 In May, General Winfield Scott started to construct a plan for how to wage the coming war. Scott was the most senior officer in the United States military, having made a name for himself in the War of 1812. He was old, had trouble walking, and he could no longer ride a horse by 1861, but he had experience that nobody else in the Union military could boast. And even though he was a Virginian, like Robert E. Lee, he stayed loyal to the United States even after Virginia made the decision to secede. Scott's strategy was to take things slow. Lincoln was working to organize the largest army the United States had ever seen up to that point, and the first volunteers enlisted for 90-day terms, though Lincoln would soon start asking for three-year volunteers. The vast majority of the men were entirely untrained. The army did not have uniforms to provide their volunteers, and supplies of weapons and ammunition were incredibly insufficient to prepare the men for war. Scott wanted time to prepare the volunteers for battle. In comparing the respective armies, the Confederacy and the Union were more comparable, but the Confederacy had some minor advantages. The slave states, despite being smaller in population terms than the free states, supplied something around two-thirds of the soldiers in the Mexican-American War. They had a large number of commissioned officers prior to secession, though not all of them joined the Confederacy as Winfield Scott demonstrates. Before the Civil War, militia organization was left in the hands of state and local governments or even private citizens, and the South always maintained better local militias than the North, primarily because of the slave patrols that were legally mandated in many areas. With a massive influx of volunteers on both sides, the majority of the men in each army were untrained in military tactics. Both sides were rapidly trying to build their armies, and before the first battle of Bull Run occurred, both Congresses had authorized the acceptance of 500,000 three-year volunteers. But at the outset of the war, the Union had one indisputable advantage over the Confederacy, the Navy. Throughout the war, the Confederacy would work to try to build a naval force that could compete with the Union, which would be a matter of dispute with Britain, who was officially neutral but had private merchants building ships for the Confederacy. But this was still a ways off in May of 1861, and Winfield Scott thought the Navy could be used to delay any major land battles until August or so. As early as April 19th, Lincoln had already announced his intention to use the Navy to block southern ports, but Scott's plan was to use the assembled troops to only secure the border states and defend the capital, while extending the naval blockade to the ports around the Confederacy, eventually snaking up through the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi River, effectively dividing the Confederacy in two. The name the Anaconda Plan became the pejorative title for Scott's plan, as the map of the proposed blockade resembled a large snake stretching from the coast of Virginia up through the Mississippi River. Scott's blockade would become a central part of the Union's strategy throughout the war, but his initial goal was to use the Navy to buy time for the Army to be effectively organized, equipped, and trained. But other people were less patient. After the Union took control of Arlington and Alexandria of Virginia on May 24th, the day after the people of Virginia approved their state secession by popular vote, many Northerners were aggressively urging the troops to push forward to Richmond. Republican newspapers in the North criticized Lincoln's apparent hesitance to push the troops forward. From the end of May and all the way through June, newspapers printed stories such as this one from the New York Tribune, quote, the nation's war cry forward to Richmond, forward to Richmond. The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date, the place must be held by the National Army, end, quote. The author of the piece, Fitz Henry Warren, accused Lincoln of still holding out for compromise with the South, which was not true at this point. But in another editorial written a few days previous, Warren said that Lincoln and his administration had, quote, no intention to press the suppression of the rebellion, end, quote. Editorials like this fired up Northern Unionists who believed that their army could easily trounce the Confederacy. An aggressive policy was widely supported in Lincoln's cabinet. Treasury Secretary Sam and Chase supported such policy as well, disagreeing with General Scott's call for patience and preparation. Lincoln already believed that Winfield Scott was letting his military judgment be clouded by political matters, an opinion of Scott that he formed during the debates over Fort Sumter, as I mentioned a few episodes ago. And Lincoln started to lean more and more towards Samuel Chase's call for action. On May 16th, a young officer from Chase's home state of Ohio gave Chase a sketch of a more aggressive plan. The author of the plan was Irvin McDowell, and he wanted to push quickly toward Richmond, not yet the official Confederate capital, but still obviously a key city for the South. McDowell had been promoted to Brigadier General only two days prior with Samuel Chase's support after Richmond was made the new capital of the Confederacy on May 20th and Northern Virginia was secured by the Union on May 24th. The McDowell plan started to look even more promising. General Scott put him in command of the forces in Northern Virginia, though later testimonies would suggest that he was not eager to do so. Through June, the winds were shifting in favor of McDowell's plan for a quicker and more direct attack on the Confederate capital. On June 29th, a meeting was held to discuss what action should be taken. And General Scott continued to argue in favor of his naval blockade and to put off any major land battles until the army could be better trained. Then McDowell explained his plan and with very little discussion about the particularities of it, the group agreed to pursue McDowell's idea. General Scott submitted to the vote and promised that he would do everything in his power to help the plan succeed. I'm Chris Calton, and this is the Mises Institute podcast, Historical Controversies. In today's episode, we will begin looking at the preparations for the first major land battle of the Civil War, the first battle of Bull Run, as the Union called it. Or the first battle of Manassas, as the Confederacy called it. In addition to being the first large-scale battle of the war, it also signified a turning point at which people became aware that contrary to popular presumption, this would not be a short and easy conflict. In the previous episode, I noted that Pierre Beauregard was put in charge of the Confederates guarding Manassas Junction. And now we have Irvin McDowell put in charge of Union forces in Northern Virginia. In today's episode, we will look at some of the initial organization of both militaries that set the stage for the battle. McDowell's plan entailed a few points, some of which I've already detailed in previous episodes. The first step of the plan was to take Arlington and Alexandria, which would add a layer of defense for the nation's capital. Then to push toward Richmond, two subsidiary goals needed to be accomplished. One was to secure Maryland, which I talked about two episodes ago. Both of these goals were accomplished by the time McDowell was put in command of the Army of Northeastern Virginia. The second subsidiary goal that McDowell was depending on was the taking of Harper's Ferry and the surrounding area. On April 18th, the day before the Virginia legislature officially ratified their ordinance of secession, the former governor and Confederate fireeater Henry Wise led a band of volunteers to the Federal Army at Harper's Ferry, the same armory that John Brown had held hostage in 1859. There was a Union garrison there of 45 men under the command of Lieutenant Roger Jones, but they were an insufficient force to keep the armory. So they set fire to it before fleeing to Maryland. The residents of Harper's Ferry helped Wise and his men to put out the fire, but not before 20,000 rifles and pistols had been destroyed. Nonetheless, the militia was able to recover some much needed arms and ammunition, as well as machinery that would become the foundation for Confederate weapons manufacturing as the war progressed. In the week's following, more Confederate volunteers showed up to join the men protecting the armory. These were young, untrained men looking for adventure. And while the forces grew in number, they remained woefully undisciplined. When a group of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, probably the best military school in the country after West Point, volunteered to defend Virginia in late April. Governor Letcher was happy to have them, but Letcher didn't know what to do with their commander. His name was Thomas Jackson, a relatively unknown military man who earned some battlefield experience during the Mexican American War, but resigned due to health problems. He then became an artillery instructor at the Virginia Military Institute. But when Robert E. Lee arrived in Richmond and spoke to Jackson, he saw potential in the man that Governor Letcher did not. Jackson was not the most popular instructor. He was a lecturer and an incredibly boring one by all accounts. He was also insufferably serious to many people. He expected strict discipline and obedience from his slaves and his students. Although he wasn't known to proselytize, he was a devoted Christian in his private life, demanding that his slaves participate in mourning prayers and nightly devotionals with his family. And on Sundays, he would teach them the Bible. He even financially supported a local black church. During the days of slavery, of course, it wasn't uncommon for slave owners to teach some form of Christianity to their slaves. They're even a bridged versions of the Bible published for slaves, which telling Lee had any portion that might suggest freedom as any kind of Christian value removed, so as not to suggest to Christianize slaves that they shouldn't be slaves. But Jackson's financial support of a black church and imposition of religious observance on his slaves went beyond that of many other slave owners who often saw religious teachings as a way to introduce better work and more obedience from their slaves. So I don't want anything I say here to be misconstrued or distorted as if I'm presenting Jackson as a quote unquote benevolent slave owner or anything of the kind. It's common knowledge that border state slave owners were less cruel than deep south slave owners for various reasons. But my purpose here is to highlight that regardless of whether or not Jackson's religious beliefs were right, it is important to recognize the sincerity with which he held his religious beliefs. And to highlight that his religious imposition on his slaves appears to be driven by something more than economic or otherwise practical interests. Jackson also avoided any kind of vice. He did not tolerate any kind of profanity or vulgarity from himself or anybody under his authority. He didn't drink. One friend of Jackson once gave an account of a time when he offered Jackson some whiskey and Jackson took a swig of it and reacted poorly to it. The friend asked, isn't the whiskey good? And Jackson apparently replied, yes, very, I like it. And that's the reason I don't drink it. He also refused to use tobacco or drink coffee or tea. These are characteristics that don't make people widely popular. People like to drink and cuss and tell dirty jokes. And that was certainly true for the young men flocking into the Confederate militias in the early days of the war. When Robert E. Lee spoke to Jackson and Richmond, even though he did not know the man, he realized that this was the kind of personality the men at Harper's Ferry needed. He appointed Jackson Colonel of the state volunteers. This taking place before Lee was made a Confederate officer. So both men were still only acting as officers of the Virginia militia. Lee then sent him to Harper's Ferry to whip them in there into fighting shape. One of the first things that Colonel Jackson did when he arrived was order that all the barrels of whiskey that the men had been enjoying should be destroyed. He gave the order and then left the men to it without bothering to supervise. Once he was out of sight, the men brought buckets to salvage as much as they could and they got drunk that night. But their partying that night was enough to let Jackson know that his order had not been faithfully obeyed and he made the men pour all of their salvage whiskey into the river. After this, he doubled down on his efforts to discipline the men. At Harper's Ferry, Jackson was also thinking strategically about how to hold the arsenal just across the Potomac River was the state of Maryland and within sight of the army were the Maryland Heights. This was a hilltop town that overlooked Harper's Ferry and Jackson, the artillery instructor, immediately recognized it as the perfect position for Union artillerists to set up an attack on Harper's Ferry below. He wanted to take control of the spot before the enemy could. Robert E. Lee wouldn't allow it. Maryland still might join the Confederacy and anything that might look like an invasion of the state would stand the risk of having the same effect as the Union troops that marched through Baltimore and could drive away support of the Confederacy. Lee ordered him to focus on drilling the troops. That was what he was appointed to do. But a few days later, Jackson violated Lee's orders and took the Maryland Heights anyway. But soon after, on May 15th, Jefferson Davis would place another officer in command of Harper's Ferry, Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston's story is not unlike Robert E. Lee's. Both men made names for themselves during the Mexican American War and they were good friends at the time. Lee and Johnston's fathers had been friends as well. Like Lee, Johnston was a Virginian who wasn't eager to secede, but ultimately followed his state. But between the Mexican American War and Virginia's secession, the two men had essentially become rivals in the military, each fighting for the same promotions throughout their careers. Still similar to Robert E. Lee, when Virginia was poised to secede, General Scott tried to entice Johnston to serve as an officer in the National Army with Johnston's wife, Lydia, corresponding on his behalf. Scott assured her that he would never give Johnston an assignment that would force him to fight against Virginia. But Lydia responded, quote, my husband cannot stay in an army, which is about to invade his native country, end quote. When Jefferson Davis was appointing the first Confederate generals, he made the offer to Johnston while Robert E. Lee was still only serving as an officer in the Virginia Militia, putting Johnston as the higher ranking authority for the time being. On May 15th, Davis ordered Johnston to take command of the men at Harpers Ferry and he arrived on May 23rd, the day before Arlington and Alexandria would fall under Union occupation. Like Jackson, he saw a body of men who were poorly equipped and undisciplined. But he thought the situation at Harpers Ferry was even worse than Lee and Davis had estimated. They believed that Harpers Ferry was effectively a fortress and that it could be defended. Lee, of course, had been there when John Brown held the place hostage. So he wasn't unfamiliar with the area. But Johnston believed that the place could easily work against the men defending it. If any forces surrounded it, the troops there could get pinned inside. Like Jackson, Johnston agreed with the strategic importance of controlling the Maryland Heights. But more importantly, he wanted his men to be mobile. And this meant withdrawing from Harpers Ferry. Lee sent his answer to Johnston on May 30th, answering concerns about what should be done if Union forces were spotted across the Potomac. Lee wrote, quote, In the event of such a movement, should you deem it advisable and should you be unable to hold your position, I would suggest a joint attack by you and General Bonham, commanding at Manassas for the purpose of cutting them off. This letter was sent the day before Lee convinced Davis to send Beauregard to Manassas Junction, so Bonham was still in charge there. This letter is the first reference to any plans connecting Johnston's forces in the Shenandoah Valley with Beauregard's forces at Manassas Junction. Lee resisted the idea of evacuating Harpers Ferry, but he gave Johnston permission to do so if he believed it was necessary. Johnston passed the idea on to President Davis. And while he waited on a reply, he began to organize the small army. In addition to Jackson, who would command both the infantry and the artillery with the help of a few subordinate officers. Johnston also had a small cavalry under the leadership of Jeb Stewart, who had helped Lee during John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry. Stewart had arrived at Harpers Ferry shortly before Johnston. The army that Johnston was putting together would become the famous army of the Shenandoah. Even before the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin was ready to start sending volunteers to support President Lincoln. He authorized a bill titled An Act for the Better Organization of the Militia of the Common Wealth and guided it through the state legislature, which approved it on April 12th, the same day that Pierre Beauregard started attacking Fort Sumter. After Lincoln called for troops, Curtin needed to appoint some officers to lead the volunteers. And one of the men he chose was Robert Patterson, who served under Winfield Scott during the Mexican American War. Curtin made him the senior general of the Pennsylvania Militia, and only three days later, General Scott transferred his title to federal stature and appointed him as commander of the Department of Washington, which put him over Washington, DC, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland. Patterson was in charge of the occupation of Maryland, and he was the one who dispatched Benjamin Butler first to Annapolis and then to Baltimore. On May 24th, General Scott gave Patterson his new goal, Harper's Ferry. Johnston and his volunteers were being carefully watched by the Union, and General Scott wanted Patterson to counter him there. But Patterson believed he needed more men to pose a sufficient threat. Like General Scott, Patterson was old, 69 at this point, and he was also concerned with the under-equipped and untrained status of his men. As I pointed out in the introduction to this episode, Scott shared these concerns. But after the decision was made to pursue McDowell's more aggressive plan, Scott promised to do what he could to see it successfully executed. Now, with Patterson, it was Scott who felt like Patterson was delaying too much. But after Patterson delayed all the way into the beginning of June, a frustrated General Scott told him to wait for reinforcements of new volunteers that were finally on their way to Washington. Scott hadn't been pleased at Patterson's delay in moving on to Harper's Ferry, but now that he had, he may as well wait for the extra men. He also wanted Patterson's movement at this point to coincide with the new orders he had issued to General McDowell on June 3rd to move on Manassas Junction. At this point, Patterson was waiting at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, where he received more detailed orders from General Scott on June 8th. The message included word that an additional regimen of 1200 Rhode Island volunteers would soon join him. Two days later, with the recent arrival of the promised reinforcements, Patterson started to finally move toward Harper's Ferry. By mid June, Johnston had a force of about 8,000 men under him, and they were gradually improving their discipline and equipment, with weapons being procured from the armory they were guarding and makeshift uniforms having been sewn by the family members of the soldiers, their slaves if they had them, or by the soldiers themselves. They were still green, but they were beginning to look a little more like a real army. But as it would turn out, Jefferson Davis would not agree with Johnston's desire to abandon Harper's Ferry. The difference in thinking between Davis and Lee's devotion to the territory around Harper's Ferry and Johnston's devotion to his men can be seen in some of their correspondences in early June. Lee told Johnston that abandoning Harper's Ferry, quote, would be depressing to the cause of the South, end quote. Davis was protective of any Confederate territory, and Lee was equally protective of Virginia territory. But Johnston was protective of his soldiers. On June 6th, Johnston responded to Lee, quote, would not the loss of five or 6,000 men be more so, end quote. Lee seems to have actually given Johnston's counterarguments some thought, and he brought them to Davis, but the president stuck by his original position. Lee wrote back to Johnston that President Davis, quote, places great value upon our retention of the command of the Shenandoah Valley and the position of Harper's Ferry, end quote. Davis added that the area was crucial to maintaining communication with Maryland, who he was still hoping would join the Confederacy. But as I mentioned earlier in this episode, Lee had given Johnston conditional permission to move his men if he thought it was necessary. Ultimately, the decision to stay and defend Harper's Ferry or to abandon it rested with Joseph Johnston. Johnston was also worried about the vulnerability of an attack from Western Virginia, where Union troops were under the command of George McClellan. Lee sent another message to Johnston assuring him that McClellan would be kept busy by Brigadier General Robert Seldon Garnet and his company of Confederates. I'll talk more about the goings on in Western Virginia after we finish the story of Bull Run, but it should be kept in mind that the hostilities there were part of the considerations made by both sides at this point in the war. The same day that Lee sent his message to Johnston, Robert Patterson's army was moving toward Hagerstown, Maryland, only six miles from the Potomac River. Johnston may have been reassured about McClellan to his west, but he definitely felt like Patterson was a threat to his north. Johnston was determined to avoid confrontation with Patterson. Patterson, though, was not aware of this, and he assumed that Johnston was determined to hold Harpers Ferry. Nonetheless, he was planning to take the territory. On June 13th, Johnston received some intel that finally compelled him to move. Apparently, a detachment of 2,000 Union soldiers from McClellan's army had taken the town of Romney, Virginia. This is bad news for Johnston. Romney was only 40 miles west of Winchester, Virginia, which was the point he'd been eyeballing as the best place to fall back to in the event of an attack on Harpers Ferry. He needed to secure Winchester before McClellan's men took it and had him cornered between McClellan's army and Patterson's. The intel was inaccurate. The raid on Romney had actually been conducted by a detachment of Patterson's army, and after it was done they retreated back to Maryland. But Johnston didn't know this, and he spent the next day supervising the movement of supplies and the armory's machinery to abandon Harpers Ferry. On the 15th of June, Johnston would be leading his forces toward Winchester. Before leaving, he made sure to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Bridge to the east of town. But Patterson was moving slowly. He had nearly 18,000 men under him, a far larger army than Johnston's. But he was being cautious. On the 16th, he received reports that Johnston had destroyed the B&O Bridge, suggesting his retreat. Patterson was skeptical. He thought it might be a trap. He ordered one of his subordinate officers, General Cadwalleter, to move up the railroad toward Martinsburg to prevent a surprise attack. He stressed the need to move slowly, something he'd be castigated for later. But Cadwalleter crossed the Potomac, only to confirm Johnston's genuine retreat. There was no trap. Patterson wired Washington to announce that he had successfully taken Harpers Ferry and that Johnston had been, quote, routed by fear. Patterson then suggested making Harpers Ferry his new base of operations. But instead of receiving praise from General Scott, he got back a curt order to send his 1,200 Rhode Island volunteers and all of his three year enlistees back to Washington. Scott was worried about Beauregard's growing army at Manassas Junction, and he feared that the Confederates might retake Arlington and Alexandria. Patterson complied with the order. But with the significant reduction of his army, he felt that he lacked the troops necessary to pursue Johnston to Winchester. Johnston assumed that he was already being pursued, though, and he was getting ready to face off against Patterson near Bunker Hill. Johnston wasn't really trying to avoid battle as he was trying to find a battle location that would be more to his advantage. So on the 16th of June, he started preparing for a battle on Bunker Hill only to find that the enemy he thought was pursuing him was nowhere to be found. Jeb Stewart, leading the cavalry, was responsible for bringing reports on enemy movement and he now reported that Patterson's army was crossing back over to Maryland. Johnston moved on to Winchester, but he had access to Harpers Ferry once again. Johnston decided that his best move now was to destroy the railroads in Martinsburg to keep the trains from falling into Union hands. He gave the task to Colonel Jackson. This decision proved to be a mistake, upsetting both the citizens of Martinsburg and Johnston's superiors in Richmond. It also demonstrated Johnston's mistake in undervaluing the importance of railroad access for the Confederate Army, an importance that would be demonstrated bull run. The decision to destroy property in Martinsburg would help Union troops enjoy a better reception when they camped there a little while later. General Sanford wrote about his time at Martinsburg after this quote, I had invitations from all the leading people to come and dine and sup with them. They were well disposed towards us and indignant at the immense injury done by the enemy to their property throughout all that part of the country," end quote. Citizens even brought out American flags that they'd been hiding from secessionists. One Union soldier described the citizens there as half-starved. Of course many of these people were Unionists before Jackson's destruction of property in the town, but as Jefferson Davis predicted, the actions did not do a great job at showing the Confederates to be the ones defending the people from Yankee invasion. Back in Winchester, Johnston worked to strengthen his army. New arrivals brought his army to about 10,000 men and he made sure that defensive fortifications and artillery were put in place around the town. Johnston now divided his army into five brigades and appointed officers, the first brigade being put under the command of Colonel Jackson, which consisted of four regiments, one battery of artillery and Stuart's cavalry. Johnston was still expecting an attack from Patterson, but he didn't know where it would be coming from, so he divided his army up and placed them along different routes. Meanwhile, Patterson was receiving fallacious rumors that Johnston was occupying Martinsburg with an army of 15,000 men. With his forces cut by a third, Patterson felt vulnerable and he believed that Johnston was getting ready to attack. He proposed a plan to cross the Potomac and join forces with Colonel Charles Stone north of Leesburg. To Patterson's displeasure, General Scott shot the idea down. Finally, on July 2nd, Patterson started back across the Potomac. By this time, Jeb Stuart had brought word to Colonel Jackson that Patterson's troops were nearby, so Jackson had already set up his men near a small valley called Falling Waters. At 7.30 a.m. Jackson's troops could see the enemy coming toward them. The first to spot the Union soldiers were Stuart's horsemen who immediately fell back according to their orders. Patterson's men kept moving and it wasn't until 10 a.m. that a brigade under the command of John Abercrombie Patterson's son-in-law ran into any Confederates that were holding a fixed defensive position. Abercrombie's men were on horseback and they were able to direct the rest of Patterson's regiments into position. They were next to a small stream called Hoax Run. The ensuing battle bears both the name of the valleys and the name of the stream depending on who's talking about it. The Confederates stationed there consisted of about 380 Virginians serving under Colonel Kenton Harper. Harper asked for permission to initiate the attack, but Jackson vetoed the idea. Instead he sent a company to explore the woods to their left and it wasn't long before these men came under Union gunfire. After this the battle erupted. Patterson had the advantage of numbers and he was able to flank Harper's men. To the front of Harper was a Wisconsin regiment under the command of Colonel John Starkweather and backing him up were two batteries of artillery. As they unloaded on Harper's Virginians two Pennsylvania regiments were sent to flank them from the right and cut off their retreat. Jackson's orders were to prevent the army from advancing as best as possible, but Harper's force was being quickly overpowered. He ordered their retreat. As they retreated Jackson's artillery kept the Union cavalry from pursuing. Every time the Union forces tried to pursue the Confederates they faced cannon fire. This was able to hold up the Yankees long enough for Jackson to execute a successful retreat back to Martinsburg. This was the first extended battle of the war spanning a few hours of fighting. For most of the troops this was also the first time they had seen combat. According to records left by one Confederate soldier, quote, when the first shell exploded over us one of our company threw away his gun and fled down the pike at breakneck speed, end quote. He wasn't the only soldier to run from the fight but the majority of them showed surprising composure for their first experience in battle. In the next episode I'm going to talk a lot more about the difficulties of dealing with the weapons that Civil War soldiers were using especially this early in the war and how hard it was to accurately aim a gun but for now it's sufficient to say that the shots from both sides were largely inaccurate. Jackson's cannon was only fired eight times and the cannon balls went over the heads of their targets. The rifles and muskets sent bullets all over the place rarely toward the intended target. Still both sides lost men but most of the losses on both sides were men taken as prisoner. Jeb Stuart was single-handedly responsible for taking the most Union prisoners taking 35 Pennsylvania volunteers. During the battle he got separated from his cavalry unit while trying to deal with the right flank of the Union forces. This is when he stumbled upon 38 men from the 15th Pennsylvania where they easily could have killed them or taken a prisoner but these 38 men were detached from their own regiment and therefore exposed so Stuart bluffed. He simply ordered all 38 of the Union men to lay down their arms and surrender. All but three of them obeyed and the three who didn't were shot down by Stuart's men when they finally caught up with their leader. Stuart's bluff allowed him to claim 35 prisoners while he was completely isolated. Colonel Jackson also started to earn the reputation for which he is known during this battle. According to one witness Jackson stopped at one point underneath the tree to watch the battle. While he was there a Union cannonball flew over his head, smashed the branches above him and the branches fell to the ground around him. According to the men who saw this Jackson didn't even flinch. Nominally this was a Union victory but Patterson was unwilling to pursue Jackson for fear of facing Johnston's full army which he still thought was much larger than it actually was. When looking back on these events people would excoriate him for not exploiting the opportunity to engage Johnston. Over the next couple of weeks Patterson refused to engage Johnston over and over. The army of the Shenandoah had around 10 or 11,000 men at any given time during the month of July but shortly after the skirmish at hoax run Patterson had it in his head that Johnston had a force of 26,000 men and by the middle of the month the number would be inflated to 42,000. While Johnston was waiting for his enemy to attack his scouts watched as Patterson's army of Pennsylvania moved south making Johnston think that Patterson was trying to flank him only to see the army continue marching until they were completely out of sight. Johnston was confused by this he had been waiting for Patterson to engage him for weeks. This move came on July 17th two weeks after hoax run and now Johnston saw his enemy completely avoid him. He didn't know Patterson was operating under the fear that the army of the Shenandoah was about four times larger than it actually was so I think of Johnston's mindset as similar to when I'm playing chess with an opponent who I know is good at the game but he suddenly makes a move that seems really really bad and the move is so uncharacteristically bad that I have to stop and think about it because I can't help but worry that my opponent has some clever trick up his sleeve that I haven't seen and this apparently bad move is just a trick to bait me into a trap. That's what must have been going through Johnston's head as he saw Patterson's army disappear from sight. He genuinely didn't know what was going on. Patterson's excuse was that General Scott on June 11th had warned him against going to battle against an enemy that greatly outnumbered him and Patterson may have been partially a victim of inexperienced scouts. He was also dealing with men whose three month enlistments were about to expire. Records left by these men demonstrate their desire to go home and avoid battle prior to Patterson's retreat but after the retreat they wrote about how they had been aching for a fight and they were upset that they wouldn't get the chance to fight now. I say all this mostly because Patterson would end up taking most of the blame for Union failures in July and in retrospect that certainly seems to be reasonable but it's easy to play Monday morning quarterback. The question is whether from Patterson's perspective at the time was it reasonable for him to believe the inflated number of Confederate forces? If so, his decision not to engage would seem consistent with General Scott's orders and Patterson, like all officers in the outset of the war, was dealing with inexperienced scouts whose reports could hardly be trusted. He was also dealing with troops who were not experienced and were waiting out their time to go home. Not knowing the future and not knowing the actual facts of the situation, Patterson's caution is at least somewhat defensible when we consider that he did not have the benefit of hindsight like we do. That being said, many of the defenses he gave for his inaction were outright fabrications and excuses that simply weren't true even given his inaccurate information and green troops. Patterson also was quite ready to spin everything he did as an unquestionable success and after the skirmish at Hoax Run he boasted about defeating an enemy that outnumbered him when he almost certainly knew that this wasn't the case for the regiments that actually participated. But when we look at military history and we reflect on what went wrong and what went right in a battle one of the easiest mistakes to make is judge the decisions of the general according to hindsight and information that they simply didn't have. So we should always try to look at the decisions they made according to the far narrower perspective that they had when making these decisions. Patterson's unwillingness to engage Johnston prior to Bull Run was rightly identified as one of the critical elements for the outcome of the battle but that is not the same thing as saying that Patterson made the wrong decision given the particularities of his situation and the information he had available. For that there are points upon which he can be defended and points upon which he can be criticized. But finally when seeing Patterson's troops disappear from sight Johnston realized that he could start moving his army to Beauregard's location around Manassas Junction which would not be enough to guarantee Confederate victory but it would certainly even the odds before the first battle of Bull Run. On the 19th of July General Johnston started moving his troops by train to reinforce Beauregard and Manassas Junction. There were not enough conductors on hand to carry all the troops at Manassas Junction at one time so Johnston had to send a few regiments at a time starting with Thomas Jackson's brigade to illustrate some of the tension that both sides were facing not knowing who was a friend and who was an enemy there was even one conductor who was suspected of deliberately causing a collision to prevent the 11th Mississippi from making it to Manassas Junction and considering him a Unionist saboteur the Confederates executed the man. I don't know if he was guilty or not but it seems likely that he was innocent. Because of the limits to the troops transport Johnston's army would arrive piecemeal with more regiments arriving throughout the battle giving Beauregard a continued supply of fresh troops throughout the day that would prove a pivotal element in the battle to come. We will continue this story in the next episode when we look at Beauregard's army of the Potomac and McDowell's army of Northeastern Virginia. Historical Controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. If you would like to support the show please subscribe on iTunes, Google Play or Stitcher and leave a positive review. You can also support the show financially by donating at Mises.org slash supportHC. If you would like to explore the rest of our content please visit Mises.org that's M-I-S-E-S dot O-R-G.