 Section B, Scholastic Philosophy. The centuries which elapsed between the death of Saint Augustine and the foundation of the Carolingian schools were centuries of barbarian invasion and barbarian rule. They witnessed the dismemberment of the Roman Empire, the disappearance of the last vestiges of Roman civilization in Europe, and the substitution of a civilization of a new order. During the lifetime of Saint Augustine, the West Goths under Alaric besieged and sacked Rome in 410, 19 years later the vandals under Gensaric overran Numidia and Muratania and laid siege to Hippo. Meanwhile, the vandals from the upper Rhine had invaded Gaul, ancient Germany, and Burgundy in 407. These invaders were followed, in 443, by the Burgundians, who settled on the upper Rhine and on the Seon. Later in 451 came the Huns under Attila, and last of all the Franks from the lower Rhine, who toward the end of the fifth century spread over Gaul, destroying every trace of civilization that had survived the invasion and occupation of France by the vandals and the Burgundians. In the same century, the Angles and Saxons took possession of Britain, and the Visigoths established barbarian rule in Spain. In the 6th and 7th centuries, the Heroly and the East Goths and the Lombards destroyed whatever remained of Roman civilization in northern Italy. We can scarcely realise the desolation that during those centuries reigned throughout what had been the Roman Empire. The condition of France is vividly portrayed by the words of St Gregory of Tours, who, towards the end of the 6th century, wrote, Vaye di Abus nostris qui a periet, studium literarum anobis. And by the verdict of the Benedictine authors of l'histoire littéraire de la France, that the 8th century was the darkest, the most ignorant, the most barbarious that France had ever seen. The utter disregard for learning, which characterised those times, may be inferred from the fact that Ambrose of Oetper, who died in 778, was forced to invoke the authority of Pope Stephen III in defence of the study of the scriptures. Inquiant multi, non est tempos, yam nonc deserendi superscripturos. Although surrounded by all the external signs and conditions of dissolution and decay, the church remained true to her mission of moral and intellectual enlightenment, drawing the nations to her by the very grandeur of her confidence in her mission of peace, and by the sheer force of her obstinate beneath in her own ability to lift the new peoples to a higher spiritual and intellectual life. It was these traits in the character of the church that especially attracted the barbarian kings, but, though towards the end of the 5th century Clovis became a Christian, it was not until the beginning of the 9th century that the efforts of the church to reconquer the countries of Europe to civilisation began to show visible results. The Merovingian kings, the do-nothing kings as they were styled, could scarcely be called civilised. Even Charlemagne, who was the third of the Carolingian dynasty, could hardly write his name. Still, Charles, illiterate as he was, realised the necessity of reviving culture and learning throughout his empire. Inspired by this noble purpose, he summoned the church to his aid, invited learned ecclesiastics to his court, and founded scores which became centres of the new intellectual movement in different parts of Europe. To this movement scholastic philosophy owes its origin. The scholastic movement, therefore, which dated from the foundation of the Carolingian schools, was from the outset a reaction against the intellectual stupor of the times. The movement was at first confined merely to the restoration of the study of grammar and rhetoric. Later on, dialectic assumed in the schools more importance than it had at first possessed, while an impulse to philosophical speculation was given by the neoplatonism of Aeregina and other Irish teachers. Thus, during the 9th and 10th centuries, there were many attempts at forming a system of philosophy, but it was not until the 11th century, when the problem of universals gave the greatest impulse to the growth of the scholastic dialectic, that these attempts were concentrated into a definite movement. Towards the end of the 12th century, the physical and metaphysical writings of Aristotle became known to the schoolmen and caused that great outburst of intellectual activity which made the 13th century the golden age of scholasticism. The middle of the 14th century marks the beginning of the decadent movement which in the following century ended in the downfall of the scholastic system. We have, therefore, the following division. First period, Scotus Aeregina to Rosalind, from the beginning of the 9th century to the 11th, the period of beginnings. Second period, Rosalind to Alexander of Hales, from the rise of the problem of universals to the introduction of the works of Aristotle. 1050 to 1200, the period of growth. Third period, Alexander of Hales to Occam, 1200 to 1300, the period of perfection. Fourth period, from the birth of Occam to the taking of Constantinople, 1300 to 1453, the period of decay. Sources The neglect of the study of the sources of scholastic philosophy on the part of some of its historians, and the apparently inexcusable misrepresentation on the part of others, render it imperatively necessary that we keep constantly at hand the primary sources, the works of the schoolmen themselves. It is from these works, and from these alone, that the student will learn the true meaning and value of scholastic philosophy. Many of the writings of the first schoolmen are of easy access, being included in means Patrologia Latina. Additional primary sources, Byterage, Zürgesicht der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Monster, 1891, are at present being published by Baumke and others. The works of the scholastics after the time of St Bernard are not included in means patrology, they are however published in separate editions, to which attention will be called. With regard to secondary authorities, the list given by Weber, page 9 of the English translation, will be found complete with the exception of a recent work, D'Wolfe's Histoire de la Philosophie Medievales, Louvain 1900, which is a valuable aid to the study of this period. D'Wolfe's work does not however supersede, stockles, Geschicht der Philosophie des Mittelalters, which is still the standard work of reference, although since its publication, 1864 to 1866, numerous important documents bearing on the history of scholasticism have been published. It is well for the student to remember that, although Uro is referred to as an authority, he owns his distinction as a historian to the care with which he has studied and edited manuscript sources, rather than to the accuracy of his appreciations. Available biographical material is to be found in Wetzel and Weltz, Kirch lexicon, published in Freiburg in 1886 to 1901. Section 1st period of scholasticism, Erogena to Rosalind, 800 to 1050, the period of beginnings. The Carolingian schools In the chronicles and biographies of the Merovingian Epoch, mention is made of a scholar Palatina at the court of Dagobert and of other Merovingian monarchs. It is clear, however, that these schools were institutions for the training of court guards, Bellator, in the art of war and the manners of the court. Before the time of Charlemagne, the only thing that the Frank was taught was how to fight. The schools which Charlemagne founded were intended to teach the Frank to respect knowledge as well as valor. They were literary schools, in which at first the programme was very elementary, the nobles and clerics who attended being taught merely the arts of reading and writing and the rudiments of grammar. The project of forming these schools seems to have suggested itself to Charlemagne during his sojourn in Italy, where the traditional learning was in part preserved by masters, who taught the grammar of Prisian and Donatus and read the works of Virgil, Cicero, St. Augustine, Buthius and Cassiodorus. In the famous Capitullari of 787, and in other enactments, Char's recommended the foundation of the diocesan and monastic schools throughout the empire, having previously founded the scholar Palatina at his own court, and given to the Abbey of Fulda, the Capitullari empowering the abbot to establish a school at that monastery. But although it was Italy that inspired Char's with the idea of founding schools throughout the empire, it was Ireland that sent him the masters who were to impart the new learning. Ireland, which had never formed part of the Roman empire, and which had escaped the invasions that barbarians had preserved since the days of its conversion to Christianity, was the tradition of ancient learning, a knowledge of Greek and Latin which was now to astonish continental Europe. Alcuin, although an Englishman, is justly considered a representative of Irish learning, with him is associated Clement of Ireland, who assisted in the work of founding the palace school. Unfortunately history has not preserved the names of Clement's fellow countrymen, who during the reign of Char's and throughout the 9th century were found in every cathedral and monastery of the empire, as well as at the court of the Frankish kings, and were so identified with the new intellectual movement that the teaching of the newly founded schools was characterised as Irish learning. Eric of Ozer, middle of the 9th century, writing to Char's the bold, testifies to the nationality of many of these pioneers. We find a mention of a Hibernicus Exal, author of a poem in praise of Char's the great of Dunigal, teacher at Pavia, of another, or possibly the same, Dunigal, who wrote to Charlemagne, joining the eclipse of the sun in 810, and of a Sedulius scotus, sometimes identified with the Irish poet Sedulius, who is one of the authors most widely read throughout the early Middle Ages. Ireland has, therefore, every claim to be considered the Ionia of scholastic philosophy. After the death of Char's and the subsequent division of the empire, a reaction set in against the schools in several parts of the empire. Lupus Servetus, the celebrated abbot of Ferrier, complains of the opposition on the part of the ignorant vulgar who, if they detect any fault in the representatives of the new learning, attribute it not to human weakness, but to some quality inherent in the studies themselves. There were some also who, according to Amalarius of Metz, reproved the reading even of the scriptures. These reactionaries, however, were silenced by the voice of Eugenius II, who encouraged the foundation of schools and spread of the new learning. Supported by the highest authority in the church, the movement continued under the successors of Charlemagne, so that during the 9th and 10th centuries they sprang up besides the palace school, which seems to have accompanied the Frankish court from place to place, the no less celebrated cathedral and monastic schools of Fulde in Germany and of Utrecht, Liege, Tournai and Saint Laurent in the Low Countries. It was in France that the scholastic movement found its first home, and it was in that country also that, after the temporary opposition of the reactionary alarmists, the most important schools were founded, namely at Tour, Reims, Léon, Oseur and Chartres. These homes of the new learning were the scene of the first crude attempts of scholastic speculation. As at a later time the University of Paris was the scene of the last and most brilliant triumphs of scholasticism. It would be a mistake to imagine that philosophy was taught in the schools at the beginning. The curriculum of studies at first consisted of the Seven Liberal Arts, that is to say the Trivium, Grammar, Rhetoric and Dialectic, and the Quadrivium, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy and Music. Little by little however the programme was extended. Around the problems of dialectic were grouped problems of metaphysics and psychology, and gradually philosophy became part of the programme of the schools. The Magister Scoli, or Scholasticus as the teacher was called, expounded the text of the author. This was the method employed, whether the subject was Grammar or Dialectic, or any other of the seven branches. The Library of Schools Of Aristotle's works the first schoolmen possessed the D'Interpretione, and in the 10th century the Categorie in Bothias' translation. It was only in the 12th century that the first book of the Analytica priora, the Tropica and the Dofisticus Elentius, became known, and it was not until the 13th century that the physical, psychological and metaphysical treaties were introduced into the schools. These facts explain why during the first and second periods of the scholastic movement philosophy was almost altogether occupied with logical problems. Secondly, of Plato's Dialogues, the Timaeus was known to the Irish monks, possibly in the original. It was known on the continent in the translation made in the 5th century by Chalcidius. The works of St. Augustine and the Neoplatonists were used as sources from which the first schoolmen derived their knowledge of Platonism. Third, of the commentators of Aristotle, only Porphyry, whose Isagoge circulated among the schoolmen in Bothias' translation, and Bothias, who commented on the Categorie and D'Interpretione, were known to the schoolmen of the first period. Fourth, translations and compilations by Marius Victorinos 4th century and Macrobius 5th century, Claudianus Mamertus and Donatus were read and expounded in the schools. Fifth, the Neoplatonic commentaries of Apuleus and Trismegistus were also used. Sixth, of Cicero's works, the rhetorical and dialectical treatises such as the Topica d'Officius etc. were known at least in part. Seneca's d'Beneficius and Lucrecius d'Rerum Natura were also read. Seventh, in addition to the genuine works of St. Augustine, the Pseudo-Augustinian treatises Categorie X, Principia dialecticae, Contra quinque hereses, and D'Spiritu et anima were studied by the first scholastics. Eighth, finally the library of the first schoolmen included the works of Clement of Alexandria and of Origen in Latin translations, and the Latin version of Pseudo Dionysus by Scotus Erogena, as well as the commentaries and original works of Martianus, Capella, Cassiodorus, and Buthius. Chapter 24 First Masters of the Schools Alcuin, 735-804, educated in the famous school of York, appeared at the court of Charlemagne in 781, and therefore eight years taught grammar and dialectic in the palace school. Later he retired to the Abbey of Tour, where he founded a school which was soon to eclipse the palace school itself. Alcuin was distinguished chiefly as a grammarian. His contributions to dialectic are of secondary importance, and his psychological treatise d'anime racione merely reproduces the doctrines of St. Augustine. His importance in the history of scholastic philosophy is due to the prominent part which he took in the establishment of the first schools. Fred Aegis, who was probably a fellow countryman of Alcuin, taught at the palace school about the beginning of the ninth century. After Alcuin's death he became abbot of the Monastery of Tour. Speaking up the problem of the nature of darkness, he proved in a treatise d'Nihilio et Tenebris that both nothing and darkness are real beings. On this point at least, Fred Aegis is a realist. He does not, however, discuss the general question of the objective reality of universal ideas. With Fred Aegis is associated the unknown author of the treatise entitled Dicte Candida d'Imagine Dei. The work is virtually an attempt at finding in man the image of the trinity. In spirit and in method it is Augustinian. Rahabanus Maurus, 784-856, is one of the most remarkable of the first masters of the schools. He was born at Mainz in the year 784. At the age of 18 he became a beneductine monk in the monastery of Fulda. Since he went to Tour, where for six years he studied under Alcuin. From Tour he returned to Fulda in order to assume the office of teacher. According to Trittenheim Rahabanus and his new learning were guarded with suspicion by a rat-garus abbot of the monastery of Fulda. Rahabanus, however, overcame the opposition of the reactionaries. He was made abbot of Fulda and later became bishop of Mainz. He died in the year 856. Like Alcuin and Fridaegis Rahabanus is of importance rather as a teacher and inaugurator of the new learning than as an independent philosopher. It was he who introduced the learning of the schools into Eastern Germany. In his work Dei Universo he treats in 22 books a variety of subjects, God, the Angels, biblical personages, ecclesiastical institutions, astronomy, chronology, philosophy, poetry, medicine, agriculture, military tactics and language. The work is a veritable encyclopedia of knowledge. Except in the portions referring to chronology and grammar it is merely a resume of the traditional teaching. Historical position These first masters of the schools belong with Isador of Seville and the venerable Bede to the encyclopedists of the period of transition between patristic philosophy and the philosophy of the Middle Ages. They rendered inestimable service to the scholastic movement by their personal influences teachers. While by their writings they summarized and helped popularize the dogmatic and exegetical teachings of the fathers, the encyclopedic scope of their writings is evidence of a condition of affairs similar to that which existed in the first schools of Greek philosophy. Just as the early Greek philosophers wrote Perifusios the first schoolman wrote Dei Universo. There is however this difference that while the philosophical movement in the first schools of Greece was independent of the past, the philosophy of these first schoolmen was virtually an epitome of the doctrines of the fathers. Erogena was the first of the schoolmen to attempt an independent system of philosophical speculation. With Erogena, therefore, the first period of scholastic philosophy begins. End of Chapter 24 Chapter 25 of History of Philosophy This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Adrian Stevens. History of Philosophy by William Turner. Chapter 25 John Scotus Erogena Life John Scotus Erogena, or Ieigena, was born between the years 800 and 815. Ireland was probably the place of his birth. About the middle of the 9th century he appeared at the court of Charles the Bald by whom he was placed at the head of the palace school. He was ordered by his royal patron to translate the writings of Pseudo Dionysus and of Maximus Confessor. He said to have gone to Oxford at the invitation of Alfred the Great and to have founded a school at Malmesbury where, according to a tradition by no means reliable, he was put to death by his scholars. These biographical data are, with the exception of his relations with Charles and with the palace school, matters of great uncertainty. There are many reasons for supposing that Erogena was a layman, although Stockel believes that he was probably a priest. Sources Erogena composed, besides the translations of Pseudo Dionysus and Maximus Confessor, a comprehensive philosophical work di divisione nature e, and a treatise di egressu et regressu anime ad diem, of which only a fragment has come down to us, to the predestination controversy which was waged in the 9th century between Gottschalk, Rattramus and Servius Lupus on the one hand, and Hinkmar, Florus and Remy Archbishop of Reims on the other, Erogena contributed a treatise di predestinatione, which seems to have gone offence to both parties. In the other great controversy of the 9th and following centuries, the dispute concerning the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which Rattramus and Berengar were opposed by Pascacius, Radbertus and Lanfrank, Erogena also took an active part. The work, however, di capore e sanguine domini, which has been ascribed to him, is undoubtedly to be assigned to some other writer of the 9th century. Very probably to Rattramus. Of considerable importance in determining the philosophical views of Erogena are his expositiones, commentaries on the works of Pseudo Dionysus, and the commentary on Martianus Capella, fragments of which were published by Oro, the commentary on the Gospel of Saint John, and the homilia in Prolegre Menon Evangeli sec Ionum, are Erogena's contributions to scriptural exegesis. The works of Erogena, as published by Dr Floss, are reprinted in means Patrologia Latina, volume 122, the divisione Naturei was first published by Gale, Oxford 1681, a recent addition to our secondary sources is Alice Gardner's John the Scott, London 1900. Erogena's Philosophy General idea of Erogena's philosophy In its general outlines, the philosophy of Erogena is Dionysus, that is to say Neoplatonic. Erogena carries the union of philosophy and theology to the point of identifying the two sciences. In his work, De Pridestinatione, he quotes St. Augustine as saying Non allium esse filosofium ed est sapientiae studium et allium religionum cum i corum doctrineum non apropamus nec sacramentum nobiscum communicat. But while Augustine evidently means merely that the speculative aspect of religion is as important as the practical, Erogena understands him to mean that philosophy and religion are one and the same. For he continues Quid est aliud de filosofia tractare, nisi verae religionis, quasum et principalis omnium rerum causa, deus et humilita, coletor et radionabilita, investigatur, regiulas exponire? Conficitore inde verum esse filosofiam verum religionum. Conversimque veram religionum esse veram filosofiam. We have here the characteristic trait of scholasticism, though in an exaggerated form, the attempt, namely, to find a rational basis for the union of reason and revelation. Later on the great masters of scholasticism, while recognizing the union of reason and revelation, will allot to philosophy a sphere of its own, maintaining that faith and science are distinct, though perfectly accordant with each other. Thus St. Thomas would not subscribe to Erogena's methodological principle that the scripture and the fathers are sources of proof in philosophy. The identification of philosophy with theology by Erogena is not to be understood as an advocacy of rationalism. It is true that Erogena maintains the priority of reason with respect to authority, as when he says omnis octoretas quai vera razione non approbatur infirma esse veretur. But this is a principle common to all the scholastics. Far from being a rationalist, Erogena is more inclined to take sides with the mystics, to belittle all reason, unless insofar as reason is illumined from on high. Instead of rationalizing theology, he would theosophize philosophy. Erogena assigns to philosophy a fourfold task, to divide, to define, to demonstrate, and to analyze. Resolutiva. This may be described as Erogena's definition of the applicability of dialectic to philosophy and theology. A notion which, like that of the union of faith and science, is destined to develop in the subsequent growth of scholastic philosophy. General Metaphysical Doctrines. The treatise di divizioni natiorei begins with the definition of nature. Nature is quid quid vel animo per sepi potest vel animi intezionem suprat. Nature is therefore synonymous with being. The first great division of nature is into things which are, and things which are not. Now there are five ways in which a thing may be said not to be. 1. A thing is not in the sense that it cannot be known. Quae per excellentiem suae natiorei omnem sensum intelectum reazionem quae fungiont yore videri non esse. In this sense God and the essences of things are nonexistent. 2. A thing is not relatively to something else in the sense that being what it is it is not that which is higher. Inferiores afermatio superiores est negatio. Inferiores negatio est superiores afermatio. That is, a plant is not because it is not an animal, and in like manner every being is relatively not being. 3. A thing is not when it is in mere potency. Quae vero ad hook in natiorei sinubos conti natiore nec informata materiae apparent dissimus non esse. A regena adduces the example of the human race potentially constituted by God in the first man. 4. A thing is not in reference to the intellect when it is enveloped as it were in material conditions. Quae lor corum spesius temporum quae notibus verantor colegiuntor solvuntor vere dicuntor non esse. 5. Finally there is a mode of not being which is peculiar to man. Man's being is the imaged beauty and holiness of God when by sin he loses this dignity destroying the image of God which is in him man ceases to exist he is not. Leaving this fivefold enumeration of the modes of not being we come to the celebrated division of nature into one natiore quae creat et non creatur. 2. Natiore quae creat e et creat. 3. Natiore quae creat e et non creat and 4. Natiore quae nec creat e nec creat. 1. Natiore quae creat e et non creatur is God the origin principle and source of all things. True to the tenets of the Dionysian philosophy Erogena denies that God can know himself. God is incomprehensible to himself as he is to us for to know himself he should place himself in one of the categories of thought and that is impossible. In discussing the possibility of our knowing God Erogena dwells on the twofold theory of theological predication. There is the affirmative theory which says that substance, goodness and so forth may be affirmed of God and there is the negative theory which maintains that all these predicates should be denied. The truth according to Erogena is that these predicates may be affirmed of the supreme being if they are taken in a metaphorical sense in their proper or literal meaning they must be denied because God is more than substance more than goodness. Thus though in speech we affirm these and other predicates in thought we deny them. In pronunciatione est forma catefattica, in intelletu otem apophattica. It is remarkable how much the first most daring of the schoolman is willing to concede to agnosticism. What is said of predicates of God in general is true also of the term creator. God and the action by which he made things are one. When therefore we say that God is creator we mean according to Erogena that he is more than creator that he is in all things as their sole substance. Om ergo otimus deum omnia facere nil aliod debemus intelligere quam deum im omnibus esse hock est essentiam omniam subsistere ipsa enim solos posse vere est et omne quod vere in his quai sunt dictur esse ipsa solos est. This pantheism is professed over and over again as, for example, deus nam quai omniam essentia est quiae solos vere est and the oft quoted formula of pseudo Dionysus esse omniam est superese divinitatis. It is true that Erogena sometimes speaks of God as separate from creatures ipsa deus in sei ipso ultra omniam criaturam nolo intelectu comprehenditor and again deus non est totum criaturai ne quai criatura pas dee. Nevertheless we cannot without accusing Erogena of self-contradiction, attach any philosophical value to these expressions. They are merely the incidental use of common modes of speech, for Erogena has certainly maintained that the being of creatures is the being of God. And that by creation God becomes his creatures. This consideration leads to the next division. 2. Natura quai criatur et criat. By this our philosopher understands God as containing in the word logos the primordial causes or types of things formed before all creation. Pater it est omniam principium in verbo suo. Unigento videlesit filio. Omnium rerum rationes quas faciendas esse voluit prius quam res fierant prae formavit. There is no hierarchy among these types as there was among the Platonic ideas. Still Erogena following the pseudo Dionysons enumerates ten first primordial causes. These types are in God. Consequently they are intelligent, understanding themselves and understanding the things of which they are types. They are indeed made, but made from all eternity for they are co-eternal with God. Of this co-eternity however Erogena is not altogether certain. The primordial causes preceded from the Father by a process which is figuratively described as a flowing. We must be careful not to conclude too hastily, as has sometimes been done, that Erogena identified the primordial causes, the world of ideas, with the second person of the Blessed Trinity. The Son is begotten from all eternity. From all eternity too the primordial causes were made. They are in the Son of the same substance as the Father yet as the defenders of Erogena have conclusively shown they are not the Son. Here as well as in his treatment of the first division of nature Erogena's pantheism is apparent. He maintains that by the emanation or flowing of the ideas from God the divine nature creates itself. Creator enim asiepsa imprimordialibus cosis acper hoc siepsam creat. He goes on however to explain that the creation in this case consists in a showing forth theophania of the divine nature. 3. Natura quae creatur et non creat means the world of phenomena, things subject to change and the conditions of time and space. Quae ingeneratione temporibusque et locis cognoscuntor hoc est imprimordialium cosarum efectibus extremis. Individual things, creatures as we call them, are derived from God. They participate in the divine nature for all derivation is participation. Now the order of derivation is from the Father to the primordial causes and from these to concrete individual existences. In the word which is the locus of the primordial causes all things are in a condition of comparative undifferentiation. But when they issue forth from the word to become the complex world of concrete things they suffer separation differentiation and multiplicity. Our philosopher illustrates his thoughts by referring to the radii of a circle. At the centre of all the radii are united but as they proceed towards the circumference they become distinct and separate. The separation of the primordial causes is the work of the Holy Spirit, of the spirit who in the beginning moved over the face of the waters. The derivation of all things proceeded in definite order through the highest genera, lower genera, intermediate species and special species to the individual. Thus did Erogena hypostatis as it were the categories and lay down the principle of the most rigorous realism that the categories of thought and being exist outside the mind in all their universality. We may then describe the process of the origin of things as an emanation or flowing from the first principle of existence. Erogena calls the process a theophania or showing forth of the divine nature and it is in this sense that the supreme principle of existence pervades or runs through all nature. For theos is derived from theu to run. Creation in the common acceptation of the term does not apply to the origin of things yet since God has made all things out of his own substance and since in the meaning already described he is non-existent he may be said to have made all things ex nihilo. The fourth division of nature is natura quinec creato nino. This is God as the end of all things, the goal to which all created beings must return. Everywhere in the universe Erogena finds traces or signs of the final return of creatures to their creator. The heavenly sphere is constantly returning to the point where it was 24 hours previously. In four years the sun completes its course in the celestial circle returning to the point whence it started. There is a period set for the return of the flowers and leaves and herbs and so all creatures at the completion of the cosmic cycle will return to the principle whence they came. This is especially true of man for the life of man on earth is but a striving after the true, the beautiful, the good, the perfect from which he came and to which he must return ere he can find rest. God who revealed himself in creation will retire within himself in the final apocatastasis or universal return of creature to creator. Just as creatures emanated from God according to definite order so shall they return to him in order the lower through the higher. As ere is changed into light and metal into fire so shall bodily substance be changed into soul and in like manner whatever is inferior shall rise through the higher forms to God. This doctrine of Erogena on the one hand reminds us of the Heraclitian doctrine of the upward and downward way and on the other hand suggests the Hegelian theory of divine processes. Problem of universals. Although the problem of universals was not proposed to the scholastics of Erogena's day our philosopher treats incidentally of the existence of the categories and placing himself on the side of the extreme realists affirms the objective reality of the highest genera as well as of the individual. Indeed he goes farther than the platonic realists when not content with affirming the logical unity of the concept of being he attributes to being objective or ontological unity affirming that being is one. Erogena's psychological doctrines do not occupy an important place in his system of thought. He divides the cognitive powers of the minds into sensible and super sensible. The sense faculty is one the so called five senses being merely the different organs which the sense employs. The higher or super sensible faculties are threefold. Imaging the trinity. The first is intellect, noose, by which the mind contemplates God, the source and author of all things. The second is reason, logos, by which the mind contemplates the primordial causes in the word. The third is internal sense, dea noia, by which the mind attains the knowledge of the world phenomena. Circa efectus causarum primordialium, civae visibilis, civae invisibilis, sint, circumvolvitor. Now while these three are merely phases of the soul, the first is properly the central nature of the soul. The second is a power, dunamis, and the third is a kind of energia or actuality of the soul. The evolutionary march of knowledge is twofold, from the higher to the lower, that is, from an intuitive knowledge of God, genostico intuitu, to a knowledge of primordial causes, and thence to a knowledge of concrete things, and from the lower to the higher, that is, from sense experience to the internal sense, which abstracts the specific and generic concepts, and thence through a knowledge of primordial causes to a knowledge of God himself. The descending march of knowledge corresponds to the origin of things from God. The ascending march corresponds to the return of things to God. Thus, in his theory of knowledge, Erogena is inclined to admit Aristotelian as well as Neoplatonic principles. He is, however, in final analysis, a Neoplatonist, for he teaches that the knowledge which most avails is knowledge of which the origin and starting point is God himself. With regard to self-knowledge, the soul can know its own existence, but not its essence, and herein the soul is most like to God, for of God we can know merely that he is, not what he is. The reason adduced in proof of the soul's inability to know itself is interesting. A definition, our philosopher argues, is a place, but the containing is greater than the contained. If, therefore, the soul could define itself, it should be greater than itself, which is manifestly absurd. Anthropological doctrines Man is composed of body and soul. Homo autum corpus et anima est. The soul is a simple spiritual substance. It is the principle of life. Moreover, the soul creates the body. Anima corpus sum ipsa creat non tamem di nihilo sed di aleco. Anima namque incorporales qualitatis in unum conglutinante et quasi codom subjectum ipsis qualitatibus ex quantitate sumente et supunte corpus cibi creat. The essence of the soul, as we have seen, is intellect. Its essential nature includes will also, tota anima natura voluntas est. In fact, will and intellect are indissolubly associated. Ubi razzionabilitas ibi necessario libertas. In the first man who was created in a state of happiness and lived a life like to that of the angels, were contained in solar possibilitate in all his successors. Simul ac semel in ilo uno homine omnium hominum razzione secundum corpus et anima criatai sum. This postulate being granted, it was easy for aerogene to explain the transmission of original sin. Historical position When we come to form an estimate of aerogene as a philosopher, we must not allow his many brilliant qualities to blind us as to the enormity of his errors. He was without doubt the most learned man of his century. He was the first of the representatives of the new learning to attempt a system of constructive thought, and he brought to his task a truly Celtic wealth of imagination, and a spiritual force which lifted him above the plain of his contemporaries, mere epitomizers and commentators. His philosophy has all the charm which pantheism always possesses for a certain class of minds. It is subtle, vague and poetic. When we come to examine its contents and method, we find that it is dominated by the spirit of neoplatonism. Through the works of pseudo-dionysus and of maximus, aerogenea made acquaintance with teachings of plotinus and proclus, and when he came to construct his own system of thought, he reproduced the essential traits of neoplatonic philosophy, pantheism, the doctrine of intuition, mysticism and universal redemption. The work di divisione naturae was condemned in 1225. Its heterodoxy is undeniable, yet we cannot doubt the sincerity of aerogenea's devotion to the truth of Catholic dogma. He was, as Anastasius, the Roman librarian, described him, via per omnia sanctus. Perhaps his attitude towards dogmatic truth is best described in the words of Gael, who first published the di divisione naturae. Potuet ergo erare, ereticus esse nolluit. Aerogenea illustrates the many-sidedness of the scholastic movement. To classify as anti-scholastic, whatever does not agree with the synthetic systems of the great masters of scholasticism, is to break the line of continuous historical development, which led through the failures and partial successes of Aerogenea, Abelard and other philosophers to the philosophy of the thirteenth century. Scholasticism, in its final form, is the outcome of the forces of Christian civilization, which, in different conditions, and in less favorable circumstances, produced the imperfect scholasticism of the period of beginnings and the period of growth. End of chapter twenty-five. Chapter twenty-six of History of Philosophy. This is a LibriVox recording, or LibriVox recordings are in the public to-mown. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Adrian Stevens. History of Philosophy by William Turner. Chapter twenty-six. Gerbert. Life. Gerbert was born in Aquitaine, about the middle of the tenth century. He became a monk at the monastery of Oriac, and there, according to Richard, a contemporary and disciple, he met the count of Barcelona, with whom he went to Spain in order to study mathematics and the physical sciences. Thence, at the request of Otto II, he went to Rome. From Rome he went back to France, and in 991 became Archbishop of Reims. In 997 he was transferred to the Sea of Ravenna. In 999 he became Pope, taking the name of Sylvester II. He lived until 1003. Gerbert is credited with being the first to introduce the Arabic numerals into Christian Europe. He is said also to have constructed clocks and other mechanical contrivances. He was probably his acquaintance with astronomy, and his success as a mechanical inventor that turned for him the reputation of magician. The legends collected and published by Benno in the eleventh century represent Gerbert as in league with the devil. The less ignorant, however, among Gerbert's contemporaries acknowledged him to be a pious monk and a man of extraordinary learning. Sources. Meen, in his patrologia Latina, volume 139, publishes the following works of Gerbert. Libelis de numerorem divisione, di geometria, di svarai constrictione, and Libelis du razionale et razione utti. Gerbert's letters were published by Massel in 1611, and republished by Duchain in 1636. Richard's histories, which throw so much light on the life and character of Gerbert, as well as on some important points of his doctrine, were first published by Perz in the momenta Germaniae. To these sources must be added a poem by Adelberow, published in the patrologia Latina, volume 151, and a letter of Leo, Abbott and Papal Leggett, which is found in volume 139 of the patrologia Latina. The work, di copore e sanguina domini, attributed to Gerbert by Perz and others, is of doubtful authenticity. An excellent monograph of the life and teaching of Gerbert is Monsieur Piguet's Gaërbert und Pap-Philosophe, Paris 1897, from the Catholic University Bulletin, volume 4, pages 295 onwards, July 1898. Doctrines Gerbert as a teacher In the midst of the wars and other external circumstances, which combined to bring about a state of almost universal neglect of learning, Gerbert revived at the school of reams the best traditions of the early days of the scholastic movement. He taught the dialectic of Aristotle, using a translation of the Categoriae in addition to the Esagogge of Porphyry and the Cometries of Boethius. He also taught rhetoric, employing at his said a mechanical contrivance in order to express the different combinations of figures of speech, and in one of his letters he speaks of a sphere by means of which he illustrated the horizon and the beauties of the heavens. His work, di divisione numero rorm, shows that he occupied himself with the task of popularizing the theory of multiplication. Gerbert as a philosopher 1. Richard, a contemporary and disciple of Gerbert, gives the most interesting description of an encounter which took place at Ravenna in the year 980 between Gerbert, master of the schools at reams, and Otrich, the most famous of the masters of the German schools. The emperor, although the second, and many distinguished prelates, lent solemnity to the scene by their presence. Gerbert opened the discussion by defining philosophy as divinarum et uminarum rareum comprehencio veritatis, thus identifying philosophy with knowledge. Then he proceeded to divide philosophy into theoretical and practical. He further distinguished physics, mathematics, and theology, theologia intelectibilis as parts of theoretical philosophy, and moral, dispensativa, economic, distributiva, and political, civilis, philosophy as subdivisions of practical philosophy. After a discussion as to the place which physiology and philology should occupy in this classification of philosophical sciences, the disputants passed on to the question, what is the aim of philosophy? Gerbert answered that the final cause of philosophical study is a knowledge of things human and divine, in other words, that philosophy is, so to speak, its own reward. At this point the argument veered around the platonic account of the cause of the world. Next the disputants took up the discussion of the cause of shadows, and when, at the close of the days debate, the emperor put an end to the disputation. The question under discussion was whether mortal is to be subordinate to rational or vice versa, or, as we should say, whether the term mortal or the term rational has the greater extension. Two, the libalus et rationale et ratione uti, addressed to the emperor, takes up the problem of predication, at the point where the oral discussion had been interrupted, and inquires whether ratione uti should be predicated of rationale. It was a principle admitted by the dialecticians that the predicate should possess wider extension than the subject. Since, therefore, reasonable is of wider extension than using reason, is not porphyry wrong when he says that using reason may be predicated of reasonable. Gerbert approaches the problem by stating the objections which may be urged from three sources, namely from the relation of power to act, from the relation of the accidental to the substantial, and from the relation of the higher concept to the lower. He then proceeds to elucidate these notions, determining the nature of act and power, thus using the objections in order to throw light on the problem, so that when he comes to the thesis that ratione uti may be predicated of rationale, he has no difficulty improving his proposition by the use of the concepts act, power, etc., on which the objections rested. This little treatise is, therefore, the first sample of the use of the scholastic method, which, a century later, was employed in Abelard's sick et non, and was perfected by the philosophers of the thirteenth century. It is by reason of its method, rather than of its contents, that the treatise occupies so important a place in the history of scholastic philosophy. Three. Adelberro, who was at one time a disciple of Gerbert at Reims, and who died in 1030, mentions in a poem addressed to Robert II of France certain theories concerning the origin of the universe, and adds, I found these things being not unmindful of what I have heard. If the theories in question are those of Gerbert, and it is natural to suppose that Adelberro, speaking of his former teacher, it is evident that our philosopher did not confine his philosophical teaching to the problems of dialectic, but that he carried his inquiries into the region of cosmogony and anthropology. Four. The letter of Leo, the papal legate appointed to inquire into the rival claims of Gerbert and Arnulf to the Sea of Reims, bears further testimony to the many-sidedness of Gerbert's teaching. It implies that Gerbert included in his curriculum the study of nature, and perhaps the study of animal life. This is all the more remarkable when we recall that Gerbert belonged to an age to which Aristotle's treatises on the natural sciences were completely unknown. Historical position. Gerbert must have exercised considerable influence on his own generation. The very grotesqueness of the notions which the superstitious entertained concerning him is proof of his preeminence. He is in the tenth century what Erogena was in the ninth, and what Abelard will be in the twelfth. His influence, however, was exercised by his oral teaching rather than by his written works. To his disciples and to the masters who succeeded him in the schools of France, the dialectical movement which was continued by Rosalind, Abelard and St. Adam's Elm, and by them transmitted to the thirteenth century, owes a larger debt than can be accurately determined. Chapter 27 The School of Osea Eric Heracus of Osea Life St. Eric, 841-881, question mark, a monk of Saint-Germain of Osea studied at Fulda, where he had four teacher, Haimo, the successor of Rehabanus, and afterwards that Feriaire, where Cervartus Lupus, who was also a disciple of Rehabanus, was at that time master. After returning to Osea, Eric became master in the monastic school of that place, and under his guidance the school became one of the most renowned in all France. Sources, Aire has shown that the marginal glosses found in Manuscript, number 1108 of the National Library of Paris, are the work of Eric. The manuscript contains the Categoriae d'Esem, falsely attributed to St. Augustine, the Perihermanias of Aristotle, the Isagogue of Porphyry, and several works of Berthius. Naturally, therefore, the glosses added by Eric deal almost exclusively with logical or dialectical problems. In addition to this document, Aire mentions a poem by Eric on the life of Saint-Germain, to which the author attached, as a marginal note, an extract from Erogena's treatise, D'Divisione Naturae. The poem was published by Minne, Patrologia Latina, volume 129, Doctrines. Eric affirms with Aristotle and Berthius that the concept is the image of the object, while the word is the expression of the concept. With regard to the universal, generic and specific concept, he expresses himself as follows. This passage indicates departure from the realistic view, and a leaning towards the nominalism, which appeared in a more definitive form in the 11th century. In a similar spirit, Eric accounts for the co-location of individual things, in genera and species, and even in the highest genus, Ousia, in Eric's glosses, there are several indications of an acquaintance with the writings of Erogena. His doctrines may be described in general as a protest against the extreme realism of his predecessor. Remy of Ousia, Life St. Remy, Remygeus, of Ousia, was a monk in the Abbey of Saint-Germain of Ousia. He had for teacher Eric of Ousia and Servetus Lupus. After the death of Eric, he taught of Ousia, Reims, and Paris. At the last mention school he had for disciple Otho of Clooney. He died in 904. Sources, beside a theological treatise, entitled, Inarationes in Samos, we possess Remy's glosses on the grammatical works of Prisian and Donatus, and a dialectical commentary entitled, Comentum magistri Remygei superlibrum martiani capelli dinuptis mercurii et philurgii et supersymptum artis liberales. As a secondary source we have the biography of Otho of Clooney by the monk John. Doctrines, from the commentary on martianus capella it appears that Remy attempted to reconcile the extreme realism of Erogena with the anti-realism of Eric. Martianus capella had defined genus as Erogena on the country had defined it as The definition given by Remy is evidently compromise. Remy seems to have occupied himself with the problem of the world of ideas. The ideas he maintained exist in an invisible sphere hidden in the mind of God. associated with the school of Ozer is the unknown author of another commentary on martianus capella. This commentary on account of the frequent occurrence of Greek words is judged by some to be the work of an Irish monk. Mention must also be made of the work entitled Glosses on the Isogogoe of Porphyry discovered by Cousin and by him assigned to the 9th century. Both Cousin and Oria attribute the work to Rahabanus Morius, Prentel, Colish and Stockel are of an opinion that it should be assigned to a pupil of Rahabanus who is called Iepa. On the question of universals the author of the Glosses propounds certain realistic principles which approach more closely to what afterwards became known as Thomistic realism than do any of the tenets of the other dialecticians of the 9th or 10th centuries. Retrospect. During the 9th and 10th centuries the philosophy which formed part of the general intellectual movement inaugurated by the foundation of the schools was still in its beginnings. Here and there different springs gave rise to different streams of thought but it was not until the following century that these streams began to flow in a common channel and the philosophy of the schools uniting all its tributaries took a definite course, the direction of which may be easily traced. Rahabanus, Erogena, Zherbe and the monks of Ozer are practically independent of one another yet each in his own way exhibits the essential traits of the scholastic, vague and ill-defined as these traits are. When compared with the characteristics of the scholasticism of the 13th century all of these philosophers agree in maintaining that there is no contradiction between philosophy and theology. They hold that dialectics should be applied to the great problems of human thought and they all attempt on a more or less restricted scale to make faith reasonable. Scholasticism in the 9th century draws the first rough sketch of what scholasticism in the 13th century will be. This period is generally described as an age of blind realism but it is far from being so. True it is that Erogena's philosophy, the most ambitious constructive attempt of the 9th century, is based on the realistic concept of the universe but it must be remembered that Erogena's realism did not go uncontradicted and while Eric Remy and the author of The Glosses did not succeed in finding the formula best fitted to express the doctrine of moderate realism, they refused with unmistakable emphasis to accept the ultra-realistic concept. It was through the storm and stress of the age of Rosalind and Abelard that moderate realism struggled to be an adequate expression. In that age too there first appeared rationalism which in a sense to be subsequently explained is regarded by Cardinal Gonzalez as an essential phase of the scholastic movement. The occasion of the extraordinary intellectual activity of the second period of scholasticism was the problem of universals. End of chapter 27. Chapter 28 of History of Philosophy. This is a LibriVox recording or LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Adrian Stevens. History of Philosophy by William Turner. Second period of scholasticism. Rosalind to Alexander of Hales. 1050 to 1200. The problem of universals. In the Izagogy of Porphyry translated by Botheus which until the 13th century was the common textbook of logic in the schools the following passage occurs. In solace notice intellectibus posita sint. Sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporealia et utram separata a sensibilbus an insensibilbus posita et circa hike consistentia di cere ree usabu artisimum enim negoziatum est huius modi et maiores egens inquisitiones. This passage which thrust the problem of universals on the philosophers of the Middle Ages proposes three questions. One to the universals. Generic and specific concepts exist in the world of reality or are they merely things the mind? Nuda intelecta. Two if they do exist outside the mind are they corporal or incorporeal? Three do they exist in concrete sensible things or outside them? The dicere recusabu of Porphyry was a direct challenge to the schoolman. Botheus in one of his commentaries had asserted the objective reality of universals although in another commentary he had spoken as if he held that they were merely things of the mind. The early schoolmen were therefore thrown upon their own resources. Not having yet developed an adequate system of psychology they are obliged to be content with the imperfect and what may be called a provisional solution of Porphyry's questions. Little by little however the problem of universals suggested questions of psychology and metaphysics so that while it is incorrect to represent all scholastic philosophy as centering around the problem of universals it is true that this was the problem that occasioned the growth from the primitive form of scholasticism to the scholasticism of the age of perfection although there were as we shall see other factors which contributed to this development. The answers to Porphyry's questions are generally classed under three heads. Nominalism, conceptualism and realism. Nominalism maintains that there is no universality either of concept or of objective reality the only universality being that of the name. Conceptualism concedes the universality of the idea but denies that there is a universality of things corresponding to the universality of the mental representation. Realism in its exaggerated form maintains that the universal as such exists outside the mind in other words that there are objective realities which independently of our minds possess universality. Realism in its moderate form known as Aristotelian or Thomistic realism while it grants that there is in things an objective potentially universal reality contends that the formal aspect of universality is conferred by the mind and that consequently the universal in the full panoply of its universality exists in the mind alone having however a Fundamentum in Ray. The formula which came to be the recognized watchword of the nominalist and conceptualist is Universalia postrem. The formula of exaggerated realism is Universalia anterem. Moderate realism in the spirit of true synthesis maintained Universalia anterem, the types of things existing in the mind of God, Universalia postrem, concepts existing in the human mind and Universalia in Ray, the potentially universal essences existing in things. In the first period of scholastic philosophy Erogena and Fredegius advocated the exaggerated form of realism. The reason of this is not far to seek. The doctrine accorded with the pantheistic spirit of Erogena's philosophy it offered the most obvious solution of certain dogmatic problems such as that concerning the transmission of original sin and its assumption of the perfect correspondence of mental representations with external things commended it to the uncritical spirit of an age of beginnings. It was for lack of a developed system of psychology that the age demanded a categorical answer to the question do universals exist outside the mind? When therefore Eric and others deny the objective existence of universals they are to be classified not as nominalists or conceptualists but merely as anti-realists for though they endeavour to find a positive answer to the question how do universals exist their solution of the problem is to be considered in its negative rather than in its positive aspect. Nominalism and conceptualism did not appear until the second period of scholastic philosophy and even then the treatment of the problem of universals was dialectical rather than psychological. It cannot be denied that some of the problems discussed by the later schoolmen were of a frivolous character. It is however a serious mistake to describe the problem of universals as a barren dispute a controversy over over refined subtleties. The denial of the universal means censism and leads incidentally to the denial of the abstractive power of the human mind. Moreover the universal has its ethical as well as its psychological aspect and the denial of the universal means ultimately the destruction of moral ideas and the subversion of the stability of moral principles. Consequently the schoolmen are to be admired not blamed for attaching so much importance to the problem of universals. It is interesting to note that it was this problem that developed the scholastic method brought out the element of rationalism latent in scholasticism and led has has been remarked to the growth of scholastic psychology and metaphysics. Chapter 28. Predecessors of Rosalind Besides the anti-realists Eric, Rummy etc. there were before the days of Rosalind dialecticians who opposed the prevailing spirit of realism. Dubule mentions a certain Uranus qui iardem atom sofisticam vocalom essa diseruit. The authors of l'histoire littéraire de la France speak of the same teacher as Uranus sofista. Uden and Kholish believe that Dubule refers to Aragena. It is more probable that the Uranus referred to is John the Dev otherwise called John the Physician. Hermann, abbot of Tournay writing in the first half of the 12th century says that in 1100 Rambere of Lille and many others taught dialectic normalistically. It is impossible that the school of Rosalind could have grown to such dimensions within half a century of its birth. Consequently Rosalind must have had predecessors in the teaching of nominalism. He was not the founder of the system but rather its first great expounder and defender. End of Chapter 28. Chapter 29. Rosalind. Life. Rosalind of Compiëne was born either at Compiëne or as is more probable in Lower Brittany about the middle of the 11th century. He studied at Soison and at Reims. In 1098 he became canon of Compiëne and taught in that city and later at Besançon and at Tour. Among his many disciples was Abelard. On account of the great number of those who flocked to hear him and partly also on account of the development which he gave to Aristotle's dialectical doctrines, Rosalind was styled Novi Lysie Conditor. He died about 1100. Sources. It appears that Rosalind did not commit his doctrines to writing, contenting himself with promulgating and defending them orally. There has come down to us however a letter addressed by him to Abelard, deening chiefly with Rosalind's Trineterian doctrine. Apart from this document we have no sources of information except the statements of Anselm, Abelard and John of Salisbury who were Rosalind's opponents. Monograph Monsieur Piquet, Rosalind d'Après la légende et d'Après l'histoire Paris 1896. Doctrines. From the sources mentioned in the preceding paragraph we derive the following points of Doctrine. One. Rosalind taught that universals were mere flatus voces. Anselm says Putant universalis substantius. John of Salisbury refers the same opinion to Rosalind by name. From these passages we infer that Rosalind was a nominalist. Although the expression flatus voces is obviously the phrase used by his opponents, rather than by Rosalind himself to describe his doctrine. Consistently with his nominalistic doctrines that the genus and the species have no substantial unity, that the union of individuals in the genus or in the species is a mere fabrication of language or at most the work of thought. Rosalind maintained that the distinction of the whole is also the result of mere mental analysis. Thus Abelard declares. Fuit autumn memini magistri nostri rosalini tam insana sentia ut nulam rem patibus constari velet said sicut solis vocibus species it ha et patis ad describe abat. And elsewhere after describing his former teacher as sudo dialecticus et sudo cristianus he argues that when the gospel tells us that Christ ate part of a fish Rosalind would be compelled to maintain that Christ ate part of a word. 3. Rosalind did not hesitate to apply his nominalism to the doctrine of the blessed trinity. The one nature in three divine persons must, he argued, be universal. Now the universal has no real existence therefore he concluded the oneness of the divine nature is not real. Tritheism. That Rosalind held this doctrine is evident from the references of Saint Anselm from Abelard's epistle to the bishop of Paris and from Rosalind's letter to Abelard. 4. It appears from the testimony of Saint Anselm that Rosalind either taught or suspected of teaching the tenets of censism. In De Fide Trinitatis chapter 2 Anselm is evidently speaking of Rosalind's school when he says 4. In the fifth chapter of the same treatise Allusion is made to the danger of passing from sensistic empiricism to rationalism. 5. No lentes credare qua non intelligent credentes derrident. Condemnation of Rosalind, scholastic philosophy contained from the very outset an element of rationalism which Cardinal Gonzales described as un racionalissimo sui generis. 6. The scholastic movement was the outcome of an intellectual renaissance of Christian civilization and hence the danger arose of claiming for reason too much freedom in the domain of theological inquiry. The peril which scholasticism had to fear was twofold, the abuse of reason on the part of the rationalist and the undue restriction of reason on the part of the mystic. Fulbert of Schatt died 1029, Othlo of Regensburg died 1083 and Saint Peter Damien, 998 to 1073, had already sounded the note of alarm and had condemned the abuse of dialectic. Berengar of Tour, 999 to 1088, had brought discredit on the scholastic movement by his heterodox views on the questions of transubstantiation and his condemnation in 1050 by four different councils resulted in a more or less widespread suspicion of all philosophers and of philosophy itself. Under the influence of L'Enflanc, 1005 to 1089, Abbott of Bec, and afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, there began what may be described as a reaction against the use of dialectic. The effect of Rosalind's Trinitarian era was similar to that of Berengar's heresy. At the Council of Swesson, held in 1092, Rosalind was obliged to retract his heretical teachings concerning the trinity, but he continued, apparently, to teach his nominalistic dialectic. Again in 1094 he was cited before the Council of Rheim, and again he retracted, Abdu'ravit. Afterwards, however, if St. Anzalm is correct, Rosalind asserted that he retracted, Quia apopulo interfici timibat. Picavet, makes no mention of the Second Council, maintains that the Council of Swesson never condemned Rosalind, that in fact it could not condemn him because he repudiated the doctrines attributed to him by John, a monk of the Abbey of Bec, nevertheless, Rosalind was virtually condemned by public opinion, and although, after his brief sojourn in England, he was restored to the dignity of Canaan, and was even allowed to teach, he gave occasion to Anzalm and others to look with suspicion on the use of dialectic argumentation, and on any attempt at opposing the realism, and on any attempt at opposing the realism, which was the traditional view, the Antica Doctrina, as Abelard calls it. Historical position. Rosalind is not to be dismissed with the remark that he was a dangerous heretic. His heretical doctrines are indeed to be deplored, both because of the errors which they contain, and because of the momentary discredit which they brought on the scholastic movement. But it must be remembered that Rosalind remained faithful to his Catholic convictions, and by the strictness of his conformity to Christian ideals of conduct, earned the right of criticising his contemporaries. In this respect he is to be contrasted with his pupil, Abelard, who was a rationalist, devoid of all reverence for dogma, and for traditional morality. Rosalind was an independent thinker who carried freedom of thought to the verge of rationalism. He represents an important phase of the scholastic movement, the beginning of the age of dialectic madness through which the movement had to pass before reaching the age of constructive activity. CHAPTER XXXV. LIFE St Alansalme is a type of scholastic altogether different from Rosalind and Abelard. He was born at Eoster in Lombardy in 1033. In 1060 he entered the monastery of Beck. In 1078 he succeeded L'Enfant as abbot of Beck, and in 1093 became L'Enfant's successor in the Archipiscopal Sea of Canterbury. As primate of England he resisted with extraordinary firmness the encroachments of the secular power. He died in 1109. His life written by his friend and disciple, Eadma, a monk of Canterbury, is published by Meen. Sources. The works of St Alansalme include the following treatises. Monologium, prosologium, diversitate, di libero arbitria, difede trinitatis against Rosalind, curde as homo on redemption and atonement, di incarnazione verbi, and dialogus di grammatico. Among recent additions to our secondary sources, mention must be made of rules, life and times of St Alansalme, two volumes, London 1883, and Vigna, St Alansalme, Filosofo, Milan 1899, Rig St. Alansalme of Canterbury, London 1896. Doctrines, problem of universals. St Alansalme seems to have attempted a compromise between the exaggerated realism of Aragena and the nominalism of Rosla. He is a realist, as appears from his refutation of Rosla, and from his use of the term substance to designate the universal. But what is his precise position as to the manner in which the universal exists outside the mind? In the first place he is clearly and unmistakably an Augustinian Platonist, as to the existence of universals, anti-rem in the mind of God. In the second place he speaks of goodness, and what he says of goodness he implies to be true of other universals, as existing in diversis, sieve in illus i qualita, sieve in equalita considererata. It is impossible to determine more accurately St Alansalme's doctrine of universals, because apparently he did not succeed in finding a more definitive answer to Porphyry's questions. When, however, he called attention to the censism latent in Rosla's nominalism, and when, as in Monologium X, he insisted on the distinction between sense by which the singular is perceived, and intellect by which the universal is known, he prepared the way for the moderate realism, which is based on a psychological analysis, and which could never have been discovered by means of dialectical disputes of Rosla and Abelard. Relation of philosophy to theology. Faith and reason, far from contradicting each other, aid each other. Intelligio ut credam has, for its compliment, credum ut intelligam, reason, of itself feeble and liable to error, is illuminated by the supernatural light of faith, so that new fields of inquiry opened to it by revelation are not beyond its scope. Indeed St Alansalme attaches more importance to the credo ut intelligam than to the intelligio ut credam. The relationship between reason and revelation, between philosophy and theology, is further illustrated by the following principles. The credo ut intelligam is evidently an echo of St Augustine's credo ut intelligas. The intelligio ut credam is the formula of scholasticism, the justification of the use of dialectic, and of the application of dialectic to dogma within the limits of orthodoxy. It is interesting to note in St Alansalme's philosophy the development of another element, which is essential to scholasticism, as is the use of dialectic, namely, the union of faith and reason, of theology and philosophy. Erogena united the two sciences by identifying them. St Alansalme recognizes that they cannot contradict each other, yet he contends that each has its separate sphere. It was left for the masters of scholasticism in the 13th century to trace the lines by which the field of theological inquiry is marked off from the domain of philosophy. St Alansalme's method St Alansalme and he is closely to the doctrines of St Augustine. He states explicitly that St Augustine is his favorite author, and that he never said anything which could not be corroborated by the writings and sayings of the Bishop of Hippo. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that both in his philosophical method and in the contents of his philosophy, Anselm reproduces the Christian Platonism of St Augustine. God and the human soul are, for him, as they were for his favorite author, the great subjects of inquiry. Novere me, novere mte, he starts, for example, with the idea of the good, the just, the great, and rises by what has sometimes been called Platonic induction to the idea of goodness, justice, greatness, to the idea of God. Theodicy In the opening chapters of the monologium Anselm recites the various Platonic and Augustinian arguments for the existence of God, from the necessity of a permanent immutable standard of justice, goodness, etc., from the evidences of order in the universe, and from the gradation of beings. While acknowledging the force of these arguments, St Alansalme, as he tells us, in the Pro-O-Emiam to the prosalogium, began to inquire whether an argument could not be found which would of itself be sufficient to prove the existence of God. Such a proof he finally discovered and formulated in the prosalogium. It is known as the ontological argument, and is as follows. We define God as a being than which nothing greater can be thought. Now, there is in the mind the idea of such a being, but such a being must exist outside the mind, for, if it did not, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought. Therefore, God exists not only in the mind as an idea, but also outside the mind as a reality. Saint Anselm presents the argument in two slightly different forms. The résumé, just given, is a brief form of the argument, as occurs in the third chapter of the prosalogium. Anselm, in formulating the argument, alluded to the fool, incipiens, who, according to the psalmist, hath said in his heart, there is no God. Gaonilo, a monk of the monastery of Marmutie, criticised the argument in a work entitled, Libre pro incipienti, to which Anselm replied in a Libre apologeticus contra Gaonilonem. The controversy was conducted with the greatest courtesy. Gaonilo acknowledged the merit of Saint Anselm's work, and Anselm praised his adversary and thanked him for his criticism. At a later time Saint Thomas examined the ontological argument of Saint Anselm, and called attention to what is really the fatal flaw in every ontological proof, the transition from the ideal to the real, from the world of thought to the world of things. Albertus Magnus neither approved nor disapproved the argument. Saint Bonaventure did not mention it. Dunskotus adopted it, and endeavoured to give it greater strength. Ockham and Gersam rejected it, and in modern times it has been renewed in a slightly different form by Descartes and Leibniz. Of Kant's criticism of the argument, mention will be made in the proper place. It is necessary to remark that in a philosophy based on the ultra-realistic doctrine of the universals, according to which the highest ideas of the human mind, substance, body, etc., as well as the generic concepts, animal, plant, etc., are realities existing as such. One may consistently maintain that the highest and most perfect of all our ideas, the idea of a being than which nothing greater can be thought, necessarily possesses objective reality. From the idea of God as supremely perfect, Quo Nihil Mayus Cogitari protest. Saint Ansem deduces a whole system of natural theology. God is infinite, eternal, the sum of all perfection, the origin of all created being. Psychological doctrines. Saint Ansem do not compose a separate treatise on psychology, the points of doctrine which are here gathered under the title Psychological doctrines are found scattered through his different works. For example, in the monologium, he describes in general terms the origin of ideas. From which one may conclude that our philosopher, rejecting the doctrine of inotism, teaches that our ideas are formed from things by the abstractive power of the mind. By the words Imaggio, Exprimere, etc., he suggests the doctrine of intentional species which afterwards became so well known in the schools. In the treatise di Veretate, Saint Ansem distinguishes three kinds of truth. Veritas inuncia tonis, Veritas cogitationes, and Veritas volantatis. A preposition is true when it expresses the relation existing between things. A thought is true when we judge cogitamus, that to be which is, and that not to be which is not. The will is true when we will what we ought to will. The truth of the will is moral rectitude. In fact, truth of whatever kind is rectitude. Truth may therefore be defined. Rectituda solamente perceptibilis. In the monologium he speaks of the immortality of the soul. In his treatment of this, as well as of other questions, he deals chiefly with the religious and moral aspect of the problem, arguing that the soul is immortal because otherwise it could not love and enjoy God for all eternity. Saint Ansem attached special importance to the will and its freedom, devoting to this subject, the incomplete treatise, di libero arbitrio, and the more comprehensive work, deconcordia pricentiae, cum libero arbitrio. In these treatises he is concerned not so much with proving that the will is free, as with showing that freedom does not consist in the power of sinning, that no will is so free as that of the righteous man, and that neither temptation nor sin can take away our freedom so long as we live. Moral doctrines Like Saint Augustine Saint Ansem is a pains to show that evil is merely the absence or negation of good. Passing from the notion of evil to that of moral good Rectitudo He identifies the latter with justice. Man, he teaches, should do good for the sake of the good itself. Procter ipsam rectitudinum Herein Ansem's teaching apparently approaches very near to the Kantian doctrine of autonomous will and moral purism. The resemblance is, however, merely apparent. Saint Ansem never intended us to forget that, while the good for its own sake is the immediate motive of action. The ultimate reason of all moral action is the will of God. Moral evil Injustitia Since it is a negation, it does not require a cause. Physical evil, such as pain, blindness, etc., which Saint Ansem calls incomodum, may be a positive thing, and may be caused by God. Historical position Perhaps the most important of all the theological treatises of the Middle Ages before the time of Saint Thomas is Saint Ansem's Cour di Asomo, a work in which is propounded the Catholic doctrine of redemption and atonement. Saint Ansem, as a theologian, does not, however, interest us here. As a philosopher, he is best known by his ontological argument, which is his most important contribution to philosophy. The argument is one of many indications of the similarity of our philosopher's method and spirit to the method and spirit of Saint Augustine. Saint Ansem has been styled the last of the fathers, the Augustine of the eleventh century, and indeed one cannot fail to observe the tendency of his mind to take the Augustinian, which is ultimately the Platonic view of philosophical method, to proceed by way of dissent from the higher to the lower, rather than by way of assent from the lower to the higher, in human thought and human knowledge. Still our Saint is a genuine scholastic, a continuator of the tradition of the schools, a precursor of Albert and Saint Thomas, a genuine representative of the neo-Latin civilization. He is the monk philosopher. His lifelong training in the cloister left its impress on his character as a man, and on the style as well as the contents of his philosophical works. End of chapter 30