 Great, good morning and welcome to Vermont House Judiciary Committee, and we are continuing working on S 119 regarding use of force, and then later in the day we'll look at the miscellaneous judiciary bill which has a number of different components to it, but we'll be focusing on DLS, and then cannabis and expungement. But right now we're going to start with with Attorney Bryn Hare welcome. And I asked Bryn to do a walkthrough again of S 119 I know we did it yesterday but it was it was quick it was a large group, and I just thought it would be helpful to have her do it again and that way we can ask questions. You see Martin's hand and I'm wondering if it just makes sense for me to give context before the walkthrough or after. Yeah, yeah, thank you, thank you yes, yes. So I would like Martin as sponsor and person who worked very hard on on this amendment. Yeah, why, why, what problem are we what for my problem, are we trying to solve. And, and how does that attempt to do this, I think that'd be be very helpful. Thank you. Essentially, the problem is accountability that we're trying to solve but but let me give a little bit background in a basic premise that the state in the first instance created the law enforcement agencies gave law enforcement agencies certain duties. And these duties can be categorized as effectuating the adjudicative process that means serving, serving warrants, you know, serving process etc searches and maintaining public order, and I could go over and maybe some other point I can provide the several different provisions throughout the title 24 and title 20 that create those duties for sheriffs for police local police agencies and for state police but I'll just move on for for now but make it. The short point is that the state has created police and has given it the authority to use to use force. So, it seems to be that it should be the state's responsibility to perhaps put some sideboards on that use of force as opposed to leaving it entirely up to the law enforcement agencies to essentially police them themselves. In fact, the legislature at one point did put some sideboards on and that's that's found in 13 vsa 2305 they kind of put some guardrails on. That's the legislature, the, that's the law related to justifiable homicide, and essentially states that a law enforcement officer will be guiltless if he or she kills or wounds someone. In, you know, quote when lawfully called out to suppress riot or rebellion, or to prevent or suppress invasion, or to assist in serving legal process in suppressing opposition against him or her in the just and necessary discharge of his or her doesn't talk anything about self defense doesn't talk anything about risk of death, etc. Bottom line is it's in dire need of updating, as far as what kind of guardrails, the legislature is putting on the force that we have bestowed upon law enforcement. And, and, and actually that law is probably unconstitutional under a current. If somebody tried to justify lethal force because they were serving process and didn't face any kind of threat of death that would probably be held to be unconstitutional. Really the idea here is to I think fulfill the legislative responsibility to have some accountability related to the force that we have sanctioned for law enforcement to use for important important activities important duties, including maintaining public order but nevertheless that there should be some sideboards. And assert that well we should leave it to policy we have lots of law enforcement agencies that have policy related to use of force. But policy is not enforceable. It's, it's, in fact, very clearly it's kind of interesting that in the training manual which I've had a chance to look at. The Criminal Justice Training Council manual for training on use of force says, generally speaking and I'm going to quote, generally speaking a violation of a department policy can result in sanctions or punishments from your department. And if the clause of the policy that is violated mirrors the law, it can also result in criminal charges or lawsuits. The accountability is at the local agency and the accountability across the state with many different agencies can be inconsistent. And I think the best way to get to a consistent accountability and guide posts for exercise of force including deadly force is to have the statute set forth those standards. So, that's, that's where this comes from. Great. Thank you. Any questions for this point before we turn to Bryn. Let's see. Okay, great. Thank you Martin. Bryn, thank you. Morning. Good morning committee for the record Bryn here from legislative council. So yesterday morning we did a sort of a blast walkthrough of the amendment to S1 19. But I was asked to do another one this morning so there'd be more time for questions. So I'm going to, again, walk through the side by side amendment, because I think that's helpful to see how the, how the amendment differs from the senate version. And also, I since I did that yesterday, I know people may have taken notes on that version. So if everybody has the side by side, I'll get started with the walkthrough. And again I'll just point out that one of the major differences between this amendment and the senate version is that the changes to this amendment make it clear that this, these are what what this bill does is it sets for standards for the use of force generally, not just the use of deadly force by law enforcement. So we've changed the title of the bill there at the top. And in section one you can see that the section name for this new section of law and title 20 is changed to standards for law enforcement use of force. To make it clear that these are really legal standards and not necessarily an entire policy because that could be fleshed out much more by the criminal justice training council or the agencies and departments themselves. So section section starts with deadly force any use of force that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury that's pretty straightforward. The next definition is imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. And I should probably preface this by saying I think that this committee has heard this several times now as 119 is really based on the California statute the past. January, regarding the police police use of force, so that this language comes from that from that bill. And this definition applies to the use of deadly force section of the standards which we'll get to in subsection C. And that definition means that when based on the totality of the circumstances, which is another defined turn that will get too soon. A reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability opportunity and apparent intent to immediately cause injury serious bodily injury or death to either the law enforcement officer or to another person. An imminent harm isn't merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great that fear and no matter how great the likelihood of harm, but is one that from all appearances must be instantly confronted and addressed. Definition law enforcement officer that's a definition from title 20 from the criminal justice training council chapter prohibited restraint is the next definition and this is the same. The definition is defined the same way as it's defined in the new crime that was passed in S2 19. So that should look familiar to you. Subdivision five is totality of the circumstances so this definition has changed pretty substantially from the senate version. The first part of the definitions is the same means all facts known to the law enforcement officer at the time, including the words and conduct of the subject and the conduct and decisions of the officer that lead up to the use of deadly force. So we've just added that word and decisions. Then we set out several different factors that are to be considered in making an analysis of the totality of the circumstances. And again, I said this yesterday, many of these come from the Seattle use of force policy. Some of them, some of them don't but many of them do. So, consideration of the following factors a is seriousness of the crime or the suspected offense. Subdivision is the conduct of the subject being confronted as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time and that is to include the following two additional factors. Signs of intoxication impairment or disordered thought that are related to the use or consumption of alcohol or other controlled substances, or signs of the subject is suffering the effects of a mental disease or defect, or has a physical disability that allows you to understand or comply with law enforcement commands. Subdivision C, I'm at the bottom of page three now. Another factor to consider when evaluating the totality of the circumstances is the time available to the officer to make a decision. E is the availability of other resources, including non lethal means to gain compliance of the subject. That's not factors regarding the physical characteristics of the officer in the subject to include the age, size and relative strength of both individuals, the skill level and training of the officer, and whether the officer or the subject are injured or exhausted at the time. And then lastly subdivision F is environmental factors and any exigence circumstances. Again, that is the long list of factors that are to be considered in an analysis of what constitutes the totality of the circumstances. Okay, I'm going to move on then. So subsection B. Now we're getting into the actual standards themselves. Can I actually, I'm so sorry, Brent, I'm just to press all the buttons in time to like a question but I know there was a, would you mind just giving a little more detail and interpretation on subsection F here. I know there were some questions about that and how far reaching that would be yesterday and I thought for me at least it would be helpful to hear your take on that one more time. So, I described subsection F yesterday, environmental factors and any exigent circumstances as kind of being a catch all. That's the way I read that language. Again, it's modified by the by the definition as it as it is presented in subdivision, subdivision five. So I'm back on page two now. So, any exigent circumstances or environmental factors that are known to the law enforcement officer at the time. So, I see that as being pretty broad language that would that couldn't encompass a variety of factors as long as it was a fact. But, but an argument that like anything and everything could be taken into account, including things that the officer couldn't have known about at the time or was unaware about the time wouldn't wouldn't hold against this provision. It sounds like No, I do think that it's clear that it has to be known to the by environmental factors could be anything from like the weather what's happening if it's if it's if it's dark out or if it's pouring rain or something like that and any exigent circumstances I see as being any, any sort of pressing or urgent environmental factors that exist at the time that are known by the law enforcement officer. Is that am I answering your question. Yeah, that's really helpful clarification just to be reminded that that this is conditioned to it. Martin. Yeah, and would it be fair to say Bryn that I that the environmental factors exigent circumstances would have to be relevant to the use of force or what the officers decisions or conduct was presumably right. Yeah, I mean I think that sort of the totality of the circumstances is describing the scenario that the use of force happened under. And I do think depending on it's such a it's obviously such a factually specific inquiry that depending on the situation, a variety of factors may be relevant to the decision of the officer or maybe relevant to the inquiry on what of whether or it's reasonable to use that level of force. And so I agree that it is kind of broad language but, again, a variety of factors may, may be relevant, depending on the specific set of facts. Brian, do we have case law. Is there a stylish case law from Seattle or elsewhere, or this all the all new territory. No, I mean there is, there is relevant case law about the reasonableness standard, which is essentially model, the totality of the circumstances modify as the reasonableness standard. So we're going to see the word reasonable throughout the standards and the bill, and it's always modified by the totality of the circumstances and that is true and existing case law certainly. Thank you. Okay, so I'm going to move on to subsection B, the use of force standards so again these are these set forth the standards for law enforcement use of force generally not necessarily deadly force. So subdivision one on page four, this is the same language that's in the Senate version, sort of a general statement that the use of force, the authority to use physical force is a serious responsibility that should be exercised judiciously. So two on page five. The sets out sort of that I see this is really being the meat of the standard for use of force by law enforcement. And you can see this language is a little bit different than the Senate version. The law provides that law enforcement shall only use the force that's objectively reasonable, necessary and proportional. Those are the three important words and we're going to get to those as we go through this section to affect an arrest to prevent escape or to overcome resistance of a person that the officer has reasonable cause to believe is committed a crime while protecting the life and safety of all persons. So, some of this language does come from the Senate version just in a different section. So, so it's not entirely different from the Senate language, not our see your hands up. Yes, thank you I just had a quick question about the, the last part of this where it's talking about the officer has reasonable cause to believe has committed a crime while protecting the life and safety of all persons. The officer encounters somebody who hasn't necessarily committed a crime but is posing a threat to the life and safety of all of anyone. How, how would that be impacted by this like I'm thinking of somebody who maybe suicidal and they have a gun, but they have at that point have not technically committed a crime is force still usable in any degree. The standards includes some language about law enforcement not having the authority to use force on a person who only presents risk of harm to themselves, and the officer reasonably believes that there is not a risk to harm to the officer to another person. So in that specific scenario I think there's another portion of the bill that addresses that specific circumstances. Okay, thank you. I'm going to carry on. Unless I see anyone okay. So, Subsection three at the bottom of page five. Again this is a little bit of a general statement that decisions by law enforcement to use force have to be made carefully and thought and thoroughly in a manner that reflects that reflects the gravity of that authority and the serious consequences of the use of force. So I'm sure that officers use force consistent with law and agency policies that's a bit of a general statement. The next subsection subsection four, four, five and six now talk about those words that I highlighted in subsection two. Subsection subsection four on page six. This talks about what that reasonable word means. So, whether the decision by law enforcement to use force was objectively reasonable should be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer and same situation based on the totality of the circumstances. So there's that language together. Like I said before, the definition of totality of the circumstances that long list of factors, but if I as what it means to, to be objectively reasonable whether or not it was a reasonable decision to use force. I'm going to pop down to subsection five now. This is describing what the word necessary means in context of the standard for use of force. So force is necessary if no reasonable, no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appears to exist to the officer, and the amount of force used as reasonable to affect the purpose intended. And whether using forces necessary again is based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the use of force. And that language comes from the policy on use of force. And so does the next subsection six describing what the word proportional means. It's proportional if the level of force applied reflects the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and immediacy of any threats to the officer or to others. And there's also a specific statement here that the proportional force doesn't require an officer to be using the same amount of force or the same type of force that's used by the subject. And then the file, the next sentence is sort of a general statement. This is all three of the words reasonable necessary and proportional, more immediate the threat and the more likely that the threat will result in death or serious bodily injury so like the more serious the threat, the greater level of force maybe proportional, necessary and objectively reasonable to counter. Okay, so I'm going to move down to sub subsection seven here. Prior to using force. This is language that kind of describes the proactive steps that law enforcement need to take prior to the use of force. So prior, then it describes deescalation tactics essentially prior to using force law enforcement officers shall if feasible take the following proactive steps to stabilize the situation so that more time options and resources are available to gain a person's voluntary compliance and reduce or eliminate the need to use force, and that can include verbal persuasion warnings tactical techniques, slowing down the pace of an incident, waiting out a subject, creating distance between the officer and the threat and requesting additional resources to resolve the incident. So it sets forth some specific deescalation, deescalation tactics that an officer can use prior to the use of force if feasible for the officer. So I'll move on to subdivision or subsection C here, which now we're getting into the standards for the use of deadly force by law enforcement. So subdivision one says that law enforcement has justified using deadly force only when based on the totality of the circumstances. Such force is objectively reasonable and necessary to achieve one of the following two objectives subsection a to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person, or the other set of circumstances. Which would an officer would be justified in using deadly force or to apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened a result or resulted in death or serious bodily injury. If it's modified by the next clause, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury if they're not immediately apprehended. So that's that subdivision one and those two sub following subsections is really the crux of the use of deadly force standard here. And it really provides that law enforcement may only use deadly force if it's necessary to defend human life. So I'm going to move down to subdivision two. I'm on the bottom of page nine now. This language doesn't appear in the Senate version and this is language that describes what the word necessary means. Can I can I'm sorry to keep interrupting but could I ask a question about that section we just moved through. Sorry, I'm having some connectivity issues so just let me know if you're, if you lose me. To notters question. I mean here it's saying the use of we've sort of, it sounds like we've said use of force that we we address later in the bill that use of force cannot be used. If the only harm is to that the is sorry that the person is only at risk of harming themselves. But here it says that deadly force can be used to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer, or another person, which I think would potentially. I'm just wondering if we need to, if that's at odds at all with the provision you talked about in response to notters question, or if it's really clear that it's talking about someone other than the subject of force does it is my question making any sense at all. Yes, yes, and I should, and I should be clear that the my response to the earlier question was, I should have made it clear that that provision is in subsection C, which has to do with the use of deadly force by law enforcement so we haven't gotten to that provision yet. It's subdivision five on page 10, and it specifically says that law enforcement shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, as long as the person reasonably believes that they do not present a danger to the officer or to another person. So reading that language in connection with C one and B, I would see, I would read the word another person to mean a different person, not the person not the subject. Against him law enforcement is using force. I'm going to move on if that's okay. Keep going. So subdivision now I'm on subdivision three at the top of page 10. This is also a new language that doesn't appear in the Senate version, and I also comes from the Seattle policy. And it provides that law enforcement have to stop using deadly force against a person as soon as that person surrenders or that force is no longer necessary to prevent against an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer to I'm sorry, I'm sorry, did you do beat. Did you do a subsection to or maybe I zoned out the regarding necessary. I skipped it. I'm sorry. Okay, that's important. That's important. Sorry, I'll go back. No problem. So page nine sub subdivision to there. I think I started out saying that this subdivision provides a description of what the word necessary means in context of the standard for the use of deadly force. So it says use of deadly forces necessary when given the totality of the circumstances and objectively reasonable officer in the same situation would conclude that there was no reasonable alternative to the use of deadly force that would prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer to another person. And then we again have some language in there saying when feasible officer shall employ all other reasonable means before resorting to the use of deadly force. Okay, so I'm going to skip subsection three on page 10 since we talked about that sub subsection for this is the same language that appears in the Senate version of the bill. Subdivision five law and here's that language about law enforcement officer shall not use deadly force against a person who only poses a danger to themselves and not to the other person. Subdivision six on page 11 now. And this is the, this is essentially the language that provides that law enforcement doesn't lose the right to self defense. So officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest doesn't have to retreat or desist from their efforts, because the person resists or threatens to resist. And a law enforcement shall not be deemed the aggressor or lose that right to self defense by the use of proportional force, if necessary, in compliance with the two that's the standard set for law enforcement use of force generally. And it also provides that retreat doesn't necessarily mean doesn't mean tactical repositioning or other de escalation tactics. So let's move on to subdivision seven. I'm at the top of page 12 now. And this is the section that deals with prohibited restraint. So the Senate version provides that law enforcement shall not use a prohibited restraint for any reason. Subdivision provides that law enforcement may use a prohibited restraint, but only in a situation where the use of deadly force is justified. And if no other intervention is available to defend against an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or to another person. Subdivision provides that law enforcement is not justified in continuing to use a prohibited restraint when there's no longer an objectively reasonable belief that the subject poses continues to pose immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person. Tom. Thank you. Subdivision seven that you just went through, Bryn. It says may use a prohibited restraint in certain situations. Well, doesn't that make that not a prohibited restraint. And maybe some other language could be used there. So the we've you've defined prohibited restraint in a couple of places now. And it's 219 you define prohibited restraint in the unprofessional conduct chapter for law enforcement. And it's also defined in the new crime that passed in as 219. So because it's the exact same definition we've used the same term here. And not sure if you would like to change the change the name. That's up to you guys. You were breaking up a little bit. I didn't, I didn't get the last probably 1015 seconds. That's not helpful. So what I said was we have defined the term and a couple of other places now. It's the same definition with the same words prohibited restraint. So if you wanted to change that name, I think that it would make sense to change it also in the other places where you've defined it. In title 13 and title 20. Okay, thank you. Martin. So I mean, on that, that issue. I've always kind of thought of the concept of prohibited restraint is that if you're using that particular maneuver choke hold whatever you want to call it to restrain somebody that's a little bit different issue then if you're scuffling on the ground with somebody in the knife and can't reach your gun and your life is being threatened. And that's not really even a restraint at that moment. It's a self defense action so it's a little confusing that that it's called prohibited restraint there but but I think it still kind of works. That makes sense. I understand that it still works because of what we can do with definitions I mean we can do anything we want with definition just, it's just that the negative connotation I mean if, if something did happen, especially in this day and age if something did happen, and it could be reported or, you know, in a report that they used a prohibited restraint. What I mean what's that going to do as far as, you know, the, the unknowing public goes and that type of thing is just to me just the negative connotations of it. Now, I think it needs to be changed I mean, I guess. We'll have a little discussion on it a little later when we, you know, and we're not going through this but yeah it in in the definition and in the public's eyes, it's a prohibited restraint period. And I don't know if we do have that situation if we need to, to stir that up. Right. Gotcha. Okay. Okay. So subdivision eight is the same language that appears in the Senate version subdivision five that requires that law enforcement do have a duty to intervene if they observe another officer using a prohibited restraint person. So I'm going to move on to sub sec or to section two of the bill now so the following sections don't appear in the Senate bill. And these are additional sections. So what section two does it, this is a little strange because I know you, you pass this language in 219. But what, because it hasn't taken effect yet we have to do something a little tricky which is you just have to essentially pass it again with the amendment you want to make. And then we repeal the version that passed in 219. So you'll see that the bill does that as well. So this is the new crime. It's identical to the new crime as it passed in 219 except for one very important caveat, which you can find on page 14 I should have highlighted it but I didn't. In subsection B, it provides that a law enforcement officer acting in the officer's capacity as law enforcement who employs a prohibited restraint on a person in a manner inconsistent with section 2368 C seven and that's the language that we just went through. That in a manner inconsistent with it doesn't appear in the 219 version of this new crime. So that's the, that's what that's what's added in S 119 here. So only if the prohibited restraint is employed in a manner that's inconsistent with that standard that set forth and C seven that we just went through for an officer to use a prohibited restraint. And that caught and the prohibited restraint causes death or serious bodily injury that would be the only time that a law enforcement officer would be able to be charged under this. Under this new crime that clear. So essentially it provides that it's no longer prohibited under under all circumstances. It is a person couldn't law enforcement officer couldn't be prosecuted for using a prohibited restraint, unless it was directly inconsistent with the standards that are set forth by the new standards for use of the force by law enforcement. And it caused death or serious bodily injury to the person. Barbara. So Brent, I actually got a interesting question from a constituent who is. Well, it doesn't matter her background but um, so she asked me about the types of bodily actions that shall not be used. And said that it seemed troubling because it was too broad and yet too narrow. And she said, if there's a physical struggle between an officer and the suspect. If one of these listed items occurs inadvertently in the midst of the struggle. She would think that would be okay particularly if it was momentary and inadvertent. But on the other hand, there are things that aren't listed that can be just as bad such as kneeling on someone's chest or back that prevents them from breathing or interferes with cardiac function. And she wondered if we should focus on prohibited results such as prohibiting prolonged or intentional interference with breathing or other bodily functions, which I thought was interesting. So I'm not sure that the definition of prohibited restraint would not include kneeling on a person's back, since that is a maneuver that could that may prevent or hinder breathing reduce the intake of air or impede the flow of blood or oxygen to the brain. So I'm not sure that that wouldn't be included. Okay. I don't know if it's like it is broad enough that it would cover something we didn't think of if there's some move that would impede breathing, but I do. I mean, I do you all worked on this definition and I think that your intent was really any, any type of maneuver that is potentially lethal for those reasons by impeding the flow of blood or oxygen to the brain or reducing the intake of air. So I think that your intent behind that that language. Thank you. It's hard to remember. And I had one other question from the very beginning definitions. When you said, um, You just see I wrote it down. So that all facts known. So I'm wondering if it should be known or should have known. Yes, so that I think that that would change the standard. That would be sort of an additional inquiry I think you would be creating kind of an additional inquiry into whether an officer should have known something that didn't. I think we should modify the reasonable officer inquiry, whether or not it was reasonable that the officer knew or did not know. Thank you. So follow up to that question. So, current law case law and such, they look at just the facts actually known, or do they look at the facts that should have been known by a reasonable law enforcement officer. I would have to, I would have to revisit some case law. My recollection is that it really talks about what facts were known to the officer at the time. But I would need to revisit it to find out if they also talk about what should have been known. I mean, if it's consistent with current state of law, I mean, we are pushing it in other areas just to make it clear, we I think are pushing what case law is, as far as defining necessity and a couple of the other things we're doing but I think is worth, I think, looking into and if the case law is should have been known, then we should seriously consider that but if it's not, since we're pushed, yeah, that would be a pretty big push beyond current case law if that's not already looked at. Yeah, yeah, thank you. Yeah, Martin, you were just talking, I didn't quite understand what you were saying about. I guess what I heard is you say, and not put in trying to put words in your mouth, but I thought I heard you say something that almost is like pushing the limits on something or no you said pushing. I mean, if you could kind of go back over what you were talking about. Well, I think overall what the policy does is, let me make clear it's consistent, certainly with what police agencies, at least the ones that are doing it right are following this policy. But if you look at Supreme Court precedent in the context that these cases come up which is usually actually civil actions under what's called section 1983, which is the federal law that you can bring against state actors for violating constitutional rights, such as a Fourth Amendment in these cases so that area of law. I would say is is more restrictive than what we're putting in as standards in this bill, but as far as what law enforcement is actually doing under policies. It's very consistent, I don't know if that helps. Yes, yeah. So, but but I would like to understand from that other area of law the Supreme Court precedent and such the concept of known or should have known, because we are looking to that law as kind of sets, I would say a base law enforcement agencies have gone beyond that base. This would go beyond that as well. Did I just use it or did I. No, no, no, you didn't confuse me anymore than I know that that was great thank you. And if I said anything wrong brain will correct me. No, that sounded right to me so as I said earlier I will look into that question and get back to the committee. Great, we just have a few minutes for for Brent to wrap up Martin. I don't think did you talk about the repealed or did I miss that bit. No I haven't gotten to that section yet. I just got two more sections which is the repeals and the effective date. So section three, this is that on page 14. This, the act, or the bill makes two repeals the first is that subdivision three of the justifiable homicide statute, which representative alone was talking about earlier it just repeals a section of the statute that essentially a law enforcement officer is justified in killing or wounding a person. When they're lawfully called out to suppress a riot or rebellion to prevent or suppress invasion, or to assist in serving legal process or in suppressing opposition against him or her in the just and necessary discharge of his or her duty. So representative along kind of covered that earlier in his introduction. That repeals that section of law, and it also repeals the new crime use of prohibited restraint as it was drafted in S2 19, because it's reset forth in this bill. And then lastly is the effective date and it provides that the bill shall take effect on passage. Okay, I'm going to go deeper in. Tom is your hand up. Yes, I put it back up. Yeah, and that section three repeals I, I guess I'd like another. I don't think it can be brief or not just just to go over it again exactly what it does I guess I don't quite understand so. Sure, so the, the whole section with the two things that it repeals. Okay, so it repeals subdivision three of the justifiable homicide statute. So, since it's not right in front of the committee I can read it to you what that subdivision three says it says that if a person. essentially provides that if a law enforcement officer kills or wounds another when lawfully called out to suppress riot or rebellion, or to prevent or suppress invasion or to assist in serving legal process in suppressing opposition against him or her and the just and necessary discharge of his or her duty they shall not be held liable criminally liable for that killing or wounding of the other person. And we're repealing that in this repealing that section of law. I don't know what I'd be right to assume that potentially it's taking away some protections of police officers. Well, as representative Lalon mentioned earlier, that is because of how broad that languages it doesn't provide any sort of parameters on on a law enforcement officer for killing or wounding a person because essentially that language is so broad. It reads as if it provides that a law enforcement officer could not be held liable for killing or wounding another person while they were undertaking their lawful duties. So it's likely to be it would likely be unconstitutional that particular provision. So, I'm sorry. Yeah, it would likely be unconstitutional. Has it ever been challenged in Vermont or another state. I gotta believe that's probably been on the books here for a long time, and and potentially in other states. It has been on the books for a long time and in fact, I think it was early 1900s that it was that it was enacted. I said is that this is some protection for police officers in certain situations. Is there anything else in the bill that would cover some of this as far as their as far as what we're kind of taking away. Yes, I think that the standards that you set forth provide for sort of guardrails about about police officers when they are justified in using and using force against a person when they're justified in killing or wounding another person. Okay, great. Yeah, yeah, that's great. And I guess the the second part section six. If you could just go over that again. Sure. And that's the other repeal. And this is again this is tricky. This is just sort of a weird drafting thing. When you're amending a section of law that hasn't yet taken effect. What this bill does amend that new crime which doesn't take effect until next July. So because you're amending that the way we have to do it is repeal it in repeal the version that was set out into 19 and set out a new, a new version. And you're only changing it very slightly. I mean the wording is very slight it's a, it's a, not commenting on on the seriousness of the change it's just a small wording change that does have a. So it's just a technical change. Yes. I mean, I would not describe that change that you're making to the new crime is technical. I think it is a, it's a policy change. But it's sort of technical while we're repealing it. Yes. All right, thank you. Okay, Martin quickly and then. I want to flag for brands before I forget this because I hadn't thought of this for the repeal I thought there was a similar provision related to sheriff's use of lethal force if we can look at that. And if you can provide what that citation is we may be wanting to repeal that as well if I recall there were. There was a similar provision. Yes. Sure thing. Do I can look I can find it now if you'd like or I can email it to the committee. Email it to the committee and we can look at it and I would think that we'd want to do the same thing with that but we should double check. Okay, right. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much, Brynn. And again, this is just, just the beginning. Folks, if you have questions that you haven't asked, just write them down and we'll get back to it. I do want to let the committee know that I reached out to believe at least 20 potential witnesses within the BIPOC and psychological psychiatric survivor community, I'm asking them if they would like to testify. I'm writing testimony. Tomorrow, next week, and heard from people's automatic emails her away but but anyway hopefully we'll be hearing from more people we will be hearing from. We'll be able to white and hopefully representative Donahue tomorrow. And they were very much instrumental in this amendment and and working with with Martin and others and social equity caucus and others so we will continue this work. Okay, so thank you so now, Eric we're going to shift gears. And then do this and then folks will try to take a break, you know, around noon time or so but okay so welcome, Eric we're shifting now to S234 which is the miscellaneous judiciary bill, which we have not finalized. Last time, Eric was with us on this bill. We were looking at it was first called the amnesty the DLS or driver amnesty program as past the Senate. And I think we're now calling it DLS reinstatement language. And, Eric, if you could bring us up to date I know you made some changes we also have Dave Evans here from DMB that can can join us. So, Eric, welcome. Good morning. Thank you. Good morning everybody. Eric Fitzpatrick with the Office of Legislative Council good to see everybody this morning here to talk about S234 as the chair said it's the miscellaneous judiciary bill has a lot of miscellaneous provisions you might even say that's appropriately named the piece that we're talking about first though is the, as you were mentioning, Representative grad was initially when it came over from the Senate called an amnesty program for persons with suspended licenses, and the House Judiciary Committee as you've been looking at it decided to alter the focus, a little bit so that it's now a reinstatement fee program the primary difference there, just to refresh your recollection a little bit, as it came over from the Senate, it provided for if a person had had their license suspended for over a year for non criminal reasons. So that's sort of your qualifying criteria your license has been suspended for more than a year. The reason is non criminal in other words it's not a DUI or something like that some not associated with a criminal offense. In that situation, the person could get their license back without having to pay either the Department of Motor Vehicles reinstatement fee, which I think is in the neighborhood of $81 something like that, you wouldn't have to pay that or sorry and you wouldn't have to pay any associated court fines and court fees so for example if they had been some sort of a, you know fair to stop at a stop sign or a speeding offense you know in addition to whatever reinstatement fee you would have had to have paid there's a there's a fine associated with that and there's also surcharges everything that would ordinarily have to be paid to the court with a ticket. So, essentially the Senate bill said we're going to waive all of that, both the court fines and the reinstatement fee, and the person would be able to get their license back. If a year had passed and it was a non criminal offense in the first place. So what the House proposal you're looking at now. In this language, basically preserves the reinstatement fee waiver from the Department of Motor Vehicles but you'd still have to pay your court fees so essentially what that means is person can get their license back without paying the DMV reinstatement fee, but they would still be on the hook for whatever court fine they might have had associated with their ticket and the surcharges that sort of thing. It doesn't stop you from getting your license back, you know you could still get it, but the court would still have available to them. All the collection procedures that they ordinarily use whether it be a tax offset or a collection agent or whatever the ordinary use to try and get their fees back. But while that was going on, at least the person would still be able to drive legally because they'd have their license back. That sort of makes sense. So that's the primary distinction between the House proposal in the Senate bill is that the Senate one waived all the court fees as well. Whereas the House one says well it's not going to waive them person will still be on the hook for them but you can still get your license back without having to pay your, the reimbursement fee to DMV. That's the big picture. Thank you and I do see Tom's hand is up and and again this is it doesn't mean that at some point we may not look at the court fees and look at going further with DLS but this is. I think this is a good step at this at this point. Tom. Yeah, I think it's a great step also. Just in my opinion I think the Senate was a little too far but that's just me, but Eric, and maybe somebody else, but how much can a court fee vary I guess I mean is there. I gotta believe if depending on how much times one spends in court. The more time the more court fee is I'm not sure but I guess I would I would like maybe a quick explanation on how court fees work and how they're assessed. Well I don't think it's it varies based on the amount of time in court. The statute sets. So what a fine is for any particular offense you know they'll say it shall be fine, you know $500 and then the, then the, or not less than $500 I should say is with is the way the language usually reads. And then the court has some discretion in there because that's a maximum fine and then I, there's a court committee that sets the range for waiver, waiver fine so in other words you can pay less of a fine if you just sort of agree to your ticket. And if you notice that whenever. Well, if you happen to have gotten a ticket. Yeah, I guess for some reason I was, I had pushed fines right out of my mind, and was just looking at, you know, the words court fees, just thinking that that there was a fee for going into court for some reason but I understand what you're saying now. So, thank you. Right, right. And the surcharges are set by statute to that's another thing you know they're, you probably recall that the statute will say like there's a surcharge that goes to the victims compensation organization or crime victims. Center for crime victim services they get a little bit of each surcharge as well so those are all folded into what what the final sort of amount is that a person knows. Right so, so if we went with the Senate version, and we eliminated the court fees that would take a lot of money away from some other programs through those surcharges. Right. I don't know about a lot. I'm not familiar. But certainly some yes, yeah, there be an effect. Yeah, okay. That's a big picture so let's let's look for a moment at, I think everybody has just I sent two documents that I know Lori was able to post the one that just is the short one relating to miscellaneous judiciary procedures that's that. Sorry, just your way to the, the reinstatement fee waiver program. So, Eric, I, excuse me sorry I see coaches hand is up I'm sorry. Oh sorry. Yeah, go ahead. Okay, coach. Just a quick technical question. Sure. You muted your. You're muted coach. Is it the kind of thing that we can get a fiscal note on. On this, our amendment to the Senate as passed. Right, because the question that Tom bought up about the, the amount. You know someone should know roughly the effect cause and effect of what it would be based on that change. Right. And I think well, Dave Evans is here with us and I know he spoke to to that before so why don't we ask him about the cost and and DMV's ability to to absorb this or not. Okay. I see Dave. Would you like to determine now I see you. See you coming on to to the group. If you wanted to. Good morning, Dave Evans with the MD. The court fees I have no knowledge of we don't deal with those at all at at DMV. We, when a person calls to reinstate their license we advise them that there are court fees because the court notifies us of that. And they work out a payment arrangement or pay the court fees directly before they send us a client. So I'm not sure how much exactly the fees are. In terms of this bill and any fiscal concerns is my understanding is that DMV does support this language and and it's not asking for additional appropriation or Right, we do support it and we're not asking for additional appropriation. Thank you. Okay. So Selena and then we'll go back to Eric. Yeah, and I don't know this is maybe more community discussion and I'm not. Sure if you're, if you want to, if you want to wait for that magazine, but or if it. I just, I, you know, I will, I will support this compromise if that's what it takes to move this across the finish line and get more people's licenses reinstated but I actually, I just feel like I have to make a record that I don't actually have a problem with the Senate version at all and have some concerns about anytime we start to get into a discussion about like needing to enact punishments to fund our justice system. I just think we, we, I hope we can shift our thinking on, on that I mean it is a functional practical issue that like there would be revenue loss that the court would then have to deal with but Yeah, yeah, so anyway, I just felt like I had to say that stuff on the record discussion from there. Right, right now I appreciate that. Thank you. Okay, Eric. So, we were speaking about sort of the big picture of what the committee's proposal does and if you look at the language. I think it helps lay the foundation for that you'll see that essentially, and I'll get to where the new languages because that's at the conveniently located at the very bottom of the page. So, before that, the, you'll see that the proposal establishes the reinstatement fee waiver program. The criteria are in subsection be which I just described and there's a date you see so by December 15 2020 is when the these licenses are supposed to be reinstated. At that time, it says that DMV has got three, three action items there number one, wave all license reinstatement fees for and then you then the next language describes well who who gets their reinstatement fees wave and that's you have two categories A and B. A, as I we were just talking about this one you've been suspended for non criminal reasons for a year. And you satisfied all other reinstatement conditions and requirements so there's any other conditioner requirement that maybe the person I think you recall Willow talking about this maybe some counseling that has to be done or, or, and I'll call counseling for example any other conditions that might be associated, those all have to be satisfied as well. But once that's done. And the suspension is lasted for a year longer, well then you qualify to get your license back without paying the reinstatement fee. That's group A group B is a group of folks who, if you had your license suspended prior to July 1 2014. And that has to do with, you may recall Willow mentioning this as well that there was a period of time. It's not the case anymore but prior to July 1 2014. If you had your license suspended for failing to pay a judgment that you owe to the judicial bureau which essentially is what we're just talking about your traffic ticket plus whatever associated surcharges and fees might have been on that if you had your license suspended solely for that reason. So it's not for the underlying offense, not for going to, you know speeding or going through the stop sign or whatever it was your only reason your license is suspended is because you didn't pay the fee. Then the suspension was indefinite way lasted until until you paid. So we're grouping those folks in is who can also get their license back without paying the reinstatement fee so they satisfied any other conditions that they might have had to satisfy. They can also get their license back. Now, essentially since they would have been under suspension for more than a year since the state dates back to pre 2014. They can get theirs back without paying the reimbursement fee also. So those are the two universes of people who are who are grouped in. So if you fall within within either of those groups. What they do, they waive the reinstatement fee number two they reinstate the license. So if they've waived your fee they have to reinstate your license. And number three you see is a notice provision. They also have to provide notice to these folks that their fees have been waived, and that your license has been reinstated or that they're ineligible reinstated for reinstatement and the reason for that so in other words you let people know, well you still have these other conditions that you have to do. You don't have to pay your reimbursement fee, but you've got another condition or two you have to satisfy. And if you do that you can get your license back. So that's the big picture of how it works. But importantly, you'll see that the definition section at the very bottom of the bill or top of the next page. You'll see it's reinstatement conditions and requirements and this is this goes to the point I made earlier about the distinction between the House bill and the Senate bill. You see that we defined it, not to include the amount due in a judicial bureau judgment. So in other words, when the language says you have to satisfy all your reinstatement conditions and requirements. One of them is not going to be the amount you owe on your fine or your fee because you've defined it to not include that. So that way, you can get your license back simply by paying the reimbursement fee. But the one of the conditions you have to satisfy is not going to be paying your, your fine or your traffic ticket or your surcharges or anything else. So since that's defined out, you don't have to pay that you can get your license back just by paying the $81 or whatever it is. That makes sense to sort of drafting why is how that works. So the next piece, and I'll let Representative Lawn talk a little bit about this as well because this is something that it's been, sorry. Maxine, if I may, before we go. Excuse me, Eric, I'm just wondering. So somebody goes through this whole process they get their license back. And if they have another violation at some point, is there any way that these violations can be stacked on top of each other, I guess you could say to make their, their penalty even worse, even though they, you know, to me, if you go with a year without your license, you probably, you paid the price, I guess you've, to me, to satisfy your, your, your duties or whatever. But is there any way that another, another violation could it be stacked on top of the old violations and in somebody is going to be fined or whatever, even, I guess even worse. I'm not sure the answer to that. It's an interesting question might be, in a sense, maybe it happens already in that, you know, points accumulate. So in other words, you know, you, you get three points for, you know, speeding or, and then you get seven points for, you know, something else. It's going to accumulate over time, right. And, and I think it's within a two year period if you get 10 points within a two year period that you get a suspension, so that, you know, if you had some points on your license from a prior offense and then like you say you're later you get another one that can result in a, in a greater consequence in the sense that, you know, you get a suspension that you otherwise wouldn't have gotten just for the one offense. So potentially I guess you know because of the point system but that's kind of a short period of time two years but I would just hate to see somebody get punished again for something that they've already for a penalty they've already satisfied that's all. Right, right. Okay. Thank you. Similar sort of a nice segue from what you were just saying represented is the last the last highlighted language you see there subdivision three. This has to do with the issue that's being addressed here is, and for your member it came up during the discussion the last time the committee talked about this, and representative the lawn was was bringing up this point that by defining the offenses that a person would apply for their waiver as non criminal. That would have included, for example this, the situation I just described to represent a bird that if someone say had got five points. Six months ago, and you don't get a suspension five points but you get a suspension for 10 if you get 10 within two years and then you get another five points. If you get a license suspended. That's a non criminal reason, right because it's too civil offenses so you've gotten your license suspended for a non criminal reason. And you would qualify for being able to get your license reinstated and not pay the waiver fee, just by those things sort of being added on top of each other. I would say you were still under suspension on December 15 when this goes into effect. If you were by virtue of the accumulation of points you were still under suspension you could qualify under the language as written to get your license back and I think the concern was that person who who was under suspension at that time. So, their first defense was more than a year ago. Right. Shouldn't be able to necessarily get their license back yet. So, the language that you see in subdivision three addresses that situation, and says all right well, we're going to do it definitionally again we're going to say suspended for non criminal reasons does not include a license that is under suspension on December 15, 2020, for the accumulation of 10 or more points. So if that person is under suspension when this program supposed to get started by DMV, because they've gotten 10 points within the last two year period, well they don't qualify. So they're not they're not able there and it makes sense if you think about it because they're still under suspension. The idea of. The proposal is that you're have you're still sort of an offense that's happened within the last little short period of time is supposed to have been a year that is passed. Well this person could only have been say three months since they got that last offense that that sort of bumped them into the suspension category. So that's I think part of the logic behind making sure that that group of people doesn't qualify for the reimbursement and that makes sense. Yeah. So we'll see if folks have have questions about it but again tell me where this came from was this. I know Martin if you wanted to. Yeah, well I did. I mean I the main thing is that the accumulation of points and then the suspension because of points. It acts as a deterrent I mean in looking back at back the days of looking at distracted driving what was the best deterrence I know I understood that really points are where you get some deterrence value. And if somebody is has a suspension because of points that means that they've probably earned that consequence and I don't want to forgive that consequence. What I understand though and Dave Evans can certainly comment on this I did have a chance to chat with him is this is a very rare occurrence because for most of the, most of the 10 point plus suspensions are not for a year, but it is something that could happen but but my understanding is fairly rare occurrence, and I did talk to Dave about whether it would be sufficient that the language that otherwise, you know, satisfied the reinstatement conditions and requirements whether that would cover the situation. And then Dave can testify to this and told me that yes that's the case but I'm thinking and I'd like to hear Dave's input on this because this is language we didn't. I didn't have when I was talking to him about whether it clarifies the situation that new language that Eric proposed which I kind of think it does but but if it's, but let's hear from Dave. Again, it's fairly rare circumstances though is my understanding, but it is one that I think that the consequence of the accumulation of points shouldn't be forgiven. Okay, anybody have questions on that new language for Eric before we turn today to DMB. Okay, right. Eric anything else. No, not for right now I think that's that pretty much sums up this piece of it. Okay, great. Great. Thank you. So, I'll turn to Dave Evans please. Great. Thank you and I wonder if, if you could let us know your, your thoughts on on this new language specifically in, in three. I definitely would work. The point violations is as represent long said, it's very rare that someone accumulates 10 points in a short period of time I mean there are those cases where, you know, somebody will go out and get two or three speeding tickets in a two week period, that's possible. For the most part, it's a fluid situation when you're dealing with points. Some will get a ticket now have three points added and then they'll go with, you know, several months or a year and maybe get a pop sign violation have two points added, and they go a little further and they're accumulating points points are also dropping off. So it's, it's not that common to have somebody, you know, be in that situation, what's, you know, what's more of a concern to us are those folks that don't learn and continue to continue to that behavior that causes those points to be added. If you're looking at a very short period of time so for example if somebody accumulates 10 points in a two year period they get a 30 day suspension, and then that length of suspension increases with each additional five points that are added to the record. So they would get a second suspension when they get 15 points, a third suspension when they get 20 points. But you have to remember that during this period of time some of those points typically are dropping off. So those, you know, 20 day, you know, 20 point suspensions are extremely rare. You know, we have a few every every three months or four months, a quarter each quarter will have a few that hit that 15 point limit. But the most common is the 10 point 30 day suspension there's only one offense that is a 10 point offense that I'm aware of and that's negligent operation, which is a criminal chart. And so we're just dealing with with point suspensions 99.9% of the time we're dealing with with VCVC's or civil civil complaints that accumulate the points. Thank you and so in terms of this language because we are just seeing it now is this is this language that that DMV needs is it is it addressing an existing problem. That wasn't part of the Senate passed and we hadn't seen it yet. I think that this, this definitely defines the point situation. You know, I think without that one could argue that that point suspension should be included in this, this amnesty. And that certainly I don't think where we want to go with this. So, so it's clarifying. Okay. Thank you. Anything else on on this language that you'd that you'd like to add. No, I think the department supports my opinion the department supports the way it's written. We absolutely, you know, support getting people back to work and getting them legal, legal driving on the road. And I think we'll go a long way towards that initiative. Great, thank you. Appreciate it. Martin your hand was up and now it's down. I guess I just want to make sure because we took this language up in May, June, June I guess is time for my thank fun remembering right. At that time, we put in the December 15th due date for this, but since then we've gone on recess we've come back, the state of emergency is continuing. I want to make sure that that's still a realistic deadline for this to occur. And I guess I ask if I could ask Dave, if, if that is still a reasonable deadline because a lot of things have happened in the last two three months since we put that. And thank you for addressing that. I don't think December 15 is a reasonable deadline and the reason why is because we're in the process of reopening DMV so all of our energy is going toward that in addition. This would be a huge, huge undertaking. You know, you're involving a lot of band hours, researching these and getting the paperwork done and getting the reinstatements done for us to get that done in this short period of time between now, even though it sounds like it's a fairly long period but it's a very short period. If you look at it. I would propose that perhaps look at it beginning January 1 ending April 30. And that would give us ample opportunity to be able to get DMV reopened and and move forward on that, and also be able to to take on this, this task of reinstating people. If that was the date I assume that once this past, you would be able to start that process it's just a matter that April date is the end date for having gotten through the 27,000 people. I mean it's not like that's not this date that you start that's the date that all that work should be done which means presumably between the time it's passed and that date there will be work at DMV to get that done. Absolutely, we would plan on starting January, January 1, and the final date would be April 30. Yeah, and I don't think there would be a start date as much I don't think we have there's there was a start date on the Senate bill, but we don't have really a start date we just have an end date here. And if you all move on it more quickly. That's great. But the key is would be the April date if that's the one that everybody's fine with. Okay, yeah, thank you. I think that makes sense. Anybody else and I think I need to go let my dog out. Oh, coach, there you are. I would support that that time change as well with everything that's occurred. And, you know, I'm really happy for you guys, being able to open Dave. I know it's going to be. But, you know, I know a lot of your, your folks and I've been in contact with several on some other projects and it looks like it's going to roll out really well so congratulations on that. So far it has moved out beyond our expectation. Everything's going smoothly. It's, it's, it's absolutely wonderful to see people back in 120 over the winter there are many days I was the only person in 120 working because I continued to work at my office. It's a great thing. Very strange to be in a building all by yourself and to look up and down state street not see a person or a car. So it's really nice to have people back for sure. Well kudos and thanks a lot for your work. Thank you. Thank you and thank you coach for that. Okay. Great. Right. Nothing. Any other hands. So I'm thinking, do folks want to, so, so in terms of next steps I was going to ask Eric to go through a high level as 234 to remind us what's still in there. Some things have been taken out. And then we're going to hear from Michelle, do people want to take a break now, or when you hear from Eric I'm sorry to gauge what people's energy and needs are. So just speak up and tell me what's, what's best for folks committee. I'll speak up let's take 10 minutes. Okay. We will do that. Okay. Can I ask you a quick question as well. The DLS thing. Yeah. How should we pass this by transportation. I thought that this at least they should be given a heads up, or should we see if Eric and, and I'm happy to be part of it as well. Should go and present it to them or what were you thinking on this. I was going to work with, and yeah, and have her run it. Okay. Run it by, by Kurt. Yeah, and. Okay, so I'm all set. I don't have to do anything else on that. All right. Yeah, but, and we also want to make sure that Senator Sears gets gets this newest one. Because I know we had the data copy of the last one. So, all right. So let's come back around, around an inch. Okay. 10 minutes or so. Thank you. So Michelle, we're running a little late, just to give you a heads up. So you're still working on DUI, or, or you're ready to switch. No, but not ready to switch yet. We're working on the, um, Eric is just going to do sort of a high level overview of miscellaneous judiciary and go through some sections and then, and then we'll switch to you. Okay, no problem. Yeah, thanks. Okay. Great. So on our committee page, we have. We have a long time since we've, we've looked at this. So I've asked Eric to do just, just a very quick high level. You know, Eric, something like sections one from one to six came from the AG's office and changes the name, you know, that, that type of thing. I don't think we need to do a walkthrough or just, you know, more of a summary. Of the sections, especially ones that we haven't changed. There are some sections that aren't in here because of our sunset bill. And then there's some sections that are, that are taken out. So, um, Sorry, is that, is that clear? Yeah, I think so. Sounds good. Okay. Great. And then I'll, again, everybody. Yeah. Yeah. So I'll chime in with. You know, when things have been taken out or some changes or whatever. Okay. Yeah. Sounds good. Eric with Patrick with the office of legislative council again to do a quick description of the different pieces that are in the miscellaneous bill as 234 as the committee is proposing. And then, and you know, if there are any, the section as well that passed the Senate, you can see identified in yellow. So again, it's a, you know, 35 page bill with many different sections and pieces. It could easily do an hour walkthrough on it. So I'll try and speed through as quickly as possible. Um, And so I'll be, everybody has any questions as they go along. Feel free to jump in. sections of the bill were requested by the attorney general's office in the court diversion program, basically involving changing the name of the youth substance abuse safety program to the youth substance awareness safety program. The reason for that is the use of some people who participate in the program didn't feel they had substance abuse problems, and that the diversion program in the court felt that was actually discouraging people from participating in the program just the name of it so we're not getting it from substance abuse safety program to substance awareness safety program. That's one through five. If you get to sections five and six, they're, and seven actually are all also connected they clarify that right now, if you're a person's 16 years old, they could be charged with possession of alcohol or possession of marijuana, as either a civil offense, or a juvenile offense and I think in the, this is sort of an ambiguity in the statute and everyone agrees that the intent of the legislature was to have persons between ages 16 and 21 charged with a civil offense, but if you're under 16, you'd be charged with a juvenile offense. So this language just clarifies that that's what happens you can see the way it works. For example, in section five person 16 years of age or older is the civil offense. If you're under 16 you get charged with the same thing possession of alcohol or marijuana, it would be a juvenile would go to the family division, a juvenile offense. And another, because it's going to come up in a minute, the thing to note about these statutes you can see it in the title of section five. It's not just possessing alcohol or marijuana or whatever that is a violation. It's also use of a fake ID. So that's just it all encompassed within the same statute it's possession, procuring, or misrepresenting your age for alcohol. I only point that out because it's about to become relevant to another section of the bill. But in my, we go to section eight. So section eight is a change to a provision in title 23 the motor vehicle statutes because there's a separate statute in section eight that has to do with using a counterfeit license. Right. Now if you think about it, a person who then used an underage person who used a fake ID to buy alcohol could be charged under either one of those statutes. Because you're violating both you're using a fake license for something and you're also misrepresenting your age to get alcohol. The problem that's come up with that is that if you get charged under this title 23 statute which you see in section eight. It's doesn't have the opportunity to go to the diversion program, which is the whole intent of having those separate civil violation statutes for possessing and using a fake ID etc. So what this does is it adds some clarifying language and to this section title 23 that says hey, if a person can be charged with violating either one of those. In other words, if you qualify because of your age to be charged with a being a minor using a fake ID. You can't be charged with that offense, rather than the violation of title 23 that way, you'll be able to go to the court diversion program which I think is the legislative intent for people who are under 21 years old using fake IDs you don't want them being charged with these motor vehicle offenses where you can't go to court diversion. So that's what's going on in section eight section nine has to do with this is a request from the court and evidently because of the way the statute is drafted and written people who plead no contest. When they get a traffic ticket or another kind of judicial Bureau offense. They're doing that and they're not realizing that a note that a no contest plea. They'll be able to challenge it later on they'll be able to come into court and assert they they didn't commit the offense or they were not guilty for some reason. Not grasping that no contest means you don't admit or deny, but you can't challenge it later on, you're agreeing that it's over. So the idea proposed by the court and tweet a little bit by me is just to put language in there that makes clear that all you're doing you see the language is different now you get rid of the whole no contest language from the ticket you just you just have to state whether they whether they request a hearing or they accept the penalties without a hearing. Simple as that. That way there's not going to be any confusion about what the words no contest mean. That either, you know, accept it, pay the ticket, or not accept it and say I want a court hearing. Keeping it sort of simple and more lay person's terms I would say. So that was section nine section 10 is just it was judge Tomasi who noticed that that there's an incorrect cross reference and it's an existing statute so that's corrected. Section 11 is similar that was noticed by the VBA actually the bar association noticed that in the oath statute which is the oath that attorneys take when they get admitted to the bar. There was a reference to specifically non gender inclusive reference says, you have to say that you will delay no man for Luca or Malus, obviously an old statute. And so that's changed that to person. So updating it for political sorry for gender inclusive language. So moving on to section 12 also purely technical just a cross reference that was incorrect is corrected there. Section 13 a lot of struck language. So this is a proposal this was the proposal from the Senate that would require or allow the victim to request that anyone who on a criminal offender who had committed any sex offends be tested for HIV, the presence of HIV in their blood. And so, essentially, there's a element of that that exists in current law and what exists in current lies that that ability to have the offender tested is permitted, but it's after conviction. Right. That's the key distinction so what the Senate had proposed and that this is originally proposed actually from the Department of State's attorneys and sheriffs. In connection with some grant money, but their proposal was that the for HIV testing, it would happen that the victim could get the testing before conviction, it would be at the finding of a probable cause finding at a certain point in time. So that's obviously a much earlier stage of the proceedings and I think for that reason that the this committee decided that they wanted to didn't want to go forward with that proposal. So actually let me let me clarify. It's really I decided. I'm going to take testimony and after hearing the testimony and then speaking to states attorneys victims advocates a number of folks during our, during our research recess. The language is about getting about getting a federal grant. And they're having cases where the policy is is not necessarily good policy where where we have declined to put in the language because of the policy and therefore have to pay it's a 5% penalty. In this case, three year grant it's $37,000 over three years if we don't have this language in. I've spoken to the appropriations committee is is aware of this. But I do I, I don't think this this language if it was included would be good policy does not help victims. So anyway, so we've decided to take that out. I spoke with Senator Sears. And again appropriations is well aware of the penalty that needs to be paid my understanding is that the penalty can be paid from the federal grant money. So, anybody more than I think you had your question you have your hand up about language that didn't get into the last section right section 11. Yeah, but I did. But any, any questions about about this section coming out. It's my proposal so. Okay, great. So yeah, Martin I think you had an amendment that's not in here in terms of the right. Yeah, since we're modernizing the oath. I think it's just to change the affirmation. It could still say so help you God I think that that we have. I know definitely we have in with respect to the language that we use when we're sworn in as legislators that we have options. You know you can either do the so help me God or there's this other option. I can't remember the language off the top my head. I can't really raise that last time, but if I mean if we're going to modernize it we may as well modernize that component of it as well. Right representative ratios and gave the thumbs up on that as well so at least I have two people who think that that's a good idea. Yeah, no we, we, yeah we did discuss it. Okay, great. Yeah. I can look into that I think probably something along the lines of it this is what you're thinking. I know I've, I've heard similar owes and I can't remember if it's the legislative one or not but I certainly have heard other ones where someone swears under the pains and penalties of perjury or something like that. It is that is that's the language. Yeah. That is the one you sort of legislative to. Oh great. I think I think that both those options are there right I mean it's we're not getting rid of God here we're giving another option as well as my understanding. Great. Great, thank you. Okay. Great. So, you know, right along sections 14 and 15 under under current law, you can't get your, you know, you've dealt with expungement and sealing in here quite a bit and persons records can't be expunged or sealed until they've paid restitution. That's current law that just just just makes clear that any accompanies court surcharges also have to be paid in addition to the restitution before someone can get their records, expunged or sealed. So section 16 is at the request of the probate judges association. And this is essentially right now you can get your will allowed and by the term allowed means that essentially the court saying okay this is the, this is the official and legally this is the finalized will that we're going to use to distribute the property, you know, has to be allowed in order for it to sort of reach that formal status and essentially means that no longer can anyone contest the will you can't say that. Well the person wasn't under sound mind or body or there was fraud there was duress there was something like that. If the will is allowed that's the form of will that's going to be used right now. In order to get the will allowed you have to have two of the witnesses affirm signed before a noted Republic sworn statement that that the will was executed under the requirements of the statute you know there was no duress there was no fraud they were of sound of mind, mind and body etc. There was one other option you could still do that you could still have your two witnesses sign in front of a notary public, or that provides another option you see that you could have one of the witnesses actually come into court physically and testify in person to the same thing that it was executed, you know properly according to the statutes it just basically gives another option that you can have one witness testify in court instead of having both witnesses do it in front of a notary. So section 17 also technical just removes an incorrectly placed conjunction or section 18 has to do with monetary monetary settlements that are entered into on behalf of a minor. So this is the situation where like you imagine a minor is injured in a car accident when he or she is 15 years old. The insurance company offers a settlement, while minor is not of legal age they can't, they can't agree to that settlement legally has to there has to be an adult, typically a parent or, or a guardian, who executes that acceptance that settlement rather on behalf of the minor right in statute. Those settlements on behalf of a minor have to be approved by the court, if they're above a certain monetary threshold and the monetary threshold right now is $1500. That hasn't been changed since the 1970s so this just changes that threshold from 1500 to 10,000 sort of updating with the you could almost call it a, what a, an inflation adjustment, right. The $1500 threshold was used in the mid 70s. The proposal was that, you know, having court approval of the $2500 settlement for example, isn't really necessary so they bumped the threshold up to 10,000 anything above 10,000 would still require the court to get involved and approve the settlement that an adult is making on behalf of a minor to make sure that, you know the minor's best interests are really being served. Section 19 also technical just removes a missing conjunction. Section 20, there's a reference to parent child contact in section 20, but that's the child support statute so that's really irrelevant. That's not something that the court considers in the, in the context of child support proceedings. So that was requested by the family division to strike that language because it's not something that's relevant to that statute. Section 21 was requested by judge Greerson, and that has to do with you see that as you remember from many discussions in this committee, mental health proceedings can take place, both in the criminal division and in the family division depending on whether it's coming out of a criminal matter, or coming out of a civil matter and voluntary commitment for example, but the statute incorrectly refers just to the criminal division. So that's not accurate because, as I said, those proceedings could take place in criminal or family court and so the reference is corrected so that it just says the superior court. 22 also a technical fix the statute as written permits the probate division to charge a fee in cases that actually aren't in the probate division. They're actually in the civil division. So that's struck section 23 technical removes a reference to guardian that light on because it actually already appears in the same statute elsewhere. So if you look up, for example, it's struck in subdivision e but if you look in subdivision d three lines in it's already there. So it just appears twice redundant no need to have it twice. 24 is exactly the same. It's the same as what I mentioned earlier it's another another statute where it's making clear that expungement and ceiling can't happen until a person pays all their surcharges in addition to their, their restitution. Now we get to section 25 you see that section is struck, and this is. You will recall the sunset repeal we're getting to a couple of sunset repeals this has to do with changes that were made to the diversion program back in 2017. And this is struck only because you remember you passed it during the during the session back in. I think it passed in April or May it was fairly early on, you passed the sunsets bill, and the decision at that time was to rather than repeal any sunsets just to extend the year. So that that provision has already passed earlier in the session, and it will extend the sunset to July 1 of 2021 and then you guys could revisit it next year and decide if you want to repeal the sunset permanently. Excuse me Barbara, see your hand up. So Eric back in section 24. If we have what I'm going to call automatic expungement. Will that section be a problem. I don't know for sure because I'm not familiar with automatic expungement the way brand is but but my guess is that the answer is that it would not because existing law already provides that they can't be expunged or sealed until the restitution is paid. So it's a similar concept. It's just making sure that surcharges as well, but I don't know for sure I don't want to say 100% so I'd want to run that by brand. So back to the sunsets. Well actually before we get to the sunset you see there's another piece section 25 that does stay in that repeal that's the voluntary arbitration of medical malpractice cases and that Judge Greerson testified that the chapter has never been used since the day it was enacted in 1975. So, since it's never been used the, I think the thought is to, you know, save some trees free up some space in the Vermont statutes annotated and repeal it. Another another sunset though in section 27 remember this is the racial disparities and criminal and juvenile justice system advisory panel. Same thing as the one we just looked at with the version this is struck from this bill but I had already passed you guys passed it in the in your sunset bill and extended it again by a year to July 1 2021 and then you can again revisit it when you come back and see if you want to repeal it permanently. Section 28 you see this we already discussed earlier this morning this is the amnesty program. So the proposal was to repeal the version that passed the Senate, the full amnesty from paying court fines and the dnb reimbursement fee and replace it with this reinstatement fee waiver program which you see starts on the bottom of page 25. Well, we looked at it already this morning. It's the exact same language that we looked at has the you see a page 27 the new definitions that clarified that that the court fines and court penalties would not be waived. The person would still get their license back, and the court would still be able to collect those those penalties, as they ordinarily do. Moving on then to section 29 that gives the legislative council authority to replace the word marijuana with the word cannabis. That language also passed the Senate in S 54 I believe so I'll connect with Michelle on this to make sure that we don't duplicate anything but for now it's in here because it's still unclear what's going to happen to S 54. So section 30, and actually sections 30 through 32 have to do with what's known as special immigration juvenile status. Now, what that is is a federally established concept, and what it what it means is that it's unique actually and unusual in federal law and that it's a federal status that requires a state court order in order for someone to apply for this federal status so if a child cannot read an immigrant child cannot reunify with his or her parents because of abuse abandonment or neglect. Then that child can petition the United States custom and immigration service for what's known as special immigration juvenile status and that allows the child to obtain lawful permanent immigration status. If they've been able to have this court order that shows they can't reunify as a result of abuse abandonment or neglect. And this these sections do is they establish a procedure under state law so that the child can obtain that order, the child can obtain, get an official order that qualifies under the federal standard to allow them to apply for special immigration juvenile status now it doesn't, we can't affect what customs and immigration is going to decide on the on the application of course that's a matter of federal law, but what this does is it just sets up in Vermont law, the structures and the procedure that can follow to make that application to the federal government and then the federal government makes it makes the ultimate decision about whether they qualify but I think it provides a that's the creation in state law of the type of order that the that the child would need to bring to the federal agency and say, here's the order, I can't reunify with my parents because of abuse abandonment neglect etc. So therefore I'd like to apply for this status, and then they can move forward with their application. So, lastly, then section 33 is basically all just is changing and this is also what the request of the court and of the diversion program to make the risk assessments and request for pre trial services, discretionary rather than mandatory. So the way the statute is written now, you know under certain circumstances risk risk assessments shall be done and pre trial services shall be offered, and it basically shifts that to a mandatory situation and I think if I understood correctly from the AG and the court, they simply don't have the resources right now to do it in every situation so it's makes it a permissible and actually I just noticed that we probably want to change the effective date, which now says July 1 2020. So, so actually I'm not even sure what effective date we're using now. So I'll double check in our office with that whether it's on passage or whether we're using an October effective date but I'll look into that and see what what change needs to be made. Okay, great. And then can I get you a second there so there will be a few more things that will be on here and it might be that that Michelle has it but this is where we're going to fix the the internet crimes that Michelle spoke about that language that's needed will be here and I think Michelle has something else regarding clarifying cultivation in terms of a recent court decision. And then we'll talk about the cannabis expungement. Okay, I do see boy, let's see, I can and then Kelly. And I'm glad to realize that we're up against time but I'm hoping that we could just go a little longer just to at least get through all of this. I apologize. I've got really crappy internet here who requested that last change Eric. One, maybe attorney general's office and the court is that the last one that he said it was somebody requested to change or something. Yes. Okay, thank you. Sure. Okay, Kelly. I just have a clarification on section 13 that the, the funding that has changed that will change because of that is it, is it going to affect a certain area. I know you said you spoke to appropriations but where will it be certainly affecting people. So, I'm not sure in terms of what if, if the state's attorneys have to pay the penalty of that how that might change positions or anything like that the hope is that it wouldn't. Because certainly the funding is very, you know, goes to domestic violence investigators and prosecutors I believe which is very important, and appropriations understands that. I just had communication with a constituent lab before we took a break that they thought it was coming from a from Wyndham County. We've, yeah, we've heard that too. And, yeah, and appropriations understands that and understands the importance of the of those programs. Okay, thank you. So, um, if folks could stay a little bit longer that'd be great just to get through all these sections, at least you know in terms of a walkthrough. If you can that'd be great. Okay. All right, great well Eric thank you. And then Michelle will turn to you and I think Michelle you have some language for us to look at. I do. I emailed it. A little earlier today and also I believe Lori has posted it. As well. So you should have two documents from me. One is going to be a just the kind of standalone language that has four sections and addresses as the chair mentioned addresses a technical fix to existing expungement law. Also has the has the other pieces that we were discussing when regard to the cannabis piece and then also I sent Eric a separate piece of the language on the child sexual exploitation which you guys have already talked about so that's all said and all this is I think the idea is that it would go into the miscellaneous bill. You should also have a copy of a little one one page chart that I did that looks at the penalties the existing penalties can compare to what they would be under this proposal. So let me walk you through if it's okay I'll walk you through the amendment first and then we'll and when we get to the penalty section all will take a look at the chart as well that work. Everybody. So if you look you should be looking at a document for me. That has four sections on it. It's dated yesterday has my initials up at the top. It's eight pages. Section a and this is I just labeled them that way because I'm not sure how Eric wants to organize them and s 234 but so section a is the expungement section and I flipped them. You know because before you had the amendments to section 42 30 I just flipped because I think the having the expungement first kind of sets the tone for the rest since that seems to be the big, the big issue. I highlighted the language in yellow that's different. If you look at subsection B. You'll see it says that the court shall order the expungement of the grandmother's tree records for those particular misdemeanor violations that occurred prior to January 1 of this upcoming year. The process for expunging these records shall be completed by the court and all entities subject to the order not later than January 1 2022. And so what. And so the way that that works is you want to tag the, the change to the D cram with the date on which you start doing the expungements. And so that would be take a year and we expanded the language so that it's just clear that it's not just being completed by the court but also any entity that is subject to the orders. I think we talked about it yesterday that after VC I see receives an expungement order. They've usually completed all their work with regard to that order within 30 days. And so, and then the, the local agencies would also have to complete that work within a within a year, a year's time. The next changes we look at subsection C. I just changed it said they're the respondent I just because we're not doing petitions and it's an automatic I just changed it to clarify that it's the notice that the court has to provide notice of the expungement to the person who is the subject of the record. So that's just a little technical tweak. Subsection D is really kind of hard of the new stuff that after y'all talked about for the last couple meetings on this. So you see that subsection D starting online 11 on page two is that on and after January 1 of 21, a person who was arrested or convicted of a violation of the misdemeanor cannabis prior to such a date. So shall not be required to acknowledge the existence of such a criminal history record or answer questions about the record and any application for employment license civil right or privilege or in the in an appearance as a witness and any proceeding or hearing. And so that was just hard to address your concerns that well, because expungements will take some time. So how can we how could you kind of get relief to folks who have those criminal history records. More quickly rather than waiting for the whole completion of the cycle to go through and have the orders issued because the court orders are really saying it's a directive to everybody that holds records to be destroying those records but you can still say that these folks can say, because what it is is that as of January 1, those, those convictions the defenses for which people had those convictions will no longer be crimes. So they could go through the other processes through existing law and petition but you're providing this kind of expedited process for those folks and so as of January 1. Those offenses will no longer be crimes and so you're saying that they would those folks who had a can have a conviction for it could say on unemployment application they don't have to disclose anything. So it was going to take the court longer to do the official orders and everybody to get rid of those records but people could, could make that statement. Thank you Michelle I do see Martin's hand up. So this is a somewhat minor point but just backing up to line six seven the person the court shall notify the person who was subject of the record, having something in there about the last known address to the court because that was already raised as an issue that we're telling them you have to contact them. And who knows how long ago that record was created, and there may not be not be any real reasonable way to contact them so something along those lines. Sure. I mean I assume that that's what they would be doing anyway but your concern is that they if that isn't in there that they there might be some interpretation that they have to do some kind of investigation to track them down. I think that's my concern and that I don't think should be required. Others may disagree and think that is required but I think that that's might be asking just a bit too much particularly since in D, you know those in the three or whatever it is, it says that you don't even have to be notified and you're covered essentially. Okay, sure. Thank you Barbara. To Mark's point maybe it should just be that there's some public announcements that this is happening rather than trying to track down everybody. But I have one other question which is Michelle you didn't mention you mentioned employment and then court proceedings. If somebody has like a housing application. I'm just thinking of where else would do they ask my convictions. So this is this language, what I did is I took what we already had in the bill around people don't have to disclose and that's modeled after existing law so I didn't start to add categories or all that so this is just marrying existing law. So I think if you wanted to go down that road I think you should maybe take it up in the context of do you want to address it holistically rather than have something that's different here than what you have in the underlying law. Thank you. Sure. I'm going to subdivision D2. So again on and after this January 1. If someone had a conviction for those violations. They in subdivision to may deny the existence of the record regardless of whether the person has received notice from the court than expungement order has been issued on the person's behalf. And that's just kind of coupled with subdivision one that says you don't have to wait for the court to actually issue that order to be able to assert that you have no, you have no conviction there and it could be, we don't yet know how the court will approach this so it may be they go alphabetically maybe they take it in chunks in terms of years we're going to take you know anything from, you know, the, the January 1 2021, you know and go back a decade and do that chunk first and then we'll go back another decade or however, but somebody doesn't need to wait until their number is called in order to be able to assert that they don't have a record. So page three is that they is just clarifying that that person may utilize the procedures that are already in law to seek expungement or ceiling prior to the court taking steps to issue an expungement order and that was I think somebody had raised the possibility well, you know what if somebody what if it fit within the existing categories and they could petition now, and they don't want to wait till their number comes up because they've got something important they need to do in terms of looking for a job or something like that and they don't want to leave it up to whenever the timing is for that order, and they prefer to initiate it themselves and take care of it that way is that just because you have provided an expedited approach it doesn't cut off cut off their ability to use the existing the existing process. Yes, it's good. Yeah, thank you. Okay, move on. I have another question and I'm sorry if I zoned out on this the last several times we talked about this. Why, why do we need an order at all I mean I yeah I want to have an order eventually but why not when this bill is effective that we are allowing these individuals to say the they do not have a criminal history. I mean are we prevented from doing that. That's what you're doing D one. So I guess I don't understand D three why that's. I mean I guess if they want to go the next step and have an order as well as that. I don't, I, you know it's hard to imagine that there's going to be that many people that do that but the reality is that those until the order as you know is issued and that goes to the Washington County Sheriff's Department or whatever. Somebody may may be able to go in there and get a copy of that record. And so you so you guys want to be sure that as of us a date certain that somebody could say, I don't have a record. You know, and, and that there would be backed up by that even if somebody went to the court and said yeah but it says right here that you do have a record. So, so the VC I see actually needs that order from the court before it takes it. Yes, yes, that's that's it so yeah okay. Yeah, all these agencies need, need the order to know to destroy all their records. Well then let me just ask. Let me throw another. Perhaps problem with this right now then. No, sorry, I have to do that but so I mean it's a confusion so if somebody understands that oh I can say I don't have a criminal history under D one. And then somebody looks on the VC I see or the or the national whatever what's that one called I never can remember the National NC I see NC I see they look on NC I say well wait no there's a record right here and NC I see. It seems like that causes certainly confusion and problems I understand that if you search on Google you're going to probably get the information anyway, once it's off at NC I see but that is a little bit more of a conflict that I'm saying I don't have a criminal record but I look on NC I see and there's a criminal record right there. So, we just accept that and we accept that but but I just that could be confusion if we're telling people that you can go to wherever so you don't have a criminal record, and they may not know that it's still on NC I see and BC I see. I think I hear you. Yes, I mean you guys were trying to address it so that people wouldn't have to wait for the time you know for everything to take the understandable amount of time to do that. I think what you also have to just always remember here is. It's not these things for which let's say somebody said I didn't have a record, you know I don't have a record and then somebody did get in it get a VCIC, you know, named date of birth conviction record and saw it on there. That offense for which they have a conviction isn't even going to be a crime anymore. So, I mean I guess maybe what the, you know, somebody have been then if the employer whoever went back and said you do have a record. I say well it's not a crime anymore and here's act, whatever it is that says that I have a legal right to say that I don't because it's not even it's not criminal anymore and the legislature has chosen to you know to direct the court to sponge of those all those records. So, you know, there's. Yeah, I mean if only a person in that situation, new to say all those things that you just said is I guess part of the problem but I understand. Selena, Selena. And I think part of it is like a feesing issue of, I mean, maybe I've misunderstood things but so the, the, maybe the key question is like, when does the court issue the expungement order, is it, you know, they do all of their work and then they're like, how the record is expansion and that information goes out to everybody else or can they, can they essentially release the order at the start of the process so that the first thing that happens is it gets cleared out from the AC I see and then they take the year that they need to to actually do their paperwork but the, but the record for all intents and purposes in the, in the system is in the place that most employers or housing authorities are going to search for it is gone. Right. Like, if I could just add and that kind of goes to the question I had the other day of how long is it going to take the court to identify those people who fall under this law and can get that order. In the long process, then yeah this step one is issued the order send it to VCIC clear that off and then that avoids a confusion I'm talking about but I, but we haven't heard from the court yet but if it's going to take six months for them to identify somebody that puts it, you know, to in order to issue that order. I think we definitely need to talk to court a little bit more but We have reached out with that question and it's, it's unclear. So, I, there could also be like if I guess that's a question to you, maybe is does VCIC. If we're saying by law, all misdemeanor marijuana convictions are kind of automatically expunged. If the VCIC even have to wait for the court expungement order to remove those records from their system, or cannot just be that like part operationalize that they just do that. It's not a probably a question for you Michelle, but to get to Martin's issue. Right. Well, Michelle. Okay, I'm going to keep moving. So, bottom of page three subdivision F3 is just a technical change again this language has been kicking around for a few years and it used to say the administrative judge and in that time to change to chief to superior judge so that's just a technical change there. So, page four sub section be so this these are the changes to the existing can of a slot and criminal law and the amounts. I did make one change here and it's a small but important change and that is that the pre 2013 misdemeanor crime. It did not include or anything under two ounces. It did not include if you had exactly two ounces. And what I had had in the Senate version, and this was not a particular like a Senate choice or whatever it was just how I drafted it, it swept in the two ounces, exactly two ounces into the Decrem. I, so then it would create this kind of weird situation where you would have, you're trying to track and say the, the, the offenses for which you're expunging are you want to Decrem that same exact amount. It didn't line up with if in the previous version if it was just exactly two ounces so this used to say if you look at subdivision a to a it said it used to say in the pre in the Senate version, unlawfully possess more than two ounces. And now it just says two ounces or more so it's just a slight change there but it is important when you're trying to kind of line those up with the expungement. So I'll take this chance to take you to the chart. If you want to take a look at that. So you can kind of see the changes so if you go to the chart, you'll see that as everybody knows you if you have an ounce right now that is legal and has been legal for a couple of years. There's no change under this proposal. But under current law. If you have more than one ounce, but less than two. It is a criminal offense, and the, the punishment for that is a six month misdemeanor for first offense and two year for second or subsequent. It's a proposed language because you're gonna when you start to tweak, you know, and everything you have to kind of tear it. So this is where you have the civil that is partnered with the expungement. If you have more than an ounce, but less than two it's criminal now, but under this proposal it would go to being a civil offense with the ticketable for $100 for first, 200 for second and 500 for third or subsequent. Okay. So moving on to the next one under current law. You have this big range for the three year felony, which is anything that's two ounces up to and including a pound is a three year felony. And what the proposed language does is it divides it out and kind of cuts that in half. And so two ounces to less than eight would be the six month misdemeanor, and then this two year misdemeanor for second or subsequent. And then eight ounces up to and including a pound would be the three year felony so it kind of again kind of trying to create a gradation. So that as you start to possess more that you gradually go up rather than kind of having a clip. And then as you when you get more than that when you're talking about over a pound. Then the penalties are the same. So the real differences are just that if you have more than an ounce but less than two, it will no longer be a misdemeanor. It'll instead be a civil offense. And then with regard to two ounces to less than eight, that'll be a misdemeanor, and right now it's a felony. Anybody have any questions about that. Okay, I'm going to skip down to the next one. I should have highlighted this because it wasn't on your earlier one but if you look at page seven in sub in section C. Maybe the chair would want to just address this but this was a request for a technical change to the existing expungement and ceiling chapter definitions is that there when they list the qualifying crime. I'm sure that it's a violation of 42 30 a related to possession, but it doesn't mention cultivation and as you can see from what we just looked at the possession. Statutes for cannabis also include cultivation of certain number of plants and so there was so legal aid and the attorney general's office reached out to the chair to ask if if you would be willing to consider this technical fix because they said that when they had made their initial recommendations with regard to the expungement law they meant for it to also include cultivation as part of that reference and it just got left off. Right. Thank you. And then I just put this in Erica will obviously have a much bigger effective date section but I wanted to put this in there just so you could see that the expungement section, and the, and this new kind of tweaking of the experiment expungement definition take those take effect on passage. So that, and then, even though the court really the period is kind of like from January to January, you know, at least gives them some time to gear up. And then section B, which is the marijuana penalties that takes effect January 1 so that's when the Decrem would take effect. Great. Thank you, Michelle. Coach, I'll get to you in a second and so. So in terms of the internet crimes that that fix. You have the line. I didn't put that in this because I thought we're just talking about expungement. Yeah, I sent it to Eric and he'll he'll fold it into the next version of 234. Okay. All right. Yeah. Okay, thanks. I just don't want to lose sight of that. Yeah, coach. Michelle, the question about that cultivation piece was, how does that correlate to the volume. Numbers that you were talking about big. The technical effects. Right. It would just, it just, it doesn't affect that at all. You have plant numbers in the existing statute. And have for a long time. And so it's just that if somebody falls under that particular subdivision subsection and the plant number, they fall under those plant numbers, they would be eligible to to expunge for that. Okay, so as long as there was a direct correlation to the existing. We were okay. That was at first I was going like, wow, somebody get off on, you know, like they had a big old field going or something, you know, but. No, no, the existing one has like, you know, you have this many plants, it's this offense and you got a whole bunch, then you're in the felony range that kind of thing. Okay. I was hoping that was the, that's I just needed clarification. Thank you. Sure. Okay, great. I know committee this is a lot of information and we'll get back to this tomorrow, but I wanted to at least have it all out there. And I appreciate everybody saying later any. Any questions. Thank you, Michelle. And I see any hands. Right. Hopefully, I'm not sure if you're available, Michelle tomorrow, but we'll check back with you but the will do 119 the first half of tomorrow's committee meeting and hopefully get, and then I'd like to get back to as 234 kind of is putting it all into to one bill and and possibly voting on this so folks have questions thoughts, you know, please get in touch with me or counsel. Okay, I think we're all already booked me for 10. So, from 10 to 10 30 tomorrow, so I think we're good. Okay, so I have my time strong. Okay, so we're not, we're not 10323. Okay. Maybe, maybe I'm wrong, but I do have a, I do have a meeting notice from 10 to 1030 tomorrow on expungement. Okay. I have us the 1030 to 1230 tomorrow. Whoever does that, I have some flexibility around there. So whoever is doing committee assistance of just send me when you need me. So send me and meeting notice. Yeah, it would be most likely, you know, 1145 ish or something like that. So, okay, I'm going to do 119 1030. So, okay. Great. Great. Thank you. I'm not seeing any hands. All right. Thank you. Thank you everybody. And so we will now Martin had a sample. Oh, sorry, sorry. Okay. You're muted, Martin. I wonder, I mean, is it possible for us to do 119 second tomorrow because I might not. I'm going to probably be late. And I'm hoping to be there for 119, unless that's already scheduled that's fine then I'll just watch the video later. Yeah, we already have will then bore and and representative and on you. Yep. Okay. Yeah. Are you look like you're. Yeah. Do we need to get that memo to appropriations. Whoops. Yes, thank you. So, so I think everybody got it right. I think he sends it out to everybody. Yeah, so I think I'm. I think I think it looks great if folks have any comments maybe get them to Barbara Ken and coach but if otherwise if folks are good with it I think just. Yeah, go ahead and send it Barbara. Thank you. Okay, I'll put it in a different. Right. I'll try to put in the format we did last time. I don't know if it goes on our letterhead or. Yeah, you know, I think it's I mean they asked. Okay, you know. So should we have time to let me know. Sure, what works. What, four o'clock today. Sure. All right. Great. Right. Yeah, and Barbara, I think just in an email it could even be a memo within an email but I, you know, I think it's just went over. Yeah. All right. All right. Thank you. Okay. Thanks everybody so we're going to go off.