 I'm Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program here at CSIS, and on behalf of John Hamry, who was here just a moment ago and had to be called away at the very last second and could not be here to introduce Commissioner Barnier. He sends his regrets to you and certainly to the Commissioner. But we are extremely grateful that you are here with us today. I had a privilege and a pleasure to have the European Union Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, and I bet you probably didn't think an Internal Markets Commissioner would talk about European common security and defense policy, but we are in for a great treat to hear this very important message. Michel Barnier, in addition to his responsibilities as Commissioner for the Internal Markets, is also Vice President of the Pan-European Center-Right European Peoples Party and has served with distinction for many years in the French government, serving as France's Minister of Agricultural and Fisheries, of course Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2004 to 2005, Minister of European Affairs, Minister of the Environment, and the list goes on and on. I will give a plug for the Commissioner's brand new book that has just come out in French, giving his reflections on the future of Europe. Michel Barnier, so reposez ou être libre, and we certainly will look forward for his reflections on, for Europe to remain free. So with that, please join me in welcoming Commissioner Michel Barnier to offer reflections on European defense. Thank you. Thank you very much, and good afternoon to all of you. Thank you for your presence. Thank you for the support you just tried to give to my book. I'm sorry, but it is just published in French a few weeks ago, not yet in English. Perhaps I can find a publisher. Thanks to you. The title of this small book, which was and which still is my contribution to the public debate in Europe about Europe and the future of Europe, is reposez ou être libre, to rest or to be free. It's a sentence of Tucydides in the War of Peloponnes, speaking to the Athenians, to rest or to be free, you have to choose. And I think it's exactly the question for the European right now. And you have just forgotten one very important piece of my long political life, which I'm very proud about, and very unusual for a politician because I spent 10 years of my life from 81 to 92 to organize the Winter Olympics in my region of the Alps. And it's very unusual for a politician to spend 10 years for 16 days, which is the duration of the Olympics. Thank you very much for inviting me to speak at this session of the CSIS. And I wish all the best to John Amre. Thanks also to your team, the team of CSIS for its outstanding work. And I'm very happy, ladies and gentlemen, to be here today in front of an American audience because it is of utmost importance to continue the dialogue, to improve the dialogue with our American friends. I was in Brussels, as usual, but last March when President Obama spoke to young Europeans in very strong speeches. And I can tell you sometimes it's good to be reminded of our shared value as we were on the beaches of Normandy a few days ago, once again. The reason why I'm here with you today is precisely because I would like to share with you how we want to defend those values together with you. And I want to speak to you, of course, as a European commissioner in charge of the single market over the financial regulations. We work so much with all the countries of Europe, but also to build the level playing field and to implement the G20 recommendations on both sides of the Atlantic during the last five years. But not only as a European commissioner, but also as a former French foreign minister. We worked closely with the U.S. in 2004, in particular with President Bush, when we managed together to free Lebanon from the grip of Syria. And I don't forget today this close cooperation between us. The world has changed since the end of the Cold War, and our relationship should be deepened. On both sides of the Atlantic, we have faced the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. America took important steps. It implemented a strong recovery plan and both monetary policy. And it is well on its way towards energy independence and objective that would have seemed totally unrealistic only a few years ago. And on our side in Europe, also, we have taken great strides to save the euro, to regulate financial markets, establish a banking union that is my major achievement of the last two years, and to consolidate public finances, improve our competitiveness, and put in place new systems of economic and fiscal governance. I'm confident that both the U.S. and Europe will emerge stronger from this crisis. Never forget when you look at what is decided and built in Europe that it is always more difficult on our side. Europe does not want to be a federal state. We have to work and to respect 28 member states. We are not a federal state, and so it's always more difficult to work and to decide. But that won't be enough, all what we did. Since the end of the Cold War, the world in which we live has become smaller, faster, more complex, and more interconnected. New actors, new interdependences, and new threats emerge. Inequalities, depletion of resources, climate change and demography, remain sources of instability in too many parts of the world. Nations outside of the U.S. and Europe have entered the global scene as big industrial, economic, sometimes military powers, China, India, and Brazil, to name a few. Defending their own interests in their sphere of influence, taking stronger positions in the UN Security Council. All this leads to turbulence and unrest in more and more places around the world, in the soil so painfully brought home to us by the kidnapping of those schoolgirls in Nigeria, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, throughout the Middle East, where the Syrian crisis show little sign of easing and next to it the increasing pressure of fundamentalists in various Iraqi regions today. Closer to home, Ukraine, where the National Army and separatists are now openly fighting each other in the Slavic regions. And we should not forget the simmering tensions in the South China Sea. Everywhere we see that regional crisis can turn into violent conflicts and that violence can come from both state and non-state actors. Terrorists can strike anyone, anywhere. A car bombed in Kabul or Kalashnikov at the Brussels-Jewish Museum a few days ago. Weapons of mass destruction are still within reach for a number of countries. And finally, if I may so, cyber attacks can target all of us, governments, banks, telecom companies or hospitals. In this new international order or disorder, the economic, military, political and even moral leadership of the West is increasingly challenging. If the US and the EU want to be in a position to influence this new world, we need to be actors, not spectators. We need to act together. In the midst of such turbulence, it's vital to know who your friends are. Be able to count on a reliable partner. And ladies and gentlemen, I want to stress that point to you. Today, Europe is that reliable partner for the US. And we are determined to act together with you to defend our common values and interests. To do so, and this is my second point, as natural allies and close friends, we need to be able to redesign our relationship and develop it further. I hardly need to recall the long and special partnership we have built together. The US intervened twice in the last century to help defend democracy in Europe against dictatorship and tyranny. It helped to rebuild Europe with a martial plan. Together, we withstood the spread of communism in the Cold War rage, saw the collapse of the Iron Curtain and reunified the European family. And more recently, we have been partners in fighting terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan. Today, the negotiations toward the free and fair, I'll take the two words of the president about free and fair and free trade, global partnership that were started last year, offer unique opportunity to strengthen and redesign the transatlantic partnership. To grow both our economies without sacrificing the values that we all dear, be at the forefront of global rules and standards and shape the global business environment for years to come. We need, in this dialogue, to be ambitious and build a real transatlantic marketplace. Trade between us does not stumble over import tariffs, already quite low at the 4%. It is to the behind the border issues where the real potential for improvement lies. And that is where we have to focus our energies. President Obama, as I said, said this treaty must be free and fair. And I agree. And we are not there yet. However, ladies and gentlemen, important for the TTIP may be, the Russian chip between the US and Europe cannot and must not be reduced to that of only a free trade area. It has to be a stronger political relationship. If we, Europeans, want to remain your best allies on the world stage, we have to act also as a security provider. We cannot leave the US alone being the world's only policeman. As President Obama said in West Point two weeks ago, the US can only use its military might when its own core interests are under threat. Allies and partners have to be mobilized to take collective action. At the present, also said rightly that the US military is still the biggest armor in the world, but not every problem is a nail. Taken together these two assumptions should be the foundation of a renewed front-Atlantic security partnership. In today's world, security can hardly ever be achieved only by military means. What we need is a comprehensive approach based on the broad spectrum of mostly civil instruments. This is a traditional EU security approach. And the main feature of its common foreign and security policy. However, in many cases, it is indispensable to back up those civil instruments with the capacity to use military firepower. Otherwise, diplomacy remains toothless. A credible common and foreign security and defense policy therefore needs first a strong common security and defense policy. And Europe can only become a credible security provider if it has also the military means to act and to be able to act without always depending on support from the US. Unfortunately, this is not the reality today. For many years, European nations have constantly reduced their defense expectations and to make things even worse. They did so in an uncoordinated way. This has led to an important capability, shortfalls, that limit Europe's capacity to act. To overcome these shortfalls and build the capacity to act, Europe has only one option, cooperation and integration. Arnaud Engant, with the chair of the Security and Defense Committee in the European Parliament, who several times in your guest here in this ICS, put it well recently, and I quote him, none of our member states, not even France or UK, the two strongest military powers in Europe, is in the position alone to face today's security challenges and threats in Europe. None of our member states, not even Germany, the strongest economic power is in a position alone to ensure the competitiveness of its national industrial base. And finally, none of our member states, not even the most attentive to ones, is in a position to rest for over on only the protection of the US. To put it in a nutshell, the US needs a strong Europe and only a united Europe has the potential to be strong and to be free. That's what I try to put in this small book. And I stress, ladies and gentlemen, united, not uniform. United, not uniform. I may add a common foreign and defense policy, not a single foreign and defense policy. In the new today, there is a growing awareness of the necessity to rise to this challenge. Last December, for the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, perhaps 10 years, European leaders came together to discuss defense at the highest political level. And they are clearly committed to stepping up the common security and defense policy. How? First, increasing the effectiveness of the CSDP, this common security and defense policy, in particular by strengthening the comprehensive security approach which combines civil and military means. Second, enhancing the development of defense capabilities with a focus on the most critical capability shortfalls. And third, strengthening Europe's defense industry, in particular by deepening the EU internal market for defense and boosting innovation. To achieve these objectives, they tasked member states and European institutions to take more than 30 concrete steps. The catalogue covers a broad spectrum of measures, ranging from preparing a maritime security strategy to developing an air-to-air refueling capacity or developing comprehensive security of supply regime. The message was clear. Member states and all EU institutions, the external action service under the direction of Cathy Ashton, the European defense agency, the European Commission have to deliver and report progress to heads of states and governments by June 2015. We know, I know that cooperation in defense is never easy since it touches upon national sovereignty and that European countries have strong national traditions, 28, in fact, different national traditions, which remain strong obstacles to any common approach. But speaking about the Commission, which is one of these institutions, I'm sure that we had that goal and to achieve this goal real added value. And with my colleagues of the Commission, we have worked on very specific fields where, through our policies, through our expertise, we can bring to the heads of states this added value to build this common security policy. For instance, the policy for energy, standardizations, research programs, public procurements, trade or space. That are the fields where we can bring this added value. We will not reach these objectives overnight. However, they are necessary, and I am convinced that the next Commission, starting its work from next October, will keep security and defense high on its political agenda. Ladies and gentlemen, I think we have more to do. As a politician and based on recent developments, I see telegraphically three main developments. First, the situation in the Kremlin made it clear that we lack a rapid and efficient sanctioned regime, because we don't have a shared understanding or overview of the investments and assets held by Russians, companies and citizens in the EU. We took too long to react. I have long called for a monitoring system for foreign investments to be implemented, especially those in critical technologies or defense industry. Second, the threat of Europe's gas supply gives us a unique opportunity to start a reflection on energy in Europe, just as you did here a number of years ago with Shell gas. This is as much a matter of independence as it is of competitiveness. And third, I think it is of the utmost importance to open a broad debate about Europe's strategic priorities. Based on the existing security strategy, we need to develop a new strategic concept, one that defines our common interests, the challenge and sometimes the threats we face and the capability we need to tackle these challenges. We need such a concept in particular to orchestrate our policies better in our neighborhood, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Maghreb and Africa. For how can we pretend to act on the world stage if we are not able to play an active part with our nearest neighbors? By setting out this strategic concept, we should also be able to better define how we would share the burden of security and defense, not only between us, Europeans, but also of our common interests with the US. Once we have a strategic concept, we should be able to make better progress with EU countries on planning and training, on cooperating to develop new technologies and capabilities, on exchanging information and intelligence, and why not on developing a range of common capabilities, operated directly sometimes by the EU. This is an attempt to conclude the world order of the 21st century. The US and Europe need each other more than ever before. The US needs strong Europe and Europe can only be strong if it is united. And the EU develops a powerful common defense policy based on far-reaching cooperation and integration. When Europe steps up its military and technological capabilities, it will be better placed to intervene where and when the US does not wish to do so, such as in Africa. And a much more capable partner in joint actions like in Libya. Europe and the US are a good team for a long time. We have shown it in the past and we will prove it in the future, employing every tool in the armory to build our partnership and rising to the challenges of an ever-changing world. Thank you very much for your attention. Commissioner Barnier, thank you so much. I always appreciate when a speaker comes here and pulls back and gives us that big picture, and always by beginning to begin the presentation by saying defending our values. Sometimes we have to reinforce that message of what we are doing here. We have about 30 minutes for some good dialogue and questions. I'm going to start asking you, Commissioner, a couple of questions to allow our audience to think through their questions. When I turn this over to you, we have microphones. If you could raise your hand and give us your name and affiliation and speak very clearly into that microphone. Sometimes it's a little hard for us to hear the question up here. And then the commissioner will respond. Commissioner has a translator here in case there's any questions. That's why we have a colleague that's joined us up here. Sometimes it's easier for me to be more concrete and more precise to speak in my mother tongue. And you'll be helped by my interpreter. But I'm really proud to speak in English. No, you're fabulous. That could be easier for me and perhaps for you too. It's fantastic. And we'll give all of us, get our French back in good working order as well. Thank you. So let me begin. You laid out a very daunting list of security challenges in the beginning. But what would you consider, Commissioner, the greatest threat to Europe's security today? I think one of the fundamental challenges for both the European Union as well as for NATO is that there's a lack of agreement on that common threat. And then, of course, from lack of that common threat assessment, it's very difficult to increase defense spending if either you don't think there is a threat or you're not sure exactly where that threat comes from. So I would welcome your thoughts. Some have suggested it's Russia. Others have suggested Syrian fighters that are returning back to Europe. Some would suggest the immigrants that are coming to Europe's shores from unrest in North Africa. What's the common threat? And do you think Europe is preparing for that threat? Depends where we are in Europe and from where we are coming from. Absolutely. Because we start from very different parts of the history. And if you look at the 28 countries where there are in the Nordic, Trois-Pays-Baltes, it is the province sovietique. Three Baltic states used to be Russian or Soviet provinces. Not so long ago. Poland, which is a very large country, is directly confronted with the risk to Europe's stability. The countries that are the most in the South-East are directly confronted with the consequences of the instability of the Middle East. The countries to the South-East are most directly confronted with instability in the Near East. Currently, France, Spain, Italy are just facing Africa and have a diplomatic, historical, cultural tradition in this immense continent. Naturally, France, Italy and Spain are directly opposite Africa and have a long-standing diplomatic and political and cultural history of ties with the continent of Africa. And that is why France, I would say, is living up to its duties, I would put it, in intervening in Mali, but it's a bit on its own out there. So you see where a long way off a truly common foreign policy and still further from a common defense policy because we don't have the same degree of sensibilities and priorities. And the day when the countries in Central Europe show as much concern as other parts of Europe for what goes on in, say, Mali or the people from the South of Europe will be confronted with the same sensibility of what is happening in Ukraine or the day when people in France are going to be just as concerned with what is going on in Ukraine as our people say in Poland, when that day comes, we will have a foreign policy which is worthy of the name. But starting from realistic diagnoses, we are making progress. Now, we won't progress with the wave of a magic wand and unfortunately in moments of crisis when you have your back against the wall when you're facing upheavals, if you haven't done the work beforehand it's very difficult to react together. And I want to dock my hat to my colleague and friend whom I've been working with over the last few years to Kathy Ashton who over five years has worked hard to build up this space, this common space for joint diplomacy. To bring together diplomats, people working on foreign policy, strategists. So I don't have a single clear cut and once and for all answer to your question. And this is why at the end of my speech I spoke about a need for a strategic concept of white paper now that the basic work has been done to bring together the diplomats and forge this common space for diplomatic thinking. Yeah, I could not agree more. The fact that the European strategy really last issued in 2003, slightly updated in 2008, I think we all would look forward to the next commission and the next external action surface putting forward certainly a new concept. The latest strategic concept was made by Ravier Solana. That represented a very important stage. Defense and military capability is very recent. It's only 10 years old at most. Nevertheless, we have undertaken about 20 civil or military or civil cum military interventions in various parts of the world, we Europeans. So it is an ongoing process. Do you sense, I mean one sign of progress, at least for many Americans, one sign of progress, we'd like to see an increase in European defense spending but yet we don't see, with the exception of some expressions by Baltic states, Poland, Romania, do you see any likelihood politically that European countries would increase their defense spending, hopefully in cooperation and integration with other European countries? Well, it all hangs together. Everything is interrelated. If you want European countries to spend more and above all spend better, then the citizens who are after all taxpayers as well, they have to understand why this has to be done. And this is why this advanced conceptual thinking has to be carried out. I don't think that overall we will be spending much more than we're spending today. If you aggregate the 28 defense budgets in theory, and add to that the common budget which is already allocated, you end up with a sum which is slightly above what China is actually spending now on defense. And that's not small bear. But the problem is that this is expenditure which involves say very little on research, say 10% of what the Americans are spending on research. And furthermore, this expenditure which is not necessarily devoted to what it should be, say research, is just opposed, it's separate. And to complete my picture, 80% of this overall budget is spent by three countries. So the real work to be done is work on coordination putting together programs, setting a common objective. As commissioner, I've done a lot of work on the various points I mentioned in my speech to facilitate coordination while respecting, of course, the limits to our competence as commission in the area of defense. For example, we managed to get the heads of state and government in the European Council to agree to our proposal that expenditure on defense should be done on a dual basis. For the first time. For example, you could imagine a drone program financed out of our research expenditures which could be put both to civilian and military use because after all we need drones to monitor our frontiers. So I say coordinate what we do already give meaning to what we are doing Everything which is going on around us, say the crisis in Ukraine, the troubles in the Near East, instability in Africa, shows that Europe has to deal with its security. Commissioner, if you will allow me, I'd like to stray a little bit away from the defense and security discussion because it's too important to have you here. I would love to get your reflections on the outcome of the European Parliament elections. What were Europeans telling European politicians about what they wanted for the future of Europe? And obviously, wearing your national hat, what were the French voters telling you after their vote during the election? We just had a complete renewal of the European Parliament. I wish to say to our American friends in the audience that the European Parliament now has a very important role. For example, as you know, I'm responsible for financial regulation. I table 41 laws over the last four years to implement the G20 agenda. Besides, some bankers think that that's a bit much. But I don't have a short memory. The crisis is not so far. And the consequences, the social, human, and economic level are still there. On all of those laws, I had to obtain the agreement of the European Parliament that was on an equal footing with the finance ministers. And if they don't agree, you don't have a European law. So this European Parliament is now in place. The broad majority within it is in favour of the putting in place and the development of European construction. And now the main group is the European People's Party today. The centre-right party of which I'm one of the vice presidents. This is why I think this party has to be the pivot of the broad majority within European Parliament and why its lead candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, should be the president of the commission. But you need to understand that you don't have a clear-cut political majority within the Parliament. You don't have a right-left split. We need to work together. You're going to have a broad majority made up of the European People's Party, the European Socialists, maybe the Liberals and also the Greens, and we have to work together. And this is possible. And on the different texts on financial regulation, I managed to obtain the support of all of those political parties. So I think that the construction of Europe will be pursued and improved by this majority within the European Parliament. And now the financial crisis, the economic crisis, the debt crisis that led to austerity measures being taken in a number of countries with unemployment that has gone up very steeply in quite a few countries, a lot of suffering, has provoked an additional doubt on what we are doing together. All of this has sparked additional doubts about what we've been doing and why we're doing it. And a populist upsurge. Extremist parties exploiting the suffering of people. And behind all of these populist parties, you have protectionism. And this is why European leaders, I am among them, have to be very careful. And my opinion is that there are lessons to be drawn from this election. Including the vote in my country which I wasn't surprised by, but which really leads us to question the situation, the vote that led to 24 or 25% of the population voting for an extreme right party. Now we're not going to act like rabbits caught in the headlights. We're going to have to react. And this is what I did in this book, preventively. We have to change a number of things in Brussels and in Europe. Less bureaucracy, less regulation, and more politics, more policymaking. And we also have to answer the British question which is important. We need to stay together. Imagine the UK breaking off from Europe. That would mean a weakening of everybody. And this is a possibility which I reject. But we need to convince. And show that what British and French and Dutch and other voters have said has been listened to and has been heard. For instance, I have proposed the last debate just after the elections for the new commission, the Member States and the Parliament, to launch a new exercise which is called the European added value review. European added value review. And to screen each of the policies, each of the European competence and to look at these policies, at these competence and to look where are the added value for European action. Where the added value of Europe is, is it still there, where it has to be created, and what consequences, what conclusions have to be drawn from that screen. And the second conclusion to be drawn is that we have to launch the policy that people expect in order to revive growth and employment. In the book, I try to describe what we need to do together to remain free, to become free, and to become, to remain strong in the global world, industry, defense, energy, digital agenda. That are the fields where we need more politics and sometimes less regulations. Fantastic. We have music to many years in the United States as well. We had time to take a few questions. What I'll do is bundle them. So, Commissioner, you may have to take a few notes. So, we'll take a few questions, and we'll start right down here, right in the front. Just wait for a microphone, Rob, right here. Thank you. Michael Lange, I'm from Brussels. I represent the NATO Industry Advisory Group. So, we are discussing all of these issues. And permit me that way, come back from the exclusion of elections to the real issues of the fragmentation. You know, I think you had the summit in December and we evaluated the results there. I think one of the biggest discrepancies is that we are fragmented. We are fragmented in the industry. We are fragmented in the requirements. I think funding is there, but we shouldn't split it into 19 version of an offered equipment. So, what is your impression after the December or from the December Council is, are the member states who have really the money, are the member states giving some kind of sovereignty up to come together in one basket to fund things? You mentioned the APAS system, so the UAV systems. If we run around in Brussels, I never found somebody who really has money in hand. You know, you find three or four million, but that's a bigger program. So, where is really the money put together to really achieve something together, unfragmented in an efficient way? Thank you. I'll take a question right here, Rob. That's fine. Thank you. Sure. Thank you for your comments. I'm Byron Callan at Capital Alpha Partners. In your preparatory remarks, you talked about the critical capability shortfalls. You mentioned air refueling. I wonder if you can add, what are some of the other critical capability shortfalls that you'd like to address from a military standpoint? Thank you. We'll just pass that on to Gail right there. Thank you. Gail Maddox, the Naval Academy. You talked about the need for a new strategic concept. Could you maybe address what you see as the major issues that need to be redesigned, that need to be, that are missing now and probably need to be in that new strategic concept? Thank you. Thank you. Can I squeeze one more? We'll go right back to us. My name is Nicholas Blake. I work at the National Democratic Institute here in Washington working on our Balkans programming. I'm so curious. You mentioned in your remarks interests that the EU has in terms of North Africa, in Ukraine, also in cybersecurity. I'm wondering from your perspective, what is the Balkan agenda moving forward? Is it limited to the accession negotiations? And is there a security role moving forward? In the last six months, we've seen French troops withdraw, but also British troops coming into Bosnia. So I'm wondering, is there a common approach moving forward? That was a wonderful menu. Where is the money to help eliminate the fragmentation? What are those critical capabilities in addition to air-to-air refueling lists and others? What are the missing elements in a new European security strategy and what's the plan for the Western Balkans? So that's a wonderful menu. Several of those questions are linked. I won't go into all of the details as if I were the commissioner responsible for foreign policy and defence. I won't go into all of the details as if I were the commissioner responsible for foreign policy and defence. I'm responsible for a part of the commission's work. I'm not going to express my personal opinion as this is a public meeting and as I have responsibility within an institution for a particular area, I'm not going to speak on a purely personal basis. After all, I would be committing the institution that I work for. I have to recall that the European Commission does not have competence over the points of foreign defence policy that I mentioned, except those that I mentioned in my speech that are generally related to the internal market. It's important for me that I respect those limits. After all, there are fears in London and other capitals that we might overstep the limits of our competence. In our July 2013 communication that prepared the December 2013 European Council that you referred to, sir, we respected those limits. And I took the matter up to the limits but I didn't go beyond them with my colleagues. We will see how standardisation and normalisation are improved in the unique market for military equipment. There are very different standards for one country to another and therefore the ability to buy the same guns or the same equipment because they are not under the same standards. With my colleagues, I went to the European Commission and with my colleagues went as far as we could within those limits and besides the European Council took on board our ideas and our proposals and came forward with recommendations that we make proposals on the question of the way in which research could be used for dual purposes, the way in which space could be linked to security and research could be brought to bear on drones or standardisation could be improved. After all, it's extraordinary that in the internal market if you want to purchase rifles you have so many standards that could apply on the question of capability. This is bound up with some of the points I've just mentioned. We have to start by putting together common programs. We're doing this on, say, large capacity transport aircraft and there are other areas in which we have to pool our research programs and our purchasing programs. There's a political point that has to be brought up in connection with capabilities within NATO and outside NATO. I've always personally been in favour of respecting the line that was drawn in the Saint-Malo Declaration on the question of an autonomous European defence policy based on solidarity. In the context of the European Union in the context of the Atlantic Alliance What I mean to say on the question of capabilities which have to be better coordinated or improved is that the citizens and the parliaments of our countries need to understand the needs that we face. This is why the strategic concept and the broad-ranging debate on a strategic concept many years now after 2003 have to be opened up. We have to have our peoples and our parliaments take ownership of this idea of a strategic concept. We have to start from there. And I believe that European citizens can understand and support just such an ambition. We have started to elaborate as a laboratory of the project bonds i.e. how to make money investments, especially in the field of law. In my little book, I made another promotion in that field that can have with military means like transportation or satellite observation linked to civil protection and the fight against the great natural and industrial disasters. I had to face up to industrial and natural disasters and we could have a European civil protection force. When I was French Foreign Minister I had to face up to the consequences of the tsunami, for example. We saw the European countries all going straight to Haiti after the earthquake, but each went separately. How long is this going to go on for? We all have budgetary fiscal problems all over our countries, but surely we should be able to pool our resources and face up to particular industrial and natural disasters in order to be more efficient, more effective. On the question of the Balkans, I always thought that the question of the Balkans was a test of credibility for the European Union. We have already committed this process of reunification or integration of the Balkans in the European project. Bulgarian, Slovenian, Croatian, Bulgarian, Slovenian, recently Croatian have all joined the European Union. The logical approach must be that the different Balkan countries, once they're ready, should be able to join the European Union. You see, we have their renewed evidence of the modernity and the strength of the European venture, the European project. These peoples have fought for centuries and centuries for various ethnic, religious or national motivations. Thanks to this overriding prospect of being able to be part of the European Union, we see that their tensions have scaled down, that they've improved their behaviour, and the recent evidence of this was the agreement that was brokered by Cathy Ashton between Kosovo and Serbia. Well, thank you. This was a terrific discussion. You started us out very provocatively with the subtitle of your book to rest or to remain and be free, and you wove that in through the entire conversation, and you have left us with a very ambitious and rich agenda, so I don't see any resting on your part, I don't see any resting on the commission's part, so thank you for joining us, please. We're getting a reading. I put the end of this book, this table, published two years ago by... Give me, please. Perhaps one could be more clear. Thank you. We'll hand those out, thank you. It was published by David Cameron two years ago when he decided to support what I did for the single market, and he published a little brochure, and this table was in this brochure. It showed the ten main countries and economic place every ten years in the world. The ranking. Today you have four European countries among the ten first, and every ten years one of these four is... It drops out. And what happened in 2050, the day after tomorrow, there is no longer one single European country, the G8. I don't want this table to be the reality. The reason why I am European, in addition to being a patriot, that's it. Why do we have to become to remain free and independent in the framework of our islands in the United States? We need to be together. We need a G8 with Europe in it. I think you need your friends to be together and to be solid and to be robust and to be credible. Well, thank you. That's a very powerful chart. Please join me in thanking Commissioner Beignet for a very interesting conversation.