 I'm sorry that the microphones are in your way, but they have to believe where they are because I've got to be able to see what I'm doing. As I always am able to see what I'm doing. This week, prime time on C-SPAN II convention speeches from 1948 through 2000. A look at past presidential and vice presidential nominees, Monday through Thursday at 8 Eastern, on C-SPAN II. We're now going live to the Florida Supreme Court for oral arguments in the Florida Supreme Court case, Jeb Bush versus Michael Shiva. Are the parties ready? All right, now I understand that you're splitting your time and you, Mr. Destro, are going to make the initial argument. Yes, Your Honor. All right, you may proceed. And go ahead. Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Robert Destro. I'm here to represent Governor Bush, the appellant in this case, and with me are Kenneth Connor, who will argue in rebuttal, and Camille Godwin. And before you get into your argument, the court would appreciate it if in your order that you would address the separation of powers argument first before the privacy argument, and then with whatever remaining time you're free to argue the other issues. Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the court. Terry Shiavo did not have the benefit of an independent advocate at any relevant time before or during the implementation. Let's try to get it into the mental and separation of powers. All right, Your Honor. Let me ask you this. Would you agree that the governor did not have the power to order a stay on October 15th, 2003? Your Honor, no, I think the order to the stay is based on the act, yes, Your Honor. So the governor's power to act and interstate came solely from the legislature. Yes, Your Honor. The power of parents Patriot does come from the legislature. Is it something unique about the governor that the legislature could give this power to? Could the legislature give this power to you? No, Your Honor, but in fact, the legislature has given the power to any person in the state of Florida to raise the question of the rights of a vulnerable adult in an appropriate court, and that's really all this act does. I've got one more question along this line now. This legislation then that delegated this power, it did it to involve in reality a single case. Correct? No, Your Honor, it did not. What other cases would meet the description of somebody that had the court ordered the whole line of things that are in this statute other than the petitioner in this case? Well, Your Honor, the statute itself is open-ended. Certainly Terry Shiveau fits within the description of the statute, but it would be a question of fact as to whether or not there are other people in the state of Florida at any given time. During the time this statute was in effect, it would certainly be a question of fact, and there are other people who could fit that description. The statute's very clear on its face that you don't have an advance directive that the court has found that nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn. There could be any number of people, and it would be a question of fact as to how many were in the state of Florida at that time. Even those people have to fit into this 15-day time period. This act came into effect on a particular day, and 15 days later it's no longer in effect. Is that correct? Yes, Your Honor. That's true. So whether Shiavo is the only person who meets the criteria or some other people in the statute who would have to be in that short 15-day time period, is that not correct? And they would have to meet each of the criteria outlined in that statute. Yes, Your Honor. And if I can just add, though, if the legislature, the separation of powers issue that the court is rightly concerned about, would also be the case if the legislature had amended Chapter 765 and provided this as a procedure across the board, which it could do after this case. Well, that's now, let's get back to the issue of the first of all. There's two aspects to the separation of powers. One is the facial constitutional issue, which is the whether this is an unlawful delegation of unfettered discretion to the executive branch. The second issue we're talking about is whether, as applied to Terry Shiavo, it is an encroachment on the judicial branch's final order and giving the governor a super appellate power. So on the issue of the unfettered discretion and going back to what Justice Wells says, this, are you saying this statute could have been set up and given the power to issue this one-time stay to anybody, any agency in the executive branch? No, Your Honor, the legislature gave this power to the governor because the governor historically stands in the role of parent's patriot. He's the ultimate defender of people's civil rights in the state of Florida. He's sworn to see that the law is faithfully executed. And with that, so the governor would be the only proper person that the legislature could give this super appellate review power to? Well, it's not, Your Honor, I would argue somewhat with your characterization that this is a super appellate power. In point of factor, Your Honor, this is the opportunity for the governor to raise the due process questions on behalf of Terry Shiavo, that the allegation here is that Terry Shiavo was denied due process in the proceedings below. But if the governor had tried to intervene in the ongoing proceedings and raised some question as an interesting party as to whether Terry Shiavo's due process rights had been interfered with, we'd be in a different situation. What we're here with is the issue of whether this law is facially unconstitutional by giving the governor the power to issue this one-time stay that's not required to do so, lift the stay at any time, may do so, and may revoke the stay, all without any standards. Well, Your Honor, this is the problem that I have with that particular argument, is that this law does not make any sense unless it's read in Perry Materia with chapter 765 and chapter 744. In fact, we would argue that in point of fact that constitutionally in order to give people with severe disabilities the right to question the adipacy of their representation below, you have to read these statutes in Perry Materia. It's not designed to be part of chapter 765, is it? Your Honor, I think actually, Your Honor, it adds that extra level of protection to chapter 765 because we do it on the face. Is it an amendment to chapter 765? Is it an additional section? I think it should be read that way, but the legislature did this quickly. Did the legislature amend chapter 765 to add a new section, which is this law? I think you should read it that way, yes. I don't want to read anything that's not in there. It's not on the face, Your Honor. I'm asking you if the legislature said that it was amending chapter 765 or any other chapter by adding this new section. No, it did not say that on the face of the statute. But I think reading the statute in terms of what it provides, it's tied very clearly to 744 and 765. Is there any other case from this court in which we have read into an act that it amends a particular chapter of the Florida laws when it doesn't specifically say so? Your Honor, this court has said in Ferguson v. State in other cases that when the face of the statute shows that it is clearly related to other statutes, it should be read in peri-materia with them. If it's clear on its face that it can stand alone, and our argument is that it simply cannot stand alone. In terms of looking at the purpose of this law, and I'm not sure whether when we get into separation of powers, whether that's the relevant inquiry, but could you then address, because I know the whole argument is that this is giving this protection, what, where the 15-day expiration date, in other words, an idea that we're going to protect a whole class of disabled individuals, severely disabled individuals who already have been found to be in a persistent vegetative state, who already have had hydration and with brawn, and it only lasts for 15 days. Well, Your Honor, given the nature of the, of what was going on not only in this case, but in all cases in which nutrition and hydration is withdrawn, there is a temporal imperative that, that there be an action before all the constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and, and privacy are lost. Are there, I'm sorry? Are there any other places in, in the Florida statute where the governor has this kind of power to stay proceedings? Well, Your Honor, actually the, the governor does have the, the power in death cases to, to stay, but you're talking about Chapter 922. Yes, and the clemency power, and then Chapter 922, isn't there standards and procedures that the governor has to abide by if he in fact enters a state? Yes, there is, and we would say, Your Honor, that Chapter 765 and Chapter 744 provide the standards, because what the governor can do under this statute, and it's clear he can, he makes the findings, and he makes a discretionary finding about whether or not he, he feels that probable cause has, has been made. And from there, what is the, under this act, what is the governor required to do? As I read it, the governor really isn't required to do anything. The state could stay indefinitely. Well, Your Honor, the, if again, that's the importance of reading this in light of Chapter 765 and Chapter 744, because the governor, he takes, he get, he goes and he asks the, the circuit court for a guardian item, they wait for the guardian item to come back with a report, reports back. This case has to be seen in light of the ongoing guardianship jurisdiction of the circuit court over the, I'm sorry, you're, just as well. But let me get back to, isn't the cardinal principle of separation of power set forth by, in the United States Supreme Court case, that's Pintriff case, in which it says that a legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case, though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases. And isn't what, in reality, when this is all boiled down to, the legislature stepped in here and reversed a decision that was final in a specific case? No, Your Honor, it didn't. In fact, the face of the statute makes it very clear that the, the legislature provided a rule, a prospective rule of procedure that would take place after the mandate was carried out. It did not, like in Plot, go back and change a rule that, that the court had already announced. It did not stop the mandate from taking place. The mandate actually was carried out. And what it did was to enact a procedural rule, a process going forward from October the 21st, 2003, that did nothing with respect to the, to intrude on the power of the court. Let's, can we explore the parameters of your, the basis for your argument? Certainly, we've got a, a singular set of facts that we're dealing with here. But would the legislature have the, the power to delegate to the governor, the ability to set aside any civil judgment on the basis of, in the governor's view, that did not meet due process requirements. Civil monetary damages cases involving family law that the judge did not adequately protect the children in this, the way that custody was handled. Would you explore for us the parameters? I mean, what, what are we opening up here if we start talking about this? How, how broad is this or how narrow is it? Actually, your honor, I think this is a very narrow principle. Because the, what we're dealing with here is, is the, the full implications of the Browning decision. Where this court held that an incompetent person has the same rights that, that a, that a competent person is going to have to come up. Because somebody, and if it's not going to be the governor, and I think it's a rational choice for the legislature to make, to say that the governor can stand in this person's shoes and assure, and to raise the question, was there adequate representation in the court below? That's it. The, the act does not even require the governor to take what the underlying litigation was that went over a, a six-year period, was to determine what Terry Shiva's wishes would have been if she were in a position to assert them at, at the time that the final judgment was entered. Do you agree with that? We're not looking at what is in the best interest of an adult, but what is, would be their wishes. Would you, do you agree with that? Well, your honor, the governor, as what Browning says. Yes, your honor, the governor is sworn to uphold not only chapter 765 and this court's holding in Browning. You know, but he is, his duty is to make sure that Terry's rights are respected. Where is that stated within the confines of the law that was enacted by the legislature? And that gets me back to the issue of this unfettered discretion. There are no standards. There is no requirement that standards be promulgated. There is no length of time that the stay remains in effect. And essentially, there is no individual or entity that can overall that stay. Your honor, this, this is where the, the, the, we would argue the constitutional necessity of reading this in Prairie Materia with section 765, because that does in fact provide the standards. But 765 is the statute that was followed, that was enacted by the legislature, that was not amended in the last legislative session, that gives a very, very substantial procedure when individuals want to challenge the decision of a proxy. And there has been no allegation that that procedure was not scrupulously adhered to in the case of Terry Shiveau. But your honor, in this case, Terry Shiveau's proxy was the judge. And the difficulty with, with the, with that procedure is that Terry Shiveau is now the governor and Terry Shiveau, who's standing in her shoes under the statute, is forced to litigate against the judge, which this court said in T.W., in footnote three, is absolutely intolerable as a matter of, of due process. So that the, so that this is really where those, those statutes fit together. I know I'm into my rebuttal time. Thank you, your honor. Mr. Gould. Filos. Filos, okay. Sorry, I was looking at the next case. Mr. Filos, could you follow up with that last response? Because if you look at 765, it does address the question of, of the proxy and the proxy making the decision. Could you address the argument that in, in this case, the, the judge became the proxy? Well, your honor. Could you first introduce yourself though and tell us who you represent on that? Thank you. Thank you, your honor. I'm George Filos. I'm counsel for Mrs. Shiveau's Guardian, Michael Shiveau. I'm here this morning with co-counsel Randall Marshall, who's the director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, and also Mr. Thomas Pirelli of General and Block Cooperating Council with the Florida ACLU. And on behalf of my client, we did want to thank the court for accepting the bypass certification and expediting consideration of this case. And, and, and answer to your question seems to me that if you read the briefs to invoke this court's discretionary jurisdiction in Shiveau one, these are the, these are the questions that we argued. Those were the arguments of, of Terry's parents in seeking review of the initial Shiveau one decision. The, were the due process rights of the ward affected in the, by the child judge having a, in essence acting as, as a proxy. And obviously this court didn't think so three years ago by, by electing not to take its discretionary jurisdiction. And I just, I just want to highlight in essence what the, what the governor is trying to do in this case is reliticate, relitigate and force a re-adjudication of Terry Shiveau's rights which have already been fully and finally litigated in the courts of the state. The procedure that was followed was the procedure that was set forth in Browning and then it subsequently put into statutory format by the legislature, which anticipates that if there is a dispute between the parties that the judge would set forth a decision. But if prospectively the legislature determined that there should be a procedure that say takes the initial aspect of this very, very private decision out of the court and starts with some administrative process and requires there be a guardian at light and appointed for an incompetent adult. Would you see any constitutional infirmity in such an act and how does this, what we have in front of us differ from that? Yes, Your Honor, I would say constitutional infirmity for a number of reasons. First off, from the aspect of the constitutional right to privacy here. The violation here is taking from the patient and giving to the state the power to make medical treatment choices. And if you're contemplating a procedure in which the current format of having a guardian, a spouse, an adult child, close family members make a decision for an incapacitated patient and you remove that and give that decision making to the state, even if it's in the context of a legislative scheme. Yes, I think there were problems. Isn't that what we do with the Department of Children and Families? In other words, when we're in a situation where we're concerned, whether the rights of an individual who cannot express himself or herself, either by minority or by incompetency, the idea of having additional procedures to make sure that the state's interest in preserving life is honored. And that is the norm. Why wouldn't a procedure like that be appropriate? And isn't that what they are trying to do, maybe belatedly, in this situation? Well, Your Honor, I would disagree. That's what they're trying to do belatedly, I think, as Justice Wells stated. It's obvious here that the intent of the legislature here was to overturn a judgment, a final judgment, of the court of this state that they were particularly displeased with. But getting back to your question, Your Honor, a guardian is already appointed under Chapter 765. When you ask, if you ask, can we take an administration of a patient's constitutional rights or dispute and take it out of the court system into another forum, I guess I would want to know what type of forum there is and who the decision maker is. You have to remember these are intensely personal and private rights we're talking about here. Let me ask you, your opponents make the point that we are not really talking about a judgment which was final since this issue in this guardianship is not final as long as Ms. Chiavo is still alive. Now, what is your answer to that, that this is always a prospective type of situation? Your Honor, this is a final judgment for a number of reasons. Number one, it was a final statement or final word of the court system of the state of Florida. It was acknowledged by the court of appeal many times as a final judgment, also appealed as a final judgment. But the fact, Your Honor, that under our system of justice under the rules of procedure, a final judgment can be vacated under certain grounds and the purported grounds here is rule 1.540 b5. The fact that a final judgment could be vacated in the future doesn't make it any less final for separation of powers. To follow that logic, Your Honor, every civil judgment in this state would no longer be final and subject to legislative rescindment because it could be vacated potentially vacated under rule 1.540 b5. Would the governor file a motion under 1.540 b5 right now or any other subsection of 1.540, saying circumstances have changed or there's new evidence? Your Honor, I don't believe so. I believe that 1.540 b5 is concerned and pertains to parties in the case. But I also did because it's a very important point as to whether this is a final judgment because that triggers the separation of powers analysis, Your Honor. Your Honor brought up the analogy of a child custody case. It is very true that in a family law situation, when a judge awards a custody of a minor child to one parent, that becomes a final judgment. It can be appealed. But the trial court or the family law court retains jurisdiction over that case, over that child, until the child reaches emancipation. And under that theory, because the trial court could address the custody issue at some time in the future, if we're saying that's not a final judgment, then the separation of powers protection, the firewall of separation of powers is eradicated in family law cases. And that's certainly not the law of this state. Can you address the governor's argument or counter-argument to that, that he's not bound by that, if it's a judgment, he's not bound by that judgment because he wasn't a party to that proceeding. And therefore, collateral estoppel or res judicata principles will not apply to him. They don't have to apply, Your Honor, because that's a red herring issue. The fact that he was not a party to the judgment does not alter the fact that the judgment was entered. And if we follow that logic, well, the governor for separation or the legislature can rescind judicial judgments to which the legislature or governor were not a party, well, then the vast majority of judgments would be subject to legislative rescindment. Is there any, if the governor cannot intervene based on Rule 1.540, is there any procedure by which the governor could, in fact, have intervened in this proceeding? I don't believe so, Your Honor, but the state's interests are protected. In these cases, if you read Browning, if you read the Dubriel decision, the Wands decision, this court was very clear to say, and it arose in the context of a health care provider. If a health care provider disagrees with the patient's medical treatment choice, do they have standing to contest it in court? This court said no. What the health care provider would have to do is go to the state attorney and give this information to the state attorney and would be up to the state attorney to decide whether to intervene in a particular case. So it's not to say that the state's interests in preserving life or whatever interests they might assert cannot be addressed, but not by the governor. Can I ask a question? In the second DCA's opinion of July of 01, it refers to the judgment specifically or the order in the terms of a mandatory injunction and not as a final judgment. And it says, until the lifelong procedure discontinued, such an order is entirely executory and the warden-guarding continued to be under the jurisdiction and supervision of the guardianship court. As long as the ward is alive, the ward is subject to recall and is executory in nature. Address that in the sense of finality. Yes, but if you also look, Your Honor, at that opinion, the second district, I believe it was in Chivo II specifically refers to the order of the guardianship as a final order. And the second district also said the procedure by which that order could be reopened is the 1.54B5 procedure. And I think it is absolutely extraordinary for the governor to argue that the legislature in 18 hours and the governor in a matter of hours somehow possesses some inherent wisdom in regarding the matters of Terry Chivo that could not have been ascertained by the justices of this state in over a six-year period. And Frank. Let's approach that just a little bit. Are you suggesting that the legislative power can never be exercised to protect disabled children? In this state, we have numerous children in this state that are disabled and cannot make decisions for themselves. Are you suggesting that the legislature cannot come in and play safeguards to protect the well-being and the virtual life of these disabled children? Absolutely not. But Terry Chivo was a competent adult who expressed medical treatment choices. Well, then you're going into the procedure. Are you suggesting that the legislature could not prohibit this kind of procedure? That you must have something in writing? You must have a procedure other than someone's friend coming in and expressing what they think the person wants? We didn't have the testimony of Mr. Chivo in this case, did we? There's all testimony of other individuals. Of other individuals. And that would always be the case, would it not, within competence and disabled children in this state? Your Honor, but to answer your question, if the legislature amended Chapter 765 and said, we're not going to permit removal of artificial life support unless somebody has a written, advanced directive. No, that law would be unconstitutional because this court has declared in the Browning case that in order to recognize and implement an individual's right of privacy, oral declarations are sufficient to establish, as long as they're by clear and convincing evidence, the intent of the patient. So such a legislative enactment in that case would be, in my opinion, unconstitutional. So you are saying that the legislature cannot come up with criteria contrary to the way that the judicial system has interpreted a privacy right. That's the fundamental base of your argument. I would say, Your Honor, that the Browning case provides the minimum right of privacy that a patient is entitled to. And the legislature may certainly legislate in the field to protect the public and to make sure that the right of privacy is effectuated. But they can't fall below that minimum. But I mean now, I mean, in the Cruzan case, if you look back at what the Supreme Court in Missouri did, they essentially decided that the testimony of a neighbor was not clear and convincing evidence of the person's wishes. So I mean, if we're getting, and probably we may be getting a little far afield of what we have to decide in this case, but because the issue isn't whether the legislature could enact something much more comprehensive to better address this type of situation, which is, you know, it's getting tragic for everybody. So could you get back to the issue on with the separation of powers? Could the legislature, if this wasn't Terri Schacht, and we're just looking at the facial challenge, what is wrong with what the legislature did in this case, as far as giving this power to stay for one time the withholding of hydration and a one-time basis? Aside from the intrusion into the judiciary, which is the separation of powers violation as applied to Terri Schacht. That's the as-applied challenge. As to the facial challenge, there are two. The impermissible legislative delegation. As your honor mentioned, there are no standards. Now the test for impermissible legislative delegation is this, could a court in reviewing the decision be able to ascertain whether the decision maker acted within discretion or abused discretion? And that statute fails in this way. If there were judicial review permitted, and of course there is no judicial review so that could never occur in this case, but if there were judicial review, how could we even begin to make that determination when we don't even know what the basis for the governor's decision is? Because he's not required under this act to tell us the basis of his decision. Well, can you address the governor's arguments, your counsel's arguments, that you have to read this act in paramateria with chapter 765 and I believe 764. And those provide the guidelines. That doctrine, your honor, only pertains to situation where there's ambiguity in the statute. This court held in Holly versus Alde that if there is no ambiguity, facial ambiguity in the statute that this court can't resort to that type of statutory interpretation. So that doctrine doesn't apply here. We're not talking about an ambiguous statute. This statute is crystal clear what it does. It gives the governor unfettered and absolute authority. But to follow that, even if there were, even if the governor did tell us or could be compelled to tell us what the basis of his decision was, there's no standards to apply. How do we know whether the legislature wanted the governor to consider a cost-benefit analysis for providing medical treatment? How do we know whether the legislature wanted the governor to take into account family wishes rather than the wishes of the patient? How are we to know whether the legislature wanted the governor to act in the best interest of the patient as opposed to determining the subjective intent of the patient? Based on this statute, can anyone lift this, can this stay be lifted? No one's standing here. Was there any attempt to do that in the proceedings below? Does it have to stay lifted? Or was it, it was only an attack on the constitutionality? On the constitutionality, Your Honor. I don't believe the, Your Honor, I don't believe the statute provides any mechanism to have the governor's decision reviewed. So what is the point then of that part of the act which says that you then appoint a guardian who reports or makes recommendations to the governor and the court? Well, I believe the statute says it makes recommendations to the governor. In terms of power and authority, there's no point. We don't know, we don't know whether the governor read the report or didn't read the report, or if he did read the report, took it into consideration or picked it up and tossed it away. So as far as the statute itself, it changes nothing as to the impermissible delegation of authority. But I also, since I only have two minutes, two minutes left, Your Honor, wanted to address the facial unconstitutionality regarding the right of privacy. And I touched on this before. The essential issue here is who is entitled to make a decision on a matter so personal and private as whether one would want artificial life support. Does that power constitutionally reside with the patient? Or does that power reside with the state? Do you agree that if we hold that this statute is unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers or at least as applied to Terry Shivo, it's unconstitutional, it's basically not gonna apply to anybody else. So by holding its unconstitutional as applied, we're really saying it's unconstitutional as its face as well, practically speaking. It's not gonna apply to anybody else, is it? It's not going to apply to another case, but we would ask this court, of course, specifically to find that it's unconstitutional as applied to Terry Shivo because it's an unlawful intrusion into judicial power for this reason. If this court only found the statute facially unconstitutional, let's say, for improper delegation of legislative authority, we don't want, and chose not to address the as applied separation of power argument, we don't want to be here a year from now, arguing the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of Terry's law too. This young woman has a right to have her final adjudication honored by the courts of Florida. This unlawful intrusion into that right should be overturned and definitively overturned so her right to privacy can be effected. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Conner. Hey, please, the court, I'm Kent Conner with the firm of Wilks and McHugh and I, along with Professor Destro, represent the governor in this action. Mr. Conner, why is this not a prohibited special act? Because the act applies uniformly to all people who fall within its classification. If that classification applies to only one person? Judge, the fact that it may apply actually to only one person doesn't make it a special act. There are any number of potential people who could fall within the purview of the act if they meet the four criteria. That is, they didn't have an advanced written directive. They've been deemed to be in a persistent vegetative state. Nutrition and hydration are being withheld and the family has a challenge. If they meet those criteria, they fall. Those are not the only criteria. I mean, it says, plus, the court has found the patient to be in a persistent vegetative state and a member of the patient's family has challenged the withholding of nutrition and hydration. I mean, you're not asking us to really hold that this act doesn't pertain just to Terry's. By the face of it, Your Honor, it does apply to more than just Terry. Terry Shibow's case was the triggering event for it. We see that all the time. We would have to ignore reality to do that, wouldn't we, Don? Well, Judge, the fact that we have Megan's law or Adam's law, the fact that we have specific fact situations involving specific individuals that trigger the need for letting slaves leave. But there are particular cases. That's where I'm having trouble. I'm having trouble with the fact that when I read this act objectively, I cannot come to the conclusion that it doesn't pertain to this single case that's been in litigation for a decade and that what is going on here is that the legislature set about to set aside what the final judgment of the court pertaining to that case. Without a doubt, Your Honor, it does apply in this particular case to Terry Shibow because she met the criteria. There are others who likewise could meet the criteria. It does not, respectfully, I would submit, involve a reversal of the final judgment of a circuit court precisely for the reasons indicated by Judge Bell and Shibow, too, where the court made the point that these orders are entirely executory. As long as the ward is alive, the order is subject to recall and is executory in nature. The mandate of the court had been complied with. The order of the court was not that Terry Shibow should have nutrition and hydration withdrawn until she was dead. It wasn't like an order that said, so and so she'll be hanged by the neck until dead. But Mr. Connor, the court went on and specifically said, because they understood that the challenge was being raised more than one year after. And they were really trying hard to make sure that the Schindlers had some opportunity to raise this new claim that there might be some new lifesaving treatment. And what the court then said is we caution, however, that any proceeding to challenge a final order on this basis is extraordinary and should not be filed merely to delay an order with which an interested party disagrees or to retry an adversary proceeding. And the mechanism they set up was rule 1.540 B5, which is for challenges to final judgment. So we must take one line out of one opinion that there's a series of four opinions really is not the correct way to look at this. Well, Your Honor, unquestionably this language arose in the context of 1.540 challenge. But the reality of it is that that is the nature of guardianship orders. They're executory. So are you saying that therefore they're reviewed as non-final orders and any interested party year after year can come in and make challenges? No, ma'am, what I'm saying is that the courts do not possess the exclusive domain to protect the rights of disabled people and to ensure that their health care choices are respected and protected. That there is a role for the legislature. There is a role for them. Are we ignoring that in this law, which didn't, again, become a part of an amendment to the chapter law in the session that succeeded the law, was a 15-day sunset. It applied to whoever was in this situation for 15 days. And then this great protection that the legislature wanted to give expired and has not been renewed. Your Honor, it demonstrates, I think, how this law, in fact, was narrowly tailored. The legislature wanted to see how it worked. They had an opportunity to tweak it. My time is up, Your Honors. I would respectfully request that the court recognize that there is a role for the legislature and the governor in protecting the rights of the disabled and ensuring that their health care decisions are respected and protected. Thank you. Thank you very much. That concludes the arguments the court will take in recess. Before calling the next case, and we would ask out of deference to the parties that before the rest of the courtroom empties that the attorneys and the parties be able to leave the courtroom. Thank you very much. A reminder that you can hear these oral arguments in Bush v. Shivo on America and the courts. That's Saturday at 7 PM Eastern on C-SPAN. Today on C-SPAN 2, we'll show you the House Government Reform Committee hearings on the September 11 Commission Report, beginning in a couple of minutes with commissioners Bob Kerry and John Layman. At 1 PM, we'll hear from relatives of those lost in the September 11 terrorist attacks. They're followed at 2.40 by Comptroller David Walker. And wrapping up at 3.30 PM, Commission Chairman Tom Cain and his colleague Jamie Gorellick talk about public diplomacy in the Middle East. C-SPAN's convention coverage gets underway this evening at 6 PM Eastern with a preview program. We'll take your calls, interview some of the delegates, and take you behind the scenes at the convention. The convention starts at 7.