 Indeed, as you said, Mary, I look at Europe both maybe as an outsider and an insider, having worked in Brussels at some point and in the national political, in the national parliament in The Hague, so knowing some of the insights, but also bringing my training as a historian and philosopher to it. What I would like to do today is just share some of the ideas and insights from the book and then I hope we'll have a nice and inspiring debate and exchange and conversation after that. I think in looking at the current situation, it's best to face the difficult situation head on. I mean, the picture is rather bleak, right? It's taking Europe now more than five years to get out of a big financial and economic crisis. Still a situation of huge unemployment in many European countries, not least in the South. European Union itself is more unpopular than ever before. If you look at the opinion polls and the longer trends, you see that there's a real full as of 2009, so closely related to the start of the crisis, first the banking crisis then the debt crisis, with on average I think the positive assessment of the European Union went down by 25 percentage point, that of national governments by about 10 on average. And then as a final point in that picture, there is not least in EU circles in Brussels a fear or a pessimism that the old way of doing things, the variable community method is put to the test by this crisis and during these past years. Or even as some say that European politics is being re-nationalized, for instance with the very visible involvement of national leaders in the euro crisis management. Well, what I would try to briefly do is to give another perspective on some of these phenomena, drawing partly on my experience in these past four years working for President von Rumpa, but also on my own analysis in the book. And I would say, I mean my overall thesis is that we are indeed living through a really transformative period for Europe as a whole and that European Union in 2013, 14, no longer is that of 2008 and the best way to sum it up succinctly would be that all our countries and public opinions have discovered the extent of our interdependence, the feeling of all being in the same boat, which governments are now more keenly aware than before what it means to be in the same club as a result of that crisis. And a lot of all the political work in these four or five years was, or maybe almost all of it, was about drawing the consequences from that interdependence and then you come to things like budgets and banks and economic oversight and that's all, but that's all sort of drawing the consequences from that discovery of independence. But also the citizens and public opinions are discovering this and it is for many also a painful discovery, it's not just good news, isn't it? And in a way after decades in which most people look at Europe, maybe this country is an exception with your story of referenda, but in many European countries indifference was a kind of polite indifference or sometimes unpolite indifference, maybe was the way Europe was treated, whereas today Europe has sort of come to the center of national political debates in many more countries. And it seems that this new proximity may even come at the price of this equally unprecedented unpopularity. So the question then is would this be a forebode of more anti-European populism or could it also be a sign of the Union's growing political maturity that people are more interested in? Now in my talk I would first like to share what I see as three overall political lessons from the crisis. We have seen, I mean the system has been tested and also as a political theorist or observer when a system is put to the test you can see what it's really about. I'll do that briefly and then I want to talk a little bit about some of the institutional changes and about public opinion and in the concluding part. Now first on the three political lessons from the debt crisis. The first one I would say that we have seen again, which is sometimes difficult to see that in the end in Europe the political motives for being together can trump the purely economic motives. I mean the euro you could say has been saved by now and not only for financial reasons, not only because of the cost, the economic cost of a breakup but also for political reasons just as it was not only created for pragmatic reasons back in 1989 in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall but also for very deep political reasons. And one way I sort of observed this difference in the past years between the purely economic and financial motives and the more political ones was if you looked at the difference between the way finance ministers were treating Greece or the whole Greek problem and has a state and government. I mean if it had been only for the finance ministers Greece might have been outside the euro zone, let's put it that way but because many of these decisions went a level up as it were to heads of government where also more political considerations came into play for Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and all the others about what would it mean for let's say stability in the Balkans when Greece went out or what would it mean for Europe's image in the world. I mean for Franco-German relations that type of more ungraspable considerations did play a role. Of course the problem was that these political motives are not so visible or they only became visible when the system was really put to the test, when it had the back against the wall or the knife at the throat on the throat and the markets I would say had some difficulty to understand the full extent of this political determination or did not immediately believe but I think by now the message has sunk in. I mean looking back I would say that the turning point is between June and September 2012 of course with the double action with the governments deciding for a banking union and the ECB stepping up its action. So to that extent we are now after, I mean this has brought an end to the more existential phase of the euro zone crisis, the risk of break up but of course we're still in the economic and social crisis. But I think the fact that this political will could be mobilized when it was needed is important to keep in mind also when looking at the future and when with other challenges that may arise. Now second lesson a bit more briefly is that I think during the crisis the European Union has shown an impressive capacity to change under the pressure of events which is remarkable because the European Union is as you all know it's a very rule bound system it's all about rules and laws which are hard to change but the pressure was such that as I said the EU in 2014 is no longer the one from 2008 I mean we have banking supervision is rescue mechanism, new treaties, budgetary and macroeconomic oversight, national economic reforms etc. These were maybe all little steps in themselves or some big steps and maybe they came all too little and too late as people said but if you add them all up and you look five six years back it's quite a sea change actually. And it shows that the system as a whole has a capacity to absorb such a shock. Now the third lesson more important one is that Europe has arrived in the heart of national political life and as I mentioned one sign of it was perhaps that national leaders dealt with it very visibly in the heydays because the survival of their own government or their economy was at stake but you can also see it in the way for instance national elections are followed intensively these days across Europe be it Italian elections early last year or the German elections of last autumn or the announcement of a Greek referendum you see these were all European phenomena just as the European elections as such will be of course. So this economic interdependence is also translating into a political interdependence and I do not see that as a backsliding of community way of doing things but also as a sign of progress of what has now really become a shared adventure because also if you translate it into institutional terms in these past years Europe has been I mean the EU institutions have been strengthened the Commission has taken on new role in supervision and etc. The parliament has played the size of role at certain moments also but also national leaders have been and ministers have been involved more strongly and have been forced to take the responsibility for European decisions. So the way I look at this is that it's not the re-nationalization of European politics but rather the Europeanization of national politics which is continuing and that's actually one of the themes which I developed in my book the passage to Europe and which I try to do to avoid the sort of sterile academic opposition between on the one hand neo-functionalist and supranational thinking and on the other hand so called intergovernmentalism I mean the ones only focusing on the EU institutions the others on national interest. I propose a model of three spheres of European politics to explain that but that will take too long for now I'm afraid. But the important thing is that whereas in the early days the EU was founded in the days of Schumann and Monet let's say was founded against the states and was kept outside the old world of diplomacy. What has happened from the start is that member states have been drawn in to the system. First ministers, later national leaders, Council European Council and this has in my reading strengthened the system as a whole because it allows it to convince public opinions more. Now so that's a first take we have this strong political determination at work capacity to deal with changes and you're arriving in the heart of national politics and maybe even strengthened by it. Now I want to spend some time on these two issues mentioned in the subtitle there the talk institutional change and public discontent. On the institutional change side I mean we can discuss a lot of other issues in the questions afterwards or in the conversation because of course relations between institutions have changed also perhaps maybe even more importantly relations between member states are changing and have changed. Think of the role of Germany and even the situation with the United Kingdom now which is also maybe an effect of the crisis. But here I just want to stress one basic point regarding this institutional change which I think in a way we are still collectively in the way of in the middle of discovering and the basic point is that we are discovering that running a currency is something else than running a market. And what Europe was built for to do was to run a currency. And now it is also running a currency and you can see in this past four or five years that the center of gravity of political attention has shifted completely from this building a market even if of course that work is still going on with still working groups every day meeting in the council I mean on new directors and things that's still going on but the political center of gravity is shifting from building the market through to the currency and that's why I mean still just I think two days ago Sikorski gave an interview somewhere the Polish Foreign Minister saying that the Eurozone was the political center of Europe and that's why Poland wants to join it will take some time but so they also see this this happening and the fact is that running a currency is really something else than running a market it's it's it means exercising a different type of power because what's a market a market is about setting norms it's about normative power for for companies and and and customers etc to to to abide to and in a way if I may simplify to the extreme the original community was established to organize powerlessness actually because the states said to each other the member states we must bind our hands we shall not interfere which shall not support a link industry which shall not we shall not this and that and as I said it was normative power not executive power which is perhaps one way it was also conceivable to have institutions in Brussels dealing with it now decisions relating to the currency are not about rules for companies etc but there are about budgetary policies macroeconomic policies things which go to the heart of national political and parliamentary life and think about recommendations to bring down budget deficits or to accelerate structural reforms even if countries themselves decide what to do and how still there is there is a strong push I could take one one example which maybe makes the point more clearly decision of March last year which concerned Cyprus was a nasty story but in the end the European Union let's not look at what happened in in all the back rooms the European Union as such asked one member state to close down one big bank which represented very large share of that country's GDP that is really an executive discretionary decision it's very different from the type of normative power where you say to 28 countries well this is the rules you buy your your banks have to buy you could also if you like describe the shift from a union exercising mainly normative power to also executive power as a shift from governance to government that is not a play with words but I think it's it's a good way to describe it and as I said it has consequences also for the role you you you can give we need to give to democratic scrutiny because in this world where the European Union where euro related policies become so important the role of national and European Parliament also changes compare again with the market legislation I think there it was never considered to be a problem that the legislation is drawn up by the council and the European Parliament and the national parliaments only come in as controllers of their own respective national governments whereas it's different with the type of more be it recommendations or in some cases executive decisions related to economic policies because budgetary powers are as I said at the heart of national political life I mean and for parliaments they're they're very resilient I mean many of them were born to control tax-raising in the past but here you come to the to the dilemmas of interdependence between the the interests of the whole let's say as in the case of Cyprus where where the failure would pose a risk to to all other countries and where still you need to give a special say to to one national parliament but at the moment we do not have configurations where you can have a European decision being as it were scrutinized by only one national parliament and the European Parliament for all of them even if there is some thinking going in that directions for instance with the the proposal to to have reform contract between member states and and and the Commission but well we can keep that for a discussion chair how much time do I have now from the parliaments I would go to the other side of that equation the the public discontent which I think it would be also useful to look at from this angle of the discovery of interdependence the fact that what happens in one country affects all others which you here in Ireland have also noticed or the rest of Europe has been interested above average in what was going on with your economy as as others have been looked at in in turn and that really I think we should really not underestimate it that is radically new that has never happened before even I mean go back to to 1945 never before have the peoples of the European Union been so aware that they are in this together and that what happens in another country can have a direct impact on your own job here or your savings or your your your pension and that discovery is is today affecting the European Union because in a way Europe was always was or used to be just either as I said a subject of public indifference or it was good news and concerned only a few groups directly in some countries these are big groups I mean agriculture or fish fishermen or students or businesses but not all citizens and that has changed with the euro you could say well it's already 20 year old story but in fact it's only the crisis of 2008 910 which has revealed this this massive changed when Europe was arriving in in peoples pockets as it were I've not said much so far and I will not on on the causes of of of the euro crisis but I I guess motor you would agree that is a mix of both really euro related or systemic elements design flaws as they are called with a nice euphemism and and the more structural economic crisis or challenges for all our countries relating to to a lack of competitiveness in in the global economy and it's I think it's the two which make for a toxic mix in a way also for public opinion because the fact is that countries across Europe are doing very difficult and unpopular reforms and many of them I will I will put your country between brackets here but many are doing reforms that they would have to have had to do anyway whether they are in the euro or not whether they're even part of the European Union of not because they are about responding to global challenges to the rise of China if you want to summarize and of course it's not always easy for people to make this this distinction and the the other thing the European Union suffers from is that on the one hand there is the sort of more general crisis of trust in politics and also a national politics which is the case in in my in my own country the Netherlands where you have a very volatile public opinion can look at many other countries in Western Europe and that resonates of course into European politics but moreover he was also specifically hit in this crisis as I said that you can see it even in the polls because of the new role that you has taken up and has been asked to take up anyway because well to repeat once more if for decades complaints about curvy cucumbers aside I mean Europe was all about maybe mainly about opening and liberating and emancipating and creating opportunities now you was seen as as being intrusive and meddling and dictating and correcting prescribing and judging and all nasty things so to sum up today many people have the impression that Europe makes them weaker whereas the founding promise was that Europe would make your country and maybe you're stronger and that that is a massive challenge for for the European Union as a whole but it's not a new question and the issue of public legitimacy and here would maybe just look at my book to to to conclude it's not a new question this necessity to raise public interest in what the European Union does in my book the third part of the book and then final part is about it's called the search for the public and I rather than go for a normative approach and talk about democratic deficit and all that kind of things what I have done is is more as a as a historian but but analytically is look at different ways and means that have been used already in the past say 40 years to make people more more interested and to and what I do what I develop as a tool is to distinguish three strategies member states and you institutions have used to interest people and I call them with sort of historic names the the Roman strategy that of results the Greek strategy of giving people a voice it's ancient Greece and the German strategy also not let's say 19th century Germany of identity politics and so the Roman strategy after the Roman Empire also think of the Pax Romana the idea of peace bread and circuses but bread as the advantage that comes with the existence of political order and and the protection it can offer the rights can give series Roman is soon I'm a Roman citizen said Saint Paul and thus he was not tortured he's quoted of course in the famous Kennedy speech about being a Berlin and that is a strategy the Roman strategy of results which the European Union has relied upon massively I mean a political scientist would call it output legitimacy I don't like that kind of terms but well the the Greek strategy of giving people a say in the European in the political order is is as of course also been been used by the establishment of European parliament for instance and and other and other means and the German strategy of trying to lay out the feeling of a shared identity that's the most difficult one a shared culture has also been tried actually because one of the things one of the ideas that always comes back up is why don't we have one sort of one history book for school children all across Europe so they learn finally that they are Europeans and not only Irish or Finns or croats as one story I tell in the book about that when they tried this 20 years ago the time of the year of the 12th have 12 historians from all countries and had to sit together all write their own chapter and then they started to fight about about the words there's this for instance in the chapter on the history of France the the historian who had to write that chapter had written about the barbaric invasions in fourth century goal which was not to the liking of his German colleague so it had to be invasion Germanic and there was also a spat which you will appreciate between the Spaniards and the Brits about what to call Sir Francis Drake who had been portrayed as a pirate in the Spanish chapter and the British didn't like that so it gives you one idea that is very difficult to come up with a sort of neutral pan-European way of our history and another story I tell in much detail in the book is how the design of the Europe bank notes came about I mean just look at them afterwards but there was a group of also a bank note experts sitting together to come up with ideas and well in almost all countries you usually had portraits of not of big political figures or I mean poets or writers or musicians but this didn't work because there were only seven bank notes and 15 countries so you would have and if we could all agree on Shakespeare and Dante and Victoria you go some countries would find themselves without a head on the bank notes so in the end well we have seven historic styles of architecture on them from from the Greek woman on the five year until 20th century but not even real buildings but anonymously as the word just the idea of the style so it was very difficult to ground as a word European history although it is interesting that at least one idea was kept the idea of of change and that Europe started in antiquity now if just to conclude briefly if you look at these three strategies in the context of the current crisis you can see that the Roman strategy of result is the most urgent one it's just feel felt desperately by public opinions I mean they want results jobs growth and I think for politicians thinking about the next European elections they feel as a race to the clock because even if growth is close to return I mean the results of that the fruits of that in terms of employment will only come after me next next year but this experience of the crisis also shows that the the the legitimacy that comes with results is what I would call a fair weather legitimacy you cannot weather a storm with it and for that you need a stronger sense of we Europeans which only the Greeks and the German strategies can can provide and I think we currently feel but it can be an issue for the discussion also strongly the need for people to have have more of a say in European politics as a result of the crisis I mean there's the changing designation of the Commission president is is one element in that the need for more transparency in some of the crisis the way crisis decisions have been taken for instance with Cyprus and so I think that that need is felt on the on the the German strategy of identity as I said it's the most difficult one and the crisis has even maybe highlighted the differences and tensions between countries and peoples within the European Union but on the other hand as I said earlier it's also very perhaps the very first time that all of us from from here on island all the way to the east have felt that we are in the same boat and that it is really a common adventure we are we are in and in that respect maybe maybe history is more effective teacher of what it is to be European than than history books themselves now to conclude there are no easy answers I mean to to to the to the crisis if you if you look at the much of the American or sometimes British press they always ask Europe to either make a big step forward or to disintegrate my conclusion also have lived through the past four years but also ready from the book is that Europe does not face that fateful choice between a breakup and federation if you will and that clearly there are many tensions in the system and some of them the way we handle with deal with these tensions can be approved but in the end not all of them can be eliminated because they go to the very heart of what Europe is well maybe one civilization but very many different countries and we will not turn that or should want to turn that into into one state so European politics is very much about dealing with these tensions and making it work and in my view that is not something to look upon with contempt but it's a very honorable task to for politics and it's a very political task to to be able to deal with these tensions between peoples and states thank you