradition and moving forward is the fact that he is a Notre Dame graduate in 1970. Dick. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, everyone. I want to just state for the record that in the process of trying to build a National Coast Guard Museum for the Coast Guard, the only armed service that does not have a National Museum. I want to dispel the notion that we're building it so that Admiral Allen can clear out his basement. That is not going to happen. I'm delighted to participate in the panel but I'm going to come at the question of lessons learned in history from a slightly different perspective and that is as a consumer. In the process of trying to identify what it is that should go into a National Coast Guard Museum, we need to look at the lessons that the Coast Guard has learned so that we can take those lessons and integrate those into the exhibits of the Museum that will show how the Coast Guard has learned to save lives, to protect our nation and our environment and what they intend to do in the future. The motto of the Coast Guard Museum Association is to respect the past, engage the present and look to the future. And as board members, we take that responsibility very seriously. We recognize that there is an obligation because we don't have that in the Coast Guard to celebrate the lives of the men and women who wear the blue. And we intend to do that. Certainly we will honor Doug Monroe, Bernie Weber, who you've probably seen in the finest hours, Elmer Stone, and we're celebrating 100 years of Coast Guard history. But we also have to recognize that we have 225 plus years that goes back all the way to Alexander Hamilton. And not only do we have to honor that history, we have to recognize in building out this museum that we're in the 21st century of museum environments. We're competing for entertainment dollar as well as entertainment time. We recognize that visitors, when they're coming to a museum, have the option to go to a variety of other places. So not only do we want them coming to the National Coast Guard Museum, we want them to come back. And how do you get them to come back? Well, one of the things that that you can do is to make it entertaining for families. And as we start the process of analyzing what the exhibitry should be in the museum, one of the key components to that is a STEM based learning center. This is an opportunity where we can have kids come in, families come in, and learn about the lessons that the Coast Guard has already learned, determine what it is that the Coast Guard does now and what are the challenges as we proceed forward. Of course, the first step in the scientific method is that of observation. And what we'll show is that observation leads to innovation. And one of the stories that I want to tell you is that of Lieutenant Frank Erickson. Frank Erickson joined the Navy in 1928 and after a few years at sea he found himself coming off shift bright sunny Sunday morning in Hawaii. As he came off the shift, of course, it was December 7th, 1941. And you saw the devastation that was the result of the Japanese bombardment. And as he looked out, he saw men sailors in the water drowning and small boats couldn't get to them simply because of the fires. And then he saw a Sikorsky helicopter loaded up with soldiers, with rifles, headed out to try to defend against the Japanese attack. And they passed over those drowning sailors, helpless to do anything. And it occurred to him that we have to do something. Is there a way that we can modify that helicopter to provide life-saving services? Well, during the war, he was assigned to Sikorsky in Connecticut and he developed a hydraulic lift. And as a result of that, Coast Guard rotary history changed forever. So we'd like to be able to take the lessons like that and through technology bring those to the public that really doesn't have an appreciation of what the Coast Guard does. And we can do that in a variety of ways. We can certainly have a geodesic dome with the means by which to propagate where the Coast Guard assets are and tap on that. And we might be able to have near, as security will allow, real-time feeds from Coast Guard assets so that people as they come into the museum will be in a position to see what Coast Guard men and women are doing across the world and through the poles. We can have a helicopter simulator so that they'll understand that. And I was just at the the Booz Allen Pavilion and saw a virtual reality camera that provided a means by which you can actually visualize sitting just outside a rescue helicopter as a rescue swimmer in a forced hem wind with people waiting to be saved in the water. That's the kind of wow exhibit that we think that we need in the Coast Guard Museum in order to sustain it. In addition, we will be able to tell the stories about the environmental concerns that adults and children have. We can talk about Exxon-Baldes in 1989, which led to OPPA 90 and the response for double hull vessels. We have the example of Deepwater Horizon. And we can take those lessons that we've learned and transfer those to where we are now and moving into the future. We, of course, have the Arctic responsibility through the Coast Guard. We need to know what the changes will be for the potential of oil spills in the Arctic, in the ice. That's going to be a means by which we can show the public that the Coast Guard has a forward-looking mentality. And as a result, it is positioned to proceed into the future and to learn the lessons. As many of you know, if you have a 12-year-old boy, the shoot-em-up games are just enthralling. Well, we have the means by which not only to show law enforcement activity in which the Coast Guard is involved, but also to show how non-lethal concepts are being added to the arsenal of Coast Guard activities so that we can try to use tethered robotic activities that will allow the Coast Guard to gain added dimension to their proceedings. I just, I want to tell you one quick story. I went to a fifth-grade classroom and I mentioned the story about Frank Erickson. And I asked following that story whether or not any of the kids had a sense of what additional things the Coast Guard might be able to do recognizing that even helicopters have limitations. And there was a young girl who stood up and she said, I know what you do. I think you need a solar-powered drones that will be out over the ocean 24 hours a day, just ready to save people. So it's that kind of enthusiasm that we need through our STEM-based learning programs. And I guess the final message I want to say is that the lessons learned by the Coast Guard are also going to be learned by future generations in the National Coast Guard Museum. Thanks. Thanks, Dick. I failed to mention in the introduction that Dick is leading our effort to build a National Coast Guard Museum, but thanks, Dick. I did get to know her name again. Our next panelist is Ellen Engelman-Connors. Ellen holds a JD from the University of Indiana, an MPA from Harvard, and a BA from Indiana. She's got a very diverse background, having served as a former chairman and member of the National Transportation Safety Board. She's worked in the private sector and not-for-profit sector. But most notably, Ellen and I share a history and when I was chief of staff of the Coast Guard, I was designated as a transition executive to move us from the Department of Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security in 2003. The transition executive working for Secretary Meded and DOT was Ellen Engelman-Connors. And there were like 175 line items we had to adjudicate, anywhere from passport to shuttle buses, to the metro, to computer services and all that kind of stuff. I boiled down, I think there were four or five things that our staff couldn't agree to, so we went and shut the door and got a cup of coffee and did some horse trading. And that was my exposure to Ellen. She is now the acting director of governmental and public affairs at the Coast Guard and a great former shipmate. Thanks, Ellen. The floor is yours. Thank you, Admiral. I think Emma Allen remembers the fact that I told him I would be attentive on a microscopic level or something and he said that was a good start. On as far as detail. Hello, everyone. Good morning. My favorite quote about history came from a chief because those are where the best quotes came from, always come from. And this one has language I can share with you. And it's as follows. Experience comes from good judgment. Good judgment comes from bad judgment. Now, if that isn't a whole history lesson right there, I don't know what is. All right. Experience comes from good judgment. Good judgment comes from bad judgment. And so when we start talking about history and lessons learned and everything, I think that kind of sums it up. I come from a history perspective from a very pragmatic perspective. Our directorate of governmental and public affairs for the United States Coast Guard and that means all the stuff involving media and social media and messaging and outreach and Congress also includes the history and heritage division. Huh. Why? It wasn't like we lost at a poker game and that was leftovers. All right. It was because history and heritage is what we do every day. When you think about it, every single thing, especially in today's world is literally living history because between social media and public comment and 24 seven news cycles, everything is being recorded. You can't get away from your own history even if you tried. So you might want to think about it as you're going forward that, wow, history really is a living subject. I have kind of a pet peeve about history because it seems like we only talk about the really big stuff. Bernie Weber. Wow. You know, that's pretty cool. Who saw The Finest Hours? Uh-oh. Okay. It's out on DVD and Christmas will be coming ultimately. So you do need to go see that movie. It's very, very good. But history isn't just about the big stuff, the big failures or the big successes. History is every day. Here's another quote from a very bad movie called Fool's Gold. And this one character said, I am the lead character in my own personal story. Well, we are. We are lead characters in our own personal story. Sheila McNeil, first woman national Navy League president, lead character in our own personal story. Carrie Thomas, Admiral, Hedda Kate May, all those young recruits were dependent on her leadership to lead their personal story. We are all lead characters in our personal story. So we are making history every day. How many people are married? Oh, that's so you've married but you're not seeing movies. Okay. Anyway, that's good. Every one of you probably remembers when you met your future spouse. Does anyone not remember that moment? Because if so, you guys need to talk. Everyone remembers when you met your spouse, right? That was a key moment in your personal history. And what caused you to meet that spouse? Was it a setup? Did you make a wrong turn? Did you order a cup of coffee? Did you glance across the room? I mean, talk about chaos theory in reality right there. That butterfly changed your life, right? Because you met your future spouse and then what happened? Well, then you either got a dog or you got kids or you got a mortgage but whatever, you were starting to build your family history. And along with that, your professional history. And every decision that you've made in your entire life has created a history and an impact on others. Every single decision you make creates a push out into this universe, if you will, that impacts others. And so if you can't see that history is relevant, then in a way, you're saying your own life isn't relevant because you are all and we are all living history as we speak. Now the Coast Guard has 226 years of lesson plans. Because we're 226 years old. So 226 years of lesson planning is used every day. And it makes sense if you think about it. Now here's a funny thought and it's not a Jeopardy Quiz question. A lot of our authorities actually derive from Alexander Hamilton, the guy, not the Broadway show. And the Broadway show understands very, very good. But think about it. Some obscure guy 226 years ago impacted the 100,000 plus people who are serving today in the Coast Guard. Through our auxiliary and our reserves and our military and civilian for. Wow, think about that. We are living Alexander Hamilton's dream. And I hope it was intentional because I think we've done a pretty good job. But these are the kinds of lessons that are really fascinating. I think that history is important not just because, well first of all, we do have an obligation. I mean there are records acts and we have an obligation to preserve our artifacts. And there's a reason that we want to have our wonderful museum. You don't want to just put history into a big warehouse. I mean, what is history in a big warehouse? It's like that old group of photographs you have in your attic. You know, it's sometimes you need to go through them and figure out what they mean. But history is a living document that makes sense. Now anyone who's worked with Congress knows they have a long memory, right? Anyone who's worked with OMB knows they have a longer memory. Anyone who knows with the press, they have even longer memory. And so thus history is a part of everyday life and I see it as a very pragmatic thing. Now at the Academy we use history every day in lesson planning. We have things called final action memos which are formal products that we learn from when things happen usually bad, usually investigations just like at the NTSB we had our safety investigations would yield hopefully good things. And I used to say out of tragedy, good must come. If someone died in an accident the only thing we could not do is to have it be meaningless. We had to have good come out of that safety investigation so that we could put forward recommendations so it wouldn't happen again, right? Because otherwise it would have been meaningless. We have oral histories of every common aunt and Amal Allen, I know you provided an oral history and we can actually live his words because we've been provided that. So governmental and public affairs what we do every day is managing today's history. That will be tomorrow's history and going forward. So I think it's very important to see that history isn't just about the statues and the artifacts and even the 3D type of wonderful things that will ultimately come through at technology applications. History is good judgment experience sometimes based on bad judgment sometimes based on good judgment that makes a difference not only in our lives today but in the entire future. Humankind has always learned from history. It's not a new idea. The Iliad okay as an example was storytelling. Storytelling. Now we have technology to assist us but in the end we're really all storytellers and in the end we all have a story to tell. Thank you. Thanks Helen. As a lead into our next speaker I was asked quite often over my last 10 years the Coast Guard is a flag officer. What is the hardest thing I ever did? What was the most difficult challenge I ever faced? And the answer was not easy but the answer was always easy to remember because there was only one answer and that is to hand a widow or a family a flag Arlington after you've been turned a fallen hero. I remember waking up being waking up in the middle of night after I gave a speech in Dallas, Texas and being told by my aid that we had just had a Coast Guard C-130 from Sacramento collide with the Marine Helicopter off the training areas near the Channel Islands and Southern California. I immediately diverted my trip went out there to be with the folks that were trying to do the on-scene search for any survivors and there were none and then the very difficult days have followed that with the crews both Marines and the Coast Guard Air Station crew at Sacramento. I only bring that up as the hardest thing you have to do as a leader is to deal with the outcome where you lose somebody and if it's as a result of an accident it's doubly hurting because not only did you lose somebody but there was probably a preventable cause for doing that. So our next presenter is going to be Rev. Chris Murray. He is the commander of the Naval Safety Center. When you look at the role of safety programs that is the ultimate in trying to understand what has happened lessons learned and prevent the loss of life injury or loss of property moving forward. He's accomplished fighter pilot has a BS from James Madison University and then went to OCS. We were talking earlier before he we came up to do the speaking. He was able to attend a course of studies at the Royal College of Defense Studies at King's College in London that really gave him a insight into not only a diverse student population but a role of dex that will live with him forever I'm sure in some of the relationships that he made. But Chris could you please put this in a safety context for us. No problem sir. Thanks for the intro. So I always heard as a J.O. when I was going through the ranks and probably my first set of orders the timing is everything and you know good timing is really good. So I had great timing coming to this job. The Navy had a pretty dismal year in 2014 as far as mishaps go. We lost about a billion dollars Navy wide. During that year Admiral Greenert former CNO got together with the two four star commanders and they created what they call a fleet safety campaign plan. The fleet safety campaign plan is a campaign plan very much like a battle plan you'd use against an adversary except the adversary is human error. Human error is what decides about 80 percent of our mishaps and that permeates no matter whether you're driving a submarine around a ship or an airplane or you're operating a shipyard. So thankfully I had two four stars. Well three four stars behind me when I came into this job about three months later. My tenant very soon after I took over was changed my organization from a reactive to a proactive and then with the goal of being predictive. So my organization was very very good at investigating accidents coming up with root causes and being kind of a facilitator for that but we really weren't getting into being proactive and then finally being predictive. So new CNOs on board we've had him for the last seven or eight months and he has a whole new initiative called the speed of learning. It ensures that Navy is continually learning and quickly adapting to changes. There's four core capabilities so to get in line with the CNOs program I'd like to put it in the perspective of risk management and safety. We are always striving to identify hazards and communicate them to everyone who needs to know. We swarmed the problems putting the right people in the right place to tackle a challenge in a timely manner. And for me that means establishing controls and innovating to reduce risk. We share these lessons throughout the organization to the Navy Enterprise and last but not least we lead others to improve risk management by developing the first three capabilities. There's several ways that since taken over the Naval Safety Center and we're a team I'll never be confused for a pioneer anywhere I had a great team down there of 200 folks about 100 military and 100 civilians who were really the leading edge of this change. I just kind of opened the doors and let people innovate and do what they needed to do. We went from safety surveys to safety assessments. I see every ship submarine, squadron and quite a bit of the shore infrastructure every three years in the Navy. We were a checklist based procedural compliance come on board you have this instruction is your valve tagged out things like that. What we knew now is we assess the overall culture of a unit and watch how they work together to perform risk management. In the past we'd take do this wrote procedural compliance survey. We'd hand it to the unit CEO and say here's our evaluation of you and take it for what it's worth. It didn't go anywhere beyond that. Now we do risk management culture or unit culture and now we share that with the next senior command the 06 commander and the Tycom which is the three star head of that community but be aviation submarines or surface warfare. I have an investigations department. My investigators I had two professional investigators that are civilians and two other military members who go through the same training. I would throw my investigators out against anybody because unfortunately up to that point we have a lot of experience investigating class A mishaps especially in the aviation world. I went and asked my folks in investigations because they worked in aviation where are my folks where are my people to help out with anything in the surface and submarine well we don't have that. So we hired an investigator a former commander and a Coast Guard who commanded a cutter and so now we are a service organization to everyone along with that we do shore mishap investigations too. We don't do the report we facilitate the report getting done quicker. We take various and sundry CSI type evidence and can get it to the SISCOMs to do engineering investigations and speed the investigation process. We didn't have a lessons learn division and I thought it was kind of poignant there because that's what we should be all about. We never want to learn learn a lesson twice because that means someone's life could be on the loss for a second time. So we set up a lessons learn division and it was basically to facilitate lessons learned dissemination within the various communities in the Navy. ORM refresh my whole organization is based on operational risk management. It's been around for 15 15 years in the Navy. Frankly we pirated from the airlines. We had a couple of reservists about 15 years ago that wrote the Navy's program and both of those guys were airline pilots. We have now taken that program and tried to make it a cradle to grave program so you have the same kind of training at every in well same but different training. It's a building block approach from when you assess into the Navy all the way until you become a flag officer leading large large groups that groups and units. So we're trying to do a an ORM refresh in the cradle to grave improve communication. So the fleet safety campaign the biggest thing it did was help communication between our communities. So we have monthly meetings between the submarine surface aviation communities in the SISCOMs now where we share lessons learned. Because these lessons learned submarine community change their watch schedule after 30 years of doing the same watch schedule based on a lesson learned from the aviation community. Because of the lessons learned shared there's now a dedicated safety professional on every DDG. That's the way it's been an aviation for quite some time. So this has opened up a great deal of interplay between the communities and what we found out is my message is the same whether I go talk to people at Newport Groton or down in Pensacola our three centers of excellence for warfare because risk management is the same for everything. We've also been tasked to have a standardized safety management system throughout the Navy. That's the four pillars of safety policy safety risk management safety assurance and safety promotions. We're trying to bring those all into one standardized thing. So what I want to see is the standardized mishap investigation so people from the submarine community can learn from an aviation mishap but we've got to get to the point where they read exactly the same way and we're getting there. Last but not least we're having a great year in the Navy for mishap reduction. Last year was a good year this year is a great year. We're not living on our laurels. Our whole goal is to get to zero preventable mishaps and our passion is best expressed in our tagline which is preserving combat readiness and saving lives and look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Dr. Charlie Niemeyer is the director of the Marine Corps History operation at the Marine University down at Quantico. It's a former dean of academics at the Naval War College. Retired Lieutenant Colonel from the Marine Corps is an accomplished author as a master's and a Ph.D. from Georgetown and other masters from the Naval War College. When I was talking to Charlie about what he was going to talk about today I was reminded of a couple of things you know they're things in your life as Ellen was pointing out they're little small pieces to become the history of who you are or something like that. I'm a people at Coast Guard already know this I'm kind of a devotee of acoustic music folk music and those sort of things. One of the one of the most impactful songs I've ever heard and I've played it time and time again to remind me about what we need to learn about history is a song written by a guy named Eric Bogle who was born in Scotland but raised in Australia and the name of the song is in the band played Walsing Matilda if you've ever heard it it's devastating. It's about young soldiers from Australia New Zealand leaving to go fight with the British in Gallipoli in World War One. Later on there was a movie made called Gallipoli that pretty underscored the futility of what happened that day. I was talking with Charlie he's gonna talk to us about the implications of the battle of Gallipoli as it relates to amphibious warfare in the Marine Corps and Charlie great to have you here today go ahead. Thanks sir. Good morning everybody I'm from Marine Corps University and many of you may be shocked that the Marines have a university but we do we actually have one down in Quantico, Virginia and we study things like Gallipoli and one of the things I always tell people is that Gallipoli really is a turning point for the Marine Corps and it's not only its operational development but as well as its intellectual development because the Marine Corps did something in the 1920s and 30s that many services oftentimes don't do which is they looked at a problem that really was looked like that would would be insurmountable and it was a 1915 Gallipoli defeat of the British and the Commonwealth forces on the coast of Turkey and and reverse engineered it they they literally took it apart piece by piece and decided to say well well yes this failed and yes this was pretty catastrophic to our allies but we think we can actually reverse engineer it and make it work you know some of you may remember from history that Gallipoli was the idea of Winston Spencer Churchill and it was so bad for him that he nearly it nearly ended his political career imagine if Churchill hadn't been around in 1939 so Gallipoli was pretty big and two things came out of Gallipoli right off the bat that that shocked people number one was that the British were absolutely unprepared to do an amphibious operation of this nature it was well beyond their capacity they hadn't thought about it very well they landed troops on the shore at Gallipoli the same way that Wolf landed troops at Wolf's Cove on the Plains of Abraham in 1750s so it was no different going ashore and it was a bad idea that really didn't come off very well so the Marine Corps decides well we're reverse engineer this thing and we'll get it right and they said it was it wasn't a bad idea per se it was a good initiative and like I take a line from my fitness report that I got when I was a second lieutenant good initiative poor judgment so in essence it wasn't necessarily a bad idea so in the late 1920s and 30s at Quantico in particular they're going to study Gallipoli and reconsider it and I quote in the Gallipoli campaign we have at our disposal the results of actual experience and the planning and conduct of overseas operations experience that can become our own through the medium of study and in essence they say that success can be realized through the study of failure which is a novel way to approach things so the new Quantico focus from the 20s and 30s was Gallipoli in fact by the mid 1930s out of a total of 1,092 hours of instruction at Marine Corps schools 455 or 42% pertain to some aspect of landing operations a special course was created in the Gallipoli campaign and was organized to acquaint students with material in which of the type we're expected to become experts in so the Marine Corps is going to take on this amphibious warfare conundrum and they're going to make it right key points of failure that the Marine Corps pulls out of the Gallipoli campaign and I'll really briefly go through them because I know we're getting short on time a lack of coordination between naval forces and landing forces a lack of purpose built amphibious shipping a lack of ship to shore letterage or landing craft a lack of adequate naval gunfire planning a lack of preliminary joint training and rehearsals the plan was never subjected to a feasibility study the operation was giving a low priority by the senior war council in Great Britain and more failure lack of adequate intelligence of enemy dispositions and capabilities command and control issues divided command at sea and ashore lack of offensive spirit on the beach head no sense of urgency lack of shore party control and logistic considerations lack of integration of aerial support well I'm here to tell you that that was pretty damning evidence right there but guess what we can move to the future and we can say we're back to the future in some ways but the Marine Corps is going to develop a manual called the tentative manual for landing operations and they're going to shut down Marine Corps schools in 1934 and they're going to produce this manual and it's going to be copied verbatim by the Navy and the Army as the manual for getting forces ashore and in an amphibious operation and the manual's high points very briefly are command relationships are they still an issue today you bet they are they have a gunfire support is that still an issue today you bet it is aerial support magtaf creation resolve this issue but only partially ship the shore movement again another conundrum that we have to deal with combat loading and shore party control all difficulties we are running into in the future so very quickly I'd like to kind of bring us up to the modern times which is basically where are we after today in today's modern amphibious warfare force what do we need to worry about okay we can look at World War II from a historical aspect that I can tell you there are two campaigns in which there was an issue in doubt and that's Guadalcanal when the navy lost control of the sea around the southern Solomon Islands for a brief period of time and the second one was Tarawa where the enemy nearly threw the marines back into the sea so we go to the future what we need to do today is refine our sea basin concept we need another tentative manual for landing operations that considers all these things that they didn't consider when they went a short Gallipoli the bold alligator exercises are a start however there's a technical problem we're running into today that we have to address which is the area any access area denial capacity of our opponents if they can keep us offshore that makes it very difficult for us to get on shore the navy is being pushed further and further offshore by these sort of precision guiding munitions and for the navy space is life but for the marines space is death you will not be able to get a shore quick enough in order to build up combat power so we need to figure this out and we need to figure this out soon can it be done the good news is yes it can task force 58 when james mattis commanded it in 2002 went into afghanistan from 600 miles away and they pulled it off it was highly successful and the enemy did not see it coming surprise was achieved so we need to retain this ability to operate in the latorals but we need to figure out a new and more effective way of getting a shore and lessons from history can easily be gained in this regard so i'll stop right here because i know we're running short on time thanks charlie convergence of history at guadalcanal as some of you may know marines landed in one portion of guadalcanal where pin down had to be evacuated in the process of doing that the coast guard coxons with the landing craft evacuated the marines and douglassman row put his landing craft between the evacuating marines and the japanese and took fire until he was mortally wounded and that is a single coast guard congressional medal of honor winners so we share a joint history with the marine corps so thank you very much i would like to note that your panel accomplished all this this morning without powerpoint we have a few minutes let me make just one other comment and then you guys can get up to the microphones here and we'll have a little bit of a conversation i'm here doing two things this week just upstairs we're having the the semi-annual nasa space-based position navigation and timing advisory board meeting of which i am a member of where we're looking at how to deal with current threats to gps to the signal jamming spoofing adjacent spectrum we're looking at gps receivers that can't differentiate between the signals they're receiving and the need to augment gps now with terrestrial based issues and we went through this 10 years ago when i was commandant when we prematurely terminated la ram program as an efficiency move by omb and as somebody mentioned them earlier they got a pretty long memory but i would i just would note that this last year the naval academy reintroduced celestial navigation you know some things are eternal you always need a backup to be resilient and some things go around and come around with all the dependence on technology of modern communications we always run the risk of being cut off and by ourselves and how do we act when that happens and those tools are going to be real important moving forward i think it was a good move we were doing the same thing at the coast guard academy so another thought there is that we're moving with navigation as well so we have a question go ahead sir tell us who you are where you're from what you're famous for yeah thank you thank you admiral it's actually appropriate that i get up after that introduction because i'm john workman i work with the association of american geographers and we do a lot of work around stem education in this country because of the need for gis and gps jobs the question i wanted to ask is in addition to that work i am a history minor in college so when we're thinking about today's total person total service member entering the military you know how do we balance the need for an e4 who has to be running a complex machine and have that technical skill but also has the ability to integrate the historical lessons that you all talked about today how do you keep that total person balance panelist i'm an english major so can i grab onto that one of the things one of the challenges with stem is the fact that engineers rarely rarely get any electives so i would i would actually suggest that you have to balance the fact that you can't just be a technical person and consider that successful you have to have the ability to make the decisions and judgment to observe understand the scientific method and by the way read a few good novels that will help you learn from other people so i think one of the things that we i always worry about pendulums and the only reason i'm speaking to this is because i had the privilege of working with nasa at the johnson space center and i had all the education programs in in my portfolio there so i work very closely with the stem and i saw a lot of these really bright kids who were mathematical geniuses and definitely going to be the engineers and astronauts of the future but they weren't reading they were doing math but they weren't reading and so i do think that there is a balance whether it's technology plus celestial navigation or a good book as well as a calculator that needs to be done in order to get that judgment application and just really quickly how do you do that if you've seen any of the advertisements i'm not endorsing but if you've ever seen the advertisements for ancestry.com people are excited to learn they have a history and that's why i brought up the idea of personal history because so many kids today feel lost i mean they have their video games and they have their handhelds but they they don't have a sense of purpose and and personhood and i think the heritage of the military services help provide that sense of continuity and history and a place to be and so i think that's all part of it as well if i may any other comments yeah i'm also told that you know MIT's program which is semester you're required to take course an elective course in in humanities because they recognize that's importance to be able to do both and i found that my naval academy education you know i i was a history major but the bulk of my courses were math science and engineering but but the combination of the two i thought prepared me extremely well for you know reality in in the navy and in the future and if you're boresighted on one of them to the exclusion of the other i think you're you're not prepared for you know operating in today's world you got to understand humanities but you got to understand technology too it's not it's not one or the other yeah one of the most impactful courses i had at MIT was choice points readings in power and responsibility to kind of balance that out there is an interesting issue about how you deal with the younger generation the millennials coming in and how you create a sense of tradition i think lindman well moranda's taught us all that you create a rap musical called hamilton good morning admiral i left the imo delegation right before you showed up captain pat burns my question is cyber war we know the advent of the printing press gave way to the 100 years war the advent of radio and film helped the rise of the nazis in world war two but i don't hear any historical perspective put on the war on cyber so what is the historian's role in the cyber war just make sure i heard the speakers appointed that way so we're gonna have to listen real hard you're talking about the kind of historical context for cyber war did i get that right i'll take a crack at it and then other folks would like to take crack at it as well in my view the entire cyber cyber environment that we're looking at today is one of these new contexts or threats that we're looking is agnostic to physically and geographically described borders therefore traditional conventions of law notions of law of war international law we're having trouble adapting all of that issues like proportionality the president just met with the chinese premiere and they talked about issues related to using cyber by foreign military powers to conduct industrial espionage in another country we're trying to come up with norms around all of this because nothing transfers very well i think it's one of the biggest challenges we have right now and it's it's required us to kind of rethink and how do you adapt and apply principles from one domain that don't neatly apply to another one of our challenges in doing that is we have divided up cyber responsibility so it's unclear to me who integrates at all i'll just make real quick comment here former vice chairman of blue's island hamilton mike mcconnell former director of national intelligence used to give speeches about a cyber pearl harbor i went to his office one day and i said mike i think you need to stop using that term and he said why i said well first of all it happens it's not going to be a surprise and you probably make a case and we have historians here that pearl harbor probably should have been a surprise in regards to cyber my bigger concern is the cyber desert one where everybody's operating in silos under title 10 title 50 or whatever they're operating under and there's no coordinating central point and with that lack of attribution you have to assume you have a responsibility to act you know if you're cyber calm you gotta assume that may be a pl a you know if you're in s a you gotta assume there's a there's a national security issue of your homeland security you gotta assume there's something with critical infrastructure and f b i and n c i j t f is gonna be trying to preserve evidence it's commingled out there right now and it's not clear to me where there's a lead follow and to get a sense of history where we want to go on this I think the first thing we gotta solve doctoringly is who's gonna leave this effort when we haven't an event and there's no attribution it's not clear who has a statutory authority to take the lead and somebody's gonna have to make that decision analyst I'd like to just say from history Patrick one of the things I teach at Georgetown University is of course home war and peace it's an elective and we start off with the 30 years war and 30 years war is an ancient war comes back to it was Protestants versus Catholics in Europe it was one of the worst wars in the history of the continent of Europe and one of the reasons why it was so bad was because of the development of Gutenberg's movable type and printing press while the Catholic forces under the Habsburgs went north and began committing a large number of atrocities against cities like Magdeburg and a few other places in the past they could have kept that under wraps and they could have conquered each one of these small principalities one by one but because of the movable type and the printing press those atrocities got out to the other North German states and they then allied with other forces that enabled them to resist the attack of the Habsburgs so as a result you can see from history that you know the idea of communication the idea of being able to control communication even if it's not considered quote unquote cyber but in the idea of printing presses coming online revolutionized warfare even back then and so it's important to understand the revolutionary aspect of cyber today and it's kind of interesting that you know the Treaty of Westphalia created in a modern nation state and said right we're going to physically define borders but they're only your borders if you can exert sovereignty and defend them and now those very borders of that Westphalian model is brought into question by these threats and things we're dealing with that are agnostic to borders now I would you know just just add a little bit having been the director of intelligence for us cyber command which my wife who's the family computer geek found enormously hilarious as a historian going to be do that but you know if you look historically you can go all the way back to the Peloponnesian war even before every advance in communications was accompanied by vulnerability either to interception deception or obstruction of some kind and the and that that has continued throughout all of history so all we're facing right now is the scale and the rapidity of it is what's you know new but the the fundamentals of you know if you have if you can communicate you have a vulnerability and to try to to balance those two is it's just the latest in a in a long historical evolution thanks sir good morning my name is Louise I work at the naval air assist command and my question involves like the future battlefield scenarios that you guys as observers of history see I mean we went from slave-driven ships to sail ships and horseback riding warfare then you know the naval island hopping campaign during World War II where air power became more dominant now we're jungle warfare in vietnam desert and urban warfare in our modern age now we're also seeing cyber warfare if you were to put yourself in the capsule in the future and go to the future what would be the future battlefield that we're fighting and how do we prepare our workforce and the up-and-coming workforce and millennials and make them believe that the threat is credible and real so that we are better prepared to fight that future war and not be like you said be be a loot the on the losing enemy because we've been on a victory role for so long yeah my quick comment and we'll refer to the panelists is I'm not sure any of that's going away things are just getting added to it so you have the the whole issue of cyber security but I have to tell you there's huge vulnerabilities in space right now and the whole notion of space warfare what's going to happen with all the assets that are up there and some of the same confounding lack of legal constructs related to the fact we're in a new domain that doesn't have a precedent I think is gonna create some real problems in the future I don't I don't see things going away I just see them getting more complicated panel yeah all threats a couple of things in one of the things that we're thinking about in the United States Navy is and our scene has put it very well as we have a near peer competitor and if you think of an old you know used to run on a sender track back in the old days and US has been running kind of unfettered with no one chasing them for a long time I mean after the fall of the wall in the in the Cold War was one we now have a near peer competitor in China and they're increasing their capabilities very rapidly in their Navy's and how they do business and they're looking at our lessons learned from Desert Storm Iraqi freedom and the precision guided munitions and taken out on board a great point on the anti-axis so you know pushing us farther out in the battle space the thing that jumps out to me right now is we need to look at capabilities that are not stovepipe by what you do in the Navy I've always been a proponent of naval aviation because it's what I've done for a living but you're seeing more and more now is is we're going to put our next dollar into what makes us better as a team and that might be a different network that gets things faster to the distributor players in the net so what I see is is a lot of players in the net and in the instead of a killed chain a kill web and that web spokes on out and we're all out there working in that web and we have lethality might not necessarily be in your platform but you can be a contributor or you could guide a weapon and that's really where we need to go and I think that's very understandable and reflectable to the millennials I can tell you I've got a nine-year-old son it's much more adept at computers than I am it's a way I do business and it's a tool to him it's a way of life we live in a globalized society now and it's it can't be said enough that information one of the things about history is is historians have been able to watch history happen back in World War II and and jot it all down in the globalized society now you're overhead of a troop concentration of ISIS that you have to drop a precision guided weapon on and you have to be exactly right because there's friendlies that have cell phones that can portray battle damage somewhere else okay so you're held to a very high standard because of the globalized society we live in it's fast and history happens very quickly and that's one of the things I think makes it more difficult for historians to either capture it or portray it as it goes on we want to got a couple minutes left we'll try and get both questions in if you have to go somewhere we understand that sir okay good morning I grew up in a family that really loved American history I really appreciate that if I could do it over again how to study the history at the naval academy instead of a technical major got a lot of history at the naval war college so I'm glad to hear that when we talk stem it's really stem dash history you know we need a broad spectrum my question is animal manager director of air warfare for the navy at the naval academy alumni association probably in dc last week so we got four competitors the animal mentioned one china we probably know the other three he said that the war on terror is probably a nuisance we're going to have to deal with for a while we could debate that a little bit he said the fifth enemy right now is the budget I'll throw a sixth one we got a lot of social changes in the country and particularly in the military right now so is there a time where we can look back in the united states history or maybe world history where we have the lineup of the peer competitors changing threat whether it's going to be Islamic terrorism or whatever economic issues social issues all coming together and how did it work out and what advice would you give to our military and our national leadership as I said at the start the world is fast and listen well I was going to actually bring up some of the societal changes that we're having and I do think that there are examples but I also believe that each generation lives its own the integration of the military whether by race or by gender is very similar to the issues that we have with transgender policies now and after the leaving don't ask don't tell and you know as society changes the military is a reflection of that I'm a civilian I'm a former Navy reservists so I was proud to serve but I came in as a civilian to the military world and helped try to bridge those worlds but you know we're looking at things and now about all right tattoo policies a tattoo policy can determine how you can recruit because if you look out there the younger folks that are looking to would be the age we would want to recruit tattoos are a way of their their social communication it's personal choices that maybe we didn't face those of us that were older and so we have all these little things that matter as well that we have to realize that we're dealing with this generation not our generation when it comes to things like recruitment we have to look to the past in order to understand the future every generation says their parents got old at some point in time right but now we have this whole societal change of the the greatest generation the oldest woman in the world was born in 1899 and when she passed there'll be no one left that was born in that century you know I'm saying so time just does keep marching on I think we have to be adaptable but if we don't see that societal changes are just as challenging as technology changes or economic challenges then I think we're missing the ball because we're really looking whether you look back to Huntington's class of civilizations forward and the discussions that as a world as a world it's not just us versus them it's all the entire world is shifting together thank you last question oh sorry I can just add a little bit a different perspective on it the American Bar Association has convened a committee on cyber security and you attempting to use law as the paradigm for finding solutions and one of the problems obviously is one of jurisdiction you have local you have state you have national international but you're also dealing with non-nationals whose jurisdiction really doesn't fit nicely into what we've really looked at in the past so I think I have to echo Admiral Allen's comments in that we really do need some international leadership to devise solutions to these problems thank you last question hi I'm with the Office of Naval Research Global I think is there would it be a good idea to incorporate could you just step a little closer the speakers are pointing that way we're having trouble sorry can you would it be a good idea to incorporate classes about world history and diplomacy in the various military academies also I mean and in the midst of all this terrible violence there's gotta be a way to break the cycle you know it's you know it's thank you actually you know academy graduate and I hold the Tyler chair at the Institute for Leadership at the Coast Guard Academy there are there's a lot of content classes material the syllabuses are rich with these examples the question is how do we adequately integrate it into the rest of the curriculum with the engineering and everything else with the the press of time we have to actually do the education but I can I can tell you personally it's not lost analyst the Naval War College has a pretty good program for history and diplomacy international relations and officers will get that PME professional military education at the right point in their careers typically when you're a junior officer you want to be more technically oriented you want to be more tactical you want to be more focused on your job of flying airplanes or driving ships or leading troops but as you get higher up and rank you know the 040506 level you want to be in this start thinking strategically I just get the feeling that if we had a better understanding of other cultures in the world maybe some of these wars wouldn't have to happen in the first place I don't think anybody would argue with that point thank you very true thanks folks