 And as to whether when we write is a willful, intentional, deliberate and mindful violation of any order. And even if you show that, and normally as to whether, like when the criminal law we say that jail is a rule and jail is an exception. And as to whether, like I can say of Punjab, Haryana High Court, abradely not because of this lockdown tenure of COVID-19. Normally they are 3,000 to 4,000 content predations. And there is also a power of where the courts, CO motor take cognizance. Again, some reference to that, but Shantush in case, again, we will not be discussing about that aspects. But where the courts take CO motor cognizance, a person criticizing a judge in his own way or the tenure of the language used on the social media like Facebook or something, what is the effect? We thought, why not request, I can say an elder brother of ours, who has been the one of the initial pillars who helped to build the Beyond Law CLC panel sessions on different issues of law. And once he has written a book on the contempt of Portaic itself. We thought that his articles have been published in the live law. We thought let's have a session being discussed across the board by Mr. Asin Pandya, who is a senior advocate from the Gujarat Bar Association. And he's also the former president of the Gujarat High Court Association. Coupled with, since I'm saying that he has written a book, need not to say that he's an author, he's an author. It needless to say it is just like saying that the water is, that the ice slopes on the water. Similarly, once we say that he's written a book, the spontaneous reaction is that he's an author. But the way, the way I've seen him taking the sessions forward, the way he tells you the judgments of the cuff and how he brings up the momentum to understand the nuances. It's always fascinating. And therefore, he was kind enough to see to our request. And we are all grateful to that. Before we request, as we also have started posting on the right, finally maintain social distancing, maintain the COVID norms, wear the mask, that is paramount. And needless to say those who want to watch us on the previous webinars, they can like, share, comment the YouTube channel of Beyond Law CLC. You're also live on Facebook. Over to you, Mr. Pandya. It's a pleasure connecting with you. Thank you, Vikas Singh. It is indeed a pleasure being here again. First of all, let me wish all of you who are present in this webinar, very good evening. And it is in fact very encouraging that Mr. Vikas Chakras praised me in a different way. And I am indeed grateful to him that I deserve those words or phrases I don't know that you will have to take decision after this session is over. So, in fact, Mr. Vikas Chakras has started this near-law last year. When the lockdown was imposed, I believe it's if I'm right. Now, since that last one year, he has been constantly arranging this kind of webinars, disseminating law, knowledge of law, which is in fact a Herculean task. It requires a great dedication, commitment and passion. So I could not resist myself in saying this that Mr. Chathar, whatever he's doing is a great job, which would be helpful not only to the present generation, but it is going to be useful to the next generation of lawyers and generations to come because whatever webinars he has conducted all throughout this year, more than one year, I think more than 300 webinars have been conducted. So all these are archived and therefore not only the present generation would be benefited, but future generation will also be benefited by these webinars. And whenever any question would arise in the mind of a student, mind of a lawyer or a mind of a judge on a particular legal issue, I'm sure that definitely in this web platform, which is created by beyond law CLC and Mr. Chathar, there would be an answer. So with this, let us move on to the subject. The subject is Article 129 and Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the contempt of courts like 1971. The title of today's webinar, in fact, does not convey what is the nature of discussion which is going to be done today. So let me just broadly point out the nature of discussion which is going to take place today is on one hand, we have constitutional provisions like Article 129 and Article 250. There are other articles also, which I will refer to a little later. And on the other hand, there is a provision, there is an act, parliamentary act, which is known as contempt of courts at 1971. So today's discussion would be about the interplay of the constitutional provisions and the provisions of the contempt of courts in 1971. You would wonder that why this kind of discussion is at all necessary. What is the need? That would be a first question which would occur to your mind. And the answer is that on this issue, that is whether parliament is entitled to make a law in relation to contempt of court. When such powers are inherent by the Supreme Court of India and the High Court of all High Courts all over the India under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. So once these powers are recognized under the Constitution, whether by ordinary legislation, such a power can be curtailed, limited and whether parliament under the enactment, prescribed maximum punishment, period of limitation and the procedure thereof. So this is the basic discussion which is going to take place today. Now, on the aspect of why it is necessary. If you examine this issue in the light of which, what I have said just now. If you examine these, the judgments of the Supreme Court of India on this issue, you would find a cleavage in opinions of the Supreme Court of India. There is one set of judgment which takes one kind, particular kind of view. And there is another set of judgments which take quite a contrary view of what has been taken by one set of judgments. Now, let me point out the first set of judgments that have taken a particular view is this. It has been stated that Article 129 and Article 215 of the Constitution of India confers or recognizes and inherits jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court in punishing contempt of its own court. Now, once this has been recognized or controlled by the provisions of the Constitution of India, such power inherent powers cannot be limited by an ordinary legislation made by a parliament. So that is first proposition of law which has been laid down in one set of judgments. The judgments I will refer to little later. The second proposition of law is, which has been laid down is that parliament has not made any law with regard to the contempt of the Supreme Court of India. It is very surprising and very, I think, ingenious way of saying that there is no law of contempt in relation to the contempt of court of the Supreme Court. So that is the second proposition of law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court. And third proposition of law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court is that the Supreme Court is not governed by the provisions of the contempt of courts act 1971. And therefore, it is free to exercise the powers in their own way. It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the contempt of courts act. And it is also even not bound by the maximum punishment which is prescribed under the contempt of courts act. So this is a first set of judgment which takes this view. The other set of judgment which has taken view is quite contrary. And therefore, as a student, as a lawyer, as a judge, you would think which view is correct. So today's discussion is on this aspect there, which view is correct. So my efforts or my endeavour would be to guide you in the right direction out of these two views, which is a correct view. The second view which has been taken in the second set of judgments is this. That parliament does have legislative authority or power to make law in relation to the contempt of high court as well as the Supreme Court of India. So that is the first proposition of law. The only rider which has been put by the second set of judgment is that these powers which are wasted in Supreme Court and in the high court are inherent powers recognised by the constitution of India. And therefore, these power cannot be abrogated or stultified or cannot be taken away by ordinary legislation. So to what extent parliament can do is that it can define the contempt. It can lay down the procedure for investigation of the contempt. It can prescribe maximum punishment which can be imposed if a person is held guilty. It can prescribe limitation for initiating the action. But the parliament has no power, authority or jurisdiction to completely take away or divest the Supreme Court or the high court of its own jurisdiction, inherent jurisdiction which is recognised under Article 129 and 215 of the constitution of India. So this is the second set of judgment and now the basic task which we will have to undertake as to which one is a correct view. Now to understand this, that which view is a correct view, we will have to go little bit into the historical aspect of the contempt jurisdiction. The second aspect is that we may have to even look at the pre-constitutional legislation with regard to the contempt of courts act. And what are the changes made by this current law which is 1971 act which has been enacted on the basis of the report which was given by the Sanyal committee. Mr. Sanyal was an additional policy general who was given task to examine this aspect and submit his report. And on the basis of his report, this act has been enacted. And in the meantime after the Sanyal committee submitted its report, the report was reported to the joint select committee and they also made certain suggestions. And the present law that is 1971 act is the outcome of the joint efforts of the Sanyal committee report and joint select committee of Bhargava committee which is known as Bhargava committee also. So this is the outcome of this. Now let us go to the first aspect, historical aspect. So far as contempt jurisdiction is concerned, it has been said that contempt jurisdiction is co-evaluable with the first foundation of the court. So it dates back to the first foundation of the court itself. When the first foundation of the court is laid, it is a necessary incident and attribute of the court because without such powers, the court will not be able to exist and will not be able to enforce the final judgements and orders that are passed by the court. So it is a necessary incident and attribute of the superior court of record and it dates back to its first foundation itself. So this is the historical background in which the contempt jurisdiction has been understood. Now under the in England, this principle that every court of record, superior court of record has inherent jurisdiction to commit contempt of court of itself and this subordinate courts there too is a principle which is referable to the common law. So this principle that superior courts has jurisdiction to decide what constitute contempt, what procedure to be followed, what punishment should be imposed is referable to the common law. And all the superior courts that are constituted have this power as a necessary attribute and incident of it being a court of record. So when in India the courts were established, initially Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta was established in 1774 and later on three courts in 1800 and 1824 at Bombay and Madras Supreme Court of Judicature were established. They were conferred the powers of King Bench and King's Bench being superior court of record, these three courts also derived this power of contempt by virtue of it being equated with the King's Bench powers. So these three chartered high courts derived this power of contempt by virtue of this charter of 1774 and more particularly since under the charter it was considered as a court of record. Thereafter in 1861 Indian High Courts Act converted the Supreme Court into the high courts and all original powers have been continued. Later high courts were established by different charters but all these courts were constituted as court of record. And court of record as I said that in England it is a common law principle that all courts of record have inherent jurisdiction to commit contempt of itself and also subordinate courts there too. So this principle of common law has been transplanted into India prior to the codification of law. The first legislation which was there in India is 1926 contempt of courts act. The object of the contempt of courts 1926 act was that prior to that it was considered to be unfettered power, unbridled power and unlimited power. So what kind of punishment is to be imposed upon a contempt was absolutely in the discretion of a judge. And that is how it was prior to the codification of law it was considered to be arbitrary power. Absolutely arbitrary power which would be depending on the judge's temperament. So some judge might impose a punishment of one year some judge might impose a punishment of six months. So it was absolutely left to them. So in those days the contempt jurisdiction was considered to be arbitrary unlimited jurisdiction which did not define what is contempt. It did not define even what would be the punishment which is liable to be imposed. And interestingly the accuser the jury the judge and hangman were the same person that is the judge concern. So that is how it was considered to be most arbitrary jurisdiction. So the parliament thought it fit to limit this jurisdiction arbitrary jurisdiction by providing the maximum punishment that can be imposed if a person is on guilty of contempt. So in 1926 act for the first time the powers are defined. So maximum punishment has been prescribed that if a person is held guilty of contempt of court. He can be punished for imprisonment up to six months and he can be a fine for 2000 rupees. So that was the punishment which was prescribed in 1926 act. Later on certain amendments were made in 1926 act in 1937. And it was held it was provided for that high court would not only include the high court created by chartered specific charters but also judicial commissioners also. So high court would also include judicial commissioners. And also there were some doubts that even person has committed contempt outside the territorial jurisdiction of the high court whether he could be proceeded with and he can be punished by a particular high court if he is outside the jurisdiction of the court. So those doubts were raised and ultimately in 1952 the act was re-enacted with this clarification that irrespective of the person whether he is in the territory of the particular high court or not but he has committed contempt of a particular high court. He can be proceeded against in that court and he can be imposed appropriate fine within the limits that are prescribed under the provisions of the 1926 act and 1952 act. So 1952 act was mere reproduction of 1926 act with these two clarification that it would also high court would also include judicial commissioners in those days. And whether person is within the territorial jurisdiction of the particular high court if he has committed contempt he can be proceeded with before that particular court and he can be punished. So these two clarifications of those enactments are very short enactments. They have hardly five sections only they are not elaborate enactments. So but interestingly when 1952 act was enacted the constitution has already come into force which has recognized that Supreme Court has also power of content but somehow in 1952 this aspect has been missed out. So the first judgment which was post constitution judgment that is 1954 judgment that is Sukadev Singh's case. In that case Supreme Court considered all these aspects constitutional history and the history of the contempt of courts and the codification of the contempt law. And all those things have been considered and then it said that these acts provide jurisdiction and provides limit in respect of the high courts only. It was true when that judgment was given by the Honourable Supreme Court of India in 1954 but that view which was laid down by the Supreme Court in 1954 was no longer a good law after 1971 enactment which is a present enactment. So this is the basic background in which the task was given to Mr. Sanyal to make recommendation what kind of legislation should be enacted. And ultimately on the basis of the report given by Mr. Sanyal and which was a report to a joint select committee the present act has been enacted. Interestingly Mr. Sanyal undertook this exercise of examining whether the inherent powers which have been recognized under the constitution of India could be limited, could be defined and could be regulated by a parliamentary legislation. After thorough examination of the constitutional provisions, the pre-constitutional laws of Privy Councils, the 1883 law in Surindranath Menarche's case of the Calcutta High Court, all those cases were considered constitutional provisions were examined and after thorough examination and after due deliberation the Sanyal Committee came to the conclusion that Parliament does have jurisdiction to enact a law in relation to the concept of court of the Supreme Court as well as the High Court. Only limitation which is there is that this power the Supreme Court or the High Court cannot be denuded of the inherent jurisdiction. The power cannot be abrogated altogether. It cannot be taken away but Parliament does have power to limit it, to regulate it and provide a maximum punishment for the content. So with this background this act was enacted. Now we are going into the debate why Supreme Court has taken a totally different view despite the recommendation of the Sanyal Committee or report of the Sanyal Committee. Why this strange view has been taken? It is because of not examining the history of the contempt of courts and the law relating to contempt of court. The Supreme Court has also not examined whatever the changes made in the 1926 act and 1952 act after codification. One important aspect which has been missed out by the Supreme Court throughout that I will advert a little later but we are considering why this kind of strange view has been taken. So first of all I will discuss those judgments where the Supreme Court has said that power of the Supreme Court under Article 129 of the Constitution of India is an inherent jurisdiction and no law of Parliament can regulate it or limit it. And it is absolutely in the discretion of the Supreme Court of India to decide in what manner the contempt proceeding should be conducted and what punishment should be imposed. Now before I take all of you to this set of judgments which has taken this view that contempt of court is not applicable to Supreme Court of India and Parliament has not made a law in relation to the Supreme Court of India or contempt of court. Now this is a very strange observation in my personal view and when I discuss the constitutional provisions and the certain omissions which have taken place you would realize that this statement of law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court their Parliament has not made law with regard to the Supreme Court of India's contempt of court. So this is a very strange view but before I go to these judgments that have taken this view let us take a quick look at the provisions of the Constitution of India. Now first provision is Article 129. Now what does Article 129 states? It states that the Supreme Court of India shall be a court of record and it shall have power of such a court including power to punish for the contempt of itself. So it has been constituted as a court of record having all powers of such a court and then including power to punish for contempt of itself. So these are the wordings of Article 120 now. Now what are the wordings of Article 250? It is also similarly worded. The only difference is that instead of the Supreme Court of India it has been stated that every high court shall be a court of record and every high court shall have all powers of such a court including power to punish for contempt of itself. So both are parametric and wordings are almost identical except the name of the court is changed in Article 129. It is Supreme Court, Article 250, it is high court. Another provision which is very relevant is Article 142 sub-Article 2. Article 142 sub-Article 2 also provides the power of the Supreme Court of India to investigate contempt of itself and impose appropriate punishment. But that power has been specifically made subject to the law made by the parliament. So please note this that Article 142 clearly lays down that Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of itself but that would be subject to any law made by the parliament. So powers are specifically made subject to the law of parliament. So inherent jurisdiction yes it is right but it is not correct to say that it cannot be limited or defined, contempt cannot be defined or limitation cannot be restrict. So it is made subject to law of the parliament. The another indication that parliament is entitled to make law in relation to contempt of court and it has made a law. Because 1971 act is a composite law which is applicable to high court as well as the Supreme Court. There is no justification from where did they get that Supreme Court is the contempt of courts act is not applicable to Supreme Court or if the parliament has not made a law in relation to Supreme Court. It is very strange view but we will discuss this aspect. So I was on the point that there is another indication that parliament has power to define or limit or regulate the procedure of the Supreme Court in relation to contempt of itself or subordinate court. That is that you will find in article 90 of article 2. Article 191 gives or recognizes freedom of speech and expression but that freedom or fundamental right is subject to the law that may be made by parliament with regard to certain exceptions and the exception contains that contempt of God. So here also article 19 of article 2 also refers to a parliament legislation. So parliament can make law containing freedom of speech and expression and that would also include law in relation to the contempt of court also. Because when certain restrictions are imposed by the provisions of the contempt of court set, they would be in the nature of restriction on freedom of speech and expression. So that is also being subject to the law made by a parliament. Now I will take you to the entries, relevant entries. Entry 77 of list 1 of schedule 7 clearly conquers powers on the parliament to make law in relation to the contempt of Supreme Court also. So entry 77 says that parliament is entitled to make law in relation to Supreme Court its organization and its jurisdiction including the contempt of courts. And also a clear indication is that 77 entry 77 of list 1 schedule 7 clearly recognizes power in parliament to define and regulate the contempt procedure of the Supreme Court. Entry 14 of concurrent list that is list 3 is also clearly says, it clearly says contempt of court but not Supreme Court of India. So if we read article 129, article 142 sub-article 2, article 19 sub-article 2 and entries 77 of list 1 and entry 14 of concurrent list 3, it clearly empowers parliament to make law in respect of the Supreme Court of India as well as the High Court. So the statement of the Supreme Court that parliament cannot make legislation in relation to the contempt of Supreme Court because it is an inherent jurisdiction recognized by article 129 on the face of it. In the light of this provisions, the statement of law is clearly not sustainable. Now, let us understand what does the court of record means. Court of record because everywhere the emphasis is on the court of record and inherent jurisdiction. So it is necessary to understand what what does the phrase court of record means. Court of record simply means that the acts and judicial proceedings of the court are preserved for permanent testimony and they are preserved and that's why it is known as court of record and the record is presumed to be correct. So that is the basic meaning of the court of record. All the judicial proceedings and the acts of the courts are preserved for perpetual testimony and they are presumed to be correct. Another incident of the court of superior court of record is that it has inherent jurisdiction to punish contempt of itself. So that is another incident of the court of record and the third and most important incident of any court when it is constituted as a court of record is that that nothing is beyond the jurisdiction of a court of record unless the constitution or a specific legislation expressly says so. So everything is within the limit within the jurisdiction of the superior court of record. So court of record has is presumed to have unlimited jurisdiction unless the parliament expressly say otherwise. Whereas inferior court of record have nothing which is not stated or I must say that it has only such jurisdiction which is specifically confirmed by a statute. Remaining or residual jurisdiction is completely ruled out. So this is the incident of the court of record. Now coming to the topic, the set of judgments which have taken view. Even recent judgment in Prashant Gushal case, in real Vijay Kurali's case, all these decisions are falling in the first set of judgments where the Supreme Court has held that parliament does not have jurisdiction or authority to make legislation in relation to the contempt of the Supreme Court of India. And there is a parliament has not made any law in respect of contempt of the Supreme Court and the provisions of the contempt of courts like 1971 are not applicable to the Supreme Court of India. So those judgment now we will start discussing. The first judgment in this line is Pritam Pal versus High Court of MP, which is reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court, page number 904. In this case, the technical point was raised before the High Court that High Court has failed to observe the procedural set parts which are envisaged under the provisions of the contempt of courts. And while dealing with such an objection, the High Court and the Supreme Court say that the powers of High Court and the Supreme Court are recognized under Article 129 and Article 200 respectively. And they are not fresh, conferral of the powers. They are simply recognition of the original powers which are already there. So it is not a fresh, conferral power and therefore parliament cannot make any legislation and whatever legislations are made of serving will serve as a guide only. And High Court of the Supreme Court of India is not bound by the provisions of the contempt of courts because their powers are constitutional. So that is the first judgment. Then another judgment is Aai Vaniyal versus Dr. H. Borobahu Singh. That is AIR 1994 Supreme Court, page 505. There it was not a question pertaining to contempt of High Court of the Supreme Court as speaker of a legislative assembly. Though he was directed to act in a particular manner, he was not carrying out the directions of the High Court and he was claiming immunity which is conferred under the constitution to the speaker of the legislative assembly. And in that background, the Supreme Court and the High Court examine their constitutional jurisdiction to vis-à-vis the contempt of courts. And they have again said that the Supreme Court and the High Courts are entitled to evolve its own procedure in relation to the contempt of itself. That is another judgment. Then third judgment in the line is T. Sudhakar Prasad versus government of an MP which is reported in 2001 SCC page 516. Now this judgment also speaks on the same line, but there also there was no such issue which was raised. It was a matter pertaining to the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The question raised before the Supreme Court was or the High Court was that after L. Chandrakumar's judgment, whether administrative tribunals power under section 17 to punish for contempt of itself would continue or it would become redundant. That was the issue which was raised in T. Sudhakar Prasad's case and there was no occasion to deal with all these issues which we are discussing today. Then next in line is Rajesh Shover Singh versus Tumratara Sahara's case that is reported in AIR 2014 SCC page 476. So here also again the Supreme Court stick to its original view which was laid down in Petham Pal Singh's case that Supreme Court is not bound by the provisions of the contempt of courts and parliament has not made any law. So in that case the court was really concerned with the technical objection which was raised by Mr. Ram Jayan Malani saying that if a complaint is made by a person without obtaining consent of the advocate general, such a complaint cannot be investigated because of the provisions of the contempt of courts. While dealing with such an objection, the Supreme Court said that it was a court monitor investigation and person was carrying out the direction of the Supreme Court and if in such directions which he was implementing, if certain interference is caused by somebody then he is liable to be punished for contempt. And in that background the Supreme Court examined the technical objection and repelled the contention by referring to its inherent jurisdictional 129 of the constitution of India. Last two judgments are most important because they have confused the law which has been settled by the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheet versus Kastroden because this was the view earlier of a prevalent prior to the Pallav Sheet's judgment. Of course Rajeshwar Singh's judgment is poor and curable because it has not taken note of the Pallav Sheet's decision which is a binding judgment where the Supreme Court has extensively examined the constitutional scheme and powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Article 129 and 250. Now interestingly, the Vijay Kurales case which is reported in AIR 2020, Supreme Court, page 3927. In this case also certain technical objections were raised about the manner in which the content proceedings were conducted by the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court failed to follow certain procedural safeguards provided under the content of court set and it was investigated in a manner which the Supreme Court deemed inappropriate. So the contention was raised that the Supreme Court ought to follow the provisions of the content of court set. It is required to frame charge. It is required to give particular notice in a particular format giving details of the content and also without consent of the advocate general such a proceeding was not maintained at all. Now while dealing with such contentions, the Supreme Court relied upon judgment of its own judgment in Pritil Mal Singh's case and Delhi Judicial Service Associations case must state of Gujarat. I will refer to that judgment little later but the Delhi Judicial Service Association case does not lay down what is referred to by the Supreme Court in Vijay Kurales case or in Prashant Bhushan case. It was entirely different case in the different set of circumstances the case had arisen before the Supreme Court and in that background the Supreme Court made certain observations. Those observations were taken out of context by the Supreme Court of India Vijay Kurales case and in the Prashant Bhushan case and the weighty argument of the lawyers have been repelled they were not accepted. So in these two cases also the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion so I will again state what are the conclusions in this set of judgments. These conclusions in this set of judgments are first conclusion is that Article 129 confers inherent jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of India and it cannot be regulated by ordinary legislation. Second proposition of law parliament has not made law with regard to the content of Supreme Court and the provisions of content of courts act will serve as merely guide so far as Supreme Court is concerned and Supreme Court is not bound by the provisions of the content of courts act. Now interestingly I guess one judgment which is also very interesting that is Zahira Habib Ghulla Sheikh v. state of Gujarat which is reported in 2006 Supreme Court page 1367 where Supreme Court improves the punishment of one year for the content of court on Zahira. The details of the case are that she filed different epidemics before different courts taking different stance and essentially she was guilty of committing perjury and which was also an offense constituting content of court. In this background the Supreme Court said that this is a very serious thing and the power of the Supreme Court under 129 is not limited by the provisions of the content of courts act. So the Supreme Court traveled beyond the maximum punishment of six months which is correct under the provisions of the content of court act and it imposed one year's punishment on Zahira Sheikh for committing content of court and also imposed a cost of 50,000. So far as cost is concerned I am not concerned because the content of court act does not specify what should be the amount of cost but it does provide for the maximum fine that is the maximum fine which is impossible under the provisions of the content of court act is 2000 rupees. So maximum punishment is six months and maximum fine is 2000 rupees. Now going beyond all these Supreme Courts in these sets of judgments have totally given a go-by to the statutory skip, the historical aspects as well as the report of the Sanyal committee which was the basis of the present act 1971 act. And it has also not noticed certain provisions of the content of court act. It has simply referred to section 15 in arriving at the conclusion that section 15 is merely procedural law and it does not affect the inherent jurisdiction and there is no other provision under the content of court act which refers to the powers of the Supreme Court of India. While holding these Supreme Court has not referred to the provisions of section 12, section 13, section 14 which provides for content in the face of the court. There also it has been specifically referred to that in the spectrum content in the face of court before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has to follow the procedure under section 14. If it is not a content, it's a criminal content in the face of the court then section 15 will apply. So section 14 specifically refers to Supreme Court by specific name, section 15 also specifically refers to by name. Section 12 and 13 refers to that no court shall impose any punishment beyond the prescribed punishment that is 6 months in prison when then fine of 2000 rupees. So no court word has been used. Now there is an interesting omission. In 1926 act and 1952 act, the act referred to that high court shall not impose punishment beyond 6 months imprisonment and beyond the proposed 2000. Now when this act was enacted in 1971, there is a clear omission. So instead of high court, the word chosen has been the no court shall impose. So no court would also include the Supreme Court. So Supreme Court has not taken note of section 12. Then section 13 also says that no court shall impose imprisonment unless the court finds that being content is substantial. So interference with the judicial proceedings or interference with the administration of justice or scandalizing of court is of substantial nature. Then only imprisonment will have to be imposed. So there also the word no court has been used instead of high court. So that would certainly mean that the legislature wanted to cover every court. Now Supreme Court comes up with a strange argument. Some people also argue that concept of court has defined the word high court, but it has not defined the Supreme Court. The reason is that there is only one Supreme Court. Whereas while defining the high court, it intended originally that it wanted to cover the judicial commissioners also because in many states at the relevant time there was no properly constituted high courts and there were judicial commissioners which were exercising the power and a robust to the high court. So for that limited court, the definition of high court was necessitated and omission to provide a definition of Supreme Court in definition clause is absolutely insignificant and is of no consequence. So similarly, then section 18 also refers to the provisions for examination of criminal content by an age of two judges. Then section 20, specifically said that no court shall take cognizance of content after one year's period. And section 23 of the content of courts provides that Supreme Court and the high court shall be entitled to frame rules in relation to the content of itself or the subordinate court. And all high courts have in exercise of power under section 23 and the Supreme Court has also in exercise of the power, constitutional power as well as the powers under section 23 of the content has enacted certain rules and this kind of specific procedure. So this is absolutely improper to state that there is no separate law enacted by parliament or the Supreme Court of India. The content of court site is read as a whole in conjunction with the historical background and the specific commissions. It would definitely apply to the Supreme Court of India also because it is a composite law and the parliament is not expected to come out with a separate law in relation to the content of Supreme Court. Because this act has been enacted in exercise of entry 77, list 1, read with entry 14 of concurrent list. So there is a specific sanction under the constitution itself and therefore the Supreme Court's observation in this set of judgments is absolutely incorrect. Now coming to the second set of judgments, we will quickly go through and then I will record what are the final conclusions and which is a correct view. Now second set of judgments which has clearly recognized the authority of parliament to make legislation. Please note down those judgments because they would be useful in coming to the correct conclusion. The first judgment is Mohammad Ikram versus state of UP that is AIR 1964 Supreme Court page 1625. This judgment is prior to 1971 act so it essentially refers to 1952 act and therefore it may not be very relevant but it has clearly stated that parliament is entitled to define content and limit the maximum punishment which is liability imposed. Then SK Sarkar versus Vinay Chandra which is reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court page 723. There also the question was raised that an application filed without the consent of the advocate general whether it would be maintainable. And the Supreme Court said that in a given case, if a prayer is made to treat its information and request is made to exercise sumo motor powers such an application is maintainable and the court would be free to take sumo motor cognizance and while examining the constitutional scheme. The Supreme Court clearly recorded that the only limitation on the parliament's power is that it cannot completely abrogate the powers inherent powers of the Supreme Court and invest such powers in another court. It can additionally confer certain powers but it cannot digest or denude Supreme Court or the high court of its inherent jurisdiction that is the only limitation which has been recorded in this judgment. The Delhi judicial service association which has been strongly relied upon in the other set of judgments. In my respectful view that judgment does not specifically state what has been referred to in the other set of judgments. The Delhi judicial service association versus state of Gujarat was a case where one judicial magistrate was manhandled by police. He was arrested handcuff and he was taken in the town in a handcuff position and that created great problem in the judicial circle and it was constituted as contempt. It was such a great contempt that police officers arrested the judicial magistrate first class and took him to the town in a handcuff position with tied with a rope. So Supreme Court, the DC very court judicial service association and many other persons directly moved Supreme Court of India to take cognizance of the contempt. And in that proceedings a contention was raised that section 15 subsection 2 of the contempt of courts provides for taking cognizance of subordinates contempt only by the high court. And Supreme Court has no direct jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt of the subordinate court. Now in this background the Supreme Court scanned the entire law and the provisions of the contempt of courts act. It referred to Article 129, 215 and 377 all those things and ultimately said that parliament will have jurisdiction to enact a law in relation to contempt but it cannot fully denude the Supreme Court of its inherent power. And only limitation is this that it cannot be invested in another court and while holding this Supreme Court said that there is no restriction under the contempt of courts act that Supreme Court cannot take direct cognizance of the contempt of the subordinate court. And in judicial hierarchy the Supreme Court being the highest court, it is the judicial duty of the Supreme Court of India to protect the subordinate judiciary. And it is not correct to say that in respect of subordinate courts only high court has jurisdiction to take slow motor cognizance. So while dealing with this particular observations were made but those observations are taken out of context in the first set of judgments which I had already referred to. And they are being interpreted to mean that the Supreme Court has, I'm sorry parliament has no jurisdiction or authority to make a law in relation to this. So this daily judicial service association judgment is discussed out of context certain observations are taken out of context. The next judgment is Supreme Court Bar Association judgment versus Union of India which is reported in year 1998 Supreme Court page 1895. Here also the Supreme Court clearly recognized so far as high court is concerned. Supreme Court clearly recognized that so far as high courts are concerned article 250 though it confers inherent jurisdiction on all high court to commit any person for contempt of itself. The contempt of courts act would be applicable the parliament is fully justified in defining what is contempt in regulating the procedure prescribing the maximum punishment. So it has stated like this that so far as high courts are concerned there is no doubt. So now please note down that so far as high courts are concerned article 215 provisions are concerned it can be regulated by parliament maximum punishment can be prescribed and limitation can also be prescribed. And that has been clearly held by this constitutional judgment of five judges. But now interestingly while coming to the power of the Supreme Court which uses the same same phrasiology like article 215 the Supreme Court states again same thing in Supreme Court Bar Association case that parliament has not enacted any law with regard to the contempt of the Supreme Court. And again stated that this issue of course has been considered in past but considering the importance of this issue we are leaving it to be decided in appropriate case. So these constitution based judgment did not decide this issue finally. It was kept open to be decided by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case whether article 129 can be factored by parliamentary legislation and whether the Supreme Court is bound by the procedure prescribed by ordinary legislation. So this issue was clearly kept open but while doing that also certain tentative observations were made and they are also being relied upon in the first set of judgments to come to a particular conclusion. Now most important judgment which lays down the correct law. Please take note of this judgment which is a three judges bench judgment. So in addition to the five judges bench judgment Supreme Court Bar Association where clearly 215 jurisdiction has been clarified. And this judgment which I'm referring to is Pollock sheet versus custodian which is reported in AIR 2001 Supreme Court page 2763. It is a three judges bench judgment where Supreme Court in paragraph 30 to 33 comprehensively examine the constitutional provisions. The Sunnel committee report previous legislation and then finally come to the conclusion that if the contempt of court has defined contempt what is contempt if it is prescribed procedure. And if it has prescribed maximum punishment and limitation it cannot be said that by ordinary legislation the power of the Supreme Court has been completely abrogated or taken away. It is merely defining and limiting the powers which is permissible if we see the legislative scheme and constitutional scheme. So this judgment in my view lays down the correct view. This is the correct view which is taken after full deliberation, whole discussion and this was the direct issue which was raised in this matter. And of course it was originally it was in connection with the power of the High Court to initiate a contempt within what period of limitation. So and what is what is the implication of taking cognizant which is used in section 20 of the contempt of court side. Allowships was essentially relating to limitation which has been prescribed for taking cognizant of the contempt. But while dealing with this issue the court has specifically considered all these aspects and what is the maximum punishment which can be imposed by the Supreme Court or the High Court in exercise of even their inherent jurisdiction under article 129 and 1115. So this judgment lays down the correct law and this has been followed again in 2016. In 2016 Mahesh was paring versus Allahabad High Court which is reported in AIR 2016 Supreme Court 3267 where again the Supreme Court said that it is settled law. That the powers of contempt, though inherent in Supreme Court and High Court, they are liable to be defined, regulated and the parliament who is entitled to impose, provide maximum punishment that can be imposed under the law by even Supreme Court. So now these are the two views and then as a lawyer, as a student or as a judge, you are confronted with these two views. You should be clear that what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the law sheet is correct. And Supreme Court, the Mubarak Association decision is also a complete answer in relation to the power of the High Court under article 250. And what was ambiguous has also been clarified so far as article 129. It is a distortion or a deviation of the settled law in these two latest decision that is we Vijay Kurali and we Prashant Kushan case. In fact in Prashant Kushan case, when punishment was to be imposed, again this argument was raised and it has been argued by the advocate that there is no conflict between the constitutional provisions and the provisions of the contempt of courts. They work in harmony. There is no conflict at all. And God is unnecessarily paying attention to some sort of imaginary conflicts and then trying to preserve their jurisdiction as if it is an unlimited jurisdiction. But this argument was negative by the Supreme Court by simply reproducing 18 pages, 18 pages from Vijay Kurali's judgment. There has to be some limits in reproduction. How can you produce 18 pages from one judgment? Just to answer a particular question and then say that this argument has been dealt with and we are therefore we are not discussing it. And we can Vijay Kurali's judgment where Pallav Shade's judgment was cited as a precedent by Indian President. Vijay Kurali's judgment is a two-judge's judgment. Whereas Pallav Shade's judgment is a three-judge's-ben judgment where the issue has been directly dealt with, elaborated and discussed. When it was cited, the Supreme Court simply said that it was dealing with limitation and this issue was not directly dealt with and therefore it is not binding and we do not propose to discuss that decision at all. So that is how the judgment in Vijay Kurali cannot be considered to be a precedent, a binding precedent for one reason that the decision of Pallav Shade has been performed currently dealt with which is binding to it. And all this legislative history and Supreme Court bar association judgment and other judgments Maheshwar Peri's judgment 2016 which is given by Justice Joseph sitting with Justice Nariman. That it is a settled law that parliament is entitled to regulate and define the contempt and the precedent maximum punishment. Despite this is the position and therefore in Prashant Vishal's case it was a three-judge's-ben judgment but ultimately they have before two-judge's-ben judgment. So entire law has been confused because of these two latest judgments where in fact the controversy was fully settled and in my view there is no doubt about the jurisdiction of parliament or authority of parliament to make legislation. With only one caveat that parliament cannot completely take away or divest Supreme Court or high court of its inherent jurisdiction under 129 and 250 respect. This is the only limit otherwise everything can be done under ordinary law which is enacted by parliament and it is a composite law. So this one interesting aspect I think very little time is left just two minutes more and then we will end it because 1 hour and 10 minutes have passed. Now the erogation of unlimited jurisdiction is antithesis to the rule of law. When Supreme Court says that we are not long by any law and we have unfettered jurisdiction. That itself violates the fundamental and basic structure in where it has been stated that rule of law is part of basic structure. And it also ignores the long-established dictum that king is under no man but the God and the law which was laid down by Henry the Brepton in 13th century and which is also part of Magna Carta. So this the erogation of unlimited jurisdiction having unlimited jurisdiction or unfettered powers in the matter of content of itself for a subordinate court as assumed by the Supreme Court has no place in the constitution which is governed by law because Supreme Court is also ultimately the creature of constitution and when the Supreme Court is the creature of the constitution it has no authority to ignore the constitutional mandate and rely upon the old powers, the powers which were prevalent which was considered to be arbitrary unregulated powers prior to the codification of law. So the Supreme Court cannot go back to the original position prior to pre-codified law and rely upon those observations which have been given by the courts in England or which have been given by pre-council or other high courts prior to the constitution of India. So my conclusions are three, Parliament has legislative competence to define and limit the contempt and Parliament cannot diverse inherent powers of the Supreme Court of contempt and investigate other court and there is no need to have a separate law for the contempt of the Supreme Court. So with this, I end this session. I am thankful to Mr. Vikas Chaturth for giving me this opportunity to share my views and I believe this clarity which I have tried to impart would definitely be helpful to you in practice when you are confronted with this kind of question by the Supreme Court of the High Court. So now let us open the question and answer session if anyone has any questions. We have got the questions. Yes. Mr. Vikas, can content proceedings be initiated against the trial court judges for not following the mandatory precedence and why the courts are reluctant to take action against the judges? Actually section 16 is a clear answer to the question. Section 16 said that the judges are also liable for the contempt of themselves also of the other court. So section 16 of the contempt of courts is a clear answer. There also, again, there is one writer which has been judge made law in the state of Rajasthan versus Prakashan. Here I am 1998 piece 1315 where Supreme Court said that the judges of the court of record cannot commit contempt of itself or any other court. So it's a broad proposition which has been laid down in the state of Rajasthan versus Prakashan. But otherwise subordinated judges are liable to be held for contempt of court if they ignore the binding precedent. This is by Dr. Shri Kanth. Can argument be advanced that the Supreme Court's power is covered under the basic structure doctrine? Basic structure doctrine on the contrary, I am saying that whatever the Supreme Court is trying to erronell to itself is antithesis to the rule of law and basic structure. The rule of law clearly says that everybody has to follow the law and constitution because as I said that the Supreme Court itself is a creature of constitution. How can it ignore the constitutional provisions and say that whatever was prior to codification of law, we will follow that on the basis of theory of inherent jurisdiction. That would be improper, that would be violating that basic principle of any legal system that the king is under no man except the God and the law. So Supreme Court is also bound by the law. This is Raghav Tana Ji. No, this is by Abed Khan, a person who disobeys the decree, judgment or order of the courts to commit civil contempt. Then what about criminal contempt procedure? Criminal contempt has been defined under section 2c. It is in three parts. First part deals with scandalizing of the court. Second part deals with the interference with the pending judicial proceedings. And third part deals with the interference with the administration of justice. So when these three things are there, any of these things, then it would constitute a criminal contempt. Then civil contempt means willful disobedience of the order, decree or an undertaking to the court. So civil contempt has been defined under section 2b. Whereas criminal contempt has been defined under section 2c, which is in three parts, but which largely covers entire spectrum of all sorts of cases of criminal nature. Either it is scandalizing the court or interfering with the judicial proceedings or interference with the administration of justice. If a matter is settled under the arbitration act and there is a violation, can proceedings of contempt of court act be initiated? I think if I recollect recently there is a judgment of the Supreme Court where it has been held probably that he would be liable for contempt. If I recollect rightly, there is a recent Supreme Court judgment that since an arbitrator is also entitled to issue injunctions under section 9 and later on under section 16 of the arbitration act. And it has almost characteristics of an enforceable decree and therefore violation thereof would constitute a contempt. That is my impression is I am subject to correction, but mostly I am right. Panaj Utyan has a Supreme Court never overtly overruled the Preetam Pall's judgment. Preetam Pall's judgment, if I may say it was 1990, I will have to check the name. Because thereafter this Supreme Court bar association judgment and the Delhi Judicial Service Association and Pallabshed's judgment. Pallabshed's judgment if you refer to it, if I recollect rightly it has been dealt with in that judgment and despite that judgment the Supreme Court free judge's bench has clearly held and therefore I am not sure but it is infinitely overruled. So I would say that it is not a correct law. The arbitration was held, I have just checked it out. In Al-Ka-Chandreshwar versus Shamsul Ishwar Khan held that if any party fails to comply with the orders of the arbitral tribunal under section 17, then that party would be deemed to be guilty of contempt of the arbitral tribunal. 2017 I believe. I think. This is 4th May 2018. 18 yes. And again there is another judgment also. There is one article also. They will have to read. This is on 15th of May arbitration proceedings and contempt will be contempt of courts apply to arbitration proceedings. This is by Gaurav 30 on 15th of June on LiveLock. Yeah. And it was a excellent session as we always have with you. And it's always a pleasure connecting on a virtual platform and otherwise. And tomorrow friends, we will be having a session on what we normally talk into the criminal law suspension of sentence code of criminal procedure. This is by Murti Naik and advocate from Karnataka High Court. So do join us tomorrow at 5pm. And before we part for the day, everyone stay safe. Stay blessed. And in whatever manner you can contribute towards the society. You can do it moderately in a procedure. That is, we can always assist someone in the oxygen slender, etc. in a WhatsApp groups, you can support in all manner, whatever it can be done, one should do it. The situation is quite tense, but we should this time to shall pass. But in any manner, whatever we can do, we should always contribute to the society from what we are getting. Thank you friends. And again, those who want to like, share and subscribe to the channel, they can do that. And thank you, Mr. Pandya. It was a seamless session. Thank you.