 Question 16, Part 2 of Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 16 of those things which are applicable to Christ in His Being and Becoming in 12 Articles. Part 2, Articles 6 through 12. 6th Article. Whether this is true, God was made man. Objection 1. You would seem that this is false, God was made man. For since man signifies substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this is false, God was made simply. Therefore this is false, God was made man. Objection 2 further. To be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change according to Malachi 3.6. I am the Lord, and I change not. Hence, this is false, God was made man. Objection 3 further. Man as predicated of Christ stands for the person of the Son of God. But this is false, God was made the person of the Son of God. Therefore this is false, God was made man. On the contrary, it is written in John 1, verse 14. The word was made flesh, and as Athanasia says in one of his letters to Apectatum, when he said, the word was made flesh, it is as if it were said that God was made man. I answer that, a thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above in Article 1. It in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of his assuming human nature. Hence this is true, God was made man, though it is understood differently by some, even as this, God is man, as we said above in Article 1. Reply to Objection 1. To be made man is to be made simply, and all those in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God is said to have been made man in as much as the human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the divine nature. And hence, for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, to be made implies that something is newly predicated of another, hence whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed, and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence, in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God in Psalm 89 verse 1, Lord, thou art made our refuge. Now, to be man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation, and hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in him, by a change in the human nature which is assumed to a divine person. And hence, when it is said, God was made man, we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature. Reply to Objection 3. Man stands not for the bare person of the Son of God, but in as much as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, God was made the person of the Son of God, yet this is true. God was made man, by being united to human nature. Seventh article. Whether this is true? Man was made God. Objection 1. You would seem that this is true. Man was made God, for it is written in Romans 1, 2, which he had promised before by his prophets and the holy scriptures concerning his Son, who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh. Now, Christ, as man, is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore, man was made the Son of God. Objection 2 further. Augustine says in On the Trinity, 1.13, that such was this assumption which made God man and man God. But by reason of this assumption, this is true. God was made man. Therefore in like manner, this is true. Man was made God. Objection 3 further. Gregory Natsyanson says in his letter to celli, God was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it. Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God. And thus it is true that man was made God. Objection 4 further. When it is said that God was made man, the subject of the making or uniting is not God but human nature which the word man signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making to which the making is attributed. Hence man was made God is truer than God was made man. On the contrary, Damascene says in On the True Faith 3,2. We do not say that man was deified but that God was humanized. Now to be made God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false, man was made God. I answer that this proposition, man was made God, may be understood in three ways. First so that the participle made absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate. And in this sense it is false since neither the man of whom it is predicated was made nor is God made as will be said in Articles 8 and 9. And in the same sense this is false, God was made man. But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word made determines the composition with this meaning. Man was made God that is it was brought about that man is God. And in this sense both are true notably that man was made God and that God was made man. But this is not the proper sense of these phrases unless indeed we are to understand that man has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although this man was not made God because this suppositum notably the person of the Son of God was eternally God, yet man speaking commonly was not always God. Thirdly, properly understood this participle made attaches making to man with relation to God as the term of the making. And in this sense granted that the person or hypothesis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and man as was shown in Articles 2 and 3. This proposition is false because when it is said man was made God, man has a personal suppositum because to be God is not verified of the man in his human nature but in his suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature of whom to be God is verified is the same as the hypothesis or person of the Son of God who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this man began to be God or is made God or that he was made God. But if there were a different hypothesis of God and man so that to be God was predicated of the man and conversely by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita or of personal dignity or of affection or indwelling as the Nestorian said then with equal reason might it be said that man was made God that is joined to God and that God was made man that is joined to man. Reply to Objection 1. In these words of the Apostle the relative who, which refers to the person of the Son of God, ought not to be considered as affecting the predicate as if someone already existing of the seed of David according to the flesh was made the Son of God. It is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as affecting the subject with this meaning that the Son of God was made to him, namely to the honor of the Father as a gloss expounds it, being of the seed of David according to the flesh as if to say the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God. Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took place in the incarnation it was brought about that man is God and God is man, and in this sense both sayings are true as stated above. The same is to be said in Reply to the Third, since to be deified is the same as to be made God. Reply to Objection 4. A term placed in the subject is taken materially, that is for the suppositum. Placed in the predicate it is taken formally, that is for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that man was made God, the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of the human nature, which is God from eternity, and hence it does not befit him to be made God. But when it is said that God was made man, the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence properly speaking this is true, God was made man, and this is false, man was made God. Even as if Socrates who was already a man were made white and were pointed out this would be true, this man was made white today, and this would be false, this white thing was made man today. Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature and the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making. For example, if it were said that human nature was made the Son of Gods. Eighth Article Whether this is true, Christ is a creature. Objection one, it would seem that this is true, Christ is a creature. For Pope Leo says, A new and unheard of covenant, God who is and was is made a creature. Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the incarnation. Therefore this is true, Christ is a creature. Objection two, further. The properties of both natures may be predicated of the common hypothesis of both natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as was stated above in article five. But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the divine nature to be creator. Hence, both may be said of Christ, notably that he is a creature and that he is uncreated and creator. Objection three, further. The principal part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which he took from the virgin, is said simply to be born of the virgin. Therefore, by reason of the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that he is a creature. On the contrary, Ambrose says, and on the Trinity one, was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command? As if to say, no, hence he adds. How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple, not a composite nature. Therefore, it must not be granted that Christ is a creature. I answer that, as Jerome says in a glass on Hosea. Words spoken amiss lead to heresy. Hence, with us and heretics, the very words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to continence their error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in his human nature, but even in his divine person. And hence, we must not say absolutely that Christ is a creature or less than the Father. But with a qualification, notably in his human nature. But such things as could not be considered to belong to the divine person in itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of his human nature. Thus, we say simply that Christ suffered, died, and was buried. Even as incorporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply, that is without qualification. For we do not say that the Ethiopian is white, but that he is white as regards his teeth. But we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as regards his hair. Reply to Objection 1. Sometimes for the sake of brevity, the holy doctors use the word creature of Christ without any qualifying term. We should, however, take as understood the qualification as man. Reply to Objection 2. All the properties of the human, just as of the divine nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence, Damascene says in On the True Faith 3.4 that, Christ, who God and man is called created and uncreated, passable and impassable. Nevertheless, things of which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds that, the one hypothesis, that is of Christ, is uncreated in its Godhead and created in its manhood. Even so conversely, we may not say without qualification, Christ is incorporeal or impassable. In order to avoid the error of man as, who held that Christ had not a true body nor truly suffered, but we must say with a qualification that Christ was incorporeal and is impassable in his Godhead. Reply to Objection 3. There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies to the person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation. And hence there is no parity. Ninth article, whether this man that is Christ began to be, Objection 1, it would seem that this man that is Christ began to be. For Augustine says in his commentary on the Gospel of John that, before the world was, neither were we, nor the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ. But what was not always has begun to be, therefore this man that is Christ began to be. Objection 2 further, Christ began to be man, but to be man is to be simply. Therefore this man began to be simply. Objection 3 further, man implies a suppositum of human nature, but Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this man began to be. On the contrary, it is written in Hebrews 13 verse 8, Christ Jesus, yesterday and today, and the same forever. I answer that we must not say that this man pointing to Christ began to be, unless we add something, and this for a twofold reason. First, for the proposition is simply false in the judgment of the Catholic faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one suppositum and one hypothesis as also one person. For according to this, when we say this man pointing to Christ, the eternal suppositum is necessarily meant, with whose eternity a beginning in time is incompatible. Hence this is false, this man began to be. Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature which is signified by this word man, because the term placed in the subject is not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said in article one fourth reply. Secondly, because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use of without qualification in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who since he pretended that the person of the Son of God is a creature and less than the Father. So he maintained that he began to be saying, there was a time when he was not. Reply to objection one. The words quoted must be qualified, that is, we must say that the man Jesus Christ was not before the world was in his humanity. Reply to objection two. With this word begin, we cannot argue from the lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if this began to be white, that therefore it began to be colored. And this because to begin implies being now and not here to for. For it does not follow if this was not white hitherto, that therefore it was not colored hitherto. Now to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does not follow. Christ began to be man, therefore he began to be. Reply to objection three. This word man, as it is taken for Christ, although it signifies the human nature which began to be, nevertheless signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false. The man Christ began to be. But this is true. Christ began to be man. Tenth article. Whether this is true, Christ as man is a creature. Objection one. It would seem that this is false. Christ as man is a creature, or began to be. For nothing in Christ is created except the human nature. But this is false. Christ as man is the human nature. Therefore this also is false. Christ as man is a creature. Objection two further. The predicate is predicated of the term placed in reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition. As when I say, a body as colored is visible, it follows that the colored is visible. But as stated in articles eight and nine, we must not absolutely grant that the man Christ is a creature, nor consequently that Christ as man is a creature. Objection three further. Whatever is predicated of a man as man is predicated of him per se, and simply. For per se is the same as in as much as itself, as is said in metaphysics five twenty three. But this is false. Christ as man is per se, and simply a creature. Hence this too is false. Christ as man is a creature. On the contrary, whatever is is either creator or creature. But this is false. Christ as man is creator. Therefore this is true. Christ as man is a creature. I answer that when we say Christ as man, this word man, may be added in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this will be false. Christ as man is a creature. But if it be added by reason of the human nature, it is true. Since by reason of the human nature or in the human nature, it belongs to him to be a creature as was said in article eight. It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to say Christ as man and to say Christ as he is a man. Hence this is to be granted rather than denied. Christ as man is a creature. But if something further be added whereby the term covered by the reduplication is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to be denied rather than granted. For instance, we're one to say Christ as this man is a creature. Reply to objection one. Although Christ is not the human nature, he has human nature. Now the word creature is naturally predicated not only of abstract but also of concrete things, since we say that manhood is a creature and that man is a creature. Reply to objection two. Man as placed in the subject refers to the suppositum and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore although it is not granted that this man is a creature, yet it is granted that Christ as man is a creature. Reply to objection three. It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every such suppositum, it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature but also of the divine nature in which he has an uncreated being. Hence it does not follow that if he is a creature as man, he is a creature simply. Eleventh article. Whether this is true? Christ as man is God. Objection one. We would seem that Christ as man is God, for Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ as man has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as man is God. Objection two further. To forgive sins is proper to God, according to Isaiah 43.25. I am he that blot out thy iniquities for my own sake. But Christ as man forgives sin, according to Matthew 9.6. But that you should know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins, etc. Therefore Christ as man is God. Objection three further. Christ is not man in common, but is this particular man. Now Christ as this man is God. Since by this man we signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as man is God. On the contrary, whatever belongs to Christ as man belongs to every man. Now if Christ as man is God, it follows that every man is God, which is clearly false. I answer that this term man when placed in the re-duplication may be taken in two ways. First is referring to the nature and in this way it is not true that Christ as man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be taken as referring to the suppositum and in this way since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the person of the Son of God to whom it essentially belongs to be God. It is true that Christ as man is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the re-duplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum as stated above in Article 10, hence this is to be denied rather than granted Christ as man is God. Reply to Objection 1. It is not with regard to the same that a thing moves towards and that it is something, for to move belongs to a thing because of its matter or subject and to be in act belongs to it because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same that it belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union and to be God. For the first belongs to him in his human nature and the second in his divine nature. Hence this is true. Christ as man has the grace of union. Yet not this, Christ as man is God. Reply to Objection 2. The Son of man has on earth the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the divine nature in which divine nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively, whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says, he said pointedly, on earth to forgive sins, in order to show that by an indivisible union he united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although he was made man, yet he remained the Word of God. Reply to Objection 3. When we say this man, the demonstrative pronoun this attracts man to the suppositum and hence Christ as this man is God is a truer proposition than Christ as man is God. 12th article. Whether this is true, Christ as man is a apostasis or person. Objection 1. You would seem that Christ as man is a apostasis or person, for what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as man, since he is like other men according to Philippians 2.7, being made in the likeness of men. But every man is a person, therefore Christ as man is a person. Objection 2 further. Christ as man is a substance of rational nature, but he is not a universal substance, therefore he is an individual substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature, as Boethius says in On the Two Natures. Therefore Christ as man is a person. Objection 3 further. Christ as man is a being of human nature and a suppositum and a apostasis of the same nature. But every apostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as man is a person. On the contrary, Christ as man is not an eternal person. Therefore if Christ as man is a person, you would follow that in Christ there are two persons, one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous as was stated above in question 2 article 6 and in question 4 article 2. I answer that as was said in articles 10 and 11. The term man placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature. Hence when it is said Christ as man is a person, if it is taken as referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as man is a person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First we may so understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person and in this way it is true for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality caused by the principles of the human nature is due to the human nature and in this way Christ as man is not a person since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the divine nature and yet the notion of person requires this. Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to every man to be a person in as much as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is proper to the man Christ that the person subsisting in his human nature is not caused by the principles of the human nature but is eternal hence in one way he is person as man and in another way he is not as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. The individual substance which is included in the definition of a person implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else otherwise a man's hand might be called a person since it is an individual substance. Nevertheless because it is an individual substance existing in something else it cannot be called a person nor for the same reason can the human nature in Christ although it may be called something individual and singular. Reply to Objection 3. As a person signifies something complete and self subsisting in rational nature so a hypothesis, suppositum and being of nature in the genus of substance signifies something that subsists of itself hence as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the person of the Son of God so likewise it is not of itself a hypothesis or suppositum or a being of nature hence in the sense in which we deny that Christ as man is a person we must deny all the other propositions. LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica terziapars triates on the Savior by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 17 of Christ's unity of being in two articles. We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common for in their proper place we must consider what pertains to unity and polarality in detail. Thus we concluded in question 9 that there is not only one knowledge in Christ and it will be concluded hereafter in question 35 article 2 that there is not only one nativity in Christ. Hence we must consider Christ's unity one of being two of will three of operation under the first head there are two points of inquiry first whether Christ is one or two second whether there is only one being in Christ first article whether Christ is one or two objection one it would seem that Christ is not one but two for Augustine says in on the Trinity one seven because the form of God took the form of a servant both are God by reason of God who assumed yet both are man by reason of the man assumed now both may only be said when there are two therefore Christ is two objection to further where there is one thing and another there are two now Christ is one thing and another for Augustine says in the incursion 35 being in the form of God he took the form of a servant being both in one but he was one of these as word and the other as man therefore Christ is two objection three further Christ is not only man for if he were a mere man he would not be God therefore he is something else than man and thus in Christ there is one thing and another therefore Christ is two objection for further Christ is something that the father is and something that the father is not therefore Christ is one thing and another therefore Christ is two objection five further as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three persons in one nature so in the mystery of the incarnation there are two natures in one person but on account of the unity of the nature notwithstanding the distinction of person the father and son are one according to John 10 30 I and the father are one therefore notwithstanding the unity of person Christ is two on account of the duality of nature objection six further the philosopher says in physics 3 18 that one and two are predicated denominatively now Christ has a duality of nature therefore Christ is two objection seven further as accidental form makes a thing otherwise altar room so does substantial form make another thing Aliud as porphyry states in his predicaments now in Christ there are two substantial natures the human and the divine therefore Christ is one thing and another therefore Christ is two on the contrary Boethius says in on the two natures whatever is in as much as it is is one but we confess that Christ is therefore Christ is one I answer that nature considered in itself as it is used in the abstract cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person except in God in whom what it is and whereby it is do not differ as stated in the first part question 29 article 4 first reply but in Christ since there are two natures notably the divine and the human one of them notably the divine may be predicated of him both in the abstract and in the concrete for we say that the son of God who is signified by the word Christ is the divine nature and is God but the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract but only in the concrete that is as it is signified by the suppositum for we cannot truly say that Christ is human nature because human nature is not naturally predicated of its suppositum but we say that Christ is a man even as Christ is God now God signifies one having the Godhead and man signifies one having manhood yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word man and by the word Jesus or Peter for this word man implies having manhood indistinctly even as the word God implies indistinctly one having the Godhead but the word Peter or Jesus implies one having manhood distinctly that is with its determinate individual properties as son of God implies one having the Godhead under a determinate personal property now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures hence if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ it would follow that Christ is true but because the two natures are not predicated of Christ except as they are signified in the suppositum it must be by reason of the suppositum that one or two be predicated of Christ now some placed two supposita in Christ and one person which in their opinion would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final completion hence since they placed two supposita in Christ they said that God is two in the neuter but because they asserted one person they said that Christ is one in the masculine for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect on the other hand the Nestorians who asserted two persons in Christ said that Christ is two not only in the neuter but also in the masculine but since we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ as is clear from question two articles two and three it follows that we say that Christ is one not merely in the masculine but also in the neuter reply to objection one this saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if both referred to the predicate so as to mean that Christ is both but it refers to the subject and thus both does not stand for two supposita but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete for I can say that both notably God and man are God on account of God who assumes and both notably God and man are man on account of the man assumed reply to objection two when it is said that Christ is one thing and another this saying is to be explained in the sense having this nature and another and it is in this way that Augustine explains it where after saying in the mediator of God and man the son of God is one thing and the son of man another he adds I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance and not another thing by reason of the unity of person hence Gregory Nadsiansen says in one of his letters if we must speak briefly that of which the savior is is one thing and another thus the invisible is not the same as the visible and what is without time is not the same as what is in time yet they are not one and another far from it for both these are one reply to objection three this is false Christ is only man because it does not exclude another suppositum but another nature since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally but if anything is added whereby it is drawn to the suppositum it would be a true proposition for instance Christ is only that which is man nevertheless it would not follow that he is any other thing than man because another thing in as much as it refers to a diversity of substance properly refers to the suppositum even as all relative things bearing a personal relation but it does follow therefore he has another nature reply to objection four when it is said Christ is something that the father is something signifies the divine nature which is predicated even in the abstract of the father and son but when it is said Christ is something that is not the father something signifies not the human nature as it is in the abstract but as it is in the concrete not indeed in a distinct but in an indistinct suppositum that is in as much as it underlies the nature and not the individuating properties hence it does not follow that Christ is one thing and another or that he is too since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ which is the person of the Son of God does not reckon numerically with the divine nature which is predicated of the father and son reply to objection five in the mystery of the divine trinity the divine nature is predicated even in the abstract of the three persons hence it may be said simply that the three persons are one but in the mystery of the incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of Christ hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two reply to objection six two signifies what has duality not in another but in the same thing of which two is predicated now what is predicated is said of the suppositum which is implied by the word Christ hence although Christ has duality of nature yet because he has not duality of suppositum it cannot be said that Christ is two reply to objection seven otherwise implies diversity of accident hence diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called otherwise simply but another thing implies diversity of substance now not merely the nature but also the suppositum is said to be a substance as is said in metaphysics five fifteen hence diversity of nature does not suffice for anything to be called another thing simply unless there is diversity of suppositum but diversity of nature makes another thing relatively that is in nature if there is no diversity of suppositum second article whether there is only one being in Christ objection one it would seem that in Christ there is not merely one being but two for damasin says and on the true faith three thirteen that whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ but being follows the nature for being is from the form hence in Christ there are two beings objection to further the being of the Son of God is the divine nature itself and is eternal whereas the being of the man Christ is not the divine nature but is a temporal being therefore there is not only one being in Christ objection three further in the Trinity although there are three persons yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being but in Christ there are two natures though there is one person therefore in Christ there is not only one being objection for further in Christ the soul gives some being to the body since it is its form but it does not give the divine being since this is uncreated therefore in Christ there is another being besides the divine being and thus in Christ there is not only one being on the contrary everything is said to be a being in as much as it is one for one and being are convertible therefore if there were two beings in Christ and not only one Christ would be two and not one I answer that because in Christ there are two natures and one hypothesis it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two and that those belonging to the hypothesis in Christ must be only one now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypothesis to the hypothesis as to that which has being and to the nature as to that whereby it has being for nature is taken after the manner of a form which is said to be a being because something is by it as by whiteness a thing is white and by manhood a thing is man now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypothesis this being is not said to belong to the person simply but relatively as to be white is the being of socrates not as he is socrates but in as much as he is white and there is no reason why this being should not be multiplied in one hypothesis or person for the being whereby socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician but the being which belongs to the very hypothesis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypothesis or person since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one thing if therefore the human nature accrued to the Son of God not hypostatically or personally but accidentally as some maintained it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ one in as much as he is God the other in as much as he is man even as in socrates we place one being in as much as he is white and another in as much as he is a man since being white does not pertain to the personal being of socrates but being possessed of a head being corporeal being animated all these pertain to the one person of socrates and hence there arises from these only the one being of socrates and if it so happened that after the person of socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes as happened to him who was born blind no new being would there be added to socrates but only a relation to these that is in as much as he would be said to be not only with reference to what he had previously but also with reference to it accrued to him afterwards and thus since the human nature is united to the Son of God hypostatically or personally as was said above in question two articles five and six and not accidentally it follows that by the human nature there accrued to him no new personal being but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature in such a way that the person is said to subsist not merely in the divine but also in the human nature reply to objection one being is consequent upon nature not as upon that which has being but as upon that whereby a thing is whereas it is consequent upon person or hypothesis as upon that which has being hence it has unity from the unity of hypothesis rather than duality from the duality of the nature reply to objection two the eternal being of the Son of God which is the divine nature becomes the being of man in as much as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of person reply to objection three as was said in the first part question 50 article two third reply and in question 75 article five fourth reply since the divine person is the same as the nature there is no distinction in the divine persons between the being of the person and the being of the nature and consequently the three persons have only one being but they would have a triple being if the being of the person were distinct in them from the being of the nature reply to objection four in Christ the soul gives being to the body in as much as it makes it accidentally animated which is to give it the complement of its nature and species but if we consider the body perfected by the soul without the hypothesis having both this whole composed of soul and body as signified by the word humanity does not signify what is but whereby it is hence being belongs to the subsisting person in as much as it has a relation to such a nature and of this relation the soul is the cause in as much as it perfects human nature by informing the body end of question 17 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 18 of Summa Theologica tertia pars triates on the Savior this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica tertia pars triates on the Savior by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 18 of Christ's unity of will in six articles we must now consider unity as regards the will and under this head there are six points of inquiry first whether the divine will and the human are distinct in Christ second whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct from the will of reason third whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ fourth whether there was free will in Christ fifth whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the divine will in the thing willed sixth whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ first article whether there are two wills in Christ objection one it would seem that in Christ there are not two wills one divine and the other human for the will is the first mover and the first commander in whoever wills but in Christ the first mover and commander was the divine will since in Christ everything human was moved by the divine will hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will notably the divine objection to further an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the will of its mover now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of his godhead hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will but by the divine will objection three further that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the nature but the will does not seem to pertain to nature for natural things are of necessity whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity therefore there is but one will in Christ objection four further damascene says in on the true faith 314 that to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect that is our personal intellect but every will is this or that will since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its species therefore all will belongs to the person but in Christ there was and is but one person therefore in Christ there is only one will on the contrary our Lord says in Luke 22 42 Father if thou wilt remove this chalice from me but yet not my will but thine be done and Ambrose quoting this to the emperor gracious in on the faith 2 7 says as he assumed my will he assumed my sorrow and on Luke 22 42 he says his will he refers to the man the fathers to the godhead for the will of man is temporal and the will of the godhead eternal I answer that some placed only one will in Christ but they seem to have had different motives for holding this for Apollon eras did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ but maintained that the word was in place of the soul or even in the place of the intellect and since the will is in the reason as the philosopher says in on the soul 3 9 it followed that in Christ there was no human will and thus there was only one will in him so too Oetikes and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in him Nestorius 2 who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will held only one will in Christ but later on Macarius Patriarch of Antioch Cirrus of Alexandria and Serjuus of Constantinople and some of their followers held that there was one will in Christ although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypothesis because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its own motion but only in as much as it was moved by the godhead as this plane from the synodal letter of Pope Agatha in the third council of Constantinople Act 4 and hence in the sixth council held at Constantinople Act 18 it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ in the following passage in accordance with what the prophets of old taught us concerning Christ and as he taught us himself and the symbol of the holy fathers has handed down to us we confess two natural wills in him and two natural operations and this much it was necessary to say for it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature as was shown above in question five as well as in question nine article one now the will pertains to the perfection of human nature being one of its natural powers even as the intellect as was stated in the first part questions 79 and 80 hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will together with human nature now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to his divine nature to which it belongs to have a will as was said in the first part question 19 article one hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ that is one human the other divine reply to objection one whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the divine will yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature for the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will who worketh in them both to will and to accomplish as is written in Philippians 2 13 for although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature yet it can be moved inwardly by God as was said in the first part question 105 article 4 and thus to Christ by his human will followed the divine will according to Psalm 39 verse 9 that I should do thy will oh my God I have desired it hence Augustine says in his letter against Maximus 220 where the Son says to the father not what I will but what thou willest what do you gain by adding your own words and saying he shows that his will was truly subject to his father as if we denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will reply to objection to it is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent yet diversely according to the property of its nature for an inanimate instrument as an ax or a saw is moved by the craftsmen with only a corporeal movement but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite as a horse by its rider and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act the servant being like an animate instrument as the philosopher says in politics one two as well as an ethics 811 and hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the godhead and was moved by its own will reply to objection three the power of the will is natural and necessarily follows upon the nature but the movement or act of this power which is also called will is sometimes natural and necessary for example with respect to beatitude and sometimes brings from free will and is neither necessary nor natural as this plane from what has been stated in the second part the past primus akundi question 10 articles one and two and yet every reason itself which is the principle of this movement is natural hence besides the divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will not merely as a natural power or a natural movement but even as a rational movement reply to objection four when we say to will in a certain way we signify a determinant mode of willing now a determinant mode of willing regards the thing of which it is the mode hence since the will pertains to the nature to will in a certain way belongs to the nature not indeed considered absolutely but as it is in the hypothesis hence the human will of Christ had a determinant mode from the fact of being in divine hypothesis that is it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the divine will second article whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason objection one it would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality besides the will of reason for the philosopher says in on the soul 342 that the will is in the reason and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupisable parts no sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality objection to further according to Augustine in on the Trinity 1212 the sensuality is signified by the serpent but there was nothing serpent like in Christ for he had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom as Augustine says in his answer to the polygons 132 hence in Christ there is no will of sensuality objection three further will is consequent upon nature as was said in article one but in Christ there was only one nature besides the divine hence in Christ there was only one human will on the contrary Ambrose says in on the faith to seven mine is the will which he calls his own because as man he assumed my sorrow from this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ now sorrow pertains to the sensuality as was said in the second part the past premise a goon day question 23 article 1 as well as in question 25 article 1 therefore seemingly in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason I answer that as was said in question 9 article 1 the son of God assumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature now in human nature is included animal nature as the genus in its species hence the son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature one of which things is the sensitive appetite which is called the sensuality consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite or sensuality but it must be born in mind that sensuality or the sensual appetite in as much as it naturally obeys reason is said to be rational by participation as is clear from the philosopher in ethics 113 and because the will is in the reason as stated above it may equally be said that the sensuality is a will by participation reply to objection one this argument is based on the will essentially so called which is only in the intellectual part but the will by participation can be in the sensitive part in as much as it obeys reason reply to objection to the sensuality is signified by the serpent not as regards the nature of the sensuality which Christ assumed but as regards the corruption of the fomez which was not in Christ reply to objection three where there is one thing on account of another there seems to be only one as Aristotle states in the topics three thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color so too because the sensuality is called the will only because it partakes of the rational will there is said to be but one human will in Christ even as there is but one human nature third article whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason objection one it would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason for damasin says in on the true faith 222 that there is a double will in man notably the natural will which is called tell a cease and the rational will which is called bull a cease now Christ in his human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ objection to further the appetitive power is diversified in man by the difference of the apprehensive power and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellect of appetite in man but in the same way as regards man's apprehension we hold the difference of reason and intellect both of which were in Christ therefore there was a double will in him one intellectual and the other rational objection three further some like you of saint victor ascribed to Christ a will of piety which can only be on the part of reason therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills on the contrary in every order there is one first mover but the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts therefore in one man there is only one will properly speaking which is the will of reason but Christ is one man therefore in Christ there is only one human will I answer that as stated above in article one third reply the will is sometimes taken for the power and sometimes for the act hence if the will is taken for the act it is necessary to place two wills that is two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason for the will as was said in the paris primis akundi question eight articles two and three regards both the end and the means and is affected differently towards both for towards the end it is born simply and absolutely as towards what is good in itself but towards the means it is born under a certain relation as the goodness of the means depends on something else hence the act of the will in as much as it is drawn to anything desired of itself as health which act is called by damasin thelesis that is simple will and by the masters will as nature is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else as to take medicine and this act of the will damasin calls bullesis that is counseling will and the masters will as reason but this diversity of acts does not diversify the power since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object which is goodness hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will in christ there is about one human will essentially so called and not by participation but if we are speaking of the will as an act we thus distinguish in christ a will as nature which is called thelesis and a will of reason which is called bullesis reply to objection one these two wills do not diversify the power but only the act as we have said reply to objection two the intellect and the reason are not distinct powers as was said in the first part question 79 article 8 reply to objection three the will of piety would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature in as much as it shrinks from another's evil absolutely considered fourth article whether there was free will in christ objection one it would seem that in christ there was no free will for damasin says in on the true faith 314 that gnome that is opinion thinking or cogitation and pro eresis that is choice cannot possibly be attributed to our lord if we wish to speak with propriety but in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety therefore there was no choice in christ and consequently no free will of which choice is the act objection to further the philosopher says in ethics 3 2 that choice is a desire of something after taking counsel now counsel does not appear to be in christ because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of but christ was certain of everything hence there was no counsel and consequently no free will in christ objection three further free will is indifferent but christ's will was determined to good since he could not sin as stated above in question 15 articles 1 and 2 hence there was no free will in christ on the contrary it is written in isaac 7 verse 15 he shall eat butter and honey that he may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good which is an act of the free will therefore there was free will in christ i answer that as was said above in article 3 there was a twofold act of the will in christ one whereby he was drawn to anything willed in itself which implies the nature of an end the other whereby his will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another which pertains to the nature of means now as the philosopher says in ethics 3 2 choice differs from will in this that will of itself regards the end while choice regards the means and thus simple will is the same as the will as nature but choice is the same as the will as reason and is the proper act of free will as was said in the first part question 83 article 3 hence since the will as reason is placed in christ we must also place choice and consequently free will whose act is choice as was said in the first part question 83 article 3 as well as in the paris prima secunde question 13 article 1 reply to objection 1 damasin excludes choice from christ insofar as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice since it belongs even to god himself to choose according to Ephesians 1 4 he chose us in him before the foundation of the world although in god there is no doubt yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature we may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted reply to objection 2 choice presupposes counsel yet it follows counsel not only as determined by judgment for what we judge to be done we choose after the inquiry of counsel as is stated in ethics 3 2 and 3 hence if anything is judged necessary to be done without any preceding doubt or inquiry this suffices for choice therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially but only when it is in an ignorant nature reply to objection 3 the will of christ though determined to good is not determined to this or that good hence it pertains to christ even as to the blessed to choose with a free will confirmed in good fifth article whether the human will of christ was altogether conformed to the divine will in the thing willed objection 1 he would seem that the human will in christ did not will anything except what god willed for it is written in psalm 39 verse 9 in the person of christ that i should do thy will oh my god i have desired it now he who desires to do another's will wills what the other wills hence it seems that christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by his divine will objection 2 further christ's soul had most perfect charity which indeed surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge according to aphesians 3 19 the charity of christ which surpasses all knowledge now charity makes men will what god wills hence the philosopher says in ethics 9 4 that one mark of friendship is to will and choose the same therefore the human will in christ willed nothing else than was willed by his divine will objection 3 further christ was a true comprehensor but the saints who are comprehensors in heaven will only what god wills otherwise they would not be happy because they would not obtain whatever they will for blessed is he who has what he wills and wills nothing amiss as augustin says in on the trinity 13 5 hence in his human will christ wills nothing else than does the divine will on the contrary augustin says in against maximus 220 when christ says not what i will but what thou willed he shows himself to have willed something else than did his father and this could only have been by his human heart since he did not transfigure our weakness into his divine but into his human will i answer that as was said above in articles 2 and 3 in christ according to his human nature there is a twofold will notably the will of sensuality which is called will by participation and the rational will whether considered after the manner of nature or after the manner of reason now it was said above in question 13 article 3 first reply as well as in question 14 article 1 second reply that by a certain dispensation the son of god before his passion allowed his flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it and in like manner he allowed all the powers of his soul to do what belonged to them now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt in like manner the will as nature turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself as death and the like yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end as in a mere man the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning which nevertheless the will as reason may choose for the sake of health now it was the will of god that christ should undergo pain suffering and death not that these of themselves were willed by god but for the sake of man salvation hence it is plain that in his will of sensuality and in his rational will considered as nature christ could will what god did not but in his will as reason he always willed the same as god which appears from what he says in matthew 2639 not as i will but as thou wilt for he willed in his reason that the divine will should be fulfilled although he said that he willed something else by another will reply to objection one by his rational will christ willed the divine will to be fulfilled but not by his will of sensuality the mover of which does not extend to the will of god nor by his will considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the divine will reply to objection two the conformity of the human will to the divine regards the will of reason according to which the wills even of friends agree in as much as reason consider something willed in its relation to the will of a friend reply to objection three christ was at once comprehensive and wayfarer in as much as he was enjoying god in his mind and had a passable body hence things repugnant to his natural will and to his sensitive appetite could happen to him in his passable flesh sixth article whether there was contrariety of wills in christ objection one you would seem that there was contrariety of wills in christ for contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects is contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of Germany as is plain from the philosopher in physics five forty nine and following now christ in his different wills wished contrary things for in his divine will he wished for death from which he shrank in his human will hence athanasius says when christ says father if it be possible let this chalice pass from me yet not my will but thine be done and again the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh weak he denotes two wills the human which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion and his divine will eager for the passion hence there was contrariety of wills in christ objection two further it is written in glations five seventeen that the flesh lost death against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh now when the spirit desires one thing and the flesh another there is contrariety of wills but this was in christ for by the will of charity which the holy spirit was causing in his mind he willed the passion according to isaia fifty three seven he was offered because it was of his own will yet in his flesh he shrank from the passion therefore there was contrariety of wills in him objection three further it is written in luke twenty two forty three that being in an agony he prayed the longer now agony seems to imply a certain struggle in a soul drawn to contrary things hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in christ on the contrary in the decisions of the sixth council of constantinople it is said in act eighteen we confess two natural wills not in opposition as evil-minded heretics assert but following his human will and neither withstanding nor striving against but rather being subject to his divine and omnipotent will i answer that contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same for if the diversity exists as regards diverse things and in diverse subjects this would not suffice for the nature of contrariety nor even for the nature of contradiction for example if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand but not as regards his foot hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary first that the diversity of wills should regard the same for if the will of one regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason there is not complete contrariety of will for example when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth and one of the ladders kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love there is no contrariety of wills unless indeed the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private good in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same secondly for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in the same will for if a man wishes one thing with his rational appetite and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite there is no contrariety unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rational appetite for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach the rational will and hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive will in christ wished what the divine will did not wish yet there was no contrariety of wills in him first because neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the divine will and the will of the human reason in christ wished the passion for the absolute will of christ wished the salvation of the human race although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further but the movement of sensuality could no wise extend so far secondly because neither the divine will nor the will of reason in christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality so too on the other hand neither the divine will nor the will of reason in christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality in christ for it pleased christ in his divine will and in his will of reason that his natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature hence it is clear that in christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills reply to objection one the fact of any will in christ willing something else than did the divine will proceeded from the divine will by whose permission the human nature in christ was moved by its proper movements as damasin says in on the true faith two 15 18 and 19 reply to objection two in us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh this did not occur in christ hence in christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit as in us reply to objection three the agony in christ was not in the rational soul in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives as when anyone on his reason considering one wishes one thing and on its considering another wishes the contrary for this springs from the weakness of the reason which is unable to judge which is the best simply now this did not occur in christ since by his reason he judged it best that the divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by his passion nevertheless there was an agony in christ as regards the sensitive part in as much as it implied a dread of coming trial as damasin says and on the true faith two 15 and in three 18 and 23 end of question 18 read by michael shane greg lambert lc