 First, for example, the principle of statism being so strong still, I was thinking, is this a big interest for any treatise to the European Union? Because it is. Thank you for your question. The Kamala's principle of statism is definitely a challenge towards the EU process and liberalization of Turkey. But other principles as well. I mean, nationalism is also a very big problem. Securism is a problem as well. And for example, secularism, the principle does not only limit the Muslim control to practice of the majority. It also limits the minority. Christians in Turkey have a problem with the secularism principle as well. For example, the Halki Seminary of the Ecumenical Petriarchies cannot be opened because Turkish law doesn't allow any religious school, period. Religious schools can only be run by the government. And the graduates of those schools can only go to the theology faculty, that's by law. So you cannot have any private religious school. Muslims can't have it. And Christians can't have it either. So secularism principle is a problem for everybody, like all religious denominations and all different religions. So you need to liberalize all these principles, that's for sure. As for Kemalism, I mean, there are writing two types of Kemalists. There are what I call the progressive Kemalists who would say, Al-Turk the best in his time and now we are at a different age. We should take his basic idea of modernization and muwan. They would be more open and supportive, open to and supportive of the EU process. But the more common Kemalism is what I call the literalist Kemalism, which says Al-Turk said this, period. That's his golden era and the reason we get there is like eternal. That is definitely an obstacle to the EU process. And about the mood in Turkey, about the EU, still there's a strong demand in Turkey to enter the EU. But Turks are a little bit disillusioned because they think Europeans don't want Turkey inside the EU, especially some Europeans. So I think the enthusiasm in Turkey for joining the EU has been a little bit curved by the fact that some European countries, most notably France and to a degree Germany and Austria, don't look as if they will ever want Turkey to join the union. Well, Kemalism has been imitated by in a few countries, most notably Iran in the 20s. The Shah of Iran was a great fan of Al-Turk and he wanted to implement some of his reforms in Iran. He even went to extreme, like he ordered his police to rip women off from their whales on the streets. Turkey never went as far as that one. What you got in return in Iran was Khomeini. So this dichotomy between a very strict and forced secularism and a traditional religious identity created all sorts of conflicts and rifts in different countries. In Tunisia, for example, there was Burkiba, he was also inspired by the Kemalist idea. He was just showing up on TV, drinking lemonade in Ramadan and telling his people not to faster in Ramadan because it makes them lazy, but national efficiency requires more work and so on. So this idea of imposed modernity created a reaction on the other side. And I think it has not been fully implemented in any other country. And I don't advise them the advice that they should. But it also has given a bad name for the idea of secularism. I mean, I make a distinction between secularism and secularity, and I'm a favor of secularity of the state, like a neutral state. But the idea that you can separate the state from religion came to the Islamic world only in the Kemalist sense. It meant that you should bend those practices, like clothes down with schools, bend hats, scarf and so on. That just created a more reactionary attitude towards any sort of modernization. So in that sense, it might have been like a factor which contributed to even the rise of radicals in some parts of the Middle East. I don't really have anything to add. I was just going to mention that his idolatry reforms were explicitly copied by the Pallavi dynasty in Iran. That's why I would agree, it's among others, but I would agree with everything that the Kurdish-Rakals, including the dangers of that kind of modernization. Actually, let me just quote for you. What exactly do you consider to be the proper role of King Mustafa as the kind of Turkey and everything you do mind? He is not a flake like the Barack Obama or the media creation. He's a man of shade in the country, he was stoner than the Indian local. While he was built in the country, he was very built as an independent state. Part of the solution, let me take it over, and he placed his different on it. And he could not be assured of Washington being the same in the United States, because he had the same annual facts in the country. Actually, both of you and some others actually have embraced a different model of Turkey, but what would be the role of the founder of the human stop in Turkey and the kind of Turkey that... Well, I think first we should note that Mustafa Kemal was the leader of the National War of Liberation to save the country, but he was not the creator of that war. And there were other generals, other people who collaborated with him. Even before he started the war, there were local organizations in Atolia to defend the country from invasion, and there was actually the Congress of those local groups to defend the country from invasion, and Mustafa Kemal came, and then they said, yeah, you're a good leader, you're a good general, you could be our leader. But he was not just the creator of... Because that kind of myth-making is very powerful in Turkey, that everybody was in vain and sleeping, and he came and showed us on the nation like a son, which was not the case, but definitely he was the number one leader there. The thing is, after the War of Liberation, what happened was that other Turks in the parliament, because the Ottoman Empire had a parliament, I mean, a parliament with all sorts of members, some parliament members sympathized with his political views. They formed the People's Republican Party in 1923, which still lives on as the Kemalist Party. The people who didn't agree with him, mean people who are either more than just the conservative or politically liberal, formed this liberal conservative alliance, and formed the Progressive Party, Terakipar-u-Afrika, as it's called in Turkey, in 1924. So there were just two party system evolving. What happened was that other Turks closed down the other party just six months later and established a single-party rule for 25 years. So then imposed his own ideology on the state as the only truth. I think he would have been done a much better job if he didn't ban opposition, and he just started his life as a politician and do his best for the country while allowing opposition to criticize him. And then maybe we would have gotten rid of some of the excesses of the Kemalist Revolution. Because there were all sorts of, since there was no criticism against his authorities, the revolution really got out of hand. I mean, they created race theories that Turks were the supreme Aryan race and everything came from Turkishness in 10,000 years ago and all those things. I think that would have been a much more balanced policy. Yeah, I largely agree. I would only want to add that, first of all, certainly I certainly would never presume to, in addressing your question, I would never presume to take the position of offering any, being a crass or didactic enough to try to tell the Turkish people what kind of country they ought to have or what sort of political arrangements they ought to make, so I just want to make that very clear at the outset. But also, I think that just to add to something that Dracula brought up, most of the Kemalist coming out of a very long tradition of a state-directed modernizing reform, in an interesting way, European kind of ended or began, or might end it in an interesting way with a centralized project of Ottoman intellectuals and military men highly influenced by a positivism by Kolt that had this, and they weren't alone in that. There were similar things were happening elsewhere in the world, South America especially. So this was sort of in the air, this kind of state-directed, guided kind of modernization. So that's just one other kind of extra point I want to mention to you. Also last year actually, at this very meeting, I gave a paper about one of these sort of alternative visions or voices for you, Mehmed Jagadbe, who was very interested in Adam Smith and Bastiat. He was executed in the context of the Kemalist. So there was, I think, a different kind of, I think that there was an interesting historical moment that for one reason or another was missed. The other thing that I'm very glad you pointed out was that the Ottoman Empire did have a harbour. It had a constitution, so there was material there on which to build some sort of a republic. For example, one symbolic effort of the Kemalist revolution is the Hatt's revolution of 1925. By law, Boller Hatt was made compulsory in Fezver's outlaw. The people were executed. A Hatt would have been. A Hatt would have been. And people were executed for not wearing it. So I mean, we didn't need to have that revolution. Today, nobody wears a Hatt, it was for the Hatt in Turkey. But some of the excesses could have been, I think, avoided if it was a system with some, a position allowed, but all the position was crushed. Thank you very much. I think both schools, and I'm asking you a fascinating, my question is to Peter, and you mentioned that in the non-consensual, there was a growing centralization of the state, which reduced the, what I thought, something that the area, the area was in favor of, which is the police-centric law system that existed in the 1925. And which was actually more than the three minutes because you had all the affirmations that had their own law in the French occupation. So it was really kind for the central, but what do you make of the reforms of the tax map in the 1830s on, which were, I would have thought, very progressive. So I would say that there was, on one hand, the kind of centralization of the legislative process, but was it not at the same time the kind of liberalization of the sub-government? Yeah, that's, and as a matter of fact, that's exactly the kind of question that Dr. Godfrey was hinting at, I think, and what you were grappling with in your presentation. The tax map reforms are of the beginning of 1839 or so, with one manifestation of this 19th century movement to centralize and ultimately modernize the empire. And yes, in some ways, you can look at those reforms, one could look at those reforms as being very progressive. The people, the Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals who initiated them saw themselves as progressive reformers, as did the French. So my point actually wasn't so much to make any normal judgments about the actual, whether these things were progressive or not or anything like that. I was just interested in exploring how the process of centralizing power in the state, and actually centralizing and codifying these different previously existing legal structures end up creating exactly the opposite of what the reform was having like. So, if I'm understanding your question correctly, and by the way, the point about the capitulations is a very good one, and I didn't bring that off because I thought that would have, muddy the waters a little too much and what already was probably too ambitious project for such a short presentation, but the point again I was trying to make wasn't necessarily to say that these reforms were progressive or not, but rather to point out, perhaps the inherent dangers of this kind of modernization or reform that's directed centrally by a sort of self-proclaimed group of reformers using the coercive power of the second government. With the tradition of regard to the important state as an absolute power against the government, and it was so very typically, now that doesn't seem to be entirely important to the facts and I'm aware of what it means to us most of this and there are a lot of things that remain in it, but you might grow up in its tiny force and it's the question of, can I have a third opinion of what it's all about, being one of the greatest facts, and I think it's around the 20th century, but that we did give the term, the constitutional state, from the further development to the constitutional. So is the division trying to grow up on the order of the state and being an absolute power against the government, in its tiny force or is there something? Well, thank you for the question. I think the term is always somewhere in between extremes and I think, let me give you one example. The Greeks rebelled against the Ottoman Empire like the Serbs because they believed that they had a national homeland and they did and they wanted to liberate it. The Jews never did rebel against the Ottoman Empire. They actually loved the Ottoman Empire to the end because Jews didn't proclaim a national homeland. Well, Zionism did at some point, but the Jews of the Ottoman Empire were actually fearful that the empire would collapse and they would be left to the mercy of these Russian, Bulgarian, Slavic Christians coming from the Balkans. So I think, I would say my, well, Dr. Menzel is definitely a much more bigger expert on Ottoman history than I am, but my sense about the Ottoman Empire was that until the 19th century, you didn't have national rebellions like the Serbian and the Greek ones because there was no idea of a nation. And so I think the Serbs and the Greeks and the Bulgarians did relatively well under the Ottoman Empire, especially at the time because the Ottomans did not have a policy of forced conversion and they just let those people live according to their norms unless there was a rebellion or something. In the 19th century, with the French Revolution, the idea of a state for every nation became widespread and it started to come to the empire. So in the western parts of the empire, Greeks said, well, we have been under Turkish yoke for 500 years or 400 years, but they didn't think that way a century ago because they didn't think themselves as a people. So that consciousness, I think, brought to this integration of the empire and that consciousness also made the Turks more and more nationalistic and suspicious of the minorities among them, which led to the catastrophe of the Armenians in 1915, the great massacres and expulsion of the Armenians, which was a product of the fall of the empire, not the empire itself, I mean, the crumbling empire created that disaster. As for Al-Thahturk, actually he did not bring a constitutional state. The constitutional state was there. I mean, the Ottoman Empire except a constitution in 1876. And in 1908, there was a second period of constitutional monarchy. He actually, he created a new constitution in 1924, which was interestingly less liberal than the one in 1920. For example, it brought the definition of Turkishness into the constitution. And also it gave the parliament, which he dominated, full powers, all the powers to try. And so there were like tribunals to just deal with the enemies of the revolution. And many people were executed, like Javid Bey, who was like a libertarian. So he brought a constitution, I mean, you should look at the content of the constitution. Right now we have a constitution, again made by the Kamalist generals, which still blocks Turkey's modernization in different ways. My view is this, Mustafa Kemal, the Turk was definitely a modernizer. No doubt about that. But modernity sometimes can be a good thing. Sometimes can be a not very good thing. And it depends on, I think, the authoritarianness or the, you know, liberalness of that modernity. And in the next time, I think the authoritarian side was much more emphasized. Again, I don't have too much to add, except that it might be of interest, especially to some people in the room, to note that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 that was then reinstated in 1908 was almost word for word a translation of the Belgian constitution. So whatever one thinks of the Belgian constitution, that was 1830, I guess. But that was the constitution they were, the Ottoman Empire used to basically the Belgian constitution. Again, I don't have too much to add, except to say that one of the things I was trying to explore in my own remarks was just, was a way, your question, but also the points that Mr. Ockel brought up, that I think that something, what happens in the 19th century is an interesting combination of these foreign ideas, ideas of romantic nationalism and the enlightenment coming in from students, the Ottoman Empire had sent to Europe. They bring these ideas back. And what's interesting is they find in the Milets, which were basically established in the 19th century, these sort of ready-made vehicles for the transmission of these ideas. So they convert these institutions, the Milets institutions, really into embryonic national states or national projects. It's also interesting that the Ottoman authorities wanted the Milets to have constitutions even before the Ottoman Empire itself officially had one in the 1860s. And these constitutions were written generally not by the clerics, but by these young nationalists coming back from Europe who then used constitutions of these Milets as a way of basically thinking about, in national terms as opposed to religious terms. And then once you start thinking about nations, then of course they need a homeland, they need a state. I'm not sure how to answer the other part of your question. I did say that I wasn't trying to, I mean, I'm not, there certainly were all sorts of abuses in all of these systems. So I'm not trying to say that, like some people do, by the way, say, that the Ottoman Empire, especially under Sultan Suleiman, who was some kind of interfaith paradise and everyone, you know, and I'm talking one another all day. It was a kind of a war, you know. I mean, it surely was. And there surely were built into the system various kinds of power relationships in part based on religion. What I thought was so interesting from some of these court cases is that it suggested that the segregation between the communities was not nearly as powerful as has been imagined. The mass of oppressed Christians kind of growing under an unmitigated Ottoman tyranny. I mean, it also suggested that there were some, there were some Christians in this world, in this pre-19th century Ottoman world who were pretty powerful, who could stand up to powerful Muslims in the establishment and win in the Sharia court. So again, I'm not sure if I'm entirely answering your question, but it's a, so what an interesting point I just want to add upon to your actually speech, which is very good about Sharia and sometimes Christians finding Sharia useful. In the ninth Ottoman Sultan, who was like, he was the grim, like a heavy-handed Sultan and he did some massacres of Shiites in the east and so on. He at some point decided to convert all Christians to Muslims so he can rule the empire better, more, you know, neat empire, everybody. The Sheikh of Islam said, you can't do this, this is against the Sharia. Sir, there has been time, because forced conversion is not, you know, it's banned in the Quran actually. I mean, there's another problem about apostasy, but, you know, forced conversion is not an Islamic practice. So this was one thing I just want to add. And the second thing is when the Ottomans gave equal citizenship rights to Christians and Jews in 1856, the Salahat Ferman, this was the second step after Tanzimah, because before then they were second class citizens. They were protected Zizmiz, but they would not have the equal rights. Some Christians didn't like it because it also meant that now they have to serve in the military. Before then they were just paying a lot of some extra tax, but they were, you know, free from military service. Not to quibble, but no one was a citizen. There were no citizens at all. Well, no citizen, but equal rights. I mean, it's just that because it implies a kind of a different kind of democratic, constitutional democratic order. Okay, sorry. I defer to your wisdom on that. It's a subject of the Salahat Ferman. Yeah, but equality was brought to all citizens equal, like things that include the, I mean, if taxes were equal, and they had to serve in the military like Muslims did, but some were not happy about that. So the system had sometimes advantages and disadvantages. And also, that was the system. But otherwise, I mean, you had like a tough Sultan who just, you know, there was a rebellion and they suppressed rebellion with very bloody methods. That's something else, but I think the general system, or I mean, to use it very, you know, like a pejorative way, the system was, I think, relatively preferable to non-Muslims. And that's why especially the Jews preferred the Ottoman Empire. In fact, even the military service was so unpopular that the authorities had to institute a special tax. It was available only to the Christians that they could buy them, and Jews, that they could buy themselves out of the military. Yeah. How much are you supposed to throw the hand into the army of the Ottomans? Well, that's a very, this is a political question, if I were a good question, thank you. I don't think so. I mean, first of all, the Caliphate is, it's a political institution. And it was established after the Prophet died, and you know, Muslims by arbitration, they said, let's have a successorship, and it went on. It's unlike the role of the Pope and Catholicism. It's not that integral to the faith. I mean, if you don't have a Caliphate, you're just totally lost. I mean, it's not that way. It was more of a political role than a religious role. And when he abolished it, I think he had bad consequences in the sense of leaving the Sunni world totally chaotic. But I don't see in the future any chance of establishing the Caliphate, because it was just transmitted, but now, how do you re-establish it? I mean, the best thing the Muslim world could establish was the Islamic Conference, the Organization of the Islamic Conference. But I don't think anyone has the authorities right now say, I'm establishing it here, but they will say, who are you, I mean? So I think we will be in a chaotic world, in that sense, for the foreseeable future. Yeah. It's a very new concern.