 All right, why don't we go ahead and get started if people want to retake their seats All right, the the Japan in me feels the need to get started very promptly You know one foot in each world. Yeah, why don't we go ahead and start again? I know some people are still trickling trickling in But we want to keep on schedule if we can so once again. My name is Ryan Schaefer I'm the president of the Japan America Society of Washington, DC. I am Pleased to be able to introduce our keynote speaker for today Hirayuki Akita who was former bureau chief of the Nikkei office in Washington, DC, which is how a lot of us know him But is now a prominent commentator and journalist in in Tokyo And a reliable commentator on our subject for today, so it's really a privilege to have him here with us He is a is formal title as foreign affairs and international security commentator for for Nikkei and he previously served as editorial writer Senior writer and a Beijing correspondent and perhaps more importantly, he's a hobbyist chef Who prides himself in his buta niku? Or sorry in his buta kimchi he likes to cook Korean cuisine Which I think is important and and maybe relevant in some way, but anyway I will I will see the stage to him and then after he's given his remarks Will do a Q&A session Until about two o'clock, so please join me in welcoming Akita-san So thank you for thank you very much for inviting me to this conference. It's very honored to be here Actually, I visited Washington DC last week too and my editor told me that you are working very hard to interview many people and try to understand what is going on in Washington and get the fresh perspective So he said good job but this time he didn't smile and Because I know the reason because I will travel to Paris next week from here for another conference So my editor told me that he didn't without smile my editor told me just have fun My wife asked me if are you are you really working or traveling to Paris? So it is always challenging to travel to Paris Not as much like to travel to Washington DC But to be serious today, I'd like to talk about Long-term Japan trend of Japanese strategy Where Japan is heading to and again It is also challenging to talk about Japan as much as I traveled to Paris because It's boring. It is Japanese politics is not as exciting as that of American politics Japan could once entertain or amused the world by changing the face of Prime Minister every year and Name of every year and also I wonder people who's gonna be a next Prime Minister But now we have same face as the Prime Minister for 80 years Everybody and not everybody but some people started to get bored at looking at him But the opposition leader's face is also as boring as well. So It is very challenging, but to be honest, I think it is a very important moment to observe and also to carefully watch Japanese strategic direction because I think that Japan is standing at very crucial Crossroad in terms of its direction of its foreign policy and security policy or maybe strategy Oh today, I know that it is a very Outdated style to use PowerPoint in this town But the police allow me to use just the six slides and to show show them up So before I came here since I'm journalist. I asked several senior officials in our administration very simple question That is what is the biggest concern in Terms of foreign policy and security policy Then they say number one Iran and Middle East and second China and third North Korea So I thought it is it was a very very boring answer Nothing interesting, but as I talked in depth with them. I Found it is very interesting because they do not necessarily worried about They are not necessarily worried about the behavior of Iran or Middle Eastern situation or behavior China and North Korea alone But they're concerned deeply related to the U.S. Japan alliance a future or sustainability of strong U.S. Japan alliance so Iran let's look at the Interactive map of the ship we can see You know dot red dot and green dot shows the Ship and tankers we can see many ships is Coming or coming from Middle East And go coming from Middle East and go to Japan and many ships are coming from Japan to Middle East Japan relies on as you know, Japan relies on About 90 percent oil import from Middle East So as long as U.S. Will be able to maintain Very very strong military presence in Pacific as it does now Japan doesn't have to worry about The security and safety of long seal she lain that connect Japan and Middle East, but now In the midst of a Iranian crisis or Middle East crisis. Mr. Trump said that why? That you have us have to Defend tonkers of Japan or Korea or China They are the one who are relying on Middle East and the U.S. Is reducing its reliance on Middle East as a source as a source of energy that is very true, so Japanese government official worries more in this context about the situation in Middle East and Shilin situation China maybe this picture is miss this map is as Familiar with some of you it is a this map is upside down And it shows the maneuver of Chinese military Chinese Navy and Air Force you don't have to It look in you know understand detail of this, but you please just feel how Chinese militaries military is active and Doing exercises and surveillance and monitoring operation and this itself is a source of concern but Japan I think Japanese government worries more in the context of the prospect Uncertainty process prospect of your Japan security treaty in other words changing balance of power in this region This is a picture from think tank CSBA Which illustrates the maybe future near future over Pacific Maritime domain due to the this shows Due to the rapid expansion of military capability by China Maybe Pacific will be divided to three domain red domain hostile zone where you rest will not be able to operate as freely as it does now because of the China's you know access denial capability such as submarine and missiles and blue Blue area Where us can operate freely and then green is a middle if this will be the reality in the future even if us and Japan are Determined to maintain strong US Japan alliance Japan cannot count on your security umbrella anymore because us cannot operate in the time of contingency and Each if China continues to expand its military budget, maybe this could be the reality so in this context Japan worries about China, but about North Korea as we can see here Japan is within the range of several hundreds mean mid-range ballistic missile of North Korea, but as long as this is conventional missile, maybe we don't have to worry so much But that there is there was very I think there was very important turning point last year You are on summer that is Japanese defense White paper for the first time acknowledged that North Korea We issued the assessment that North Korea may have Miniaturized Existing nuclear warhead small enough light enough to deliver them by Existing ballistic missile So when I interviewed several defense officials They say we have to assume now that Japan is within the range of not only conventional, but nuclear ballistic missile of North Korea for the first time in the history and So this itself is a you know rescuing but as long as us Determines capability to deter North Korea or prevent North Korea from Launching some military provocation Japan worry doesn't have to worry so seriously, but again Mr. Trump says last year short range and mid-range Missile test are not problem North Korea is keeping a promise Not to launch ICBM which can hit US or nuclear test In the private meeting Japanese government or Prime Minister Abe quietly Tell his counterpart or Mr. Trump that it is a problem because Japan is already Japan might be already within the range of nuclear ballistic missile and if they you know Improve their accuracy of missile This means that North Korea can more easily use that missile because they can hit Japanese target more precisely without Unnecessary casualty, so after all Yeah but this is a Only slide I need to show The first part for half of my presentation so Middle East Iran Middle East and China North Korea biggest concern Japan have now is deeply related to the Sustainability question of strong use Japan security alliance This morning, of course assistance. I hope I'm very glad that mr. Still still well is not here. I'm not challenging him. He said that you know, just Japan security treaty is strong as ever and Japan it is true that US Japan government jointly issued a joint statement to state Alliances strong as ever. I do not challenge and I don't count count to argue that it is not it is wrong Maybe it is not incorrect, but I'm not so sure that it is a true you know so When we look at Operational level Self-defend defense forces and US militaries interoperability is very very deep and deepening and also US Japan security cooperation has been making a lot of progress and moreover when we look at the highest level Mr. Trump and Mr. Abbey's relation is as Mr. Stiller said Very very good based on a genuine friendship Mr. Abbey is The only leader who can play who could play golf golf and enjoy four times and Keep the score of the game as a state secret. I think that the abbey I Suspect it is classified. So I don't know but I suspect that Mr. Abbey Lost game by slim margin in order not to offend the Mr. Trump So it's very good relation and Mr. Abbey and Mr. Trump met Bilaterally more than about 14 times and talked on the phone more than three Talked more than 30 times maybe about 33 times. This is this frequency of the current highest contact is maybe, you know highest Most close communication between two leaders But if we stick back and look at the I'm not talking only about I will not talk about only about Mr. Trump individual But I'll go to the more broader Observation, but if we step back President Trump's view about the alliance is Is scaring if not frightening or horrifying He's he openly criticized us Japan security treaty as unfair and he thinks that it'll have to change He once implied that he wants to withdraw from South Korea if possible and He won't he doesn't like a joint exercise between you know ROK and us because it is expensive. So obviously for him Alliance is not important asset rather. It is a burden or cost I'm not criticizing, you know from American point of view. Maybe it contains the element of truth but Japan believe that alliance is kind of mutual beneficial. So Prime Minister Abbey again at Private meeting try to persuade Mr. Trump several times For example, Mr. Abbey explained Mr. Trump that Japan bears the Maybe about how it how we count is different, but maybe about 80 percent Over cost for US military military to stay in Japan and Mr. Trump said As I heard I've heard Mr. Trump responded. I don't know. I've never had that number Is it true? He asked the advisor who at the meeting and the advisor responded. Yes, sir. And Mr. Trump said Maybe and Then he raised the same question again and again. So it is very difficult to persuade and He often mentioned Reportedly he often mentioned Samurai spirit of Japan He says Japan once had the samurai spirit What is it? What this? What he meant is why doesn't Japan Maybe it Spend more money for defense Or maybe maybe I don't know but maybe he doesn't like the Japanese constitution Which prohibit Japan to engage maybe offensive operation unless Japan is under attack so I Talked about Mr. Trump's view, but let's step back further and See if he Concept or approach is his individual one or His approach to allies not only to Japan but ROK and Europe is a long-term reflection of Changing long-term US security approach or commitment to Europe or Asia Or Middle East where where's I? Think there is a growing of Recognition a man in Tokyo that it could be latter Rather than his individual approach, but it could be a long-term reflection of long-term trend maybe to Simple evidence evidence is for example. It was not the Mr. Trump, but it was Mr. President Obama who declared that US will not play the role of world policeman anymore he made that remarks and It was not Mr. Trump But was is but it was Mr. President Obama who started to demanding NATO countries to spend 2% of Increase the defense budget to the 2% of GDP It was 2014 so There is a trend To ask allies more burden sharing in order to sustain alliances which is understandable and Mr. Trump it is fair to say that Mr. Trump is accelerator But he is not causing this trend and What if Democrats win the presidential election Maybe this trend will get reversed. I don't think so because many there are many Democrat supporters who support People candidate like mr. Sanders or mr. Elizabeth Warren and I don't think that I don't think that any Democratic Democratic president Can say that okay. We will play the role of policeman again Well, we will spend more money to you deepen the military commitment in Middle East or abroad might be even in Asia so Tentative conclusion is that US allies including Japan have to is better had better to assume that this trend Maybe get accelerate one out slow down, but this is a long-term trend and again. I'm not criticizing I'm not blaming us. You know US has been fighting the war in Middle East and Also in Afghanistan for 20 years about 20 years as I understand 20 years war is one of the longest war us engaged in the modern history Maybe intervention to Haiti in the 19th century could be a you know longest, but they know Intervening to haitch intervention to haitch and you know we're fighting the war in Middle East and Afghanistan are totally different dimension so then last point is If it Premise is that US Needs time will need time to rehabilitate from this series of war and rehabilitate to regain the energy If it will energy to deepen its military commitment Sustained strong leadership in the world US needs if it requires several years or decays What is option for Japan? What maybe allies in general? Here is my conclusion Plan a and a dash is a status quo planning is Sustaining strong, you know alliance with the US which is a very least risky and status quo But as I said, it is may may not be a possible. So Plan a dash is For Japan again, Mr. As Mr. Steelers said with Japan will enhance his security cooperation with Australia, India and some other countries to supplement or complement or support Haban spokes System of US Japan or US, Australia US ROK alliances This is the Indo-Pacific strategy actually This is the Indo-Pacific initiative that Japan may be invented and now US, Japan, Australia probably India Try to pursue together But plan a dash is based on the premise that US will maintain strong commitment to the region so logically if we This premise is not given in the future. We have to move to Plan B three plan B's and Again, I don't want you to misunderstand. I'm strong supporter of plan a. I don't believe that No other option No other better option than plan a US-Japan security alliance Indeed, but I'm just wants to intellectually. I want to provoke myself and everybody By saying that we maybe hot could be a plan B. I think three plan B's Every plan B's are very very painful first plan B Regional security framework without us So in this context Japan may will be forced to change Constitution Article 9 and then sign that defense mutual defense treaty With India or Australia some other country and try to defend try to help each other Maybe this may work in a peacetime competition But does it work in the wartime? if Japan Was attacked would be attacked We can we count on Australia and Indian troops to come to Japan to help May even if they were to be willing to do that distance means a lot So plan a plan B1 is maybe is not so you know feasible then plan B to Independent Homeland Security Approach Japan do not spend a Japan spend only on Homeland Security Anti-Mid anti-sip ballistic missile missile defense maybe submarine or cyber Budget investment to improve the resiliency against cyber attack and forget about the you know Budget to complement US military operation because plan B doesn't have a you know based on primers that the US US will not US Japan alliance will disappear Maybe Japan can achieve that but now China's military budget is four times bigger Already done that with Japan I don't think it is a better than nothing but not sustainable Japan's is increasing defense budget Incrementally, but continuously for past eight years and next next fiscal year's budget will be about 5.3 trillion trillion Japanese yen. It is about the 48 billion US dollars. It is the biggest But still plan B2. I cannot count on that. So in that case plan B3 that is Equal partnership with China To secure Japan In China is bigger in terms of the GDP. They are bigger than in bigger about three times more So I hope equal partnership But when we look at the balance of power, maybe Japan have to make a concession on Senkaku Island and so on unsigned kind of like you know partnership or security arrangement to secure Japan That is very very painful and Maybe I'm not so sure about the public Japanese public will be happy to accommodate that so I Wrote this kind of piece actually my work is to write op-ed and I wrote base that it is time to Rethink which means start intellectual kind of thinking About how to reduce the reliance Deep reliance on us military I'm not saying that we should abandon Alliance of course not but reduce the online reliance so that it's going to be more sustainable Then so basically I criticize Japanese government Being Japanese government is getting beating a polarized just saying that the US Japan security tree and so on is not good enough but unfortunately It was I think it was the last March March last year. I needed to have a lunch with a senior official of other Abbey government on the day when I published that piece So I printed it and I gave it to him and he said I read it And I scared a little bit, but he said thank you for writing it. Thank you And I'm get puzzled why and he said Some people Some individual in Tokyo when the government You have a kind of the same kind of instinct that maybe it is important to think about broader spectrum including Maybe possible plan B of a dash In order to seriously come up with the prescript prescriptions to sustain plan A Plan A is possible Plan is sustainable only when we seriously think about how it is painful when we lose it plan B is how Plan B is difficult, but it is so Dedicated and sensitive. It is taboo to trigger that discussion inside government If somebody say let's discuss about it. Maybe he'll be in the wrist. He'll be at the risk She so that is I thought that that is a you know mindset In Tokyo and I think that my as a journalist. I'm better I'm not good at the moderator, but maybe I'm at the provocator In a good way. So That's all thank you very much. Well, thank you very much. That was just what we What we were hoping for and why we So enthusiastic to invite you back even just a week a week later And I know that you were just in in the US last fall as well and and surprising Capability to to put together a very coherent and persuasive argument despite being thoroughly jet lag, I'm sure But if I could start actually let me pause before I get into question and answer and just reiterate our thanks to Jim and the Carnegie Endowment for for hosting this event and really putting so much of the intellectual heften and institutional competence behind it So really really appreciate you hosting us once again So let me fire off a few questions while audience members are formulating their own and then turn to the audience But since plan B1 and B3 are still up there I was hoping I could dig a little bit more into those two And maybe you start with probably the more provocative one I note that in in sort of gaming out a plan B1 and describing the The relationships that that Japan might have to strengthen with with regional allies to secure its own right defense you You you mentioned India and Australia which are which are quite far away But there is one neighbor that's much closer that you didn't mention and that's the Republic of Korea So I'd be interested to know a little bit more about your thoughts there and and and perhaps a related Korea question is Korea I think from the Korean perspective took a painful politically painful step in Walking back from their threat presumed threat to withdraw from the Jisomia agreement But in the recent trilateral summit or bilateral summit in China I think that there was some expectation that the Prime Minister might have taken Step towards reciprocating and he really did he took a very firm stand And and restated the Japanese position that that no no no you cannot celebrate giving back what you shouldn't have taken in the first place So I just wonder about you know domestic politics in Japan. I'm sure are playing playing a role Is there more than meets the eye is the public or private? action to To respond to the the Korean step and then what about Korea in a plan B1 I knew that you'll ask about South Korea and Japan relation and and First of all, I think it is very important to reconcile with South Korea by overcome history issue. That is basic Having said that I wonder if country any country can they cooperate closely Because they are friendly or Even though they are not friendly They cooperate because when they share the common strategic interest during World War two Roosevelt cooperate with Stalin totally unfriendly totally unshared value but Share the common strategy go to fight against Germany and Japan So, you know, I'm not so sure that this analogy can be applied to you know current Situation, but I when we look at the strategic calculation of Japan and ROK I Should say that there is a challenge to Diverse but there is a risk of the dive diversion of its strategy school Stradis the priority because of the two factors one is the rise of China and also nuclearization of North Korea Japan is separated by sea from China, but the South Korea is connected by land and Also, South Korea's Reliance on Chinese market is I think how much About China export Maybe more than I cannot remember exact figure But the reliance on South Korea on the Chinese market is bigger than that of on US Japan together more reliance on China and North Korea now have nuclear missiles We should assume at least they have nuclear bombs so for South Korea To avoid a war Whatever it takes is important higher highest priority because war means not a conventional but a nuclear war But for Japan highest priority is get rid of eliminate those nuclear missiles to secure Japan so Of course, Japan preferred to tough approach to North Korea while South Korea wants to ease tension and if possible Maintain dialogue and then try to in a stabilizing situation and in this context try to do a kind of like effort to do nucleus so I think that the diversion of a strategic interest strategy is a kind of priority between Japan and South Korea Is challenge for both countries to improve relation or maintain good relation? Of course history history issue is one of other big element Well, that's interesting especially from the This event is all about the DC perspective on the look forward and I think the DC perspective tends to be that the rationale For a stronger relationship there is the shared values, right? So that's a great great alternative perspective, but it also brings us to plan plan 3 Which I think presumes past a little bit of that rationale I don't want to bring up the subject of another important regional country that that you didn't mention But I'd love to hear your thoughts and that is Taiwan I mean presumably Plan B3 presumes Some unfavorable circumstances for Taiwan, but of course Japan has a tight relationship with Taiwan and certainly The implications of the US-Japan alliance Really bring Japan squarely into the that strategic calculation as well So if you could address Taiwan a little bit and your perception of Japanese interests in Taiwan You are very good at the dropping bomb Okay, I think that the for plan a to balance against balance against China and maintain favorable balance of power for in this context in Japan Taiwan is Very important for Japan to Huggins maintain the balance of power because Japan is willing to also maintain the balance of power in the plan plan a option together with the US But the plan B3 means virtually means accommodation of China's influence so feel the influence in some degree in this context mean Taiwan Existence of Taiwan means totally different In plan a Japan may may want to support Taiwan quietly in Quietly enough not to provoke China, but quietly for them to be able to balance against China but in plan B3 It's based on premise that Japan will be forced to In some degrees forced to accommodate China's influence. So some in this context supporting Taiwan Does it isn't helpful it will definitely provoke China and make Plan B3 very difficult It was you know China will get very angry resented in plan B3 will be impossible So my point is that the meaning of Taiwan Significance of time in Taiwan implication to Japan is totally opposite depending on Which strategy Japan will pursue plan a plan a dash or plan B3 accommodation All right. Well, this is perfect. Let me let me drop one more bomb Because it brings us back to China and Japan is preparing for a state visit for President Xi in March or April soon So how does that? Not necessarily how does that fit into your plans a B and the dashes and versions But reflecting a little bit more and you know looking more immediately where this The conversation is about Japan in the year not Japan in the decade or century But Japan presumably has been Concerned about events in Hong Kong Concerned about Chinese meddling in the Taiwanese election And yet we have a state visit coming up. So how do we understand the upcoming? Yeah, state visit Okay, I personally do not necessarily support the idea to invite him as a state guest It is good to invite him, but In you know in the midst of Hong Kong situation, you know Hong Kong in stable situation also Xinjiang problem I do not think that the Japan should necessarily Invite him as a state guest But also I think that is good to invite him to Japan because it is first Visit to Japan by Chinese president in 12 years 12 years U.S. President Chinese president of mutual visit more frequently, but the 12 years and That is the first point and second point. How does it fit to this? You know Japanese strategic options? You know Japan now try to pursue plan a dash Very strong multi-lateral security framework based on U.S. military press based on strong U.S. military commitment to the region But Japan also want to hedge So that Japan's hedge to other options, of course as well as every nation want to do so want to hedge some energy on plan B And because we don't know In maybe this year five years, okay, but in 20 years or 30 years Maybe we need to seriously think about plan B plan B And in that context Japanese effort to involve invite she present she this year is to diffuse Tension unnecessary tension between China and Japan in other words Japan-China relation maybe say let's say it is minus temperature and then I don't think Japan China neither expect that it will go up to a record, you know Big plus but try to bring it to the zero level so that we can avoid unintended conflict So Japan hopeful Japan hope to sign. I think sign some agreement to set up defense hotline We have a contingent in Japan and China have another contingency contingency emergency Contact mechanism at the lower level, but maybe hotline between defense minister and Japanese defense minister and also wants to discuss to make Progress on the 2008 agreement on the East China Sea Energy exploration that is also another potential source of conflict, but China doesn't wants to so far has been cautious to make this agreement to be To upgrade be a treaty or agreement official agreement, so Japan want to do it. So all effort is to achieve Not a partnership, but it's the tent It's a the tent Diffusing tension So that is that that is not necessary on trajectory to a plan a dash. I think All right Well, I will have one final question that you want for you now before I turn it over and that is Again, we're about making predictions for the year ahead. So by the end. I'm going to ask you to predict Three sports in which Japan will take the gold medal in the Olympics So you can think about that for a moment, but then why don't we turn to the audience? Gentlemen in the brown sweater. I think hand went up person and as a reminder, please state names and affiliations beginning the question Hi, my name is Jim Patrick. I'm a freelance interpreter and a Japan American society member. I work for myself. So no affiliation I wanted to ask about the dispatch of Japanese Marine maritime self-defense forces To the Persian Gulf to the Middle East That's not part of the US coalition of the willing officially. I think Korea South Korea has done something similar I was wondering if you could talk about that dispatch Overseas of Japanese troops in this context of hedging against the US Alliance. Thank you. Thank you very much Can you show the slide again? Oh, it's okay. Oh, it's okay. As we saw there are many many tangles and ships In this This is a situation and then Japan wants to and Mr. Trump says Why does US have to defend in Japan Japanese or Chinese or Korean tankers? They are relying on so Japan took that statement very seriously Then decided to send dispatch self-defense Worship, but at the same time Japan don't want to provoke Iran because it is counterproductive So Japan needed to work very stream and fine line Show that resolve that Japan will make utmost effort to defend Japan ships By itself, but I in case maybe Japan will need help but not listen But also Japan explained to Iranian side Not only to Washington that it is Japanese intention So Iran openly said that Iran doesn't oppose So this dispatch is a very delicate decision So far, I think it is you know, it works well. Yeah, so that is my understanding Thank you. Art of one mobile sherry from a university Richmond Going back to the security scenarios that you mentioned and you talked about a little bit about the The trade figures between Korea and Japan, but if you actually look at So China is the biggest export market for Japan Japan is the third biggest export market for China Korea China is the biggest export market for Korea Korea's Japan's the fifth biggest export for Korea and Korea's the third biggest export market for Japan If you go out 10 years from today, the three countries combined GDP will be bigger than the European Union and bigger than NAFTA And so if you if economics and I hate to look at it purely as an economist is the most natural relationship between two parties Why would a regional security framework without the US between let's say these three or even a partnership with China not be the most natural Security relationship Between these three countries if the economics tells you it is the most natural relationship between these three countries, okay? I think there is two way to look at that Japan Lost the war and Japan somehow could Reconstruct its economy and prosper Prosperous There's to look way one thought is that it was possible because Japan was Provided very very peaceful and And stable environment and the security umbrella of us, you know Look at the sea lane from Middle East to Tokyo and also Japan didn't have to spend so much money so much energy on Japanese self-defense as much as other country does do Second thought is that Pure economic kind of Way to analyze Japan could Japan made effort and Japan the industry policy and so on Japanese economy portion is top industry policy trained policy worked very well and Help Japan to develop, but I think that without you as a strong US security umbrella I don't think Japan could prosper as much as we do now. So If China so I agree economic relation with China's is very important, but is it sustainable? In long run without Security umbrella in In which Japan could trade and do commerce with China freely without any anxiety About political anxiety or security anxiety. I'm not so sure So Japan doesn't I think that Japan cannot Sacrifice Japan cannot hug in Even if Japan wants to maintain cross-economic cooperation trade with China, but Security relationship with us is very important So dilemma now is that as long as you as China relation is stable Japan doesn't have to choose Side neither side. Well, Japan is taking a side of us, but in a political in a political level but now US and China seemingly getting into a long-term strategic competition so Japan will fit is facing more serious choice on the far way But Japan made a decision to exclude five from 5g, but next one is maybe entity list entity list US is In putting a sanction on many Chinese company. So to how much excellent Japan will follow us that goes to the question of years But I think that after all Japan will as long as plan a or plan a dash is Sustainable Japanese choice is to make utmost effort to follow us. Sorry. I'm not so sure Clearly I answered your question, but that is my thought All the way in the back. Mr. Mayer Thank You Kevin mayer with the enemy consulting form of the State Department In terms of plan a and plan b to the hedgehog seems at the operational level a lot of the requirements and capabilities Japan needs to get like play as you mentioned Surface to ship capability or long-range counter strike either way you go. It's the same capabilities But I agree plan a is probably where we're going but assuming we are sticking to the alliance plan a There's some issues coming up in procurement that could send signals one way or the other on Japanese thinking most analysts agree In terms of numbers We need to be beyond interoperability to be networked and really integrated with our capabilities to counter the numbers the Chinese have But in things like developing Enhancing integrated air missile defense or more importantly a decision coming up in the next It would probably be by the end of this year or next year your future fighter With now that you can do Two questions now that you can do collect self-defense you think Japan will get integrated with US forces to the point of commonality of systems and as I said more than in our ability But real integration and data links and integrated fire control really is what we're talking about Is that politically possible or and do you think that's the way Japan will go or will Japan try to develop a Independent fighter capability somewhat independent not totally obvious Thank you. So question is a more indigenous defense capability or Interoperate First of all Kevin Sun mentioned What the Japan should do for to enhance plan a option and Those of plan B2 hedgehog option There's a lot of overlapping domain in my Japan have to be strong Enough to defend Japan, but as you said There's a two way one is to enhance invest more to enhance interoperate ability in other words invest more to Japanese capability to work together with us more efficiently and so on or The other way is Invest more for Japan's not independent necessarily, but autonomous defense capability. So there's two different and Logically thinking if we know that US Japan security security alliance will last forever or for long-term time We should invest 100% on this Interoperate ability because it is efficient. The tendency is not so efficient But if we are not so sure about 10 years or 20 years We sure are not about the US US. Japan is willing to you know maintain I think but the US Approach then we should allocate some of the budget to this hedgehog option So question is what is the big mix big but what is the best balance between this investment and this investment? and at present Go back to a father's development at present. I think Japan tried to do your hedge 50% on this or maybe 60% or 40% and then also here Because we don't know So kind of like a dual hedge approach But at the same time Maybe I think it is good idea to invest more to this domain because if Japan can defend Itself by its own especially like Southwest island chain by its own it will flee up US burden So that US can use that capability To other region so this could also enhance Plan a sustainability So in that sense investing a bit more on this domain It's not bad idea. I think also for fun a option. Thank you Yes, I think this will be the last last one Have a microphone coming behind you I'm Hubbard a retired diplomat and and currently at McClarty Associates in Washington just Kind of working through your your frameworks and and I'm one of those who in trying to find ways to Help the Japanese and Koreans get along with each other better and cooperate more effectively it seems to me that You sort of left Korea out of Plan a dash you talked about Indo-Pacific Really talked about Australia and India. You didn't really talk much about ASEAN, but if you're trying to Sort of supplement and enhance the bilateral reliance on the United States It seems that Korea where one of the things you share with South Korea is an alliance with the United States and One of the things Korea has is a very strong economy and very large military It seems to me that you know the questions about the United States In some ways off to be trying to move Japan closer to Korea Rather than apart That's a comment. I guess a question. What do you think of that thought? Thank you very much for pointing out that I Might have missed South Korea in this context Actually, I didn't have that intention, you know I but I paid more attention to a maritime Competive strategy competition in a maritime domain. So maybe that's why I didn't mention so much about ROK Sorry, sorry about that. But I of course, I think that It is very important that for Japan also to that Korean Peninsula will be the Sophia of Democratic influence democracy in the Sophia of the influence of democracy if North Korea is South Korean Peninsula alone will get dominated by Autocrats Unified by Possibly North Korea is a nightmare. So Not only on the maritime context, but also for geopolitical context It is very important for Japan are located to cooperate with each other and I think that our administration In this respect understand this strategy importance and made Effort together with the US to maintain G. Somia G. Somia and I'm very I'm very leave to you know hear the news that Korea made a Same decision made the same strategy calculation. So I totally agree with you and thank you for pointing out Thank you All right, that just about just about wraps up the panel, but now for my most important question Your prediction of three sports in which Japan will take gold in the summer Olympics. Oh You mean I have to raise. Yeah. Yeah, maybe Is Not by any order, you know order Maybe, you know, swimming and judo and what else? Badminton, yeah All right, I should Pick up more, but we'll review those predictions next year. Yeah, please please. Oh, I think Sumo is going to be included I'm also karate karate My son is doing karate, so I have to pick up Please join me in thanking Akita And I think we'll transition immediately now to the to the final panel of 215 the next the final panel of the day will begin so you have a few minutes to stretch your legs and maybe great Thank you. I'll get that's on and Ryan 215 we will reconvene And we've got a China North Korea I'm international trade we've got a lot of issues to talk Perfectly to the to the afternoon as well. Thank you very much. Yeah. Yeah, that was great That's right I So Yeah, I'll wait for what's going to be your meeting. Okay everyone, I think everyone can take their seats again. We'll get started with our final panel of the day. Feel free if you're in the back to move up. Some seats have opened up. So come up closer, make it nice and cozy. We've got a full plate of issues and a great group of people to discuss. I'm going to turn it over to Jim Zumwald here in a second. And you can go to, we'll take the 90 minutes so then we'll end at 345 because you have a lot of people to weigh in here. So thank you. We had a wonderful session so far and I wanted to again thank Carnegie Institute for hosting, co-hosting with the Japan American Society this event. This has been a nice tradition, I guess the seventh year we've done this and I hope you all found it useful as well. We've assembled a really interesting panel today. We're going to be focusing on pivoting a little bit from Japanese domestic policy to Japanese foreign policy and so we've assembled an array of experts on Asia. Patricia Kim, who's senior policy analyst with the China program at USIP and I'm going to be asking her to kick things off on Japan-China relations because we have some exciting or interesting developments coming up there. Then I'll ask Scott Snyder to talk about Japan's relationship with both Koreas which I think will be quite interesting. We've had a lot of discussion this morning about Japan-South Korea relations but very interested in your thoughts on both of those two issues. And then I'll ask Kristin Vikasi who's assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and School of Policy and International Affairs at University of Maine. Thank you for coming down for this event today. An important part of Japanese foreign policy is its international economic policy and so if you could maybe focus a little bit in your comments on how Japan is looking at Asia-Pacific but also relations with the US from the perspective of advancing its economic interests and what are some of the things we might be looking out for. And then finally our cleanup hitter will be the Sashi Morano, the Japan Chair at the Hudson Institute and I'm hoping you can focus a little bit on the bilateral US-Japan relationship particularly from the security side. Thank you very much. So maybe I'll ask Patty to start. Thank you. Thank you Jim and I just want to thank the Carnegie Endowment as well as the Japan American Society for inviting me here today. It's really a pleasure to be here on this panel with all of these excellent scholars. So on your question on Japan-China relations, where is it going? So let me start by noting that Japan-China relations has been on the rise and it's looking much more positive than it did. If you compare it to the state of relations in the 2010s, when there was a downturn that really started with a collision of a Japanese coast guard ship and a Chinese trawler in September 2010 near the disputed territories that Japan called Senkaku and China calls the Daoyu Islands and there was another spike in tensions or tensions really grew from there when China declared an ADIZ or Air Defense Identification Zone in 2013 in response to what it saw as Japan's nationalization of these islands. So really since then, the relationship was not at a good place and then things began to thaw around 2017 with Prime Minister Abe visiting China for the first time in 2018 marking the first visit by a top Japanese leader since 2011 and since then there have been a number of exchanges between the two sides and most recently you saw the Prime Minister in Chengdu along with his South Korean and Chinese counterparts for a trilateral. Now since the warming of relations, Japanese and Chinese leaders have been talking about a new era in bilateral relations and there are reports in the media that the two sides are considering signing some sort of fifth political document in timing with Xi Jinping's first state visit to Japan probably in April of this year and this document, there's a lot of speculation what could be in it but essentially what we've seen in the media is that the document will outline how these two states can cooperate on regional and global efforts for peace and stability. So I want to just go into what precipitated this uptick in relations and how deep or sustainable is this thaw. First, I think there's no doubt that the rise of the Trump Administration and the America First policy towards both China and Japan sort of sparked both sides to look around in their neighborhood. For China, the U.S.-China trade war and what looks like a long-term hard-line shift in U.S. policy towards China precipitated a lot of anxiety in Beijing and drove home the point that China needs to stabilize its other relationships given the fact that it will probably be in this long-term competitive relationship with the United States. In Japan, I think President Trump's rhetoric, disparaging alliances, his call for allies to pay more and his desire to correct what he saw as imbalances in trade relationships with both allies and non-allies alike really spooked people and also President Trump's withdrawal from the TPP was a big blow to Prime Minister Abe who had really sold this as a means to strengthen the Japanese economy and keep the United States economically engaged in East Asia. So I think all of these recent developments underscored the urgency for Tokyo and Beijing to shore up their relationships. But I want to note that beyond just the Trump factor that's played out in the last three to four years, there's also a long-standing recognition in Tokyo and Beijing that given their geographical proximity, their economic interdependence, it's really unrealistic not to engage one another. So if you look back in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, this has always been the case. So even in the first half of the Cold War, the two sides were looking for ways to economically cooperate and Japan really wanted to normalize relations with China because it felt like that was the realistic thing to do but it really couldn't until Nixon went to China and as soon as that happened, the two states normalized relations in 72. And again, in 1989, following the Tiananmen Square repression, when China was isolated in the world, Japan was one of the first countries to sort of re-engage with China and to make the case that it's better to engage with them than to keep them isolated. So there's this important recognition, there's this important sort of pragmatism that underpins the relationship that is driving this thaw, I think, that is beyond just the Trump administration. Now, thinking about what's ahead in this summit, it's not really clear what will be in this new fifth joint document. But again, I think from what we've seen in the media, talking about this document guiding cooperation between the two countries on regional and global issues, it again reflects this recognition in Japan that China is here to stay. It will remain for the long-term engaged in the global arena and so rather to ignore that or to shun it, it's better to get with them and try to shape what they're doing in a more productive direction. Now, having said that, I think there are sharp limits to where this rapprochement can go. And there are several factors that remain barriers. First and foremost, I think it's the U.S.-Japan alliance. It's a key pillar of Japan's national security strategy. And while Japan doesn't want to have to choose between the United States or China, if there's a war, it's pretty clear that Japan would side with the United States and I think China recognizes this. I think it recognizes that Washington and Tokyo are very much aligned on the threat that is posed by China's military expansion and they also are aligned on the need to balance against this rising threat. And so Beijing understands this very well and I don't think it sees Tokyo as one of the soft targets that it can woo away from the U.S.-led alliance network like it sees some other countries in the neighborhood. And I think China has and will continue to vigorously oppose any efforts by Japan to take on a greater security role in the alliance or to strengthen its own military. And of course, as everyone here well knows, the two countries also have a very serious outstanding territorial dispute in the East China Sea that probably will not be resolved anytime soon. And so even though relations have been warmed, this is one issue area where both sides have expressed that they're not going to compromise and you see that the Chinese have actually stepped up their efforts to assert their sovereignty over these islands. From what I understand, last year was one of the highest rates of Chinese incursions into what Japan considers its EEZ. Another barrier to deepened or very deep alignment between the two countries is just this deep suspicion of China's intentions within Japan and among Japanese citizens. So if you look at polling data, Japan as well as South Korea often are on the most negative end of the spectrum on how they view China. And I think a lot of this comes from historical reasons as well as this fundamental disconnect in values and norms that pose a serious limit to real policy coordination. So to wrap up, I think Japan and China's relationship this year and in the foreseeable future will essentially remain lukewarm. It's not going to get too hot, it's not going to get too cold. There will be political engagement based on pragmatism, but again there are limits to deep cooperation or alignment. Now I think some ways the relationship might be thrown off track is if there's some sort of accidental escalation in the East China Sea, but there's strong will I think in both capitals right now to keep this rapprochement going and so I think that will serve as a restraint against some sort of flare up. And there's also discussions about pursuing assist mechanisms and so on, which is a positive thing. And finally, I think China, and this serves as probably the biggest restraint, China is not seeking a war anytime soon. It doesn't want to engage in a military clash with Japan or the United States. It's dealing with so many issues at home from Hong Kong to Xinjiang to this newest viral outbreak. It wants to keep up its economic development, it wants to keep up its growth rates. It needs to show progress on BRI and all these ambitious initiatives that it's put out there. And so I think this will serve as a stabilizing factor in the Japan-China relationship for the foreseeable future. Thank you. Okay, now we'll turn to Scott to talk about the two Koreas. Okay, well thanks Jim. Thanks to both Jims and to the Carnegie Endowment and Japan America Society of Washington DC for hosting this. So by my count, so far there's been one question that has been asked three times today. What about South Korea? And so I want to try to answer that, but I'm actually going to do it by deviating from my instructions a little bit because I want to broaden out. One area that I'm interested in right now is how do Japan and South Korea fit in the context of the free and open Indo-Pacific? And so I want to make a couple of observations about that and then get into North Korea and then say something about Japan-South Korea relations. Because Assistant Secretary Stillwell referenced free and open Indo-Pacific, of course, and referenced the Japanese framing of that. And really if you go back and look at Prime Minister Abe's speech in 2016 and his description of free and open Indo-Pacific, it's hard to say that in my view that the U.S. has necessarily added much to the specifics that Prime Minister Abe put forward and emphasis on standard setting, economic prosperity, infrastructure, people-to-people connectivity, and peace and stability. But then as we think about how the U.S. policy is evolving, there are these other two documents now that I think provide some perceptions of work in progress. And one of them is the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific that was issued in November of 2018 and the other is a joint fact sheet between the U.S. and South Korea just issued last November that also talks about the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. And so what's really interesting to me as we look at those documents is how much they're parallel, how much they even converge. And so if you look at the U.S.-Japan priorities in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Joint Statement through energy, infrastructure, and digital connectivity cooperation, it talks about energy sector development. It talks about financing of infrastructure. It names specific projects. And it talks a lot about standard setting. And then the joint fact sheet from just last November, which... So the interesting question that I'm sure that our colleagues in Japan and South Korea will look closely at is, well, what's the difference between a joint statement and a joint fact sheet? And how do we measure the relative comparison? Well, I don't know the answer to that, but what I can say is that in the U.S.-South Korea joint fact sheet issued on the sidelines of East Asia Summit, the emphasis was on prosperity. And that was describing cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and development, finance, and digital economy. It sounds a lot like what came out the previous year in the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement. People talk about investment in human capital, and I've heard a lot about that from Assistant Secretary Stillwell in peace. And there are discussions about water management, maritime security, HADR, strengthening of law enforcement. So in a way, I think the main difference is that the issue of standard setting in the U.S.-Japan Statement was kind of upfront. The standard setting in the U.S.-Korea document was kind of embedded in some of the practical cooperation. But my point in going through all of this is isn't it remarkable how in the context of the U.S. framework, maybe that's a dashed scenario, the hero put forward, how much it looks like Japan's and South Korean respective interests are parallel if not convergent. However, we know, I think, that in the context of free and open Indo-Pacific, the subtext or the missing piece is about respective views of China, where Japan and South Korea seem to have very different approaches from each other. And I think that those approaches are related to primarily geography, preferred modes of engagement, balancing versus accommodation on the South Korean side, and relative dependency on China to achieve core strategic objectives. And of course, that's North Korea. And so in some ways, I'm tempted to think, okay, well what we're really dealing with in the context of the free and open Indo-Pacific is something more akin to American, Japanese, and South Korean individuals sitting in a room but who have different preferences about what is the temperature in the room. Some have a colder, a desire for a colder room and some have a desire for a warmer room. And so I'm just kind of suggesting that those are parallel, but there are differences. North Korea, historically, trilateral cooperation has been critical. As we have thought about engaging North Korea, it goes back to 1998, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group that Secretary Perry set up. But as, again, with our lunch presentation, interestingly, on the one hand, as North Korea's capacity to project threat has grown, ironically it seems like it's generating opportunities for North Korea to play off different parties against each other. And this really gets to perceptions of extended deterrence and the credibility of extended deterrence. It's also related to how the U.S. deals with those issues. And so I just focus on that question and basically the risk that North Korea can play a nuclear blackmail game in ways that can divide the U.S. Japan and South Korea. And then coming back to Japan and South Korea, which of course is really the nub of the issue, and we've heard basically today how Japan looks past South Korea, but South Korea does not raise its hand when it comes to looking for opportunities for cooperation. The core issues there, I think, really revolve around three issues. The deepest is an identity issue related to how each side sees the other. And a desire by South Koreans to look to the past versus the future. There's also, I think, an issue that has gotten less attention that I think complicates things. And that's the ideology issue. It's hard to think of a stable Japan-South Korea relationship when South Korea is led by progressive administrations. And so I think we have to ask ourselves why that is the case. And I think a third overlay in the case of Moot and Abe may be that it's a kind of personality challenge. It doesn't seem to be much chemistry there. And so my final point is that, again, from a U.S. perspective, as we look at things that we can do to manage this relationship, historically, actually, on the spectrum between geopolitical realism and identity-driven conflicts, the U.S. at the very beginning put its thumb on the scale in favor of geopolitical realism when it helps to establish an environment where Japan and South Korea could normalize the relationship. I think that what we've learned from the U.S. still has an interest in putting its finger on the scale because the assumption underlying the U.S.-led security architecture is that Japanese and South Korean security interests are indivisible from each other. And what that means is that the U.S. it's in the U.S. interest to oppose decoupling, whether it comes in the form of South Korea leaving Eusomia, or whether it comes in the context of economic moves that turned the glue that had been supporting the security relationship for so long into a solvent. And so that's where I would conclude from a U.S. perspective. It's really important for Japanese and South Korean security interests and therefore the economic interests to be conceived of as indivisible from each other. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. Now we'll go to Kristin. Thanks so much for having me today. I took my assignment here. I'm going to talk about Japan's goals moving forward over the next year from a government perspective and also kind of talk about private sector goals, particularly thinking about the large Japanese international businesses and their associations. So it's been interesting listening to the discussion today thinking about this glue that might hold the region together. And we have a gravity model of trade and that gravity model of trade says that these large vibrant markets that are really close to each other are going to trade a lot with each other, have a lot of investment with each other and perhaps complimentary and occasionally competitive, or maybe often competitive interests. But we don't have a gravity model of political alliances. And that it's not, in fact, typically, historically, it's not natural to have neighbors have very close political alliances. And that's something that needs to be built. And there is some fundamental shared economic interest that might provide a stage for those to be built upon, but that's not a given. That's something that needs to be actively developed. Japan, recently, the last couple of decades, economic, statecraft and diplomacy has been a place where the Japanese government is more comfortable acting internationally than other forms of statecraft. And in particular, there's been a pursuit of formalized rulemaking, a strong support of the World Trade Organization, dispute settlement mechanism system, and Japan moving forward really wants to be a multilateral rulemaker. And we see, and that point is key to what I think we should look for as we look forward into 2020. So there's two main points. So thinking from the government perspective, that Japan's going to continue to pursue multilateral economic integration. I'll unpack that a little bit in a minute in the Indo-Pacific, while at the same time deepening bilateral relations with the U.S. So you can already see there's a little bit of attention here pursuing multilateral rulemaking on the one hand and bilateral rulemaking with one of Japan's most important economic and first security partners, the United States. So there's this bilateral trade deal. It came into effect January 1st. It's a really big deal. After all these years, we got a trade deal. It lowers tariffs. It's about tariffs, and it's about tariffs and goods largely. Particularly for some big wins for the U.S. with agricultural products, it's pretty much in line with what the United States would have gotten through the TPP minus some stuff. But there's also this digital trade agreement, which is also a really big step forward and is a long-term goal of Japanese trade policy makers to start to build digital rules in a multilateral context. And so here this is done bilaterally, but there's hopes that this might become somewhat of a template moving forward. On the private sector side, the private sector is trying to respond to sort of contradictory trends that are happening. So on the one hand, there's this move towards deeper multilateral economic integration, and there are some possibilities in 2020 for further institutionalization in the Indo-Pacific region. Actually, not the Indo-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific region without India in this particular case. But at the same time, we see Japanese leadership and the Abe administration threatening some of the deeper economic integration with close partners, particularly with Korea, with recent trade restrictions and I can speak to that later if people are interested. But I won't at this time for the rest of time. Okay, so Japan's long-term goal for the last couple of decades has had to have 20, 70% of their trade covered by high quality multilateral trade institutions. So what does high quality mean for the Japanese government? It's not just tariff reduction. In particular, they want to address core economic concerns, particularly those articulated by the large multinational business community like Haydn, so these are the concerns articulated there. So these are things like protecting intellectual property rights, trying to prohibit forced technology transfer, having shared production and manufacturing standards across borders as you have these very multilateral integrated supply chains, and you can have the same ISO standards across all of those. It makes it much easier for these companies to do this. Why does the multilateral trading system, why do the institutions need to be multilateral? Well, because the business is multilateral, right? You want a match that way. And perhaps also some shared environmental and labor standards, although those are secondary. They also want trade agreements that contain ways to solve the disputes that inevitably rise. Even among close friends you might have arguments about what the rules actually mean. So you want dispute settlement mechanisms, things like the WTO court for example, or perhaps investor state dispute settlement mechanisms, ISDS systems where companies can seek redress outside of a domestic court system when they think they might not get a fair say there. So thinking about this 70% goal, Japan, depending on how you define high quality, is going to probably reach this goal in 2020. And this will happen through the firm movement on the regional comprehensive economic partnership or RCEP. Because it will bring, it will bring so they already have an agreement with ASEAN, but it will bring ASEAN and China and Korea into a multilateral trade agreement. Unfortunately, RCEP doesn't include India. It looks all signs point to India is not going to sign. It's outside of the Indo-Pacific region and it also doesn't contain a lot of the things, the kind of aspects that would make it a high quality trade agreement as articulated by Japan. In particular, it doesn't address IP intellectual property rights in the way that they like and it doesn't contain strong dispute settlement mechanisms. Either by the way, does the U.S.-Japan trade agreement. We don't have a way to solve our inevitable arguments via that agreement. However, this is over a decade in the making and there's a good chance it will be signed this year. So that's a pretty big deal. It will reduce tariffs on somewhere around 80 to 85% of goods somewhere as high as they would like but it's a big step forward. The business community also has these perennial notes of optimism including this December, that there'll be a China-Korea-Japan-free trade agreement. This has been going on for about 15 years and they're always optimistic including this December. Their statement on it was very optimistic. I'm skeptical but keep your eyes out for that. From the perspective of the private sector the they're a little the K-dan run and to some extent K-zai, though you guys also made some noises, are a little bit less happy with the Japanese government's advocacy work for their free and open internationalization than they would like in particular with the whitelist issue with South Korea and some other movements that there's maybe not quite as much of support for open liberal globalization as they would like. So they're trying to balance their advocacy and their desire for these very high quality trade agreements that will protect their intellectual property address industrial subsidy issues, things like that while also trying not to make some of these political tensions that have been affecting business any worse. The Japanese private sector faces in the region much more explicitly political risks than the United States faces in the region when there are political tensions they do tend to bleed into economics, particularly with China but also recently with South Korea so there are these real challenges that the private sector is facing and having the Abe government perhaps be more of an advocate for liberalization would be on their wish list and so that's something we can look out for. Sort of in and actually, I'll leave it right there. All right. Thank you very much. So now we'll turn to particularly how Japan is looking at the United States and what it hopes to see from us in the next year. Thank you very much Ambassador before starting to the mind our initial presentations are very thanks to the Carnegie Endowment and the Japan American Society of the United Washington DC to think about that the U.S.-Japan specifically security relationships the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship it is not independent variables so in that reason I'd like to start assessing very briefly assessing the security environment what we face so I'd like to looking at the positive and negative aspect of the security environment facing Japan so let's start to think about the positive aspect of our security environment nothing so unfortunately that from the positive aspects so as already there are some previous some number of the previous speakers such as the Akita-san and the Scott for instance that as for the North Korea the military tension has eased since the 2017 however in the meantime the North Korea's denuclearization has made no progress at all unfortunately and the North Korea is continuing to upgrading not only their long range missile but also their short range and medium range missile capabilities which are capable of attacking Japan not only Japan but also South Korea so some of them may be revealed at the coming military parade of next month and my current position is a Japan chair fellow now so I'm working with the general who is the former national security advisor he was one of the person who referred to all options for the North Korea in the current Trump administration to be clear that I'm not going to the emphasis on the military options but at the same time the absence of the conflict or military options is not necessarily a good situation for us what I mean by this is that giving North Korea a moratorium it could be to us then it is now so how do we compare to the current risk avoiding to the same escalations so how do we balance the current calculation the current risk or the risk in the future so how about China? what about China? the current situation Japan-China relationship improving as number of previous speaker already mentioned about in this year the president is scheduled to visit Japan as a state guest however looking at some specific situation for instance in the East China Sea the activities of the Chinese coast guard and the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force have become increasingly active and are now very restrained in other words even if Japan-China diplomatic relations improve China's behavior is irrelevant so in that reason in this way the security environment facing Japan and facing US-Japan alliance is deteriorating today so therefore it is clear that US-Japan alliance must be strengthened so the next question is how do we further strengthen our alliance so it has been almost the five years what I mean by this in five years ago the US-Japan government has revised our US-Japan defense cooperation guidelines but I thought that the Trump administration has taken over and we have both reduced the major defense strategies in case of the United States in 2017 end of 2017 national security strategy released one month later national defense strategy released and they also released nuclear posture review and missile defense review most of Japan as Akita-san mentioned the Ministry of Defense revised that our strategic document so-called national defense program guideline or MVPG it is a capstone document for our defense strategies these kind of the strategic document are mutually compatible strategic documents in which Japan and the United States are basically in the same directions but we had some lack of considering some lack of thinking of this document the first one is how we defined our strategic objectives in the long-term strategic competition it also paraphrased how to compete with China China has a career a cellular victory in the US in metal capabilities a form of anti-access of area denial capabilities and say the dominance domains of us and the prevent of the US interventions but Japan even the United States don't have our equivalent blue cellular victory so in particular we needed to be more serious that Japan overwhelmingly the disadvantage to China in terms of resources for example the 2018 latest version national defense program guideline emphasis the investment in the new domain such as the space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum I think that it is good things however that other programs has unclear priorities so we no longer have the superiority against China in all domains so when I so read to this strategic document I remember that the other strategic document the joint vision 2020 it's released by the from the US department defense in the 2000 this document the emphasis of the importance of maintain the full spectrum dominance but seeking to the full spectrum dominance it is not a strategy the strategy is prioritizing to the our defense portfolio so in that reason the US Japan alliance should start to narrow down the areas and the programs to focus on what is the priorities in this context that we should our common strategic objectives in order to use common analysis methods to prioritize our limited defense portfolio since September 11 the US defense strategy has been focused on the global war on terror but now again it is a lot of strategic competition so in line with this we should consider common strategic objectives and redefine our roles, missions and multi-domain joint capabilities of US forces and our JSDF specifically what element do we expect the SDF the self defense forces to acquire for instance more longer range strike capabilities and as an example is the hosting to the US ground-based missiles in Japan in those kind of capabilities to perform in conjunction with the allied integrated missile defense so we should consider how to be identified to the appropriate mix our allied offensive and defensive capabilities and second is to think about the original impact of the review of the US forward deployment posture in my understanding just yesterday the secretary expert a little bit mentioned about the possibility to start into those kind of review process in my understanding it is the equivalent of the global posture review 2.0 the concern is here is that the relocation of existing bases becoming more complex so in the in the morning sessions somebody already pointed out and they are asking the Q&A sessions about the including to the FUTEMMA relocation for city issues but also it not only in case of Japan but also in case of Korea sometimes based on the same programs so realignment of the US forces in Japan including South Korea and Okinawa and was part of the transformations and the global posture review process under the Bush administrations so if this is a review to prepare for the strategic competitions the existing base relocation plan may be reviewed so that is one of the the embodied to the some political complexities and finally I'd like to mention that this is a command and control structure in this region as we know that the US-Japan alliance does not have the single integrated operational command structures such as US ROK alliance and US NATO alliance Japan is not informed for this reason Japan is not informed of the details of the US military operations including US bases and nor it shared what kind of operational plan US ROK alliance had so these kind of the black box like the situation might have been avoidable in the 1950s or 1990s when Korean war happens and the Taiwan crisis breaking out so in other words the alliance coordination systems Japan support to the military operations of the United States or the US ROK alliance that was based on the fundamentals that is the Japan is the the safe staging area however this assumption no longer uses due to the improved missile capabilities of China and North Korea so given that Japan face significant risk is supporting US operation of US ROK alliance so in that reason the command and control mechanism in this region should be redesigned to appropriately reflect Japan's burden and risk so in 2020s in this year US Japan will have to negotiate to the host nation support issues but this is no longer two issues that can be solved to handle to just money issues so it should be in the discussion of the strategic concept of the entire US Japan alliance based on all elements or I just mentioned thank you very much it was very thoughtful and I'm still trying to digest all the comments you made if I could maybe turn back to China and just ask Patty a question you mentioned that there were sharp limits to how much the rapprochement between Japan and China could be both sides are realistic but there were some fundamental differences so if you were predicting what sorts of discussions the Japanese prime minister and the Chinese leader will have during the state visit do you think the Japanese side would raise the issue some of the sharp limit type issues like the tensions of Japanese scholars in China or treatment of Uyghurs or the status in Hong Kong and likewise do you think that the Chinese side would raise restrictions on Japanese investment by these companies like far away in Japan some of these really tough issues and if so how do you think they might deal with some of these issues so hard to say with the latter but definitely I'm sure those will be on the table and there have already been calls within Japan for instance why are we having the state visit because of these outstanding issues we have Japanese nationals detained you know are we endorsing what's going on in Hong Kong and Xinjiang so there's certainly concern and there's been a recognition by Japanese leaders that these issues need to be addressed before and during the summit in terms of how are they going to solve them it's hard to say but thinking about sort of what might be on the agenda more broadly speaking and zooming out I think you'll see probably a lot more emphasis on sort of bilateral cooperation on economic development in the region and beyond so you've seen some of this you've seen previews of this for instance in terms of bilateral and commitments by Japan, South Korea and China to work for their development banks to work with ASEAN for instance on infrastructure financing and so on and so I think you might see these sorts of things on the agenda at the summit and of course you know China has been very eager to win Japan's endorsement of BRI and its support of China's role and so I think those sorts of items will also be on the agenda as well really focusing on the areas where there might be win-win outcomes or positive progress I would think those would be highlighted but certainly I think both sides would be eager to mention these are the core interests or the core concerns that we have and make sure that's on the record but I don't really know how a summit would resolve many of these issues and if I could turn this to Scott for a second you mentioned identity issues as one of the big challenges in ROK Japan relations and I wonder if it might be fair to say on the Korean side identity issues are the challenge and on the Japanese side I don't know but it's so much fundamental to their identity as it is a lack of recognition of some of the Korean concern about their past history but is that a fair way to look at it and if so do you think the recent you know compared to 20 years ago there's so much more people to people contact between Japan and Korea massive flows of tourism TV shows and music are very popular in Japan you know makeup on both sides there's a lot of more cultural connections than there were 20 years ago so do you think these identity issues might gradually become less important going forward because of the greater contact between the two yeah that's a great question so when I talk about identity in part what I'm talking about is the South Korean insistence on defining the identity in the Korean public discourse as pre-war and I think that for modern Japanese to be denied the self identity of a pacifist nation is a nation that has changed yeah it's it's unusual if we step back from a global perspective and from a Japanese perspective it's easy to see why they might be dissatisfied with the way that Koreans are looking at and defining Japan so that would be kind of the way that I would frame that when I'm pointing to identity but really it's about perceptions of self and other that I think have been deeply engrained and that have kind of fails to be overcome and so when I think about that I'm thinking about well what would move the needle in terms of changing perceptions on either side of the other and you're right that we've seen a lot of interchange and I think that actually at an individual level we've seen progress and in some ways I feel like it's closer to being compartmentalized as an issue between the governments but we've also seen setbacks right especially over the course of the past year targeting the two institutional constituencies that have always been ballast for the relationship, the business community and the military community with the radar firelock issue and so even despite that I do think that there are limits but it's hard to say I would say it seems variable if we look at the boycott issues for instance and the power of collective opinion I think it's more limited in a way but it's still there and also I would say that there's a tendency to attribute the worst to the other side so if you monitor Japanese tourism to South Korea and vice versa up until last summer I would say that it was more a reflection of exchange rate fluctuations which way the flows were going but prior to last summer you could also see media gravitating towards the tourism numbers are down they must be upset with this kind of view I think there's so definitely person to person and cultural contact particularly with the Korean wave things increased over the last two decades at the same time two decades ago there were more particularly in Korea Korean elites Korean business people that had really close personal ties with Japanese business people and spoke really great Japanese and they had these very close personal relationships and that has faded somewhat and so there's the mechanism of elite leadership from both sides driving the pragmatic economic relationship I think it's fading a little bit and that's a cause for concern moving forward even if young people might feel happier about Japanese makeup products or K-pop or whatever you still need the leadership and that is fading a little bit just as that generation that had those close ties is getting older also the analysis of public opinion surveys absolutely shows what you have pointed out that Koreans in particular who are very who feel very hostile towards Japanese political stances or policies that has no effect that doesn't move in the same direction with whether or not they want to buy Japanese product or whether they want to watch a Japanese movie so you really do see a cordoning off of these different issues historically in Korea at least up until through the last maybe six months we'll have to see what happens and I also Patricia a trade question for you you mentioned Japan on the one hand pursuing a multilateral approach building rules supporting the WTO and on the other hand cutting the best deal they could with the United States their largest trading partner even though that deal was probably WTO inconsistent and in some ways you know kind of weakens their sort of moral authority if you will in the WTO so I wonder if you could comment on that but also I'm really interested in your thoughts on how did Japan see the US deals with NAFTA the successor agreement to NAFTA and the Japan China I'm sorry the US-China trade agreement because Japanese business had huge interest at stake in these two agreements and yet they had no voice in the outcome of these two right yeah absolutely so I mean so Japan's interest with the United States is keep the United States at the table keep the United States talking keep the United States engaged and there was they held out a long time before they entered by level negotiations hoping that the United States would come back to the table with some form of TPP so that as time went on right that clearly wasn't going to happen and so they negotiated this trade agreement in a record five months that's stunning as a stunningly fast trade agreement Japan so but the United States right remains at the table we heard we heard this morning it was a phase one agreement that means there's going to be a phase two so we're still talking we'll resolve section 32 et cetera right so that's that's going to go forward the newly renegotiated NAFTA there's some distress on the Japanese side about that deal in particular yeah because of autos and because of content requirements right so they really they they opt the local or within deal content requirements and country specific things in that agreement and that's tough for Japanese auto producers in particular so they would have preferred some other outcome there particularly an outcome that had Japan in the same trading block as the US, Canada and Mexico as would have happened with if it was TPP rather than CPTPP with respect to the US-China agreement so Japan is still waiting and seeing I think as the we all are of what that is actually going to mean what phase two of that will mean the trade tensions have already had some effect on on regionalization and the way that regional economic patterns are going and so that that the new US-China trade deal isn't going to change any of those any of those sort of longer underlying trends Thank you and Masashi it's hard for me to ask you one question because you raised so many issues but I was really intrigued by your comment on how there's a need to work together more on command and control issues and you raised a very good point that Japan is no longer the safe rear area in case of a conflict in Korea on the front lines and involved in a conflict very quickly due to North Korean ability to strike targets in Japan you know there has been a lot of discussion within the US obviously about the need to modernize the approach and one of the big constraints frankly has been poor Japan career relations where USFK has been very reluctant they have a lot of difficult issues they're trying to work out with their Korean counterparts so they introduced this Japan issue Japan career relations are so poor really complicates their life very greatly and so they're just not sort of eager to take that on even if it makes sense in a sort of strategic sense but do you think this might interest Japan in improving relations with Korea as one of the positive potential outcomes that they could become more integrated in this kind of approach? Well so I think that from the context of the comprehensive relationship between Japan and South Korea is the one of the opportunity to improve our security and diplomatic relationships especially in particular from the expert communities and not only the expert but what I mean by this is experts including through the policy practitioners really recognize the importance of the trilateral cooperation between among three countries Japan, US and ROK but at the same time I already mentioned about the realistically the assisting to our security environment the it's that command of control structure could be improved to that more the operating reflecting to the Japan's possibility and risks so I don't have some clear answer but one of the possibility is the mutual exchange of their liaison officers as you may know that Japan still hosting to the United Nations command rear in Yokota air bases so in that sense if Japan JSDF works Japanese government as a JSDF officer as a liaison for United Nations commanding so but instead of this instead of this Japan could accept some ROK officers to the United Nations command rear for the more frequently communicate about how we coordinate with each other it's in this element I think the technically separated on the OPCON transfer issues between the U.S. ROK alliance but the strategically the form of the OPCON transfer after the USFK to the it's now so called the future combined force command in Korea but this the kind of form of the new command structure in Korean peninsula it's definitely the current command structure of the United Nations command so in that reason that that is one of the opportunity to redefine the appropriate mix of our regional command control system not only the three countries but also domestically for instance the relationship between the OPCON and the SFK and how do we implement the USFJ how do we deal with those war fighting command and supporting command I could add something to that I mean so thinking about trilateral integration between the United States, Japan and South Korea it completely makes sense from a military capabilities perspective that is exactly what China opposes and will do everything it can to oppose so if you remember it's a bad blow up that's what it really was about China did not want to see moves by US allies especially South Korea to link into any sort of US missile defense system and it pushed South Korea to commit not to to say it commits not to pursue any sort of trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan and so I think some things that make sense militarily would undercut other parts of the relationship and that's one kind of screw that could mess up this warming of relations between China and Japan as well so that's one thing to keep our minds on so how do you balance that Scott did you want to add anything on ROK perspectives I was just in South Korea where we had a workshop on the OPCON transition issue and one of the really sensitive points related to that process is the relationship of the new Korean commander of future CFC to the UNC structure so in some sense this is a particularly sensitive time to try to address the relationship of Japan to that because obviously Japan was not a sending state at the time of the Korean War it is the host of UNC Rear I think that it is would be smart for USFK to find channels by which to provide effective briefings for USFK working with USFJ to the Japanese in order to have a better understanding of the threat environment from a Korean Peninsula perspective but this may be a particularly unpropitious moment to try to take that up now thank you I'm sure the audience has a lot of questions as well so let me invite questions from the audience again if you could state your name and your affiliation and if you could keep your question relatively short and also identify who you would like to respond to the question thank you I'll start over here and then go to the very back over there I was going to ask you to go back to the automotive industry can you state your name my name is Jim Patrick and I'm just a member of the Japan America Society I wanted to go back to the automotive I wanted to go back to the automotive sector before we had the most recent good news about this trade deal between the US and Japan the background to that was Trump tariffs on steel and aluminum and then the sort of the big issue for the Japanese was possible tariffs imported cars from Japan and the fear in Japan I think of some kind of quota or quantitative restrictions I wonder if you think that that's the next shoe to fall in the US-Japan relationship do you think that in this coming year we're going to see those kind of moves from the Trump administration how do you see that working out yeah thanks that's a really important question so all of those things are still on the table right that's that they haven't been resolved and there's and there are significant threats we also recently when president Trump was in Davos and he was who's made threats towards the German automobile industry as well trade it's right trade and a very highly visible important economically good much of the US-Japan trade deficit that the president is so worried about is because of the Prius that it's a car an automobile driven gap and so I those that's definitely I think we'll hear talked about that I my hope is that everyone will stay at the table talking about that as we as we did in the we saw in the past but that's going to be I would be surprised if either tariffs were placed under or quantitative restrictions a new round of voluntary restraints were placed on Japanese automobiles this year if the president is re-elected that's something we could look forward to in 2021 okay we'll go to the back and then I'll come up to you here I love Eric Gomez from the Kato Institute and I have a question related to INF and in the lead up to the initial decision to deploy the Pershings and the Griffins in Europe in the 1970s what was very striking about that was that European allies led the effort to deploy them that they wanted them they said that they needed them even though the U.S. didn't really want to do it the Carter administration was kind of dragged along I'm curious what is the alliance dynamic with Japan and the decision with modern sort of systems now that the U.S. is out of INF I know that supporters of the missiles are saying yeah you know even if the allies aren't totally on board now maybe China gets more aggressive and then we can you know put them in later but it seems like from what I've gathered listening to other things at the conference it seems like there's not really a consensus within China or within Japan about the threat perception that China poses and there might be an effort by the Abe administration with this outreach to Japan to find other ways to resolve security issues with China and re-establish that so if anyone could you know talk to this Japanese threat perceptions of China and do they actually feel this sort of similar need to have this kind of U.S. system or is it something else? Especially we can start with you on Japanese use on possibility of U.S. deployment of medium-range missiles Thank you very much for your questions At first so that is one of the reasons why I emphasize the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance we will start to discuss about our strategic objectives before that starting to the specific weapon system issues including to the basing location issues of course we can easily imagine if we start into these specific issues it is easy to have some trouble involved to the domestic political conflicts including Okinawa so that is my thought the first priority is starting to the U.S.-Japan alliance should start to discuss about strategic goals and the second is the identifying our tactical goals means including to the share the threat assessment and capability assessment and third the two share starting with the share those threat and the capability assessment and we start into our targeting coordination mechanism so if Japan JSTF itself or the inviting for hosting U.S. operated ground-based missiles those kind of missiles it has a huge impact not only Japan society but also the strategic calculation of China and North Korea so in that reason but the difference of the number of the launchers and the missiles and how we allocate those capabilities depends on the tactical objectives what is the targets what is the operational concept target so more specifically our target is what is our target is fixed target or moving target like a Chinese PLA vessels or other option is targeted to the Chinese airstrips to degraded Chinese counter-air capabilities so in that reason I think that the most important thing we starting to the strategic our concept development so after that we should move into more the specific argument about where is the appropriate location of the deployment of those kind of missiles Scott did you want to add anything on potential Korean reactions if they were asked Maronis is better on this but so far we can see a supply signal but I just don't see a demand signal in Asia and so that's a problem from the perspective of those who see it as an important development related to the U.S.-China strategy and Penny maybe I'll ask you a related question you mentioned how China came down very hard on South Korea for this deployment issue really some tough measures that really had a real hard impact on Korea how do you think China would react if the U.S. began talks with Japan about deployment of intermediate missiles in Japan is a bigger country more able to react would they how would you think China would respond I think China would respond in a similar way would it impact Japan in a similar way that's a different question but I think they would see this as something they need to block that they can't just let this happen and so again there would be this in the Japan-China relationship that would probably go away very quickly as well but you know there is a recognition again that in Beijing that Tokyo is sort of a lot more aligned with the U.S. it can't really put as easily put a wedge between the two powers and so perhaps that might moderate China's strategy but I can't see Beijing staying still and accepting it right well here with Jim you've got the prerogative of being the host I'm not supposed to do this Jim show for Carnegie Endowment thank you all I want to ask two quick 2020 questions and they're primarily Korea related so maybe Scott and whoever else wants to jump in but number one are we going to see is there a forcing function within 2020 on the Japan-Korea force labor case issue is there some kind of deadline where Seoul has to make a decision about how it's going to handle liquidation of assets or can this stretch out beyond 2020 and then the second piece is will we see a North Korean nuclear test in 2020 do you think we'll start with Scott on those two easy questions I'm not aware of a forcing function on the force labor it seems to me that the Korean government has made a decision to hold but I also haven't I don't know if there are some specific other issues related to the Supreme Court implementation process or something I'm not aware of in terms of nuclear tests this year I mean the ceiling for North Korean provocations is not clearly President Trump's statements it's China and I don't think that China is would be able to absorb and tolerate another nuclear test without undertaking a response that would be severely adverse to North Korean interests I would just echo that I think North Korea understands well that China has its own red lines it experienced that in the late 2017 period when it was really ramping up its tests and China you know there's a lot of economic leverage that China has and so far it's relaxed many of its sanctions it's allowing North Korea to brief but that concludes very quickly and I think the North Koreans understand that you know according to the New Year's messaging and so on you know the comment has been well don't expect economic sanctions relief anytime soon we need to trudge on and in order to trudge on you really need that lifeline from China and so I don't think they're going to test anytime soon then again North Korea you can never predict so I don't want to be held to that prediction but I think there has been signaling certainly from Beijing and you see Beijing sort of trying to coax North Korea as well in the security council you know Beijing and Russia propose together that we relax sanctions on North Korea so it's it's doing both it's doing the pressuring and sort of the coaching thank you okay we'll go here and then open up here next thank you Artavon Moshe area University of Richmond I guess this is a question for everyone up there including yourself you talked about earlier how the potential closeness of relations whether it's tourism or economics is maybe could potentially changing and Scott mentioned the identity issue in Korea and the Japanese Pat mentioned the Chinese attitudes towards Japan and Christian you alluded to some opinion post to some to what extent do you think what's maybe preventing some of these issues from progressing is it a generational issue at play here right or a Brexit issue right if we had kept the votes on everybody under 40 in Britain that the vote would have failed overwhelmingly to what extent is it the memory you know of the of the past playing a role for the older generation that is right now in the decision making apparatus that in 5 or 10 years could be shifting to the new generation that maybe to what extent do you think that there's a divide here or is there a commonality whether you're 25-year-old Japanese or Korean or 70-year-old Japanese Korean you have the same attitudes you want to start on the Korean side the generational divide that has stemmed from the 2015 was actually that older Koreans supported it because they supported Park and younger Koreans were against it because they supported Moon and so the problem isn't generational it's actually political polarization deepening political polarization in South Korea and the entanglement of the Japan-South Korea relationship in domestic Korean politics and the key issue there is really related to an ongoing struggle between the executive and judicial independence issues in which the former Supreme Court justice was embroiled in part for advising the executive that it would be a bad idea to move forward on the forced labor cases because it had implications for foreign relations and so it's really complicated and messy on the Korean side and very politicized especially did you want to add anything to that from the Japanese perspective? I can particularly speak to the Chinese politics with that respect and there's been there's a lot of optimism in particularly in the Japanese business community in China and to some extent among Japanese diplomats that have worked in China that there will be a generational shift as living memories of wartime atrocities fade unfortunately there's not a lot of evidence to support that and we actually see more virulent opinions amongst younger generations in China there's some mixed research on this but I think I'm curious if you agree Patty but that in particular as a result of the patriotic education campaigns that were initiated in the 1990s attitudes have really hardened amongst younger generations in China towards Japan and so what's preventing issues from progressing with China and Japan in order to take a risky diplomatic step there are some pretty strong domestic constraints from a very nationalist anti-Japan population so there's it's not a democracy they're not electorally accountable but there is a degree of accountability and that is being held so Japan-China relations are held back by that and even more so by younger people so that bodes negatively for the future is the way I read it you agree with that? I think we have time for two more questions one and further back there yes hello Neil Silver retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer this question is primarily from Ms. Kim and this relates to the Senkaku's Dalu Tai there are probably half a dozen major maritime and island issues between the United States and Canada including up along the main border which you never hear about and I realize U.S. and Canada have a relationship from China and Japan and I can understand why from a Chinese political and nationalist point of view continuing to stir the war issues makes sense and I can even understand why the Chinese government would assert it's you know what it wants to assert over the Senkaku's but what I find more difficult to understand is the continuing increase of incursions why do they do that I've heard at least two Chinese popular takes on the issue one is you know that this is just a spit of sand out there it makes absolutely no sense that the we the Chinese demanded that Russia give back hundreds of thousands of square miles and then the issue went away I've also heard the Chinese assert that there's probably a lot of oil out there and that's why the Chinese government asserts this but still any why do they keep this issue in their teeth the way they seem to I think there's a lot of factors as you mentioned there's resources there's a history behind it there's a nationalism factor and I think the bottom line is why is China doing this more now because it can because it has the ability its military capabilities are growing and it sees it's been doing this not just in the East China Sea but also in the South China Sea so I think the behavior reports and it sees sort of this as a strategic period where it could start asserting its rights that it couldn't in the past and I think that's the bottom line if I could just add your comment on resources in 2008 China and Japan did conclude an agreement dividing up areas where one side or the other could explore for oil and leaving areas that were disputed so that was seen as a positive step since we have this dispute let's at least exploit the resources where we can unfortunately since then I think China has explored for oil in the area where they had agreed not to do so I think one of our speakers earlier this morning mentioned the hope that Prime Minister Abe would try and restart that agreement or get some Chinese acceptance that that's a base for further discussion of how you exploit the resources in the area where each side has claims With the Senkaku's Diayutai the US has a commitment under the security treaty because it's under the administration of Japan so it's different at least from my way I look at it I'll jump in but then I'll ask I think it is different but China is not invading the Senkaku's and probably won't because of that security but what they're doing is pushing and making Japan uncomfortable and what they would like Japan to do is let's talk about this issue and Japan is saying we won't talk about it because there's no dispute so you're right the US security guarantee does provide a constraint but not a constraint to current Chinese activities I don't know if you would agree with that one more question in the back and then yeah you right there sorry thank you my name is Kyung-Goo Lee I'm currently studying here and I have a question for Scott you mentioned about the ideology factor of Korean domestic politics influencing Korea's attitude toward Japan and especially the progressive liberal wing being more aggressive toward Japanese but looking back historically I'm not sure if that is always the whole story because when we see like incident in 2012 or like between 2013 to 2014 there are lots of clashes between Korean conservative presidents like Lee Myung-Bak or Park Geun-Hye with Japanese administrations about historical issues, territorial issues and lots of security issues and also we can go back further on another conservative president Kim Young-San was also very critical about Japanese in historical ways and also liberals tended to be more like approaching Japan especially in Kim Dae-Joon era and maybe in the early 2017-2018 when there were lots of dialogues between Moon and Abe so I wanted to ask you why you viewed ideology factor as a huge factor determining Korea-Japan relations and how that mechanism works in Korean politics that's a very good question I'm glad that you asked it because you offered some clarifying observations that are very useful and I don't want to say it's a huge factor but it was one of three factors that I named and the reason why I named that was not necessarily from a perception of what was happening on the South Korean side but rather a perception of what was happening on the Japanese side and what I see happening over time on the Japanese side is a perception in Japan that has kind of dug in related to the idea that progressives are open to changing Korean identity by moving closer to North Korea and that has become embedded in the Japanese foreign policy default view as a view that actually divides capacity to work with conservatives from capacity to work with progressives to the extent that the government of Japan and elites almost seem to have given up on the idea of having a stable relationship with a progressive political leader in South Korea Thanks very much. Okay, we have about nine minutes left so I'm going to give each of you two minutes and my question to each of you is not to make a prediction about the year because that is in a way too easy, I'm going to make it a little bit harder and when I was in government we would look at what we called low probability high impact scenarios what might happen, not that we're predicting it will happen, but what might happen that would have a huge impact on Northeast Asia so I'd like each of you to throw out one thing we should be a little bit worried about even if it's not a prediction that you're making. Can I maybe start with you? Sure, so when you pose this to me you know I was racking my brain and there are a lot of actually medium probability even like US troop withdrawals from the Korean Peninsula and what that might mean for the US Japan Alliance and so on we have very low probability and high impact event that could completely shake up Northeast Asia is if we see progress in nuclear negotiations with North Korea and we see progress towards a peace deal and then there's a push to truly denuclearize the Korean Peninsula which means retracting the US extended deterrence nuclear umbrella guarantee and maybe including even Japan in a nuclear free zone and a neutral zone so I've heard this proposed not seriously by any political leader but in Track 1.5 Chinese colleagues have brought up this idea and it's very far fetched but I can see it resonating with certain communities within well obviously China could support that I was going to say China would be quite happy with that outcome North Korea might have a mixed opinion on that South Koreans there may be segments that appeal to this idea of a neutral Korean Peninsula there are also segments of Japanese society with these very strong non-proliferation norms that I can see gravitating towards that idea as well I think it's far fetched I don't think it's going to happen especially because I don't think there's going to be too much progress in the nuclear negotiations anytime soon but if this were to happen this would have huge implications obviously for the US Alliance Network in Asia and just globally as well Thank you so we should be thinking about what if there's progress and what does that mean I think that's a good that even if the probability is not high OK Masashi we'll go to the next It is the echo of the answers that if the North Koreans agree to the complete denuclearization it is a huge impact for the regional security environment and after that how do we coordinate with the Japan and our local relationships because of the if we can share the perceptions North Korea is already no longer is the threat of us the second question is what is the objectives of the ROK forces ESF case and the South Korea's capability itself so how do we adjust to the trilateral cooperation in the area of the strategic competition with China but at the same time this is a very complex question for ROK so we are of course we understand through that complexity but if those kind of situation we face that is one of the next huge question is our vice Mr. So thinking about this from a sort of a trade institutional standpoint a I think low probability is the thing is that President Trump either signals strong intentions or actually did withdraw the United States from a little trade organization something he's mentioned but it's again I think very low probability it would be very high impact and that would so right now the WTO is still the framework that underlies the international trade institutions even in our regional trade agreements there's been a lot of talk about which way Japan is going to try or lean either of those in terms of its economic statecraft and economic leadership and if the United States did decide to move completely away from a multilateral trading system I think that question would be answered and Japan would lean very regionally Asia and would start forming partnerships with Chinese leadership and we would see more of a Asian more Asian trade institutionalization that would try and replace a probably very quickly crumbling military thank you I've got two black swan events for 2020 one is a nuclear accident in North Korea that requires that it's so severe that it requires international help and the second given Moon's marginalization from the inter Korean dialogue and Trump's potential distraction that Kim Jong Un reaches out to Abe as the last leader remaining who can through his action of meeting with Kim Jong Un implicitly recognize North Korea's nuclear state could I just pull the thread a little on your first black swan the nuclear accident piece how do you think China would react to an international response as opposed to a Chinese response to a nuclear accident in North Korea maybe I'll ask you to after that as well I think once it becomes public to that degree it's not going to be possible for China to control it and I mean China has expressed in the past we're comfortable with peacekeeping forces or something of that sort in North Korea so it's not like they would oppose any sort of foreign presence in North Korea so I think if there was a nuclear accident type level of happening then you could see China opening up all right well I want to thank the panel for a great discussion and thank you all for being such a great audience today thank you so much Jim and everyone I really appreciate that that's a fun game and I want to add one my thought was Chinese economic meltdown would be a very low probability but it would be huge so be prepared no I just want to thank you all our previous panel our keynote speakers and you all get the dedicated Japan follower award for sticking with us to the end it's a long day but I think we covered a lot here's to a very prosperous and healthy 2020 for all of you and we'll keep seeing you here at Carnegie over at the Japan America Society thanks a lot thank you discussion I really appreciate it I don't think I've given you my card yet let me do that and certainly let me know if there's things ever I can so that was fun very interested in your